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1. Overview of the Essence of the Problem Discussed 
On the 1st of July 2004 when the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter CCP)1 
entered into force, Estonian criminal procedure took a big step towards the 
adversary system.2 As it is provided for in § 14 (1) of the CCP: in a court 
proceeding, the functions of accusation, defense and adjudication of the criminal 
matter are performed by different persons subject to the proceeding. Thus, court 
proceedings are conducted by courts (CCP, § 16 (1)), and the Prosecutor’s Office, 
the accused and his counsel are parties to a court proceeding (CCP, § 17 (1)). 
According to the explanatory memorandum of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
the aim of the draft of the Code of Criminal Procedure was to raise the 
effectiveness of criminal procedure by giving active roles to the parties to a court 
proceeding, i.e. task of the prosecutor is to accuse, the task of defense counsel is 
to defend the accused, and the court’s task is to decide the case based on the 
evidence represented by the parties to the court proceeding.3  
One essential element of the system in which different functions of the 
proceedings are divided between different subjects to the proceedings, i.e. the 
adversary system, is an impartial tribunal – the court. Absence of bias and 
nonparticipation in prosecution of the case, in assisting the accused and in 
presentation of the evidence and arguments are two main characters of the 
impartiality.4 In short, the court’s task is to remain as passive as possible during 
the court proceedings, to avoid expressing sympathy for one specific party to a 
proceeding and acting on behalf of a party to a proceeding. Absence of bias 
should appear both from court’s actions during the proceedings and from its 
decisions and final judgment.5  
                                                     
1 Code of Criminal Procedure. Passed 12 February 2003. Entered into force 1 July 2004. 
Last amended 1 September 2011 – RT I, 14.03.2011, 35. 
2 Andreas Kangur, Märkusi seoses võistleva menetluse rakendamisega kriminaalkohtu-
pidamises, 3 Juridica 176 (2005), p. 176; Eerik Kergandberg & Priit Pikamäe, Eesti uue 
kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku eelnõu lähtekohad, 9 Juridica 555 (2000), pp. 556 and 560. 
3 Explanatory Memorandum to the Draft of the Code of the Criminal Procedure. 594 SE, 9th 
Riigikogu. Online. Available: http://web.riigikogu.ee/ems/saros-bin/mgetdoc?itemid= 
003674541& login=proov&password=&sys tem=ems&server=ragne11, 29 April 2011. See 
also Meris Sillaots, On the Scope of Competitiveness of Court Proceedings in the Draft Code 
of Criminal Procedure, 6 Juridica International 198 (2001), p. 198. 
4 Murray L. Schwartz, Zeal of the Civil Advocate, the, 1983 Am. B. found. Res. J. 543 
(1983), p. 546. 
5 According to the second sentence of § 146 of the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 
(Passed 28 June 1992. Entered into force 3 July 1992. Last amended 22 July 2011 – RT I, 
27.04.2011, 2.) the courts shall be independent in their activities and shall administer justice 
in accordance with the Constitution and the laws. The Supreme Court of Estonia has also 
emphasized that every accused has a constitutional right his case to be heard by impartial 
court. Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 26 January 2009, court case 
no. 3-1-2-2-08, pp. 13 and 15. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst= 
222514168, 29 April 2011. 
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The nonparticipation of the court is the obverse of another essential element 
of the adversary system, which dictates the course of the adversary proceedings: 
the parties to a court proceeding are responsible for prosecuting and presenting 
their cases, including the evidence, and for challenging the prosecution and 
presentation of the other party,6 which in turn leads to the conclusion that each 
subject to a proceeding has its own and inalienable function in the criminal 
proceedings. In a system in which the functions of prosecution and defense are 
performed not by the tribunal but by the parties to a court proceeding, each 
party is expected to try as hard as it can to present its version of the case and to 
support it with appropriate evidence and the same time challenge the stand-
points of the other party,7 and the court is expected to remain passive when it 
comes to presenting the case. Consequently, the task of counsel is to present his 
case and challenge the prosecutor’s arguments as thoroughly as possible, 
because he and his principal, the accused, are not supposed to get any help from 
the court in doing that. In addition, counsel’s actions and decisions in criminal 
proceedings should be based on the presumption that at least in legal decisions 
he is not going to get any help from his principal either, because accused 
persons usually do not have a legal education or even knowledge of the legal 
system. Therefore, counsel has a duty to be diligent in the criminal proceedings, 
the same duty as his opponent, the prosecutor, has, and “[t]he significance of 
the assistance of counsel can be seen to be directly connected to the cor-
responding importance of the defence’s institutional role in procedural systems 
based on two opposing sides and an impartial judge.”8  
Thus, another essential element of the adversary system is participation of 
counsel: but not only participation of counsel, but participation of diligent 
counsel, as the requirement of participation of counsel without requirement for 
him to be diligent can easily result in the situation where the accused in fact has 
no support from his counsel. Only when counsel is an equal opponent to the 
prosecutor, prosecutor’s arguments and evidence can be challenged and the 
accused has an opportunity to present his version of the case through the 
activities of his counsel. To expect the same to be done by the accused himself 
is obviously too optimistic and unrealistic – as I already discussed, the accused 
has most likely no legal education and consequently it is unfair to let him 
compete alone against an adversary who is professional in the field of law. 
Therefore, if competent and diligent counsel is absent in the criminal 
proceedings, the balance of the scales – the Prosecutor’s Office and defense – is 
disturbed to the prejudice of the accused.  
There exist two different bases to justify the accused’s right to fair trial. As 
John Jackson from the University College Dublin has described: “On the one 
hand, they (fair trial standards – author’s explanatory remark) are seen as an 
                                                     
6 Schwartz, Zeal of the Civil Advocate, the, 543, p. 546. 
7 Ibid., pp. 546–547. 
8 Sarah J. Summers, Fair Trials: The European Criminal Procedural Tradition and the 
European Court of Human Rights (2007), p. 78. 
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expression of individual autonomy – the right of the accused to be respected as 
an individual throughout the criminal process and participate in his or her 
defence; on the other hand, they are an expression of the need for trials as the 
public face of justice to reach accurate verdicts by means of a system of 
accusatorial or adversarial truth finding.”9 If the system is adversarial, the only 
way to reach the verdict and to conclude that the trial in result of which the 
verdict was reached was fair is through competition of equal adversaries, i.e. the 
prosecutor and counsel. If the court has decided the case in the proceedings 
where counsel is absent or performs his duties inadequately, there has been no 
competition or there has been an unbalanced one, which means that the accused 
has not had a chance to participate in his defense, the adversarial system has 
broken down and the right to fair trial has been violated.  
 
 
2. Formulation of the Research Question 
The perfect balance in the adversary system I described above – an impartial 
and therefore passive tribunal with two diligent adversaries presenting their 
cases, hardly ever exists to the full extent. In my thesis I am analyzing situations 
in which the unbalance between the parties arises from the shortcomings of the 
defense: from the shortcomings in the activities of counsel to be more exact. If 
we picture the adversary system as scales (the prosecutor on one side and 
counsel on the other), which we can call fair only if the sides are in balance, we 
can conclude that if counsel’s contribution to the proceedings lessens, the 
balance is disturbed at the expense of the accused. The scales are no longer in 
balance and the trial ceases to be fair. If we want to restore equality to the sides 
of scales, we have to find someone to support the side of the defense or to 
compel counsel to do more work himself. The first option is somewhat 
contradictory to the idea of the adversary system, at least when the court or the 
prosecutor is the one that has to do counsel’s job. If the court is tribunal and 
counsel at the same time, both principles that form the basis for the adversary 
system – the absence of bias and nonparticipation in defense – are violated. To 
ask the prosecutor to do counsel’s job means that the prosecutor has to 
prosecute and defend at the same time, which is obviously impossible. Of 
course, one option is to name a new or additional counsel for the accused 
instead of asking the court or the prosecutor to perform as counsel, but this 
raises the question about who should decide the replacement or addition of 
counsel: should it be for the accused, the Bar or the court to decide whether new 
counsel is needed and whether the former, ineffective one should leave the 
proceedings? Definitely it should not be the prosecutor as the adversary 
proceeding is a competition and there is no real competition if one adversary 
can choose his opponent. If counsel is not replaced but he is asked to do his job 
                                                     
9 John Jackson, Autonomy and Accuracy in the Development of Fair Trial Rights, UCD 
Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies (Research Paper No. 09/2009), 
pp. 5–6. 
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better, a similar question arises: should it be the accused, the Bar or the court 
that has the competence to do that?  
 
 
3. Arguments Set Forth for the Defense  
In my dissertation I am raising the hypothesis that it should indeed be up to the 
court to decide whether to replace counsel or not, which means that the court 
ceases to be passive for a moment and instead of taking the place of counsel, 
names the new one to replace the ineffective one (or just adds an extra one). In 
addition, I am going to examine if the replacement of counsel, which is the most 
drastic step for the court to take, is the only option to guarantee the accused the 
real assistance of counsel or are there any techniques the court could use to 
compel an ineffective counsel to fulfill his obligations as the accused’s advisor 
and a person who acts on behalf of the accused. Court’s competence to compel 
counsel to fulfill his duties or replace counsel both mean that the court interferes 
with counsel’s activities and influences the scales, the place where it should not 
be according to the idea of the adversary process. That is why I am going to 
examine thoroughly, what are the main justifications for giving the court the 
competence to do that and what are the main dangers. Basically it means that I 
am going to analyze if the balance of the scales is restored after the court has 
taken the measures it finds appropriate to react towards the ineffectiveness of 
certain counsel in the proceeding or the scales remain still unbalanced (and 
maybe now to the advantage of the accused), which means that the fairness of 
the proceeding comes into question. What I am not going to discuss in this 
dissertation is the solutions outside of the criminal proceedings for the in-
effectiveness of counsel for the following reasons. 
First, it should be specified that supervision over counsel’s activities 
performed by the courts can be divided into two categories: direct (performed 
during the criminal proceedings by the courts) and indirect (performed in pro-
ceedings other than the criminal proceedings, e.g., by the Bar or civil courts), 
with the former subdivided into ongoing and ex post supervision. By ongoing 
supervision I mean the competence of the court conducting the proceedings, 
mostly trial court, but sometimes also higher courts, to make remarks and 
enquiries with ineffective counsel, up to and including the competence of the 
court to remove ineffective counsel from the proceedings. The courts perform 
ex post supervision at the request of the accused (and/or his new counsel), 
primarily in the appeal or cassation proceedings, which may lead to annulment 
of the judgment of the lower court on grounds of ineffective counsel and the 
possible new proceedings for the accused (other possibilities are also acquittal 
of the accused and also imposing a more lenient punishment).10 In this 
                                                     
10 Anneli Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the 
Independence of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel in Criminal Proceedings? 7 Juridica International 252 (2010), p. 253. 
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dissertation I am going to analyze only the first category with both ongoing and 
ex post supervision and leave indirect supervision aside. 
Sometimes the opportunity to deal with ineffectiveness of counsel in the 
criminal proceedings is rejected, because it is argued that the convicted offender 
has the right to file a legal malpractice action against counsel. Nevertheless, I 
agree with many authors that claim that a legal malpractice action is an 
insufficient remedy for counsel’s ineffectiveness in the context of criminal 
proceedings. In a situation where the person has already received a guilty 
verdict the damages can hardly compensate for an unfair trial and in the worst 
cases an incorrect conviction and incarceration.11 Because a civil damage award 
does nothing to remove the harm done to a convicted person as a result of 
counsel’s ineffective performance – the conviction that is a result of a pro-
ceeding in which counsel was ineffective stands,12 it is little comfort to the 
convicted offender who remains punished and in many cases in prison to obtain 
a judgment for damages against his counsel for professional negligence.13 As 
the liberty of the person is at stake in the criminal proceedings, it is very 
important that there is a standard to ensure that accused persons receive their 
guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel in the criminal proceedings,14 
not that afterwards it is stated that they did not receive effective defense and 
they must be financially compensated. Even if the accused is not incarcerated, 
but punished another way (pecuniary punishment, probation or community 
service), one has to take into account that the conviction of a person results in 
labeling the person as “a criminal” and it should not be done unless the person 
has had a proper chance to defend himself. Consequently, convicted offenders 
can bring malpractice actions against lawyers, but as a practical matter, the only 
remedy for ineffective representation is to annul convictions that are the result 
of the proceedings in which counsel was ineffective and give to the accused 
person a chance to receive a new and fair trial.15 In addition, the legal 
malpractice action is something that a convicted offender may or may not file in 
a distant future, i.e. post-factum, and is therefore an inefficient remedy to 
improve the quality of defense, because it has almost no effect on counsel’s 
behavior at least in a certain criminal proceeding.  
                                                     
11 William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel – the Trial Judge's Role, 93 
Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1979–1980), p. 649. See also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in 
Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 
679 (2006–2007), p. 700. 
12 Jay William Burnett & Catherine Greene Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting a Felony 
Trial Judge: To Remove Or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1315 
(1999–2000), p. 1353. 
13 Asher D. Grunis, Incompetence of Defence Counsel in Criminal Cases Articles and 
Addresses, 16 Crim. L. Q. 288 (1973–1974), p. 289. 
14 Elizabeth Gable & Tyler Green, Wiggins v. Smith: The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Standard Applied Twenty Years After Strickland Current Developments 2003–2004, 17 Geo. 
J. Legal Ethics 755 (2003–2004), p. 756. 
15 Harvey E. Bines, Remedying Ineffective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures 
from Habeas Corpus, 59 Va. L. Rev. 927 (1973), p. 929. 
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Some also claim that another solution would be to address the advocates’ 
ineffectiveness through the disciplinary boards of the Bar.16 But Eve Brensike 
Primus has expressed her opinion about the matter very pertinently: “A problem 
with this strategy, however, is that it ignores both the inherent weaknesses of 
the attorney disciplinary system and the resistance within the profession to 
strengthening it.”17 It is an absolutely appropriate standpoint when we think 
about the fact that the Bar has to perform supervision over its own members and 
who wants to admit that its member has been incompetent? In addition to that 
every member of the Bar pays fees to be a member of the organization, which 
means that the loss of a member means also a financial loss to the Bar. These 
are the main reasons for the Bar’s loyalty to its members, that weaken the Bar’s 
disciplinary system. In addition to that, as advocates are not only counsels in 
criminal proceedings and non-advocate persons may be allowed to perform as 
counsels also, as it is in Estonia, a number of counsels would be left without 
sanctions altogether if the Bar would be the only competent body to react in 
case of ineffectiveness of counsel in the criminal proceedings. In addition to 
that, disciplinary action is not a proper remedy against ineffective defense, 
because it has the same problems as the civil action – when it comes after the 
criminal proceedings, it does not change the result of the criminal proceedings 
and most of the time it does not have a direct effect on the advocates’ 
performance as defense counsels.  
If the accused turns to the Bar during criminal proceedings and complains 
that an advocate has provided him ineffective assistance, there is a chance that 
consequences of ineffective defense are cured: the disciplinary board of the Bar 
may disbar an advocate or suspend his professional activities, and the accused 
will have new counsel. If the disciplinary board of the Bar imposes on an 
advocate any other penalty than disbarment, it is even possible that the penalty 
will have an effect on the advocate’s future behavior. But anything that has 
been mentioned above does not change the fact that it is highly probable that the 
Bar, as a representative of its members – advocates – is at the same time loyal to 
them and therefore avoids taking actions against them whenever possible. If the 
accused turns to the Bar after the criminal proceedings are finished, in a civil 
action, the Bar’s action does nothing to restore the convicted offender to the 
position he would have been in if the ineffective conduct would not have 
                                                     
16 But in the United States some authors say that although judges in the United States prefer 
to leave the disciplinary function to the disciplinary authorities of the Bar, they are often 
reluctant to notify the Bar of professional misconduct of counsel that may have occurred in 
their cases. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics 
Perspective Ethics Symposium what do Clients Want: Practice Contexts, 52 Emory L. J. 
1169 (2003), p. 1193, Note 112, referring also to Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, 
Lawyers, Clients, and Professional Regulation, 1976 Am. B. found. Res. J. 917 (1976), pp. 
999–1014. 
17 Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Claims, 679, p. 700. 
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occurred:18 it really does not help the convicted offender if his advocate is 
disbarred or sanctioned any other way.19 In addition to that, as already 
mentioned, it is again reacting post-factum, which means that the quality of the 
advocate’s behavior will not be influenced, at least in the specific case. Because 
of the Bar’s inherent weakness described above, there is also a risk that the 
Bar’s disciplinary action does not have a direct effect on the quality of defense, 
which means that there will be hardly any improvement in the advocate’s 
overall performance, as they know that even if they perform ineffectively, no 
serious consequences follow. This in turn leads to a conclusion that there will 
be no improvement in guaranteeing the right to defense counsel for accused 
persons. As it has been said: “... [A] right is only as potent as its enforce-
ment...”20 And finally, if we think about it from the side of the accused, the 
disciplinary action is even more pointless for him than the civil action: the civil 
action may result in monetary compensation, whereas the best result for the 
accused in the case of disciplinary action is the finding by the disciplinary board 
of the Bar that the advocate did not fulfill his duties properly. 
For the aforementioned reasons I discard the opportunity to file a legal 
malpractice action and the opportunity to turn to the Bar for disciplinary action 
as direct remedies for the ineffectiveness of a defense counsel in the criminal 
proceedings in this dissertation and concentrate on the remedies applied by 
courts during the criminal proceedings to react in case of ineffectiveness of the 
defense counsel and through that to improve the quality of defense in criminal 
proceedings. I agree that measures against an ineffective defense, no matter if 
they are applied by courts of lower instance during the court proceedings or by 
courts of higher instances in the appellate proceedings are the most effective 
safeguard against poor criminal defense lawyering21 and I do that because of 
following reasons. 
As civil action and control exercised by the Bar are mostly post-factum 
remedies, one has to search for more appropriate measures that prevent 
ineffective lawyering in criminal proceedings or at least enable timely 
interference, i.e. interference during the criminal proceedings. Three possible 
measures exist: the market for legal services if we talk about retained counsel 
(in Estonia it is called contractual counsel), possible state’s regulation and 
interference if we talk about appointed counsels, and judicial supervision. The 
market helps to assure competent lawyering, because reputation prevents some 
                                                     
18 Burnett & Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting a Felony Trial Judge: To Remove Or 
Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 1315, p. 1355. 
19 Grunis, Incompetence of Defence Counsel in Criminal Cases Articles and Addresses, 288, 
p. 289. 
20 Adele Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 18 Crim. just. 37 (2003–2004), p. 37. 
21 See also Meredith J. Duncan, (so-Called) Liability of Criminal Defense Attorneys: A 
System in Need of Reform, the, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 1 (2002), pp. 12–13 discussing that 
ineffective counsel claims in criminal proceedings are constitutional safeguard against poor 
lawyering. 
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clients from engaging ineffective counsels, both members and non-members of 
the Bar. Nevertheless, in some areas, especially in rural areas, the small number 
of lawyers dictates the reality: clients simply have no choice.22 In the case of 
appointed counsels, it can be that the state has competence to choose counsel 
either by establishing public defender offices and naming persons to work there 
and/or giving the court competence to choose between certain persons to be 
appointed as counsels in the certain criminal proceeding. But it could be that the 
state does not have the competence to take either of these steps. For instance, in 
Estonia, as of the 1st of January 2010, counsel is appointed at the request of an 
investigative body, the Prosecutor’s Office, or the court by the Estonian Bar 
Association, which means that neither the state nor courts have any say in the 
choice of appointed counsel. While on the one hand this ensures that the body 
conducting the proceedings cannot appoint an advocate who will make its job 
easy, it also leaves no possibility for the courts to exclude advocates who are 
known to provide ineffective assistance.23 Therefore, as long as counsel is a 
member of the Bar, he can accept tasks of an appointed counsel whenever he 
wants to, no matter how ineffective he has been in former criminal proceedings. 
Thus, neither the state nor the court is authorized to choose the appointed 
counsel, which means that in Estonia the system of appointed counsel is 
exclusively in the hands of the Bar.24  
As I have already discussed, judicial supervision means that judges have the 
authority to interfere with counsel’s performance in anything from making 
small remarks up to disqualifying a defense counsel or to reverse convictions in 
cases where counsel has provided ineffective assistance,25 i.e. to perform 
ongoing and ex post supervision. It can even be that the court has the compe-
tence to verify counsel’s preparation even before the ineffectiveness has ap-
peared. In order to justify judicial supervision over the performance of counsel, 
Eli Wald has written: “Presiding over the adversary system, judges are arguably 
                                                     
22 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors 
do Justice, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45 (1991), p. 66. I still remember a comment posted on the 
website of the daily newspaper Postimees in Estonia in which one reader lamented that he 
required legal assistance in a small town in Estonia but his choice was rather limited: one 
advocate was a known crook, another was the spouse of the judge trying the case, the third 
was hired by the opposing party, and he was left with no choice than to hire the fourth and 
last one. 
23 Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the Independence 
of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Criminal Proceedings? 252, pp. 253–253. 
24 As right now appointment of counsels takes place through the State Legal Aid information 
system, which means that counsels themselves choose in this system whether they want to 
acquire the case and also which cases they want to acquire, it could be even said that in 
Estonia appointment of counsels is in the hand of advocates. 
25 See also Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Pro-
secutors do Justice, 45, pp. 66–67. 
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well-positioned to directly observe lawyer misconduct.”26 To be more exact, 
two judges may expose the ineffective services rendered by defense counsel: the 
first is the trial judge (although sometimes it could be also the judge of the 
higher court before whom the ineffectiveness occurs), and the second is the 
judge reviewing the case, i.e. the judge of the higher court, before whom the 
allegation of ineffectiveness is raised.27 In this dissertation I am raising a 
hypothesis that both supervision by the trial court and supervision by the courts 
of higher instances are appropriate measures to cure consequences of the 
ineffective assistance and to improve quality of the assistance provided by 
counsels. I will bring out advantages and disadvantages of both forms of 
supervision and will find out which of these forms should be the one to be 
preferred in criminal proceedings and why.  
The judicial supervision is considered to have at least two advantages over 
other measures that could be used in the case of ineffectiveness of counsel and 
that have been discussed briefly above. First, it allows intervention during the 
criminal proceedings, therefore before the final verdict. If the supervision is 
performed by the trial judge, it allows the amendment of damage caused by the 
ineffectiveness of counsel before the first verdict is made, and even more, it 
enables the court to react already before the ineffectiveness has occurred.28 
Second, judicial supervision has an effect on the quality of legal representation 
in the specific criminal proceedings and also generally: although a judicial 
decision that the accused was represented ineffectively would not result in 
direct punishment for the defense lawyer, it would have a high price for a 
lawyer who cares about his reputation, because his failure to fulfill his duties 
will be established by the judge hearing the criminal matter, not by a judge 
deciding a civil matter or the disciplinary board of the Bar.29 Thus, by dis-
qualifying counsel or annulling the judgment of the lower court, the judicial 
supervision can provide strong informal sanctions.30 In case the court decides 
not to remove counsel and confine itself to a more lenient measure, the remark 
made by the court may have an effect on counsel’s behavior immediately and it 
might be that counsel will turn out to be sufficiently effective in a proceeding 
after all. 
The problem with judicial supervision is that counsel does not work by himself 
or for himself in the criminal proceedings and neither is his function to perform in 
                                                     
26 Eli Wald, Should Judges Regulate Lawyers? University of Denver Legal Studies Research 
Paper no. 11–01, pp. 14–15. 
27 Grunis, Incompetence of Defence Counsel in Criminal Cases Articles and Addresses, 288, 
p. 291. 
28 If counsel is ineffective during the court proceedings of higher instance, the situation is 
similar – ineffectiveness is cured before the verdict is made. 
29 Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective Ethics 
Symposium what do Clients Want: Practice Contexts, 1169, pp. 1185–1186. 
30 Barbara R. Levine, Preventing Defense Counsel Error – an Analysis of some Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims and their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. Tol. 
L. Rev. 1275 (1983–1984), p. 1428. 
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the way that just pleases the court. The duty of counsel is to be at the accused’s side, 
to advise him and to present his case to the court for him. Therefore, whenever the 
possible intervention by the court to the performance of counsel comes into 
question, it has to be taken into account that it should not be done without a good 
reason and without at least considering the accused’s opinion, because every 
intervention by the court affects the attorney-client relationship and also the 
principle of independence of counsel. If the trial court does not use the most drastic 
measure – removal of counsel – it is obvious that whatever step it takes towards the 
improvement of performance of counsel, it does not need the consent of the 
accused, because counsel stays in the criminal proceedings, although the court 
should always have the attorney-client relationship and also counsel’s independence 
in mind when it takes such actions. In a higher court the question of possible 
ineffectiveness of counsel is answered only if the accused requests it, because the 
accused is the one who decides whether to appeal or not. But when it comes to the 
court’s competence to remove counsel, even if there is a strong cause for removal 
of counsel, the question of whether the accused’s consent is needed or not, rises 
very sharply. This is a question that I am going to discuss in this dissertation 
thoroughly. To do that, I am raising a hypothesis that the monitoring of counsel’s 
performance, even if it results in the removal of counsel, should be exercised by the 
courts conducting the procedure regardless of the accused’s opinion about his 
counsel’s work. I am going to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of this 
approach and then give my opinion about the matter. I am also raising a hypothesis, 
that although counsel’s independence is a principle that should be honored, it is 
nevertheless a principle that could be overridden if the accused’s right to counsel 
and therefore to fair trial is violated. 
If one agrees that judicial supervision over the performance of counsel is an 
appropriate and allowable measure against the ineffectiveness of counsel, the 
questions whether courts should rely on some standard to evaluate the 
performance of counsel and what standard should it be, arise. It is easier for the 
courts to evaluate the work of counsel if guidelines for counsel’s performance 
have been established and consequently there is less chance that the courts will 
infringe the independence of counsel and the attorney-client relationship 
without good reason.31 In addition to that the existence of a standard helps to 
reduce unreasoned differences between decisions made about the performance 
of counsel by different courts in similar cases. Therefore establishment of an 
effective counsel standard or standards that would assist the court in evaluating 
the performance of counsel both during a criminal proceeding and also 
retrospectively in appeal or cassation proceedings should at least be considered. 
Of course, there are some criterions for a person who wants to enter the criminal 
proceedings as counsel, e.g., requirements of education or requirement of 
membership of the Bar, but that may not be enough. The experience of many 
                                                     
31 Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the Independence 
of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Criminal Proceedings? 252, p. 263. 
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countries, including Estonia, has indicated that even if a person matches the 
stipulations provided by the law, it can still turn out that he performs his duties 
ineffectively in the criminal proceedings. Therefore criterions to enter the 
criminal proceedings are just a basic minimum and courts should check the 
person’s Bar membership status and educational history, if necessary before 
allowing him to perform as a counsel as well as monitor the performance of 
counsel during the proceedings.  
On which standards should courts base their decision about whether counsel 
is or was ineffective, is another question to be solved. It is obvious that 
regulations provided by the state governing the education, qualifications and 
conduct of lawyers authorized to practice law in a state criminal system are 
permissible,32 and in order to guarantee at least a minimal quality of defense in 
my opinion even compulsory. But often laws providing the rules for criminal 
procedure do not give guidelines for conduct of counsels. There are codes of 
conduct, which are established by the Bars and applied to the performance of 
advocates, i.e. to the members of the Bar, and also laws that regulate 
qualification and even conduct of advocates. But to ask a court to verify if 
counsel followed the rules established by the Bar or for the Bar in order to solve 
an ineffectiveness claim or decide removal of counsel, is to ask court to apply 
rules that are imposed by or to a private organization that incorporates a small 
number of lawyers from the society, which in turn means that lawyers who are 
not members of the Bar should act in accordance with rules imposed by the 
organization or for the organization that they actually are not members of. In 
addition to that it must be taken into account that these rules have been worked 
out for disciplinary actions and therefore are not usually meant to bring along 
such severe outcomes as removal of counsel or annulment of judgment of a 
lower court, although it could be claimed that disbarment that may be imposed 
as a punishment on the advocate who has broken those rules is almost as severe 
as these consequences. Nevertheless, if it is decided that all lawyers that 
perform as counsels in criminal proceedings should fulfill duties that are 
imposed by the Bars or for the Bars, courts should consider that because of the 
nature of these rules not every breach of the duty described in these codes 
should result in severe action taken by the courts. Of course, the codes 
established by the Bars and laws that are established for the Bars can be taken 
as an example, as the United States Supreme Court has taken the American Bar 
Association’s standards as an example in case of ineffectiveness claims, but for 
the above mentioned reasons courts should have discretion in this matter.  
Whether to rely on the codes imposed by private organizations, e.g., by the 
Bars, and also on laws that are provided by legislation for the members of Bars, 
to impose a distinct standard for courts or to ask courts to solve ineffectiveness 
claims on a case-by-case basis, which basically means that there is no standard 
at all, is a matter of agreement. But if one supports imposing a specific standard 
                                                     
32 David Harris & et al, Harris, O'Boyle & Warbrick Law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Second Edition ed. 2009), p. 316. 
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different from guidelines imposed by the Bars, it must be very careful to work 
out a standard that really is a guideline and therefore helpful for courts.33 If a 
standard states only that counsel needs to be “diligent”, “effective”, “reasonably 
competent” etc., it means that one has actually put together no standard at all 
and counsel’s performance is still evaluated in accordance with the case-by-case 
approach. Actually, there is nothing blameworthy in admitting that an 
institution or a person is unable to compose an appropriate standard and 
therefore counsel’s performance should be in fact analyzed based on the facts of 
a certain case, but one should have courage to admit so. Nevertheless, in this 
dissertation I am taking my chances and raising a hypothesis that a specific 
standard is possible to compose, but at the same time I am also ready to admit 
that it is unattainable after all, if all I can find is that counsel should be, for 
instance “reasonably competent”.  
As one of the main purposes of the dissertation is to find out, whether the 
standard-based approach is really achievable, I am trying to work out a standard 
for the Estonian courts to be used in case the question, whether counsel is or 
was ineffective, arises during the criminal proceedings. My goal is to determine 
whether it is possible to elaborate a standard that is not excessively vague and 
offers real support to courts, instead of guiding them to use a case-by case 
approach. As I have already discussed, I agree with the opinion that the codified 
standards, which courts could rely on in case the question of ineffective defense 
arises, would promote the impartial and efficient administration of justice and 
through that ensure effective legal assistance.34 The standard would also provide 
defense counsel with knowledge of the necessary steps to be taken in the 
criminal proceedings and therefore would serve as a notice to counsels of the 
professional performance standards required from them. The Bar would have 
guidance for professional and educational programs in fashioning the means to 
educate lawyers for practice under the standard of professional conduct. And 
other persons who want to perform as counsels in criminal proceedings would 
have an opportunity to improve their skills also by familiarizing themselves 
with the quality of performance requirements expected. Courts of all instances 
could use the guideline to monitor the performance of counsel who appears 
before them in the courtroom. Higher courts would have a guide for resolving 
claims based on allegations of ineffective assistance. Guidelines would improve 
consistency and predictability in the outcome of judicial supervision over the 
performance of counsel in the courts of first instance as well as of appellate 
reviews from one jurisdiction to another. Finally, these standards might be 
                                                     
33 For instance in the United States where the United States Supreme Court has set out a 
“standard” for ineffective counsel claims, many people still think that the standard governing 
effective assistance of counsel is a national embarrassment and does not provide any help at 
all. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Ethics in an Adversary System: The Persistent Questions Legal 
Ethics Symposium: Lawyers' Ethics in an Adversary System, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 641 (2005–
2006), p. 652. 
34 Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional 
Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689 (1980–1981), p. 690. 
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useful for accused persons, because they would at least have a chance to have a 
clearer understanding of the quality of representation to which they are entitled 
and therefore it might be that they would be able to demand much more from 
their counsels.35  
 
4. Description of Methods 
Although it is my strong belief that the code of conduct imposed by the Bar 
Associations (in Estonia the Estonian Bar Association) and laws that regulate 
activities of Bar members cannot and should not be used one-to-one in criminal 
proceedings to evaluate effectiveness of counsel for the reasons I have 
discussed above, I still suggest that those codes and laws could be used as an 
example of how one organization thinks that counsel should be performing in 
the criminal proceedings. The United States Supreme Court uses different 
American Bar Association standards as guidelines, but still warns the courts to 
take into account that they are composed by the American Bar Association and 
not for the courts specifically, but for the Bar and its members (and for 
disciplinary actions). Therefore with reservations, guidelines composed by the 
Bars and also for the Bars could be used as models to work out courts’ own 
standard(s). Consequently, I will use conduct rules established by the Estonian 
Bar Association and to the Estonian Bar Association and by the American Bar 
Association as guidelines to develop counsel’s performance standards in 
criminal proceedings for Estonian courts. I also use the standards imposed by 
the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (hereinafter CCBE).36 
Additionally, when trying to work out a standard for Estonian courts I assume 
that there should be at least two standards: one for the courts conducting the 
proceedings and the other for appellate courts. I base this assumption on the fact 
that the higher court’s conclusion that counsel has been ineffective in the court 
proceedings of the court of lower instance results in annulment of the judgment. 
Therefore, only the most serious mistakes of counsel should be listed in the 
standard for higher courts. With the standard of counsel’s effectiveness to the 
court conducting the proceedings the situation is a bit different – the most 
serious step the court could take is replacement of counsel, which means that 
principle of finality is not affected. Therefore there the standard of effectiveness 
of defense counsel should be much stricter and should enable the courts to react 
already to counsel’s less serious breach of duties. 
                                                     
35 Of course the usefulness of standards to accused persons depends on whether they 
understand the essence of those standards or not. More about advantages of specified 
standards: Thomas Hagel, Toward a Uniform Statutory Standard for Effective Assistance of 
Counsel: A Right in Search of Definition After Strickland, 17 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 203 (1985–1986), 
pp. 213–214; J. Eric Smithburn & Theresa L. Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In 
Quest of a Uniform Standard of Review, 17 Wake Forest L. Rev. 497 (1981), p. 526. 
36 Estonian Bar Association has been a full member of the CCBE since 1 May 2004. Estonian 
Bar Association, General Information. Online. Available: http://www.advokatuur.ee/ 
?id=4&PHPSESSID=5eee24e4f6a0fca5f04e4683b67dd667, 29 April 2011. 
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In addition to conduct rules established by the Estonian Bar Association, by 
the Estonian legislator to the Estonian Bar Association, rules established by the 
American Bar Association and the CCBE, I will also use the European Con-
vention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR),37 the 
judicial practice of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR), 
the judicial practice of the Supreme Court of Estonia and of the United States 
Supreme Court, legislation of the European Union, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and other relevant Estonian legislation in order to create a standard of 
effectiveness of defense counsel in criminal proceedings for Estonian courts. It 
must be mentioned that when it comes to the European Convention on Human 
Rights and to the judicial practice of the ECtHR, it has to be taken into account 
that the ECtHR’s finding that counsel has been ineffective in domestic criminal 
proceedings does not automatically result in annulment of judgment of a do-
mestic court and usually just results in compensation for the convicted offender. 
Therefore, the ECtHR does not have to consider the principle of finality to 
compose its standard for effectiveness of defense counsel, which in turn means 
that whenever the case law of ECtHR is taken into account, one has to consider 
the fact that the ECtHR does not search for a ground for annulment of the 
state’s judgment. On the other hand, it must be also considered that because the 
ECtHR makes decisions over independent states, it could be that it sometimes 
makes the Court refrain from taking a reproachful standpoint. 
In order to prove my hypothesis that judicial supervision is an allowed 
measure and should be used to guarantee the accused effective legal aid, I 
employ the results of analyses conducted by different authors from the United 
States and from Europe in numerous law reviews and also monographs. Here I 
also use the same sources that I use for composing the standard of effectiveness 
of defense counsel for Estonian courts with the exception that the Bars’ 
guidelines do not provide any help in answering this question.  
There is a very simple reason why this dissertation employs the United 
States as an example in the field of ineffective counsel claims – in the United 
States this subject has been widely dealt with for a long time. I also examined 
some other countries with adversary criminal proceedings – Great Britain and 
Canada mainly – for the dissertation, but as it turned out, almost always they 
refer to the United States’ long-term experience on this matter. Therefore I am 
relying on many sources originating from the United States in my dissertation. 
My decision to use the United States experience as an example also stems from 
the fact that Estonian criminal proceedings has moved towards the adversary 
system since the year 2004 and latest developments, e.g., amendments of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure that came into force on the 1st of September 2011 
show that Estonia is willing to move even closer to the adversary system. 
Because criminal proceedings are adversary in the United States, it is logical to 
thoroughly examine the United States’ experience in the field of ineffectiveness 
                                                     
37 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. – RT II 1996, 11/12, 
34. Entered into force in respect of Estonia 16 April 1996. 
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of defense counsel. While doing that, I am not looking only for success stories 
but also mistakes that have been made in the United States from which we can 
learn a great deal. In addition to looking into adversary systems I also did a 
research in German judicial practice, because Germany is the country that has 
been used as a model for Estonian lawmaking, although not when the Code of 
Criminal Procedure was drafted. Even though not adversary, the German 
system of criminal procedure could be cited as an example. In specific literature 
it has even been claimed that because of the adversary system’s vulnerability in 
cases where one party is not effectively represented, there is an interest in 
reforms that have implicit or explicit inquisitorial elements as a means to 
prevent and remedy these situations.38  
To achieve the two main goals I propose in this dissertation – to search for 
justification for the judicial supervision over the performance of counsels and to 
work out standards for effectiveness of defense counsel to be used by Estonian 
courts, I have divided my dissertation into six chapters. In the first chapter I 
write about the accused’s right to counsel, about where this right comes from 
and what it means. I also write about the role that counsel plays in criminal 
proceedings and what are his duties. The second chapter is about the effective-
ness of counsel: why is the right to effective assistance of counsel inseparably 
related to the right to counsel and what to do in order to guarantee the accused 
the right to effective assistance of counsel. The goal of the first two chapters is 
to show that not only has counsel to be present in the criminal proceedings, but 
he has to be effective as well. In the third chapter I list different reasons for 
ineffective representation resulting in various types of ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel, which I will be using as examples to set my proposed standard. 
The fourth chapter is about judicial supervision and in that chapter I am 
searching for justification for ongoing and ex post supervision performed by 
courts. In addition to that I am also writing about the requirement of prejudice, 
which is a very important element of ineffectiveness claims in the United States 
and at the same time rejected by the ECtHR explicitly, although as I will discuss 
further, there seems to be a slight confusion about the matter in the judgments 
of the ECtHR. In the fifth chapter I try to answer the question why should there 
be standards for courts to be used in case of ineffectiveness of defense counsel 
and why I decline case-by-case analysis, using the United States as an example. 
This enables me to continue with the sixth chapter in which I am making a 
proposal for standards, which could be used by Estonian courts in order to 
decide whether counsel’s performance has fallen under what is required from 
him in the criminal proceedings.  
                                                     
38 Kent Roach, Wrongful Convictions: Adversarial and Inquisitorial Themes, 35 N. C. J. Int'l 
L. & Com. Reg. 387 (2009–2010), p. 424. For example, more active role could be given to 
the judge. Ibid., pp. 426–432. 
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I. THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED  
TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
1. Where Does the Accused’s Right  
to the Assistance of Counsel Come From? 
1.1 The Accused’s Right  
to the Assistance of Counsel in Estonia 
The right to defense is one of the main procedural principles of the rule of law 
and gives a person the right to defend himself against criminal charges with every 
means enacted by the law.39 One of the defense rights is the accused’s right to the 
assistance of counsel. The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia  
§ 21 (1) establishes: “Everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty shall be 
informed promptly, in a language and manner which he or she understands, of the 
reason for the deprivation of liberty and of his or her rights, and shall be given the 
opportunity to notify those closest to him or her. A person suspected of a criminal 
offence shall also be promptly given the opportunity to choose and confer with 
counsel.” The subsection under discussion distinguishes two groups of people: 
everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty, which is a broad group, and a 
person suspected of a criminal offence, which is a narrow group. Compared to 
everyone who is deprived of his or her liberty, the person suspected of a criminal 
offence has the right to choose counsel and confer with him.40 The second 
sentence in § 21 (1) of the Constitution is the only sentence in the Constitution of 
the Republic of Estonia that considers the right to counsel.41  
The Supreme Court of Estonia has interpreted § 21 (1) of the Constitution in 
the court case no. 3-4-1-5-10.42 The Court stressed that the second sentence of 
this subsection provides, without making any reservations that the suspect shall 
be promptly given the opportunity to choose and confer with counsel.43 The 
Court added that arising from § 47 (2) of the CCP, counsel is required to use all 
the means and methods of defense which are not prohibited by law in order to 
ascertain the facts which vindicate the person being defended, prove his 
innocence or mitigate his punishment, and to provide other legal assistance 
necessary in a criminal matter to the person being defended, which means that 
counsel participates in the proceedings in the interests of the accused.44 But the 
Court also stressed that although the duty of counsel is to act in the proceedings 
                                                     
39 Court Ruling of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 22 November 2002, court 
case no. 3-1-1-114-02, p. 7.3. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-1-1-
114-02, 29 April 2001. 
40 Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus: Kommenteeritud Väljaanne (Eerik-Juhan Truuväli & et al eds. 
Second Edition ed.2008), § 21, Comment 3. 
41 Ibid., § 21, Comment 6. 
42 Judgment of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the Supreme Court, 18 June 2010, 
court case no. 3-4-1-5-10. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=1176, 29 April 2011. 
43 P. 38 of the judgment. 
44 P. 41 of the judgment. 
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in the interests of the accused, at the same time he is not the representative of 
the accused, but an independent party to a proceeding. Hence, the duty of 
counsel is to act in the interests of the accused also when the accused does not 
understand the need to act.45 In the light of this case two conclusions arise. First, 
that counsel is an independent party to a proceeding, and second, that because 
of this independence he has competence to act in the proceedings as he sees fit 
and not always is he obliged to take the accused wishes into account or ask for 
his permission or approval. 
According to the third clause of § 8 of the CCP investigative bodies, Pro-
secutors’ Offices and courts shall ensure the assistance of counsel to the suspect 
and the accused in the cases where participation of counsel is mandatory by the 
Code of Criminal Procedure or if such assistance is requested by the suspect or 
the accused. The Supreme Court of Estonia has emphasized that it is the duty of 
the investigative bodies, Prosecutors’ Offices and courts to provide the accused 
with an opportunity to defend himself (also provided for in the second clause of 
§ 8 of the CCP).46 Clauses 34 (1) 3) and 4) of the CCP prescribe that a suspect 
has the right to the assistance of counsel and to confer with him without the 
presence of other persons. As it is established in § 35 (2) of the CCP the 
accused has the rights of a suspect. Thus, the accused’s right to counsel is 
provided for verbatim in the Code of Criminal Procedure, although the accused 
is not mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. The general 
principle, which is adopted by the Code of Criminal Procedure and also re-
cognized by the Supreme Court of Estonia with its judicial practice as described 
above, is that the accused has the same rights as a suspect, so it can be 
concluded that both the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure protect the accused’s right to counsel as well as the 
suspect’s right to counsel.  
 
 
1.2 The Accused’s Right to the Assistance  
of Counsel According to the European Convention  
on Human Rights and the Judicial Practice of the ECtHR  
According to Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR, everyone charged with a 
criminal offence has the right to choose either to defend himself in person, 
through legal assistance of his own choosing47 or, if he has not sufficient means 
                                                     
45 P. 57 of the judgment. 
46 Court Ruling of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 29 January 2002, court case 
no. 3-1-1-3-02, p. 7.1. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-1-1-3-02, 
29 April 2011. Court Ruling of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 2 August 2010, 
court case no. 3-1-1-61-10, p. 10.1. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/ 
3-1-1-61-10, 29 April 2011. 
47 Therefore the denial of legal assistance constitutes a violation (Panasenko v. Portugal. 
Application no. 10418/03. 22 July 2008, § 54; Shulepov v. Russia. Application no. 15435/03. 
26 June 2008, § 39) as does the failure to allow confidential communication (Zagaria v. 
Italy. Application no. 58295/00. 27 November 2007, § 36). 
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to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interest of justice so 
require.48According to S. Trechsel a defense which is conducted with the 
assistance of chosen counsel is certainly the best of the three alternatives 
offered by Article 6 paragraph 3 (c).49 S. Trechsel does not explain what he 
means by the concept “best”. Since the object of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the 
ECHR is an effective defense50 and a person can defend himself effectively in a 
situation where he is opposed by a professional lawyer with the assistance of 
professional counsel chosen as he best sees fit, it is clear that the best option 
among the rights set out in Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR is a person’s 
right to defense with the assistance of counsel of his choice.51 
However, according to the case law of the ECtHR, the right to choose 
counsel, no matter if counsel is appointed or retained, is not an absolute one. It 
is noteworthy that under certain conditions the ECtHR does not require the state 
to provide the accused with legal assistance at all. For instance in the case of 
Engel and Others v. Netherlands, while the ECtHR recognized that the right of 
the person to choose counsel was limited in state proceedings, it held that there 
was no violation of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR, as the persons 
charged were, in view of the simplicity of the case, capable of defending 
themselves.52 As in Engel and Others v. Netherlands disciplinary proceedings 
not the criminal proceedings were conducted against the applicants, although 
the Court concluded that “charges” against the applicants were “criminal” in the 
context of the Convention, it could be that Engel and Others v. Netherlands 
does not apply for criminal proceedings as it is possible to claim that there is no 
such thing as “simplicity of the case” in criminal proceedings. Additionally, for 
instance S. Trechsel has claimed that the view expressed in Engel and Others v. 
Netherlands must be overall rejected,53 a view I agree with as when it comes to 
the criminal proceedings there is too much at stake for the accused to conclude 
that if the case is simple, the accused request for the assistance of counsel could 
be rejected and he should be left alone to defend himself in the proceedings. 
Therefore in my opinion the right to counsel should be absolute in criminal 
proceedings in the meaning that it should be guaranteed to all persons accused 
of crime. 
                                                     
48 Pishchalnikov v. Russia. Application no. 7025/04. 24 September 2009, § 93; Padalov v. 
Bulgaria. Application no. 54784/00. 10 August 2006, §§ 53–54; Quaranta v. Switzerland. 
Application no. 12744/87. 24 May 1991. 
49 Stefan Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (2005), p. 266. 
50 Clare Ovey & Robin White, The European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed. 2006), 
p. 205. 
51 Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the Independence 
of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in 
Criminal Proceedings? 252, p. 254 Note 13. 
52 Engel and Others v. Netherlands. Application nos. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 
5370/72. 8 June 1976, § 91. 
53 Trechsel, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, p. 267. 
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The ECtHR accepts that national law may prescribe certain conditions for 
persons who have the right to act as counsel in criminal proceedings. In addition 
to that it is permissible for national law to lay down even stricter rules for those 
who wish to defend persons in supreme courts.54 In Mayzit v. Russia55 Mos-
kovskiy District Court refused to let the accused’s mother and sister represent 
him at the trial. The mother was a person of advanced age and frail health. The 
sister worked as a speech therapist in a children’s polyclinic, and the duties of 
her office prevented an active involvement in the proceedings. The ECtHR 
concluded that the right to choose counsel is “…subject to certain limitations 
where free legal aid is concerned and also where it is for the courts to decide 
whether the interests of justice require that the accused be defended by counsel 
appointed by them.”56 When appointing defense counsel the national courts 
must certainly take into account the accused’s point of view and his wishes, but 
“…they can override those wishes when there are relevant and sufficient 
grounds for holding that this is necessary in the interests of justice…”57 In this 
case the restriction imposed on the accused’s choice of counsel was limited to 
excluding his mother and sister, which means that the accused could have 
chosen any advocate he would have found suitable to represent him, but he did 
not do that, which led the Court to conclude no violation of the Convention.58 
Although in my opinion the right to counsel is by its nature absolute, I tend to 
agree with the Court that sometimes it is necessary to limit the accused’s choice 
of counsel. The accused as a person with little or no knowledge about the legal 
system may think that he is best represented when a person familiar or even his 
relative is his counsel, but with that wish he may miss the fact that his 
opponent – the prosecutor – is a professional lawyer, which requires that he is 
represented by a professional lawyer too. It is here the duty of the court to make 
sure that the accused cannot prefer an emotional choice over a practical choice. 
There is a general tendency in the judicial practice of the ECtHR, holding 
that although counsel has the right to participate in the proceedings, he must 
demonstrate a certain amount of initiative to do that (e.g., request permission to 
be present during the questioning of a suspect, or he has the duty to ensure that 
he was replaced for the day of the hearing in cassation court or that the hearing 
would be adjourned), and if counsel fails to do so, there is no violation of a 
person’s right to counsel.59 On the one hand it makes sense as it is the duty of 
counsel as the representative of the defendant to be present when it is necessary 
and in order to do that he must be active, for instance, he has to show up when 
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he is called or if he is not able to do that, he has to notify the appropriate 
authorities. On the other hand, this may lead to the conclusion that the right to 
counsel is a right that has to be guaranteed by counsel himself, not by the state, 
which is a standpoint contradictory to the ECtHR’s own judicial practice. But 
one thing I most certainly agree with is that in cases where counsel abuses a 
person’s right to the assistance of counsel, with the intention of delaying the 
proceedings, by systematically failing to appear in court and thereby causing the 
trial to be repeatedly postponed, the court should have the right to limit the 
person’s right to choice of counsel and to appoint counsel for the person 
charged with a criminal offence.60 In such cases, the principle embodied in 
Article 17 of the ECHR applies, by which the Convention does not protect any 
abuse of the law.61 The court should be allowed to disqualify such counsel even 
if the accused is not aware of his counsel’s tactical decision to cause delay in 
the criminal proceedings as allowing counsel to proceed in the proceedings 
would result in spending extra resources and may even cause expiration of the 
period of limitation of the criminal offence. 
 
 
1.3 The Accused’s Right to the Assistance of Counsel  
in the European Union 
In the European Union a person’s right to counsel is also considered to be 
important. The right to defense is provided for in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union,62 although according to Article 51 (1) of the 
Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the member states only 
when they are implementing European Union law, which means that the 
provisions of the Charter are not binding to the member states in case they are 
conducting internal criminal proceedings. Article 47 (Title 6 of the Charter 
called “Justice”) of the Charter provides the right to an effective remedy and to 
a fair trial. According to Article 47 (2) everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being 
advised, defended and represented. According to Article 48 (2) of the Charter, 
which guarantees the right of defense, respect for the rights of the defense of 
anyone who has been charged shall be guaranteed. 
According to the Lisbon Treaty63 Article 6 paragraph (3) fundamental rights, 
as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and as they result 
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from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, constitute 
general principles of the European Union’s law. The Stockholm Programme64 
states that the area of freedom, security and justice must be “…a single area in 
which fundamental rights and freedoms are protected.”65 The Programme 
continues: “The protection of the rights of suspected and accused persons in 
criminal proceedings is a fundamental value of the Union, which is essential in 
order to maintain mutual trust between the Member States and public 
confidence in the Union.”66 To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual re-
cognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European 
Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules that concern 
the rights of individuals in criminal procedure. Such rules shall take into 
account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the member 
states (Article 82 (2) b of the Lisbon Treaty). Consequently, since the Lisbon 
Treaty entered into force the European Union has had the competence to adopt 
directives in the area of defense rights, if the Union considers that rights 
provided for in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and 
the Lisbon Treaty are too general and they need to be specified in order to 
facilitate mutual trust and cooperation between the member states. Even the fact 
that all European Union member states are parties to the European Convention 
on Human Rights, and with the Lisbon Treaty the European Union received the 
competence to accede to the Convention, has not been enough for the European 
Union. It has already set itself a goal to set out the basic standards for suspects’ 
and accused persons’ procedural rights in the European Union. To achieve this 
goal, the European Union started taking action already before the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force, i.e. before it was under the European Union’s jurisdiction to 
adopt directives in order to establish minimum rules that concern the rights of 
individuals in criminal procedure, and has continued to do so after the enforce-
ment of the Lisbon Treaty.  
On the 19th of February 2003, the European Commission published a Green 
Paper “Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and Defendants in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the EU”.67 In the Green Paper the Commission stated: 
“It is important for the judicial authorities of each Member State to have 
confidence in the judicial systems of the other Member States. From May 2004, 
this will apply to twenty-five rather than fifteen Member States. Faith in 
procedural safeguards and the fairness of proceedings operate so as to 
strengthen that confidence. It is therefore desirable to have certain minimum 
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common standards throughout the European Union, although the means of 
achieving those standards must be left to the individual Member States.”68 In 
this document the Commission concluded that whilst all the defense rights are 
important, some of these rights are so fundamental and basic that they should be 
given priority. Here the Commission added that the first of these rights is the 
right to legal assistance and noted: “If an accused person has no lawyer, they are 
less likely to be aware of their other rights and therefore to have those rights 
respected.”69 According to what is written in the Green Paper, the Commission 
sees the right of the accused to counsel as the foundation of all other rights.70 
The suspect or the accused who has counsel in the proceedings is in a far better 
position when it comes to the enforcement of all his other rights, and it is so 
because of two reasons. First, his chances of being informed of his rights are 
greater when counsel is by his side and second, a lawyer present will assist him 
with having his rights respected.71 It is difficult not to agree with the Com-
mission as counsel as a legal professional is a main source for information about 
other defense rights to the accused, as he is also the one whose duty is to help 
the accused to exercise these rights. 
In the Green Paper the Commission also gives its opinion about the balance 
between the European Convention on Human Rights and minimal rules that will 
be established by the European Union. In the Commission’s opinion the right to 
a lawyer is already well established – it is provided for in the European 
Convention on Human Rights and stated also in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union as well as in other instruments.72 Therefore, the 
Green Paper is not designed to ensure that member states comply with the 
European Convention on Human Rights but rather to make sure that those 
rights, including the right to counsel, identified in the Green Paper are applied 
“in a more consistent and uniform manner throughout the European Union”.73 
Still, the aims of the European Union would seem to be much clearer, if it 
would state that it sees a standard of minimum rights for accused persons higher 
that is established by the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
judicial practice of the ECtHR – otherwise the European Union only repeats 
what is already in force. 
The Green Paper was followed by the proposal for a Council framework 
decision on certain procedural rights in criminal proceedings throughout the 
European Union74 on the 28th of April 2004. In the proposal the Commission 
stresses that research, consultation, and the judicial practice of the ECtHR, 
shows the European Convention on Human Rights is implemented by the 
                                                     
68 Introduction, p. 4. 
69 Identifying the basic rights, 2.5., p. 14.  
70 Ibid. 
71 The right to legal assistance and representation, 4.1., p. 20. 
72 The right to legal assistance and representation, 4.2., p. 20. 
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member states very differently and that there are many violations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.75 The intention of the European Union 
is however not to duplicate what is already told in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, but rather to promote the equivalent treatment in respect of trials 
throughout the European Union, which could be done by “orchestrating 
agreement between the Member States on a Union wide approach to a “fair 
trial”.76 Whilst it is in the competence of each member state to regulate its 
criminal justice system, the safeguards should be as similar as possible among 
member states: the standard can only be common if it is recognized and applied 
by all member states, so it is not possible to achieve a common standard and 
rely entirely on member states’ right to shape internal procedural rules in-
dependently.77 Still the Commission does not explain acceptably how its actions 
can help to guarantee the accused persons’ rights that are already stipulated in 
the European Convention on Human Rights and stressed by the case law of the 
ECtHR.  
In the proposal the Commission also speaks about the right to counsel. The 
Commission proposes that legal advice should be an entitlement of suspects and 
accused persons throughout all the criminal proceedings which are defined as 
“proceedings taking place within the European Union aiming to establish the 
guilt or innocence of a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence 
or to decide on the outcome following a guilty plea in respect of a criminal 
charge”.78 It also includes any appeal from these proceedings.79 The Com-
mission also proposes that the member states should ensure that only lawyers as 
described in Article 1 (2) (a) of Directive 98/5/EC80 are entitled to give legal 
advice.81  
The European Parliament recommended a number of amendments to the 
proposal,82 including adding a subsection providing that the rights laid down in 
the European Convention on Human Rights should be regarded as minimum 
standards with which Member States should in any event comply, just as they 
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should comply with the case law of the ECtHR.83 In addition the Parliament 
suggested that a principle according to which a failure to respect the right to 
legal advice shall invalidate all subsequent acts and those dependent on them 
throughout the criminal proceedings should be added to the proposal.84 In 
addition to what has been mentioned above, the Parliament mitigated the 
educational requirements for counsel with its recommendation, suggesting that 
lawyers as described in Article 1 (2) a of Directive 98/5/EC or other persons 
duly qualified in accordance with applicable national provisions should be 
entitled to give legal advice.85 
It turned out that the Commission’s plans were too ambitious and no 
political agreement was reached on the matter, some member states claiming 
that the European Convention on Human Rights adequately protects the rights 
of suspects and accused persons in the European Union,86 an opinion that is 
actually not far from the truth. So in 2009 the European Union started all over 
again, now with slightly more modest plans. On the 1st of July 2009 a roadmap 
with a view to fostering protection of suspected and accused persons in criminal 
proceedings was issued, stating that “…there is room for further action of the 
European Union to ensure full implementation and respect of the Convention 
standards, as well as, where appropriate, to expand existing standards or to 
make their application more uniform.”87 On the 30th of November 2009 the 
Council of the European Union adopted the resolution on a roadmap for 
strengthening procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings.88 The Council emphasized in the resolution that any new European 
Union legislative acts in this field should be consistent with the minimum 
standards set out by the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted 
by the ECtHR.89 In order to strengthen the rights of suspected or accused 
persons in criminal proceedings an action comprising legislation as well as 
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other measures should be taken at the level of the European Union.90 With the 
resolution the Council invited the Commission to submit proposals regarding 
the measures set out in the roadmap. The third measure, Measure C, in the 
roadmap is legal advice and legal aid. The right to legal advice through legal 
counsel for the suspected or accused person in criminal proceedings at the 
earliest appropriate stage of such proceedings is fundamental in order to 
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings; the right to legal aid should ensure 
effective access to the aforementioned right to legal advice.91 By now, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have adopted the 
directive on the first measure, Measure A, translation and interpretation92 and 
the Commission is working on Measure B, information on rights and 
information about the charges.93 
 
 
1.4 The Accused’s Right to the Assistance  
of Counsel in the United States 
A person’s right to the assistance of counsel for his defense was provided for in 
the United States Constitution94 already at the time of adoption of the Bill of 
Rights in 1789. According to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution in all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to “have the Assistance 
of Counsel for his defence.” At first when solving cases related to absence of 
counsel from the proceedings, courts in the United States relied not on the Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of the right to counsel but rather on the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the principle laid down in this 
amendment that an accused must receive a fair trial.  
So, first the due process was the basis for the right to the assistance of 
counsel, as courts relied on that when they decided whether counsel was 
appointed (or was not appointed at all) in a manner that precluded effective 
representation.95 It was in 1932 when the first case concerning a person’s right 
to counsel was brought before the Supreme Court.96 The United States Supreme 
Court acknowledged in Powell v. Alabama that due process (i.e. the Fourteenth 
Amendment) requires an appointment of counsel when compelled by funda-
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mental fairness. While deciding the case the Court adjudicating on the Powell 
case considered a number of factors about the trial: not just how counsel 
performed, but also other circumstances, including the accused’s lack of 
education. So the Powell Court concluded that in order to analyze any possible 
violation of the right to counsel, it must also be taken into account the 
characteristics of the accused persons, the circumstances of the trial, the 
evidence presented and excluded, and many other factors.97 In its judgment, the 
Supreme Court held that denial of counsel to the accused constituted a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, yet what is more important is that the Court 
recognized that an accused in a capital case who is unable to employ counsel or 
defend himself, has the right to have counsel appointed. A few years later the 
United States Supreme Court took a small step back from the Fourteenth 
Amendment and interpreted the Sixth Amendment to guarantee counsel to all 
felony defendants in federal courts.98 But in state criminal proceedings, the due 
process approach was applied until Gideon v. Wainwright99 made the Sixth 
Amendment applicable for the states’ criminal procedure by incorporating it 
into the Fourteenth Amendment.100 This means that in states’ criminal pro-
ceedings the courts were looking, until the Gideon v. Wainwright, at the overall 
fairness of the proceedings when the accused claimed that he was not provided 
with the assistance of counsel. 
The Supreme Court’s judicial practice in the area of the right to counsel with 
its explicit reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment halted the development of 
the right to the assistance of counsel for a person’s defense as a fundamental 
right for some time and drew much criticism and dissatisfaction.101 In 1963, 
when the Supreme Court finally ruled that all accused persons, regardless of the 
charges against them or the specific criminal case at issue, have the right under 
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution to court-appointed counsel, the Court 
returned to the Sixth Amendment inquiry and “…laid the foundation for a 
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declaration of a specific Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.”102 
Betts,103 which was overturned by Gideon, hoped to strike the balance between, 
on the one hand an accused’s right to fair trial and on the other hand, a state’s 
interest in conserving its resources and honoring the principle of finality104: 
“Only when both the magnitude of an accused’s interest in life or liberty and the 
risk of unwarranted deprivation outweighed a state’s interests would 
“fundamental fairness” require an appointment of counsel or, in its absence, 
reversal for deprivation of due process.”105 But in Gideon the Court said: “We 
think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.”106 
Hence, in pre-Gideon right to counsel cases, the United States Supreme 
Court justified the calculation of fairness of whole proceedings by reading due 
process requirements into the Sixth Amendment. But in Gideon, the Court 
abandoned the due process approach and shifted the focus of the right to 
counsel analysis from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Sixth Amendment,107 
i.e. from the right to fair trial to the right to counsel. The main message of 
Gideon was that a fair trial always requires a certain balance of power between 
the prosecution and the defense, and that is why the accused must have a lawyer 
to compete with the prosecution.108 As the Supreme Court had stated 21 years 
before: “The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of 
prejudice arising from its denial.”109 By abandoning ordinary due process 
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methodology, Gideon converted all assistance of counsel cases into Sixth 
Amendment claims, which led to some authors hoping that due to Gideon, a 
denial of the right to counsel always requires automatic reversal.110  
The Court’s decision in Gideon has been perceived as an important symbolic 
victory for all those who had urged that the assistance of counsel was essential 
to fair trials.111 It has been even asserted that the Gideon decision was so 
forward-looking that it has been immune from attack even by the most severe 
critics.112 Gideon’s message was that accused persons no longer had to argue 
that their trial was fundamentally unfair if they wanted to be successful with 
their absence of counsel claim. The Courts could set the Fourteenth Amendment 
aside and focus on what the Sixth Amendment itself required,113 which meant 
that in every absence of counsel claim courts had to look thoroughly and 
directly into the fact that counsel was not present in the proceedings and leave 
other calculations aside.  
But the truth is that the Court’s decision in Gideon was not without its flaws. 
The problem with the Gideon judgment was that although the Court declared 
that the right to counsel was essential to achieving “a fair system of justice”,114 
the basic elements of the right were not outlined and the question of what 
standards would be applied in determining whether the right of counsel has 
been constructive unanswered.115 Since Gideon it was clear that counsel has to 
be present in the criminal proceedings, but what else he has to do there 
remained unanswered. It took the Court 21 years to do that and in that time the 
composition of the Court had changed and the right to counsel was dramatically 
altered by a new doctrine.116 The standard the United States Supreme Court 
established by Strickland v. Washington117 is a subject of the fifth chapter of 
this dissertation, but here it is important to mention that although the Strickland 
Court referred to the Sixth Amendment, it established a two-prong standard 
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with a requirement of prejudice and therefore incorporated the right to counsel 
again with the due process based doctrinal limitations, leading to a much 
weaker construction of the right to counsel than seemed to be signaled by the 
Court in former decisions.118 While the Court in Strickland understood the right 
to counsel as protecting an accused persons’ right to fair proceedings, which is 
measured by the reliability of the outcome, the Court in Gideon and before that 
in Glasser viewed the Sixth Amendment more broadly as protecting individuals, 
guilty and innocent alike, from a potentially oppressive government.119 Con-
sequently, instead of affirming what was said in Glasser and Gideon, 
Strickland’s focus refers back to Powell and to the Fourteenth Amendment and 
result-oriented analysis.120 To be more exact, in the Supreme Court’s opinion 
the right to counsel is split in half: prejudice is presumed if counsel was absent 
from the proceedings (or basically fails to act completely)121 or there was a 
conflict of interest and the court failed to react although a party to a court 
proceeding informed the court about it,122 and not presumed if any other claim 
of ineffectiveness of defense counsel is raised. But still the United States 
Supreme Court refers in every case concerning alleged breach of the right to 
                                                     
118 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 60 
Syracuse L. Rev. 1 (2009–2010), p. 12. Before Strickland none of lower courts had 
acknowledged a prejudice requirement as the elements of a Sixth Amendment violation; 
those courts that had adopted a prejudice requirement had done so with regard to the inquiry 
into whether there should be a remedy for the Sixth Amendment violation, i.e. whether the 
decision of lower court should be annulled. Ibid., p. 35. 
In the United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez the question arouse “whether a trial court’s erroneous 
deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of counsel entitles him to a reversal of his 
conviction?” The government claimed that the accused should be required to show that the 
substituted counsel’s performance prejudiced the accused by denying him a fair trial. The 
Court wrote: “In sum, the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a 
fair trial; and that right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous.” United 
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez. 548 U.S. 140 (2006). But while rejecting a prejudice requirement 
with respect to an accused’s choice of retained counsel, the Court justified a prejudice 
requirement for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that the latter had 
been derived from the due process. The Court stressed: “The requirement that a defendant 
show prejudice in effective representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific 
element of the right to counsel at issue there – effective (not mistake-free) representation. 
Counsel cannot be “ineffective” unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, 
unless it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective representation is not “complete” until the defendant is prejudiced.” Ibid. 
119 Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 1, p. 38. 
120 Garcia, Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right, the, 35, p. 83. 
As the Supreme Court of United States has acknowledged the right to the assistance of 
counsel as an autonomous right, but still demands the proof of prejudice from accused 
persons, it has been claimed in the United States that requirement of prejudice is “a vestige 
of due process analysis of the right to counsel inappropriate to the trial rights guaranteed by 
the sixth amendment”. Green, Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, A 
Note, 1053, p. 1053, referring to judicial practice of lower courts in the United States. 
121 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
122 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978). 
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counsel to the element of prejudice, which means that in its opinion the right to 
counsel is a right that is not independent from the right to fair trial. 
 
 
1.5 The Nature of the Right to the Assistance of Counsel 
The question whether the right to counsel is an independent element of fair trial or 
the overall fairness of the criminal proceedings has to be considered if one has to 
decide whether the right to counsel was violated or not, is essential. It is not just a 
question the United States courts have tried to answer for a long time. Basically, it 
is a question which every court that deals with violation of the right to counsel 
claims has to answer before solving those claims. Therefore, although in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Estonia there is no specific right to fair trial, the 
question of where the right to counsel stands should be still solved in case the 
competence of courts to annul judgments, which are a result of the proceedings in 
which possible violation of that right arises, is recognized. In short, this is a 
question of prejudice, a notion which I will discuss thoroughly in chapters four 
and five. Here I will discuss what the results of both approaches are. 123 
If the right to counsel is not an independent procedural right, but an element 
of fair trial, then whenever solving claims referring to possible violation of the 
right to counsel, the court has to take into account circumstances of whole 
proceedings: whether any other accused’s right was violated, whether the judge 
was fair, whether the outcome of the case was affected etc.  
In short if the court takes the approach that the right to counsel is an element 
of fair trial, it considers the overall fairness of the proceedings without focusing 
on the absence of counsel (or on the particular acts or omissions of counsel if 
the accused claims that counsel was ineffective in any other way) which the 
accused complains. If the appellate court concludes that the accused got a fair 
trial despite of counsel’s absence (or counsel’s deficient performance), a 
judgment is not annulled. Therefore, when the right to counsel is considered to 
be just an element of fair trial, it might be that even if the court establishes that 
counsel was not present in the criminal proceedings (like it often was in the 
United States before Gideon) or there was a material violation of counsel’s 
duties, it still concludes that the trial was fair and does not annul the judgment.  
If the right to counsel is acknowledged as a separate procedural right, each 
court’s finding that counsel did not participate in the proceedings or did breach 
one of his essential duties, results in annulment of judgment, even if in whole it 
could be concluded that in any other aspect the trial was fair: judge was neutral, 
any other rights were not violated, the verdict would have been the same even if 
                                                     
123 It could actually be claimed that nowadays in the rule of law no one doubts that the right 
to have counsel present is independent from the right to fair trial and not just a part of it, but 
in order to achieve systematic approach to the right to the assistance of counsel and the right 
to effective assistance of counsel in this dissertation, I still think that first it is necessary to 
clarify what is the difference between the right to have counsel present on the one hand 
being a part of fair trial rights and on the other hand being an independent procedural right.  
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counsel would have been there or effective etc.124 This means that the right to 
the assistance of counsel is regarded as a procedural guarantee to which an ad 
hoc balancing of interests is inappropriate: the right to the assistance of counsel, 
unlike the right to fair trial, is not defined exclusively by a concern for the 
reliability of the outcome of the adjudicative process.125 Adjudicating a case 
with focus on the right to counsel means that the court looks directly at whether 
counsel was present or not and at the challenged conduct of counsel if counsel 
was present and decides the case based on those findings.126 Other aspects of the 
trial that may have mitigated the prejudicial effect of poor representation are 
irrelevant since the only issue is whether the accused was denied the right to the 
assistance of counsel, which is a fundamental right: justice does not involve 
only outcomes, but also processes.127  
As well as the aforementioned reasons, reliance on the right to counsel 
exclusively and leaving due process aside promotes a salutary thoroughness in 
the review of ineffectiveness claims (including absence of counsel claims) as it 
requires a reviewing court to look directly at the challenged conduct to 
determine whether it was “effective”.128 But if one agrees that the right to 
counsel is an essential procedural right, the element of prejudice, i.e. the 
requirement that the accused has to prove that his counsel’s ineffectiveness had 
an effect on the outcome of the proceedings has to be discarded.129 Hence, 
according to this approach representation by counsel is fundamental to fair 
proceedings and if the right to counsel is violated, the proceedings have been 
unjust no matter whether the outcome was influenced by counsel’s non-
appearance (or in other ineffective defense claims by his mistakes) or not. 
There are two reasons for the primacy of fairness in the adversary system. First, 
it is viewed as a proper way to treat accused persons: they as persons have the right 
                                                     
124 As I have already discussed the United States Supreme Court’s judicial practice shows 
that the Court has mixed position about where the right to counsel stands. When it comes to 
the participation of counsel, the Court, although talking about presumption of prejudice 
seems to acknowledge the right to counsel as separate right (the same is with conflict of 
interests in some situation). But when it comes to other counsel’s ineffectiveness claims, the 
right to counsel clearly is just an element of fair trial. 
125 Green, Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, A Note, 1053, p. 1056. 
126 Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: 
Principles for Appellate Review, 1, pp. 7 and 85. 
127 Smithburn & Springmann, Effective Assistance of Counsel: In Quest of a Uniform 
Standard of Review, 497, p. 503; Ed Cape et al., Effective Criminal Defence in Europe 
(2010), p. 4. 
128 Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: 
Principles for Appellate Review, 1, p. 7. 
“… [B]y protecting the explicit procedural right to counsel enunciated in the sixth 
amendment, fairness is achieved and the requirements of both the sixth and fourteenth 
amendments are satisfied.” Richard L. Gabriel, Stickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of due Process, the 
Comment, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. [1290] (1985–1986), p. 1275. 
129 Chhablani, Disentangling the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 1, pp. 43–44. 
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to be respected as an individual throughout the criminal process and to participate in 
their defense. Second, fair trial rights help to assure that accurate verdicts are 
reached by means of adversarial truth finding.130 One aim of the second principle is 
to ensure that innocent persons are not convicted, which is a great danger if a 
persons’ procedural rights are not respected. The system seeks to satisfy this 
objective by implementing rules of procedure and rights of the accused in criminal 
proceedings, which all are guided by the principle of fairness.131 But the aim of 
procedural rules is not only to guarantee that innocent defendants are not convicted. 
Richard Ekins has explained the additional aim of procedural rules very 
expressively: “An adversarial criminal process demands that convictions be 
obtained through fair processes with due regard to the procedural rights of 
defendants. Where convictions are obtained in violation of those rights, they are 
typically regarded as unsound and unsustainable. At some point, the failure to 
observe due process requirements forces the courts to treat a conviction as a 
miscarriage of justice.”132 The presumption of innocence upon which the criminal 
justice system stands in Estonia, requires that no accused be declared guilty unless 
the prosecutor, opposed by defense, proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.133 
Consequently, the reliable outcome is achieved by process that goes according to 
rules, which means that a vital prerequisite for adversary process is fairness of 
procedure and the fairness of the procedure in turn comes from following the rules 
of adversary procedure. It can even be said that the adversary process focuses on 
determining legal rather than factual guilt or innocence, as the person could be 
declared guilty only after the certain procedure is followed. The right to silence; the 
right to call and cross-examine witnesses; the exclusion of unfairly obtained 
evidence – all of these rights should not be overridden during the proceedings, even 
if it is clear that the accused is factually guilty.134 Therefore many authors in the 
United States claim that the right to fair trial is not just an innocent persons’ right 
but the right of all persons that are accused of committing a crime, a standpoint I 
agree with as there are certain procedural rules that courts have to follow in every 
criminal proceedings (in the case of Estonia rules provided for in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure) and it would go against the principle of equal protection, if it 
could be concluded that some of these rules apply to some of accused persons more 
than to others. 
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how Adversarial Systems of Justice Assess Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 9 
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Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Notes and 
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134 Ekins, Defence Counsel Incompetence and Post-Conviction Relief: An Analysis of how Adver-
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In order to decide whether the right to counsel is an independent procedural 
right or just an element of fair trial, the structure of adversary proceedings and 
position of counsel in it must be taken into account. The primary purpose of the 
right to counsel is to ensure that in the adversary system, i.e. in a criminal 
justice system which is based upon the truth being revealed by a contest 
between two adversaries, every accused has access to the legal skill and 
knowledge to meet the prosecutor on a more or less equal footing.135 Because 
the adversary system presupposes the existence of these two opposing parties, it 
is contradictory to say that we have an adversary system, when there is only one 
contestant – the prosecutor – and the other contestant – the accused – is a 
contestant in name only.136 Here it is a lot to do with the principle of equality of 
arms, which requires that “…each party must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present his case under conditions that do not place him at a 
substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent...”137 If counsel is absent from 
the proceedings, the accused is clearly at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
prosecutor: if the accused, who usually does not have a legal education, 
participates in the criminal proceedings alone, he does not know how to present 
his case, exercise his rights and protect himself against a violation of rights. 
Counsel is needed to protect the accused’s rights and marshal the conduct of the 
proceedings to be fair and reliable to determine the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, and if the accused is found guilty, a proper sentence.138 Therefore, 
counsel is the person who gives the meaning to the notion of an “adversary” by 
balancing a scale that would be in favor of the prosecutor if counsel would not 
participate in the criminal proceedings, which in turn leads to a conclusion that 
the participation of counsel in the proceedings is absolutely essential for 
adversary proceedings. Therefore, we reach again the conclusion I presented in 
the last paragraph, but with different arguments supporting my conclusion: that 
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all accused persons, no matter how factually guilty they may be, should have 
counsel present in their proceedings:139 the lawyers in criminal cases are 
“necessities, not luxuries”.140 
For the aforementioned reasons it is wrong to say that the only purpose of 
the guarantee of assistance of counsel is to reduce the chance that innocent 
persons will be convicted or to guarantee that the result is “correct” (which 
means that it is in accordance with the accused factual guilt). The right also 
functions to ensure that convictions are obtained through fundamentally fair 
procedures. Justice Marshall has written about it in his dissent in Strickland: 
“Every defendant is entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and 
conscientiously advocated by an able lawyer. A proceeding in which the 
defendant does not receive meaningful assistance in meeting the forces of the 
State does not … constitute due process.”141 But when we reach a conclusion 
that the right to counsel should be guaranteed to all accused persons, we cannot 
make the conclusion whether the accused’s right to counsel was breached or not 
depend on other factors than the participation of counsel. This in turn means 
that the right to counsel is an independent procedural right and the right to have 
counsel present is of an absolute nature in the context of the adversary system. 
Although the right to counsel is universally regarded as an individual right, 
like principle of fairness, it simultaneously enhances the protection for all of 
society by ensuring that courts are able to perform their independent role of 
adjudication according to valid laws and that all procedural rights of the 
accused are guaranteed in the course of the proceedings. Courts can check 
activities of executive power through the observations made by counsel142 and 
they can check even their own actions. Therefore counsel’s observations help to 
ensure that a trial conducted against the accused is fair, i.e. it goes in accordance 
with procedural rules. An accused has the right to know his rights and the right 
to have his rights respected, which means that he has the right to be tried fairly, 
and if he does not have counsel he may lose both of these rights. In short, an 
unrepresented accused risks a trial in which his rights are not respected,143 
which in turn upsets the common sense of justice. Consequently, the right to 
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counsel is not just a right that is provided for in different legal acts from 
procedural codes to constitutions and even in international instruments, but it is 
clearly one of the most fundamental constitutional rights for an accused to 
protect all other rights he has in the criminal proceedings144 that also helps to 
retain society’s belief in the fairness of the criminal justice system. 
According to the common understanding in Europe a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings is impossible without adequate guarantees of the defense rights and 
effective exercise of these rights, which is inconceivable without one of the 
main actors of criminal proceedings – the defense counsel, whose task is to 
defend the accused against a criminal charge.145 Consequently, having counsel 
present ensures that due process shall be followed.146 The European Com-
mission of Human Rights has stressed that counsel may play a particularly 
significant role as an observer monitoring the legality of the proceedings.147 
Also the bodies of the European Union have repeatedly emphasized that without 
counsel the accused may not be able to exercise his rights properly, which 
means that the standpoint of the European Union is, that the right to counsel is 
the basis for other rights of the accused in the criminal proceedings. In addition 
to the European Union the Supreme Court of Estonia has also emphasized 
counsel’s role in protecting the rights of the accused. The ECtHR has strongly 
expressed the same opinion, holding violation of Article 6 paragraph (3) of the 
ECHR whenever counsel did not participate in the criminal proceedings, unless 
the participation was not necessary under very special circumstances like in the 
case Engel and Others v. Netherlands. In the United States Justice Schaefer 
from the Illinois Supreme Court once wrote: “Of all the rights that an accused 
person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, 
for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”148  
For the aforementioned reasons, it can be concluded that the right to counsel 
is one of the basic rights of every accused in criminal proceedings and although 
it is closely related to the principle of fairness, it is still a separate procedural 
right. Therefore in my opinion if a criminal case has been conducted in the 
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adversary proceedings and counsel has been absent from the proceedings, the 
question arises, whether the court judgment made in such proceedings could 
ever be left unrevised. It seems that when it comes to the judicial practice of the 
United States Supreme Court, the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of Estonia the 
answer to the question is clearly “no”, which means that in the opinion of these 
courts the right to have counsel present in the criminal proceedings is an 
absolute one and stands separately from the right to fair trial. But when it comes 
to the right to effective assistance of counsel, there is no such consensus about 
the matter, as I will discuss in the next chapter. 
 
 
2. Role of Counsel  
in the Estonian Criminal Procedure 
In Estonia as in many other legal systems counsel may participate in criminal 
proceedings on two bases: on agreement with the client or on appointment by a 
competent authority. Whereas conclusion of a contract with counsel imposes an 
obligation on the person being defended to pay for counsel’s services, state-
appointed counsel provides services to the person being defended free of 
charge, at least during the proceedings. Pursuant to § 42 (1) 1) of the CCP an 
advocate or, with the permission of the body conducting the proceedings, any 
other person who meets the educational requirements established for contractual 
representatives in subsection 41 (4) of the CCP,149 may serve as contractual 
counsel. According to § 42 (1) 2) only advocates can participate in criminal 
proceedings as appointed counsels. I agree with the position of the American 
Bar Association expressed in the standards “ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice. Prosecution Function and Defense Function”150 (hereinafter ABA 
Standards) that once representation has been undertaken by counsel, the 
functions and duties of him are the same whether defense counsel is retained, or 
appointed.151 To conclude otherwise would mean violation of principle of 
equality provided for in § 12 of the Constitution of the Estonian Republic.152  
With the retained counsel it is very simple: the accused may choose whoever 
he wants to become his counsel as long as the person he wants to become his 
counsel meets the requirements provided for him (in Estonia requirements 
provided for in § 42 (1) 1) of the CCP) and he reaches an agreement with this 
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person. It may not be so simple for the accused to obtain appointed counsel, at 
least in some legal systems.  
According to the ECtHR, two conditions must be met, one financial and one 
legal, for a person to qualify for the right to free legal aid.153 The financial 
condition is that the right to free legal aid is reserved for persons who do not 
have sufficient means themselves. The ECtHR has left the definition of this 
condition primarily to the domestic courts.154 The legal condition is that the 
provision of free legal aid must be in the interests of justice.155 The concept 
“interests of justice” clearly does not mean that the accused should be provided 
with free legal aid only where the public interest so requires.156 The ECtHR has 
associated the legal condition with four criteria: seriousness of the offence, the 
complexity of the case, the principle of equal treatment of the parties, and the 
personal situation of the accused (e.g., mental health, linguistic skills, etc.).157  
The grounds for provision of legal aid by the state are in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure broader than required by the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the ECtHR case law, and we cannot speak of free legal aid 
in the classic sense. Namely, there is no consideration of the financial situation 
of a suspect or the accused under Estonian criminal procedural law; rather, 
pursuant to § 43 (2) 1) and 2) of the CCP, counsel is appointed for every suspect 
or accused person who has not chosen counsel but has requested the 
appointment of counsel, or who has not requested counsel in a case where 
participation of counsel is mandatory. Grounds provided for in § 43 (2) 1) and 
2) of the CCP could be considered as legal conditions for a person to qualify for 
the right to free legal aid.  
Since in Estonia a person’s financial situation is irrelevant to his right to use 
the assistance of appointed counsel in a criminal proceeding, it is reasonable 
that upon conviction the person assumes the obligation to reimburse the costs of 
legal aid, from which he can be partially released only if his financial situation 
does not allow him to perform this obligation. Subsection § 180 (1) of the CCP 
provides that in the case of conviction procedural expenses, which under § 175 
(1) 4) of the CCP include remuneration established for appointed counsel, shall 
be compensated for by the convicted offender. Pursuant to the first sentence of 
§ 180 (3) of the CCP, when determining procedural expenses, the court shall 
take into account the financial situation and chances of re-socialization of the 
convicted offender. Pursuant to the second sentence of the same subsection, the 
court shall order a part of the expenses to be borne by the state if the convicted 
offender is obviously unable to reimburse the procedural expenses. According 
to the judicial practice of the Supreme Court of Estonia the court is not allowed 
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to order all expenses to be borne by the state,158 which means that the convicted 
offender always has to reimburse a part of procedural expenses, even if it is just 
a small part. 
According to § 45 (1) of the CCP counsel may participate in a criminal 
proceeding as of the moment when a person acquires the status of a suspect in 
the proceedings. Of course, this presupposes that counsel has been appointed to 
the suspect or the suspect has chosen him to participate in a proceeding as his 
retained counsel. The participation of a counsel in a pre-trial proceeding is 
mandatory as of presentation of the criminal file for examination to counsel, 
which means that if a Prosecutor’s Office declares a pre-trial proceeding 
completed, it gives a copy of the criminal file to the defense counsel who 
introduces it to the suspect (CCP, § 45 (3), § 223 (3) § 224 and § 2241). There-
fore, by the time the suspect acquires the status of the accused, the participation 
of counsel is mandatory.159 The participation of counsel is mandatory through-
out a criminal proceeding if at the time of commission of the criminal offence, 
the person being defended was a minor; if due to his mental or physical 
disability, the person is unable to defend himself or if defense is complicated 
due to such disability; if the person is suspected or accused of a criminal 
offence for which life imprisonment may be imposed; if the interests of the 
person are in conflict with the interests of another person who has counsel; or if 
the person has been under arrest for at least six months or if the proceedings are 
conducted in the criminal matter pursuant to expedited procedure (CCP, § 45 
(2)). Until the 1st of September 2011 the participation of counsel in a court 
proceeding was always mandatory. Now the participation of counsel in a court 
proceeding is mandatory unless the accused does not wish the participation of 
counsel, in the opinion of the court he is able to represent his interests himself 
and he wishes to waive counsel in court hearing in the settlement proceedings in 
case of criminal offence in the second degree; during the pronouncement of the 
court judgment in the simplified proceedings;160 or in the case of the alternative 
proceedings if the accused meets the educational requirements established for 
retained counsels by the Code of Criminal Procedure and submits a reasoned 
request to defend himself (CCP, § 45 (4)). According to the explanatory 
memorandum to the Act to Amend the Code of Criminal Procedure the aim of 
amendment was to reduce the accused’s expenses to the legal aid in the case 
                                                     
158 Court Ruling of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 16 September 2010, court 
case no. 3-1-1-76-10, p. 8. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=222527795, 
29 April 2011. 
159 According to § 35 (1) of the CCP the accused is a person with regard to whom a 
Prosecutor’s Office has prepared a statement of charges pursuant to § 226 of the CCP or a 
person against whom a statement of charges has been brought pursuant to expedited proce-
dure or a person with whom an agreement has been entered into in settlement proceedings. 
160 In Estonia simplified procedures are: alternative proceedings (CCP, § 233), settlement 
proceedings (CCP, § 239, similar to plea bargaining), summary proceedings (CCP, § 251) 
and expedited procedure (CCP, § 2561). 
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where there is no risk that his rights are violated in the court proceedings.161 
Because this is a very exceptional situation and always requires the accused’s 
consent (his initiative to be more exact), I am not going to discuss this subject 
further in the dissertation as my aim is to analyze situations when counsel is 
participating in the court proceedings.  
The participation and assistance of counsel in the criminal proceedings does 
not mean that a person is deprived of the right to defend himself together with 
his counsel. A person has the right to submit evidence, complaints, and requests 
(CCP, § 34 (1) 7) and 8), § 35 (2)), and he is an independent party to the court 
proceeding (CCP, § 17 (1)). Besides the victim he is the only party to the court 
proceeding who has the right to testify, a right that his counsel does not have. 
Therefore, the accused may be an equal partner to his counsel in defending 
himself provided that he is willing to do that and capable of doing it. Only in the 
cassation proceedings does the accused not have the right to defend himself 
together with counsel, as the accused is not a party to a cassation proceeding 
under § 344 (3) and (5) of the CCP. The ECtHR considers it permissible for a 
state to restrict the right of a person to defend himself in a supreme court.162 
If a person is retained or appointed to perform in a criminal proceeding as 
counsel, the question of what are his functions in the criminal proceedings, i.e. 
the question of his rights and obligations in the proceedings arises. In Estonian 
criminal proceedings pursuant to § 47 (2) of the CCP counsel is required to use 
all the means and methods of defense which are not prohibited by law in order 
to ascertain the facts which vindicate the person being defended, prove his 
innocence or mitigate his punishment, and to provide other legal assistance 
necessary in a criminal matter to the person being defended. This allows us to 
conclude that counsel is bound by law and only by the law in the fulfillment of 
his duties.163 In order to fulfill the duty provided for in § 47 (2) of the CCP 
counsel has a number of rights, including the right to submit evidence (CCP, § 
47 (1) 2)); submit requests and complaints (CCP, § 47 (1) 3)); upon the 
completion of pre-trial investigation, examine all materials in the criminal file 
(CCP, § 47 (1) 7)) and confer with the person being defended without the 
presence of other persons for an unlimited number of times with unlimited 
duration unless a different duration of the conference is provided for in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP, § 47 (1) 8)).164 Subsection § 47 (1) of the 
CCP does not establish all the rights that the defense counsel has during the 
                                                     
161 Explanatory Memorandum to the Act to Amend the Code of the Criminal Procedure and 
Other Related Acts. 599 SE, 11th Riigikogu. Online. Available: http://www.riigikogu.ee/ 
?page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid=793874&u=20110828103142, 1 August 2011.  
162 Meftah and Others v. France, § 45. 
163 Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the Indepen-
dence of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel in Criminal Proceedings? 252, p. 253. 
164 According to § 34 (2) of the CCP, conference between the accused and his counsel may 
be interrupted for the performance of a procedural act if the conference has lasted for more 
than one hour.  
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criminal proceedings. Defense counsel has also the right to submit a petition of 
challenge against the judge (CCP, § 50 (1)), against the prosecutor (CCP, § 53 
(1)), against an expert (CCP, § 97 (1)), against the court session clerk (CCP, § 
157 (3)) and against the translator or interpreter (CCP, § 162 (2)). In addition to 
that, defense counsel has the right to request an expert assessment. According to 
the § 105 (2) of the CCP the body conducting a proceeding shall not refuse to 
order an expert assessment requested by counsel if the facts for the ascertain-
ment of which the assessment is requested may be essential for the adjudication 
of the criminal matter. At the request of the person being defended counsel has 
the right to participate in the hearing of the application for an arrest warrant 
(CCP, § 131 (3)), of an application for bail (CCP, § 135 (5)) and of an 
application for a temporary restraining order (CCP, § 1411 (3)). As a party to a 
court proceeding, counsel has the right to question the accused (CCP, § 293 
(3)), and examine a victim and a witness in a cross-examination (CCP, § 288). 
An important right for defense counsel is the right to refuse to give testimony as 
a witness concerning the circumstances which have become known to him in 
his professional activities (CCP, § 72 (1) 2)). This principle helps counsel to 
achieve a trusting relationship with his client and through that to fulfill his 
duties more effectively. The professional support staff of counsel also has the 
right to refuse to give testimony (CCP, § 72 (2)). 
Since a considerable number of counsels participating in criminal pro-
ceedings in Estonia are advocates,165 I will also look into what duties are 
imposed on them by laws and by the Estonian Bar Association rules. 
According to § 44 (1) 1) of the Bar Association Act166 (hereinafter BAA), 
that provides the organization of the Estonian Bar Association and the legal 
bases for the activities of advocates, associated members of the Bar Association 
and advocates of a foreign state (§ 1 of the BAA), an advocate is required to use 
all means and methods which are in conformity with the law in the interests of a 
client while preserving his professional honor and dignity. According to the 
Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association,167 which applies to the 
professional activities of the advocates (Article 1 of the Code), an advocate 
shall choose, within the power and authority given by the client, the best lawful 
measures and means to protect the interests of the client (Article 4 (5) of the 
Code). When rendering legal services, an advocate shall observe the law, legal 
acts and decisions of the Bar authorities, rules of professional conduct, as well 
as good practice and his conscience (Article 4 (1) of the Code). According to 
                                                     
165 While no statistics have been published on the percentage of criminal proceedings that are 
conducted with participation of an advocate or the participation of other counsel in Estonia, I 
dare to say, based on my experience, that the majority of counsel in criminal proceedings are 
advocates. 
166 Bar Association Act. Passed 21 March 2001. Entered into force 19 April 2001. Last 
amended 24 March 2011 – RT I, 14.03.2011, 24. 
167 Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association. Adopted on 8 April 1999 by the 
General Assembly of the Estonian Bar Association. Amended on 5 May 2005, 13 March 
2007 and 21 February 2008 by the General Assembly of the Estonian Bar Association. 
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the second sentence of Article 8 (1) of the Code subject to due observance of all 
rules of law and professional conduct, the advocate shall use all means and 
methods for the benefit of his client such that the personal honor, honesty and 
integrity of the advocate are beyond doubt. Subject to the provisions of law, his 
expertise and experience as well as to his conscience, the advocate shall use 
only those measures and means consistent with law which enable him to better 
protect his client’s interests (first sentence of Article 8 (2) of the Code). 
Therefore it is established by the Bar Association Act and the Code of Conduct 
of the Estonian Bar Association that advocates have to act in the best interests 
of the accused and they are only bound by the law and ethics.168  
The other principle that comes from the Bar Association Act and the Code of 
Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association is advocate’s independence, which is 
closely related to the principle that in his activities the advocate has to be 
guided only by law. The Code of Conduct for the European Lawyers169 also 
emphasizes lawyers’ independence. Article 2.1.1. of the Code states: “The 
many duties to which a lawyer is subject require the lawyer’s absolute 
independence, free from all other influence, especially such as may arise from 
his or her personal interests or external pressure. Such independence is as 
necessary to trust in the process of justice as the impartiality of the judge. A 
lawyer must therefore avoid any impairment of his or her independence and be 
                                                     
168 The American Bar Association emphasizes that the basic duty of defense counsel is to 
serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and devotion and to render 
effective, quality representation. Standard 4–1.2 (b). 
169 This Code is adopted by the CCBE. The CCBE is an international nonprofit making 
association and its objects are to represent the Bars and Law Societies of its members, 
whether full, associate or observer members, on all matters of mutual interest relating to the 
exercise of the profession of the lawyer, the development of the law and practice pertaining 
to the rule of law and administration of justice and substantive developments in the law 
itself, both at a European and international level. In addition to that the CCBE monitors 
actively the defense of the rule of law, the protection of the fundamental and human rights 
and freedoms, including the right of access to justice and protection of the client, and the 
protection of the democratic values inextricably associated with such rights (Statutes of the 
Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe. As adopted at the CCBE Plenary Session in 
Brussels on 28 November 2009. Online. Available: http://www.ccbe.org/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/document/statuts/statutes_en.pdf, 29 April 2011). The Code of Conduct for 
European Lawyers (The Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. This Code of Conduct for 
European Lawyers was originally adopted at the CCBE Plenary Session held on 28 October 
1988, and subsequently amended during the CCBE Plenary Sessions on 28 November 1998, 
6 December 2002 and 19 May 2006. The Code also takes into account amendments to the 
CCBE Statutes formally approved at an Extraordinary Plenary Session on 20 August 2007. 
Online. Available: http://www.ccbe.eu/index.php?id=32&L=0, 29 April 2011) dates back to 
28 October 1988 and has been amended three times; the latest amendment took place at the 
plenary session in Oporto on 19 May 2006. It is a binding text on all member states: all 
lawyers who are members of the bars of these countries (whether their Bars are full, 
associate or observer members of the CCBE) have to comply with the Code in their cross-
border activities within the European Union, the European Economic Area and the Swiss 
Confederation as well as within associate and observer countries. 
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careful not to compromise his or her professional standards in order to please 
the client, the court or third parties.” The independence of the Bar and counsel 
in criminal proceedings is a principle that is not usually provided for in any 
other law than the law that stipulates the Bar’s position in society and legal 
system. Thus, in Estonia it is not established in the Constitution of the Republic 
of Estonia or in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet it is clear that defense 
counsel should act solely in the interests of the accused in criminal proceedings 
and that it is not up to the opposing side, to the court, to the third party or to the 
society to dictate how counsel should fulfill his obligations.170 Pursuant to § 43 
(1) of the Bar Association Act, advocates are independent in the provision of 
legal services and shall act pursuant to the law, legal acts and resolutions 
adopted by the bodies of the Bar Association, the requirements for the profes-
sional ethics of advocates, good morals, and their conscience. The principle of 
independence is important on the one hand because an advocate is an opposing 
party to the prosecutor and the court has to be neutral towards both of them, 
which means that neither the prosecutor nor the court is competent to dictate to 
an advocate how to perform his activities. On the other hand, as the accused 
usually does not have a legal education, an advocate should not at least fully 
depend on the accused’s directions either.171 And finally, an advocate should be 
free of influences from outside of the proceedings too, as otherwise the accused 
would not receive the best assistance or in the worst case he will receive no 
assistance at all from the advocate who has the other person’s interests in 
mind.172  
So, while rendering legal services, an advocate has to keep his client’s best 
interests in mind and has to be independent in his activities. The same is with a 
non-advocate counsel, because if he does not put his client’s interests first, he is 
not able to perform his functions in a way that would provide the accused with 
real assistance. It is obvious that by acting in the best interest of the accused 
counsel may sometimes upset other subjects to the criminal proceedings, 
especially the court. The American Bar Association emphasizes that defense 
counsel, in order to protect the rights of the accused, may resist the wishes of 
the judge on some matters, and although he is never allowed to be disrespectful 
towards the court, he may appear uncooperative at times. But instead of 
contradicting his duty to the administration of justice, counsel is actually 
fulfilling a necessary and important function within the adversary system.173 
This function the American Bar Association stresses here is counsel’s task to 
stand for his client’s interests and it must be agreed with the Association, that 
here the court’s opinion does not matter. According to Article 4.3 of the Code 
of Conduct for European Lawyers a lawyer maintains due respect and courtesy 
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Counsel in Criminal Proceedings? 252, p. 253. 
171 See more about this subject in subsection 3.4.6 of this dissertation. 
172 See about conflict of interests in subsection 3.2 of this dissertation. 
173 Standard 4–1.2 commentary. 
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towards the court and defends the interests of the client honorably and fearlessly 
without regard to the lawyer’s own interests or to any consequences to himself 
or to any other person. Consequently, whenever ineffective assistance comes 
under discussion, counsel who acts in the best interests of the accused and by 
that upsets the court should not be considered ineffective. It has even been 
discussed that in case the competence to remove ineffective counsel is given to 
courts, courts may abuse it by removing counsels who act too fiercely on behalf 
of their defendants.174 I personally believe that these abuses of independence of 
counsel could be avoided by imposing a standard, on which the court has to 
refer whenever it decides to remove counsel. That way it is possible for higher 
courts to verify if the decision to remove counsel made by a lower court was 
correct or was guided by the wish to get rid of an inconvenient party to the 
proceedings. 
 
                                                     
174 Meris Sillaots, Kaitsja võimalikust rollist ja seisundist Eesti tulevases kriminaal-
menetluses, 2 Juridica 83 (2000), p. 91. 
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II. THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED  
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
1. The Meaning of Effective Defense, its Purpose and  
the Causes for Ineffective Defense 
In the last chapter I talked mainly about participation of counsel and what the 
consequences of his absence are, but as I also mentioned a couple of times the 
notion of “effective defense”, it is now necessary to explain what effective 
defense means. Basically, effective defense is what the assessor (the Bar, the 
court, the legislator) considers to be effective in a certain case or overall, e.g., in 
guidelines, in legislation, in the court judgment etc. It could be that for the 
assessor mere presence of counsel in the proceedings is enough, which means 
that participation of counsel also is effective defense. But usually it is agreed 
that effective assistance is more than just participation of counsel. It actually 
covers the participation of counsel, but means also that counsel who participates 
in the proceedings has to be active and provide proper assistance to the accused. 
That is why the right to counsel can have two meanings: first the right to 
presence of counsel without paying attention to what counsel does in the 
proceedings,175 and second, the right to have counsel present and active in the 
proceedings; but the right to effective assistance of counsel is usually 
considered as the right to have active counsel present in the proceedings. In my 
opinion the problem with the right to effective assistance of counsel is two-fold.  
Before I look into the problems related to the right to effective assistance of 
counsel, it is appropriate and necessary to explain why I am using in this 
dissertation, notions of “effective” and “ineffective” instead of the notions 
“competent” and “adequate”, while the notions “competent” and “adequate” are 
often used as synonyms for the notion “effective”. First of all I am doing it 
because theoretical sources and the judicial practice of the ECtHR and the 
United States Supreme Court use the notion “effective” and not “competent” or 
“adequate”. Second, there are considerable difficulties, at least with using the 
word “competent” instead of “effective” in the context of the assistance pro-
vided by counsel to the accused. This difficulty is twofold and is described by 
Richard Brody: ““Competence” relates to the inherent abilities of the attorney 
(in my opinion also his physical and mental health in the moment of court 
proceedings – author’s explanatory remark), whereas the focus should properly 
be on the performance actually rendered. An able and well qualified lawyer may 
fail to provide the kind of assistance which the Constitution guarantees to all 
defendants owing to factors beyond counsel’s control, for example an 
overwhelming caseload. Furthermore, “incompetence” suggests an egregious 
case, a gross abuse. This is precisely the kind of notion which retards the 
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participates in the proceedings the right to the assistance is guaranteed and no violation of 
that right can be concluded. 
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development of the right to effective representation.”176 Hence, the “in-
competence” is a narrower notion than the notion “ineffectiveness”. Therefore 
when I am speaking about “competence” I mean counsel’s wisdom, education, 
physical and mental condition, whereas when I am speaking about “effective-
ness” I mean counsel’s overall performance in criminal proceedings.  
But now I will explain the two main problems related to the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. First, as the right to the assistance of counsel derives from 
the constitutions of Estonia and the United States directly, and it is also 
stipulated in the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to effective 
assistance is not explicitly provided for in the legal acts and therefore it is 
difficult to say whether it is something that the accused should be guaranteed or 
not, i.e. whether the right to counsel should be considered to be the right to have 
counsel present and active or just present. When it comes to the judicial practice 
of the US Supreme Court and also to the judicial practice of the ECtHR,177 
although both courts acknowledge the right to effective assistance as part of the 
right to counsel guaranteed by legal acts, their acts speak another language: they 
refuse to evaluate the effectiveness of counsels’ performance whenever 
possible. It could even be claimed that these courts interpret the right to counsel 
provided for in the constitutions and international legal acts, with rare 
exceptions, almost always as in a way that it means only the right to have 
counsel present in the proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has set a 
standard to prove ineffectiveness of defense counsel so high that it is almost 
impossible for the accused to claim successfully that counsel who participated 
in criminal proceedings provided the accused with the assistance that was not 
effective.178 In addition to that the Supreme Court requires showing prejudice, 
which means that in the United States the right to effective assistance of counsel 
is the right of accused persons who are either factually innocent or manage 
somehow to prove that without counsel’s deficiencies their punishment would 
have been more lenient. The ECtHR says that rights guaranteed to accused 
persons ought to be practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory, but 
when it comes to the right to effective assistance of counsel the ECtHR is much 
more modest in its actions than in its words. The ECtHR has concluded that the 
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated if counsel, no matter if 
retained or appointed by the state, was absent from the proceedings or failed to 
fulfill his duties completely. Whenever someone claiming ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel refers to mistakes of counsel other than being absent from the 
proceedings or failing to provide legal assistance completely, the ECtHR draws 
back and hides itself behind the principle of independence of the profession.179  
                                                     
176 Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: 
Principles for Appellate Review, 1, p. 8. 
177 I am going to discuss the case law of the ECtHR and the United States in this area in next 
subsection of this chapter. 
178 I will discuss it in chapter five further. 
179 Read further about this subject in the next subsection of this chapter. 
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But to be fair towards the courts, their reluctance to intervene is actually under-
standable. On the one hand the accused has a constitutional right to fair trial and 
therefore adequate procedural safeguards, including the right to counsel.180 At 
the same time in adversary proceedings the functions of accusation, defense and 
adjudication of the criminal matter are performed by different persons. For that 
reason a balance between the accused’s right to counsel and defense counsel’s 
autonomy has to be achieved.181 Courts in the United States have stressed the 
importance of ensuring defense counsel’s autonomy from judicial supervision 
because in their opinion such autonomy ensures that the adversary system is 
preserved.182 The ECtHR has also emphasized the principle of independence of 
the Bar as I will discuss in the next subsection. In addition to that while solving 
ineffective defense claims society’s interest in speedy and effective adjudication 
and conservation of judicial resources must also be taken into account.183 It is 
clear that disputes over the effectiveness of defense counsel during criminal 
proceedings consume time and money and may end with the replacement of 
defense counsel or annulment of a court judgment, which may lead to new court 
proceedings and in turn consume more time and money. Besides, courts always 
have to balance between the competing interests of finality and procedural 
fairness,184 which means that courts usually do not want to act unless there is a 
very serious breach of the accused’s rights. 
Second, if one concludes that the right to assistance is not enough and the 
right to effective assistance has also to be guaranteed to the accused (i.e. the 
right to effective counsel is an element of the right to counsel), one has to 
clarify what the right to effective assistance really means. Of course, it 
obviously means that counsel has to participate in the criminal proceedings, but 
what next? How active should counsel be in order to conclude that the 
accused’s right to effective counsel was guaranteed in the proceedings? Should 
                                                     
180 Ekins, Defence Counsel Incompetence and Post-Conviction Relief: An Analysis of how 
Adversarial Systems of Justice Assess Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 529,  
p. 532. 
181 Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New 
Look After United States v. Decoster, 93 Harv. Law Rev. 752 (1980), p. 752. 
182 Ibid., p. 752 Note 4, discussing judicial practice about the matter. “Under our adversary 
system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel, the vast array of trial decisions, 
strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and 
his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and counsel in our 
legal system.” Estelle v. Williams, 425 U. S. 501 (1976), p. 425 U. S. 512. “The adversary 
system, warts and all, has worked to provide salutary protection for the rights of the accused. 
Efforts to improve the performance of defense counsel should not imperil that protection.” 
United States of America v. Willie DeCoster, Jr. No. 72–1283, 624 F.2d 196; 199 U.S. App. 
D.C. 359; 1976 U.S., October 19, 1976, p. 36. 
183 Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New 
Look After United States v. Decoster, 752, p. 752. 
184 Ekins, Defence Counsel Incompetence and Post-Conviction Relief: An Analysis of how 
Adversarial Systems of Justice Assess Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 529,  
p. 533. 
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he perform some specific duties prescribed in some guidelines or does he have 
to make his decisions according to the facts of a certain case? Or should it be 
something in between those two options? These questions I will try to answer in 
the context of the Estonian criminal justice system in the next chapters of this 
dissertation. 
Here it must be noticed that the right to effective assistance and effective 
assistance itself do not have the same purposes. The purpose of the right to 
counsel and also the right to effective assistance is to guarantee fair trial and 
through that a result that society can call just. To assume that this is also the role 
of defense counsel means that counsel provides ineffective representation only 
when society does not consider the result just.185 But actually the role of counsel 
is not to see that the accused received a fair trial and therefore just outcome 
resultant,186 although counsel should be monitoring that his client’s rights are 
not violated. The task of counsel is to try to achieve the most likeable result for 
the accused, even if is not “just”. In order to do that counsel has to challenge 
prosecution’s arguments, present a defense, advise the accused, negotiate for 
him, advance mitigating arguments, etc. Although generally effective counsel 
tends to promote a reliable and therefore “just” verdict, in the context of a 
particular case effective assistance means simply fighting for the interests of the 
accused, whatever they may be and here counsel is only bound by law and 
ethics as I already discussed in the last chapter.187 This actually leads to a 
conclusion that courts should decide whether an accused received effective 
assistance without regard to the fairness of the proceedings as a whole:188 
instead of that they should look directly into counsel’s behavior. Because of the 
above mentioned arguments I believe that whenever counsel’s conduct comes 
under question, the assessor (here I propose that the court) should analyze what 
counsel did or did not do in the criminal proceedings and not to dispose of the 
issue because the proceedings were “fair” in the meaning that the accused’s 
other procedural rights were not violated. In addition it should be emphasized 
here that the phrase “effective counsel” may even be a bit misleading in the 
context of counsel’s assistance, because it sounds like the accused should have 
successful counsel. However, this connotation is not correct, because there is no 
right to acquittal: the right to effective counsel is not a right to success.189 
                                                     
185 Genego, Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and 
Competent Representation, the, 181, p. 200. 
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Therefore in order to determine whether counsel has been “effective” in the 
proceedings, which means that the right to effective counsel was guaranteed to 
the accused, the focus should not be on the result of the case, but on counsel’s 
actions in the proceedings. This is a standpoint I support strongly and will 
discuss further below. 
When we talk about reasons for ineffective defense, there are five main ones: 
counsel simply may be a bad lawyer; he may be unable to perform his duties in 
the particular case (e.g., because of illness, consumption of alcohol, or conflict 
of interest); he may be ineffective because of the lack of time or resources to 
prepare; or the law and the court’s actions may constrain counsel’s effectiveness 
(e.g., the court does not give counsel enough time to prepare, the law provides 
for excessively short deadlines, the court does notify counsel of the date of the 
court session and counsel fails to appear).190 A fifth reason could be counsel’s 
motivation, which might include everything from how attractive the case is for 
defense counsel to whether counsel will receive fair remuneration.191 I am going 
to analyze ineffectiveness of defense counsel no matter what the reasons for 
counsel’s failure to fulfill his duties are. 
Whenever ineffectiveness of counsel is a subject of discussion among 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers, one easily realizes that there is an under-
standable reluctance to discuss the problem of ineffective defense.192 For courts 
the assumption of always-effective-counsel is convenient to apply, because it 
reduces the workload for them, as it removes the need for reasoned 
deliberation193 and removes the never ending discussion over the independence 
of the Bar and whether courts are justified to intervene into it. Prosecutors seem 
to be reluctant to discuss the matter, because they also think that counsel is an 
independent party to a proceeding, and what is more important, as an adversary 
to counsel, they are not interested in too eager a contestant. And counsels 
themselves prefer to be independent and not criticized for the work they have 
done, which is understandable as they are representatives of an independent 
profession.  
But in reality it has to be acknowledged that ineffectiveness of counsel is a 
problem that should be dealt with, because it really is there. To say that 
ineffectiveness of counsel does not exist, means turning a blind eye towards the 
reality. There is no reason to presume that an average lawyer is always doing 
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his job properly. There simply is no evidence to justify the presumption.194 On 
the other hand there is empirical evidence that supports the conclusion that 
ineffectiveness of counsel in criminal proceedings is a real problem, especially 
when it comes to appointed counsels.195 But if the ineffectiveness of counsel is 
not dealt with, it means that there is no improvement in the quality of defense, 
which also means that one of the reasons for ineffective defense, or at least one 
of the factors that encourages it, is the reluctance of the justice system to pay 
attention to it and to solve the problem.  
 
 
2. Does the Accused’s Right to Effective Assistance 
Counsel Come from his Right to the Assistance  
of Counsel? 
As it was already discussed in the last chapter, the constitutions of Estonia and 
the United States and the European Convention on Human Rights provide the 
accused’s right to counsel for conference and defense, but not the compulsory 
level of quality of the assistance provided by counsel, which means that they are 
silent on the level of effectiveness required of such counsel.196 It can even be 
said that it is not clear from the language of the constitutions of Estonia and the 
United States and the European Convention on Human Rights that the right to 
effective assistance is a necessary addition to the right to counsel. By its terms 
the second sentence of the first subsection of § 21 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia, the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
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States and Article 6 of the ECHR do not suggest that the accused’s right to 
counsel is violated by counsel’s mistakes made in the course of criminal 
proceedings.197 Consequently, the question arises, whether the right to counsel 
in the context of constitution and international law means that counsel has to be 
present in the proceedings or counsel has to do more in order to conclude that 
the right to counsel is guaranteed to an accused. 
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the presence of counsel in the 
adversary system is absolutely necessary and arises from the concept of 
adversarial proceedings. But to say that mere presence is enough, means that 
although the accused will have counsel by his side he actually does not receive 
any support and assistance from him, which would result in the ceasing of the 
adversary process.198 Without overstating the importance of the role of counsel 
in criminal proceedings in the adversary system it can be said that the system 
itself presumes counsel’s effectiveness. The adversary system is premised upon 
defense counsel’s function as a protector of the procedural rights of his 
representative that otherwise would be useless to an accused who usually does 
not have a legal education.199 Certain rights, such as the right to confrontation, 
are preserved only if they are exercised in an effective manner and only counsel 
as a legal professional is able to do that. Consequently, the right to effective 
assistance should be defined by the accused’s need for a skilled partisan to 
protect his procedural interests, a partisan that is an equal adversary to the 
prosecutor and acts diligently.200 I think the standpoints from the authors from 
the United States are here appropriate and applicable to Estonian criminal 
proceedings also, as the Estonian criminal justice system is by its concept 
adversary.201 This means that although the Constitution of the Republic of 
Estonia does not explicitly mention right to effective counsel, the right to 
counsel should be interpreted in the way that this means the right to have 
actively participating counsel present in the proceedings. 
In case counsel has provided poor assistance, there is no contest between 
parties to a court proceeding and therefore the structure of the adversarial 
system is jeopardized.202 The accused represented by ineffective counsel is at a 
manifest disadvantage in the criminal justice process, because he is practically 
without defense and yet the adversary system is predicated on the notion of an 
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equal battle between zealous combatants.203 These are the standpoints I strongly 
agree with. In case counsel does not exercise his duties effectively, the right to 
counsel and other rights in criminal proceedings lose their meaning and the 
accused loses the support counsel should give him. Consequently, one 
contestant in the proceedings, although physically present, is “missing” and the 
right to counsel is therefore an empty, meaningless right, which goes strongly 
against the right to fair trial and the idea of adversary proceedings.204 Thus, if 
we say that the right to effective assistance is not a compulsory element of the 
right to assistance, we deny a basic requirement of a working adversary model – 
a fair contest between equals,205 as we would also do if we would conclude that 
even presence of counsel is not needed in adversary proceedings. As Barbara 
Allen Babcock has strikingly written: “The people’s victory has little value and 
offers less satisfaction if the individual has been represented by an ineffective 
champion.”206 It could be said that the fact that ineffectiveness of counsel has 
occurred in the criminal proceedings has bad consequences for the reliability of 
the criminal justice system. When ineffectiveness of defense counsel is so 
serious that it leads to an annulment of the court judgment, it can be said that 
the administration of justice is destabilized. Reversals always impair pre-
dictability and fairness of the judicial process, and undermine public confidence 
in it. Even if lawyers’ ineffectiveness is not as serious as to justify the 
annulment of the court judgment, the administration of justice suffers if balance 
between the parties to the proceedings is disturbed,207 which in turn affects 
public confidence in the justice system. Therefore in my opinion the conclusion 
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that the accused received effective assistance of counsel is one indicator that he 
received fair trial.  
When it comes to the right to effective assistance of counsel, the principle of 
fairness is closely related to the principle of equal protection. This means that 
the criminal justice system, which relies on counsels of widely varying skills, is 
not allowed to treat similarly situated accused persons unequally. Basically this 
means that “[s]imilar defendants who have committed similar crimes under 
similar circumstances ought not to receive vastly different dispositions because 
of their respective lawyers’ varying professional attributes.”208 Therefore it may 
be that when we look at a certain procedure, it may appear fair, but when we 
compare different procedures, we may conclude that is was unfair compared to 
similar cases where there was more lenient treatment.209 For an adversary trial 
to be credible, contests based on similar facts should produce similar results. 
Counsel’s zealous commitment to the interests of the accused ensures both that 
“…particular trials produce believable results and that all criminal trials are 
sufficiently similar as contests to produce results that are relatively reliable.”210 
I agree with that opinion and believe that the treatment of the accused in 
criminal proceedings and also the result of the case should not depend on which 
counsel participated in criminal proceedings.  
For the aforementioned reasons, it is unquestionable that the adversary 
system requires more than the mere presence of counsel211 and that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is by its essence related to the right to counsel. 
Therefore, to say that the accused’s constitutional right to counsel was 
guaranteed, counsel has to be present and participate actively on the accused’s 
behalf in criminal proceedings, i.e. has to be effective. 
Although not provided for in the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the right to effective legal assistance can be deduced from ECtHR case law.212 
The ECtHR has held that “…although not absolute, the right of everyone 
charged with a criminal offence to be effectively defended by a lawyer, 
assigned officially if need be, is one of the fundamental features of a fair 
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trial.”213 The most famous judgments of the ECtHR about the ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel are Artico v. Italy and Goddy v. Italy.214 In both cases the Court 
concluded the violation of Article 6 paragraph (3) (c) of the ECHR. 
Mr. Artico, who had originally been represented by retained counsel Mr. 
Ferri, included in his declaration of the 10th March 1972 to the Court of 
Cassation a request for free legal aid in connection with the applications to 
quash. This request was granted on the 8th of August 1972 by the President of 
the Second Criminal Section who appointed Mr. Della Rocca, a lawyer from 
Rome to Mr. Artico. After that Mr. Artico wrote to the Section President and 
the public prosecutor attached to the Court of Cassation to inform them that he 
had heard nothing from Mr. Della Rocca and to request that he would be 
provided with effective assistance. He also wrote to the Section President and 
the Cassation prosecutor requesting Mr. Della Rocca’s replacement. In his 
application of the 26th of April 1974 to the ECtHR, Mr. Artico alleged violation 
of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR, by reason of the fact that he was not 
assisted by a lawyer before the Court of Cassation in the proceedings that 
terminated on the 12th of November 1973.  
The ECtHR held in Artico v. Italy that the aim of the European Convention 
on Human Rights is to guarantee not rights that are “theoretical or illusory” but 
rights that are “practical and effective”: “…this is particularly so of the rights of 
the defence in view of the prominent place held in a democratic society by the 
right to a fair trial, from which they derive…” The Court continued: “Again, 
mere nomination does not ensure effective assistance since the lawyer 
appointed for legal aid purposes may die, fall seriously ill, be prevented for a 
protracted period from acting or shirk his duties. If they are notified of the 
situation, the authorities must either replace him or cause him to fulfill his 
obligations.”215 After making previous statements the Court solved Mr. Artico’s 
case and concluded that Mr. Artico never had the benefit of Mr. Della Rocca’s 
services. From the very beginning Mr. Della Rocco stated that he was not able 
to act: first he referred to a busy schedule and after that to his state of health.216 
Because the government claimed that the lack of assistance did not actually 
prejudice Mr. Artico, the Court also had to answer the question of prejudice. 
The Court pointed out that “…here the government is asking for the impossible 
since it cannot be proved beyond all doubt that a substitute for Mr. Della Rocca 
would have pleaded statutory limitation and would have convinced the Court of 
Cassation when the applicant did not succeed in doing so.” The Court added: 
“Nevertheless, it appears plausible in the particular circumstances that this 
would have happened. Above all, there is nothing in Article 6 par. 3 (c) (art. 6-
3-c) indicating that such proof is necessary; an interpretation that introduced 
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this requirement into the sub-paragraph would deprive it in large measure of its 
substance. More generally, the existence of a violation is conceivable even in 
the absence of prejudice...”217 In addition to that the Court noted that although a 
state cannot be held responsible for every shortcoming on the part of appointed 
counsel, in this case it was an obligation of the competent Italian authorities to 
take steps to ensure that the applicant enjoyed the right to counsel. There were 
two ways the Italian authorities could have done that: either to replace Mr. 
Della Rocca or, if appropriate, to compel him to fulfill his obligations. But they 
choose the third and in the Court’s eyes inappropriate way: remaining pas-
sive.218 So, two important conclusions come from Artico v. Italy: first, that mere 
appointment of counsel is not enough, because counsel has to act during the 
proceedings also, and second, when the accused has notified the authorities 
about the absence of his counsel’s actions, the authorities have to interfere. 
In Goddi v. Italy Mr. Goddi’s appeal was drafted by one of the two lawyers 
who had defended him in the first instance, Mr. Monteleone. The Bologna 
Court of Appeal set the hearing down for the 30th of November 1976, but Mr. 
Monteleone did not appear, although he had been notified of the date. The Court 
of Appeal appointed a lawyer, Mr. Maio, to act for Mr. Goddi and then 
adjourned the proceedings indefinitely for other procedural reasons. The 
President subsequently decided that the hearing should be held on the 9th of July 
1977. On that day, the Court of Appeal once more ordered an adjournment. The 
record of the sitting discloses that Mr. Goddi appeared before the Court assisted 
by a new lawyer of his own choosing, Mr. Bezicheri. The hearing of the 3rd of 
December 1977 was held in the absence not only of Mr. Goddi and his lawyer 
but also of the party seeking damages, the co-accused and his lawyer, and the 
three witnesses who had been summoned. The Court of Appeal was unaware of 
Mr. Goddi’s recent arrest and declared him to be unlawfully absent. Mr. 
Bezicheri failed to appear, because he had not received the notification: it had 
been sent to Mr. Monteleone and to Mr. Ronconi, the other lawyer who had 
defended Mr. Goddi at the first instance. At the hearing on the 3rd December, 
the Court of Appeal appointed another lawyer, Mr. Straziani, to act for Mr. 
Goddi. Mr. Straziani just referred to the grounds of appeal, which had been 
drafted by Mr. Monteleone. Mr. Goddi filed a complaint to the ECtHR, 
claiming that the hearing of the 3rd of December 1977 before the Bologna Court 
of Appeal was held in absence of himself and also his retained counsel, Mr. 
Bezicheri. He also claimed that the defense provided by Mr. Straziani, the 
appointed lawyer, had not been effective. 
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The ECtHR determined that Mr. Goddi and Mr. Bezicheri did not appear at 
the court session. Mr. Straziani was not familiar with the facts of the case and 
he did not even know who his client was. In addition to that he did not have 
enough time to prepare since the hearing closed on the same day, and the 
outcome of the hearing was a heavier sentence than the one imposed at first 
instance.219 The Court expressed an opinion that failure to notify Mr. Bezicheri 
deprived the applicant of a “practical and effective” defense, because the 
Bologna Court of Appeal should have known that only Mr. Bezicheri could 
have provided an effective defense to Mr. Goddi on the 3rd of December 1977. 
Therefore, the court should have notified Mr. Bezicheri about the hearing.220 
Related to the applicants claim that Mr. Straziani was ineffective, the Court 
refused to give its opinion about the lawyer’s work, referring to independence 
of the profession: “As regards the defence provided for Mr. Goddi on 3 
December 1977 by the officially-appointed lawyer, it is not the Court’s task to 
express an opinion on the manner in which Mr. Straziani, a member of a liberal 
profession who was acting in accordance with the dictates of his conscience as a 
participant in the administration of justice, considered that he should conduct 
the case.”221 On the other hand, the Court looked into the (in)action of the 
Bologna Court of Appeal and concluded that it did not take steps to ensure that 
the accused had an opportunity for an adequate defense. Mr. Straziani did not 
have the time and facilities to study the case-file, prepare his arguments and 
consult his client. Therefore the Court of Appeal should have taken measures, 
e.g., it could have adjourned the hearing, as the Prosecutor’s Office requested, 
or it could have directed on its own initiative that the sitting be suspended for a 
sufficient period of time.222 
Thus, the most important judgments of the ECtHR in the field of ineffective-
ness of defense counsel handle both cases with appointed and retained counsels. 
The ECtHR held in those cases that when counsel does not participate in 
criminal proceedings, no matter if it is because of counsel’s failure or because 
of court’s failure to notify him of the date of the court session, effective and 
practical right to counsel is not guaranteed to the accused. The next two ECtHR 
cases do not concern non-participation of counsel in criminal proceedings, but 
the quality of the assistance provided by him. 
In Kamasinski v. Austria223 Mr. Kamasinski complained that his appointed 
counsel, Dr Steidl, had not provided effective legal assistance for him in the 
preparation and conduct of the case: the lawyer did not attend at the indictment 
hearing, visited Mr. Kamasinski at prison only briefly, failed to acquaint Mr. 
Kamasinski with the prosecution evidence prior to the trial and did not perform 
adequately at the trial. Mr. Kamasinski claimed that after the incident following 
                                                     
219 Goddi v. Italy, § 27. 
220 § 30 of the judgment. 
221 § 31 of the judgment. 
222 Goddi v. Italy, § 31. 
223 Kamasinski v. Austria. Application no. 9783/82. 19 December 1989. 
63 
which defense counsel made an unsuccessful request to withdraw from the case, 
he was without the benefit of any legal assistance at all.  
The ECtHR stressed once more as it had done in Goddi v. Italy, that legal 
profession is independent from the state. Therefore the conduct of the defense is 
essentially a matter between the accused and his counsel, whether counsel is 
appointed or retained. The Court noted: “… [C]ompetent national authorities 
are required under Article 6 § 3 (c) (art. 6-3-c) to intervene only if a failure by 
legal aid counsel to provide effective representation is manifest or sufficiently 
brought to their attention in some other way.”224 Because Mr. Kamasinski’s 
lawyer unlike Mr. Artico’s lawyer took a number of steps prior to the trial 
(visited Mr. Kamasinski in prison on nine occasions, lodged a complaint against 
the decision to remand in custody and filed written and telephone motions for 
the attendance of witnesses), there is no reason to conclude that competent 
authorities were notified of ineffective legal representation.225 During the trial a 
dispute occurred between the accused and Dr. Steidl, as a result of which Dr. 
Steidl asked the trial court for withdrawal, which in the Court’s opinion means 
that the Austrian judicial authorities were notified of the fact that Mr. 
Kamasinski was not pleased with the assistance provided him. Still, the ECtHR 
did not find that the decision at the trial not to discharge Dr. Steidl deprived Mr. 
Kamasinski from the effective assistance of counsel. “It may also be correct that 
the defence at the trial could have been conducted in another way, or even that 
Dr Steidl in some respects acted contrary to what Mr. Kamasinski at the time or 
subsequently considered to be in his own best interests. Nevertheless, despite 
Mr. Kamasinski’s criticisms, the circumstances of his representation at the trial 
do not reveal a failure to provide legal assistance as required by paragraph 3 (c) 
(art. 6-3-c) or a denial of a fair hearing under paragraph 1 (art. 6-1).” 226 
In Daud v. Portugal227 the first appointed lawyer, before reporting sick, had 
not taken any steps as counsel for Mr. Daud. The second lawyer, whose 
appointment the accused learned of only three days before the beginning of the 
trial at the Criminal Court, did not have the time she needed to study the file, 
visit her client in prison and prepare his defense. The ECtHR held that “…it was 
for the relevant authorities, while respecting the fundamental principle of the 
independence of the Bar, to act so as to ensure that the applicant received the 
effective benefit of his right, which they had acknowledged.”228 In the ECtHR’s 
opinion, because the accused had sent the court letters claiming that his first 
counsel had not taken any steps since being appointed, the court should have 
inquired into the manner and possibly replaced him sooner, without waiting for 
him to state himself that he was unable to act for Mr. Daud. In addition to that, 
after appointing a replacement the court failed to adjourn the trial on its own 
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initiative, although the judge knew that the accused had not had any proper 
legal assistance until then. The fact that the second appointed lawyer did not 
make the application is of no consequence for the ECtHR, because the 
circumstances of the case required that the court should not remain passive.229 
The case of Daud is very important as it shows that sometimes the court has an 
obligation to act to ensure effective assistance even if the accused or his counsel 
do not request court’s action. 
In general, the case law of the ECtHR indicates that the Court currently 
considers Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR to be breached only where 
counsel completely fails to perform some duty or the performance of duty is 
materially impeded. In the case Artico v. Italy counsel refused to provide legal 
assistance to the person charged with a criminal offence. In the case Goddi v. 
Italy counsel failed to appear to the court. In the case Daud v. Portugal the first 
appointed counsel provided no legal assistance at all, and the second failed to 
prepare for the trial. In all these cases the ECtHR held that Article 6 paragraph 3 
(c) of the ECHR had been breached. It is noteworthy that all these cases 
involved a situation in which counsel completely failed to perform one of his 
duties or he was not able to perform because of court’s action. In other cases 
like Kamasinski v. Austria, the court has referred to the independence of 
defense counsel and has refrained from evaluating the effectiveness of legal 
assistance provided by counsel. It is clear from the judgment in Kamasinski v. 
Austria that the ECtHR will refrain where possible from addressing the 
substantive aspect of counsel’s assistance. In any case, the ECtHR has never 
found Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR to have been violated merely on 
the claim of a person charged with a criminal offence that although counsel 
fulfilled his duties generally, he failed to fulfill some of these duties effec-
tively.230 
In addition to that the standpoint of the ECtHR is that the national courts 
should intervene only if a failure by counsel to provide effective representation 
is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way. The 
ECtHR has therefore developed a harsh rule for the accused no matter if he has 
retained or appointed counsel: the judge has to act only if he is or should be 
aware that the accused is not being represented effectively. This rule was 
criticized already in the United States by Richard Brody in 1977 when Mr. 
Brody analyzed case law of the United States’ courts. Mr. Brody pointed out 
that the accused may create such awareness by complaining to the court during 
the trial about the quality of defense counsel’s assistance or bringing his 
dissatisfaction to the court’s attention any other way. Otherwise, he will have to 
argue afterwards that his lawyer’s ineffectiveness was so apparent that the judge 
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should have been aware of it.231 An accused who does not complain at trial may 
thus lose the chance to refer to the breach of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the 
ECHR. Yet the expectation that an accused will complain about the 
performance of his counsel to the judge during trial is unrealistic and too 
burdensome for the accused. First the accused may not know that it is necessary 
to do that to obtain court’s action. Secondly the accused often does not know 
that his counsel’s performance is ineffective.232 Thirdly, even if he knows, it is 
not certain that he dares to complain.233 It is illogical to charge the accused with 
responsibility for the acts of his counsel, because he does not have proper 
knowledge to supervise his counsel’s activity and even if he does he is in a very 
weak position, because he has to complain about the flaws of a person who is at 
his side. If we oblige the accused to watch over the conduct of his counsel, then 
in every ineffectiveness case it could be argued that the accused waived his 
right to effective counsel by not properly supervising his advocate.234  
The cautious approach of the ECtHR to the quality of legal assistance is 
understandable – counsels truly are independent in their profession, which 
means that they can choose their actions and they do not have to act in the way 
that is pleasing to the court, and as a party to a court proceeding counsels need 
to have authority and freedom to make decisions. To hold a state responsible for 
counsel’s mistakes seems somewhat contradictory as it is against the basic 
principles of criminal procedure, both adversary and modern inquisitorial, to 
ask the state through the courts to exercise control over the performance of an 
individual party to the proceedings and to oblige him to take some certain steps. 
In addition to that one argument against looking directly into counsels’ actions 
for the ECtHR is the fact that by ratifying the European Convention on Human 
Rights, states agree to grant certain rights to individuals, but at the same time, 
the European Convention on Human Rights does not bind individuals. 
Therefore it is not possible for an applicant to complain to the Strasbourg Court 
about his lawyer’s unsatisfactory representation only and he has to refer to 
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mistakes made by the state.235 However, from the accused’s perspective the 
consequences of bad lawyering may be left unresolved, if he was represented by 
counsel, but the assistance provided by counsel was not effective, and the 
ECtHR refuses to analyze counsel’s mistakes.236 Of course, it is true that 
counsels are independent in their actions, but in sum the state is the one who 
charges the accused with crime, conducts the proceedings and may even finally 
deprive the accused person of his liberty, which means that the state is 
responsible for the quality of proceedings, not the accused or his counsel who 
are just parties to the proceedings. Therefore in case counsel has been 
ineffective, the ECtHR could find a justification for analyzing counsel’s actions 
in the argument that it is the state’s responsibility to guarantee fair trial rights to 
the accused. As some even say that ineffective representation reduces the right 
to counsel into “a hollow right” as “ineffective representation is the same as no 
representation at all”237condemnation of the state for not guaranteeing the right 
to fair trial for the accused is easy to justify in the situation where the accused 
did not receive effective assistance of counsel. That way, although the ECtHR 
would look directly into counsel’s actions, it would finally give its opinion 
about the obligations of the state, not of counsel. 
The European Commission has expressed its view about effectiveness of 
counsel in the area of state legal aid. According to the Commission it is not 
enough that the state appoints a lawyer – the legal assistance provided by 
counsel must also be effective.238 The European Commission has proposed that 
member states should be required to implement a system for providing a 
replacement if the original lawyer is found to be in effective239 and the 
European Parliament has recommended that member states should ensure that 
an independent body with competence to replace counsel is charged with 
hearing complaints about the effectiveness of a defense lawyer.240 Since the 
suspect is not always in a position to assess the effectiveness of his legal 
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representation, according to the Commission, the onus has to be on the member 
states to establish a system for checking this.241  
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to 
counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.242 It is an absolutely 
reasoned standpoint when we look into the role that counsel has in the criminal 
proceedings as the prosecutor’s adversary and the accused’s adviser. Therefore 
it must be agreed with the United States Supreme Court that the mere fact that 
the accused is represented by a person who happens to meet formal require-
ments to enter the proceedings as counsel is not enough, which means that the 
guarantee of the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is not satisfied by 
a formal appointment of counsel to defend the accused.243 The same is in the 
United States Supreme Court’s opinion with retained counsel: “An accused is 
entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays 
the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair.”244 Consequently, the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized in the United States not for its own 
sake, but for the effect it has on the ability of all criminally accused to receive a 
fair trial.245 
If the right to effective assistance of counsel is recognized as an essential 
element of the right to counsel and therefore the right to fair trial, it can be 
asserted as I already concluded when I discussed the right to counsel that it 
must be guaranteed to all accused persons, regardless of guilt or innocence, 
because only effective assistance guarantees that the proceeding is adversarial. 
Because the objective of an adversarial system is to reach the truth through 
skilled advocacy of counsels on both sides,246 this holding should not be 
sacrificed even if there is strong evidence against the accused. No one ought to 
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be found guilty without a fair trial, which means that there was the effective 
assistance of counsel in the proceedings.247  
In spite of what has been mentioned above, it is obvious that the right to 
effective assistance of a defense counsel does not mean that the accused is 
entitled to an absolutely flawless and perfect defense. The United States 
Supreme Court has expressed its view in this matter: “... [T]he Constitution 
entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.”248 Therefore the 
representation does not have to be of the “highest quality”, but only “effec-
tive”.249 This is an absolutely practical standpoint when we think about how 
things are in reality. First, counsels are humans and all humans make mistakes. 
Therefore it might be that in real life there is no such thing as a “perfect 
defense”. Second, there are always the principle of finality and the need to save 
resources that we have to consider when we start demanding “perfect 
assistance”. The truth is that if the accused shows that counsel made mistakes in 
the course of criminal proceedings, the question of whether the conviction was 
obtained through unfair process in denial of the accused’s right to effective 
counsel always arises. But it would be too burdensome to the system to afford 
to have cases retried where the procedural violation is minimal.250 Therefore I 
repeat here that it is important to set a standard which stipulates, which 
counsel’s mistakes result in ineffective defense in a meaning that they lead to 
annulment of the court judgment and which are just mistakes. While it is 
probable that it will uphold a conviction obtained in denial of fair procedure (at 
least if we presuppose that in order a trial to be called fair, the defense counsel’s 
representation has to be flawless), it is a pragmatic approach and helps to 
preserve institutional integrity.251 Then again, effective advocacy is more than 
the mere absence of radical mistakes, and as such advocacy is essential to the 
adversarial system,252 it is important not to set the standard of effectiveness too 
low. Both low standard and lack of coherent standard for evaluating counsel’s 
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3. The Methods to Guarantee the Quality  
of the Assistance of Counsels 
There are two kinds of measures to guarantee the quality of the assistance: 
measures that are preventive and measures that are used during the specific 
criminal proceeding. 
The most elementary preventive method to improve quality of the assistance 
provided to the accused by counsel in criminal proceedings is to enact require-
ments to persons who want to be counsels in criminal proceedings. In Estonia 
only advocates or persons who meet the educational requirements established 
for contractual representatives by § 41 (4) of the CCP are allowed to participate 
in criminal proceedings as retained counsels (CCP, § 42 (1) 1)). So to be a 
defense counsel one does not have to be a member of the Bar in Estonia – only 
counsel who is appointed by state has to be a member of the Bar (CCP, § 42 (1) 
2)).  
If a non-advocate person wants to enter the proceedings as counsel, he 
always has to have consent from the body conducting the proceedings, which is 
another measure to guarantee preemptively that the accused receives effective 
assistance. But if this person receives consent from the body conducting the 
proceedings, which means that the body conducting the proceedings presumes 
that he is able to act as counsel, it does not mean that if he turns out to be 
ineffective during criminal proceedings, he is allowed to continue as counsel. 
The Supreme Court of Estonia has repeatedly held that it is in the competence 
of the body conducting proceedings to permit a person who is not a member of 
the Bar, but who meets the educational requirements, to enter the proceedings 
as counsel and therefore it is in the competence of it to withdraw the per-
mission. If the body conducting proceedings decides to withdraw permission, he 
has to notify the accused and counsel and give the accused an opportunity to 
choose another counsel.254 The Supreme Court of Estonia reasons its position as 
follows. When the body conducting proceedings gives a person permission to 
participate in criminal proceedings as counsel, he verifies only whether the 
person meets qualification requirements or not, because the body conducting 
proceedings usually does not know the person personally and therefore has no 
other facts to use for evaluating his competence. During the proceedings the 
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body conducting proceedings has a chance to monitor the person’s actions and 
gain knowledge of his skills. Consequently it is possible that the body 
conducting proceedings reaches a conclusion that the person is incompetent as 
counsel and leaves the accused without defense. That is why it might be 
necessary to withdraw permission and give an accused a chance to choose 
another counsel.255 Even if the accused is against that, it is important to notice 
that the right to choose counsel is not just the accused’s personal matter: the 
court has to make sure that counsel actually fulfills his duties.256  
If counsel already participates in the criminal proceedings and turns out to be 
ineffective, the question arises, what should the state do and whether the state 
has to do anything at all in order to guarantee the accused effective assistance of 
counsel? As it was discussed above, the Estonian Supreme Court has found that 
the state has to act in case retained counsel who is not an advocate, turns out to 
be ineffective, but should the state act in case counsel is an advocate, and if yes, 
should it act no matter if counsel is retained or appointed? On the one hand it is 
unquestionable that the defense counsel is an independent party to a court 
proceeding, a standpoint that the ECtHR has declared repeatedly. On the other 
hand, it is clear that the state is responsible for guaranteeing the accused’s right 
to fair trial and therefore effective defense, and as we look at the above referred 
judicial practice of the Estonian Supreme Court, the court has recognized this 
principle in despite of ECtHR’s standpoint in the context of non-advocate 
counsels (who are in Estonia always retained counsels).  
When it comes to the denying relief for ineffectiveness of retained counsel, 
the supporters of that approach impute errors of retained counsel to the client 
who retained him. They claim that the appointment of counsel constitutes state 
action,257 so the ineffective assistance of appointed counsel is denial of the right 
to effective assistance of counsel. However, where the accused has chosen his 
own advocate, the supporters of denying relief for ineffectiveness of retained 
counsel suggest that the mere fact that the advocate was ineffective involves no 
state action and constitutes a denial of no right. 258  
I tend to agree with the authors who claim that there is no justification for 
holding that an accused who has appointed counsel is entitled to relief for 
ineffectiveness while relief would be denied to a person who has retained 
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counsel when the conduct in question is the same.259 To be true, the state cannot 
intrude directly into appointed counsels’ actions either because of the principle 
of independence that applies to the conduct and actions of lawyers generally: 
what the state can do is that it has an opportunity to control the quality of the 
assistance of both retained and appointed counsel through the certification of 
advocates and minimum requirements for practice for all lawyers (and through 
courts’ observations too as I will discuss in chapter four). Therefore there are 
some state measures to guarantee quality of both retained and appointed 
counsel’s work. And what is more important, it is unfair to impute the in-
effectiveness of counsel to an accused who does not possess the knowledge 
necessary to understand or detect his counsel’s flaws. It has been also pointed 
out, and I explained this standpoint more thoroughly in the last subsection of 
this chapter, that the criminal trial itself is state action, and that the ineffective 
assistance of counsel at trial constitutes a denial of due process, no matter if the 
accused had counsel retained or court-appointed. Even where the accused 
selects his own lawyer, there is still the state’s responsibility, because the state 
is the one who conducts criminal proceedings. If an accused is convicted in 
violation of his right to effective representation it is clear that there are 
shortcomings in the proceedings conducted by the state.260 Advocates are 
informal agents of the state who supply one of the elements of a fair trial which 
the state is obliged to secure for all accused persons.261 As the United States 
Supreme Court has found: “Since the State’s conduct of a criminal trial itself 
implicates the State in the defendant’s conviction, we see no basis for drawing a 
distinction between retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal 
justice to defendants who must choose their own lawyers.”262  
Therefore it is reasonable to hold the state responsible for the ineffectiveness 
of appointed and also retained counsel because the state has an obligation to 
provide a fair trial to all people accused of crimes. In turn it means that the state 
has to act in specific criminal proceedings and also in the justice system 
generally to improve effectiveness of counsels. In addition to imposing require-
ments of education beforehand, the state has to act also during the proceedings. 
By state I mean mostly the court, because the court is the one that presides over 
criminal proceedings. Of course, the state can always turn to the Bar As-
sociation too with the application to decide whether the advocate has fulfilled 
his duties in criminal proceedings, but this results in giving the state’s 
responsibility to monitor fairness of the proceedings into the hands of a private 
organization. It is my sincere belief that courts themselves should be authorized 
to assess counsels’ behavior and to evaluate if counsel fulfilled his duties 
properly or not, and the principle of independence of the Bar should be left 
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aside when the accused’s right to effective counsel is violated. This principle 
might be convenient for the ECtHR to use if it does not want to assess counsels’ 
actions for some reason, but it should not be taken as a tool for the state courts 
to disregard their responsibility to guarantee procedural rights to accused 
persons. The courts should note that supervision performed by them over the 
performance of counsel is an effective measure to raise the quality of the 
assistance provided by counsels. It is a strong condemnation, and I dare to say 
shame for counsel, if the court concludes that he has been ineffective in the 
proceedings and either asks him to fulfill his duties properly, removes him or 
annuls the judgment that was a result of the proceedings in which counsel was 
ineffective.  
After I have described different reasons for ineffectiveness of counsel and 
different types of ineffective representation, I am going to discuss the 
justification of judicial supervision further as I am also analyzing different 
forms of judicial supervision over the quality in the performance of counsel in 





III. SITUATIONS THAT LEAD  
TO INEFFECTIVE DEFENSE AND  
TYPES OF INEFFECTIVE DEFENSE 
1. Interference by the State 
There are cases where ineffectiveness of counsel does not derive from counsel 
but from the court or from the law. For example the court may appoint counsel 
too late, i.e. give counsel too little time to prepare for the case, or grant too short 
deadlines during the criminal proceedings. The court may instruct counsel to do 
something that impairs the defense position (e.g., ascertain that witnesses are 
questioned in a certain order, although counsel is strongly against it) or prohibit 
counsel to something (e.g., to interrogate the accused during the court 
proceedings). The court may also groundlessly interrupt the attorney-client 
relationship (e.g., remove retained or appointed counsel although there is no 
ground for removal) or refrain from interrupting when there is ground (e.g., if 
there is a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and the 
accused files a request to remove appointed counsel, but the court refuses to do 
that). It might be also that the law prohibits counsel to do something or instructs 
counsel to do something that breaches counsel’s right to make tactical decisions 
or gives counsel too short deadlines. I will discuss all of these examples further 
below. In the United States the examples of the case law of the United States 
Supreme Court about court’s or legislator’s interference with counsel’s 
assistance are: a bar on the attorney-client consultation during an overnight trial 
recess (Geders v. United States263), a case where a judge refused to allow 
defense counsel to make a closing argument (Herring v. New York264), a 
requirement that the accused has to testify first or not at all (Brooks v. Ten-
nessee265), and a case where the state’s law prevented defense counsel from 
calling his client as a witness (Ferguson v. Georgia266). 
It may happen that the period between when counsel is retained or appointed 
and the court session begins is very short and counsel does not have enough 
time to prepare the case. In Estonia, although the participation of counsel is 
mandatory since a presentation of the criminal file, which occurs in the pre-trial 
stage of the proceedings and before court session there is a preliminary hearing, 
which gives counsel an opportunity to prepare the case thoroughly, it is still 
possible that during the proceedings the necessity arises to change counsel and 
therefore the problem with too little time to prepare may still arise. And even if 
there is no change of counsel, it might be that appointed or retained counsel has 
too little time to prepare before the court session, because there is an extensive 
amount of materials to work through. In Chambers v. Maroney the United 
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States Supreme Court stated that the courts should always make every effort to 
make early appointments of counsel, but it is not a per se rule requiring reversal 
of every conviction following late appointment of counsel.267 The message of 
Chambers v. Maroney seems to be that even if counsel is appointed late, the 
higher court still has to analyze counsel’s performance during the trial and in 
order to annul the judgment of the lower court the higher court must ascertain 
that counsel’s performance was somehow deficient, e.g., he was not familiar 
with the facts of the case, failed to consult with the accused etc.268 In Morris v. 
Slappy the United States Supreme Court continued the same path and said that 
broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances. If 
counsel assured that he was prepared and ready for a trial it cannot be concluded 
that the denial of a continuance prevented the substituted counsel from being 
fully prepared for trial.269 Although the Supreme Court looked in this case into 
counsel’s actions during the proceedings too, it still emphasized the most the 
fact that counsel himself assured that he was ready for the trial. Basically it 
seems to be that according to the Supreme Court’s standpoint counsel is 
ineffective only if he declares himself ineffective, which does not make sense, 
as counsels usually do not want to admit their ineffectiveness. The ECtHR has 
expressed its opinion about the late appointment too, but according to the 
ECtHR’s opinion counsel’s view about his ineffectiveness does not matter. In 
Sakhnovskiy v. Russia,270 the accused was able to communicate with the newly-
appointed lawyer for fifteen minutes, immediately before the start of the hearing 
of the Supreme Court, sitting in Moscow. The ECtHR emphasized that, given 
the complexity and seriousness of the case, the time allowed was clearly not 
sufficient for the accused to discuss the case with his counsel Ms A.271 There-
fore the Court did not look into counsel’s performance or into her opinion about 
the matter but relied on its own experience and concluded that with so little time 
counsel was not able to prepare the case thoroughly and adequately. The Court 
also emphasized that the relationship between the lawyer and his client should 
be based on mutual trust and understanding. The Court added: “Of course, it is 
not always possible for the State to facilitate such a relationship: there are 
inherent time and place constraints for the meetings between the detained 
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person and his lawyer. Moreover, in exceptional circumstances the State may 
restrict confidential contacts with defence counsel for a person in detention ... 
Nevertheless, any limitation on relations between clients and lawyers, whether 
inherent or express, should not thwart the effective legal assistance to which a 
defendant is entitled. Notwithstanding possible difficulties or restrictions, such 
is the importance attached to the rights of the defence that the right to effective 
legal assistance must be respected in all circumstances.”272 Therefore the 
ECtHR does not look for counsel’s opinion in order to decide whether counsel 
was able to prepare the case or not when a late appointment occurs, which is a 
reasonable approach in the light of the thought that counsels do not want to 
admit their ineffectiveness. 
The court’s instruction to do something or refusal to allow counsel to do 
something may infringe a defense strategy. This may even not be a court, but 
some other state authority that interferes. For instance in Moiseyev v. Russia273 
counsel for Mr. Moiseyev was required to seek special permits to visit and 
confer with him. Permits were valid for one visit only and the lawyers’ attempts 
to have extended their period of validity proved to be unsuccessful. Permits 
were issued by the authority in charge of the case. Consequently for the entire 
duration of the criminal proceedings against the applicant visits by the 
applicant’s counsel were conditional on authorization. The ECtHR noted that 
the need to apply for an individual permit for every visit created considerable 
practical difficulties in the exercise of the rights of the defense because it 
claimed a lot of time and effort. In addition, this arrangement put the defense in 
a position where it depended on the discretion of the prosecution and therefore 
destroyed the appearance of the equality of arms.274 In the context of this 
decision it is difficult to propose a certain standard in order to evaluate whether 
the accused’s right to effective assistance of counsel is violated by a state’s 
action that infringes the defense position. It is a task of the higher courts to 
ascertain whether state’s action prejudiced counsel’s independence and strategy, 
restrained counsel’s freedom to exercise defense rights and in accordance with 
case law of the ECtHR destroyed the appearance of the equality of arms. When 
the law, not court or other state authorities, is the one that puts counsel in that 
position, counsel has a right to seek commencement of constitutional review. 
In my opinion when it comes to the late appointment or too short deadlines, 
first it is a task of the higher court to give a meaning to the notions “too late” 
and “too short”. Because every case is different and not all cases are difficult, it 
might be possible that counsel has enough time to consult the client and prepare 
the case even if he is appointed only a couple of days before the trial. With 
more difficult cases it is obvious that it is not possible. With deadlines it is the 
same: if counsel is instructed to, for instance, compose a short document, the 
deadline granted to counsel could be very short, but if counsel is instructed to 
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write a thorough opinion about a complicated case, he needs a lot more time. 
Another question is, should the finding “too late” or “too short” compose the 
ground for annulment of judgment per se. In my opinion here it would be 
reasonable to look into counsel’s performance in the proceedings and see, for 
example, if counsel was badly prepared or not, if the document was thorough or 
not, etc. If the court orders counsel to do something or prohibits counsel to do 
something and the accused claims that it impaired the defense position, the 
higher court should also look directly into counsel’s performance and decide, 
whether court’s action prevented counsel from fulfilling his duties or not. 
Therefore the question should not be whose fault was that,275 but always what 
was the consequence of it. If the consequence was inadequate or nonfulfillment 
of one or more duties, the higher court could declare counsel’s performance 
ineffective depending on what duties he did not fulfill. If the accused claims 
something that is not shown from the evidence, e.g., that counsel had not 
enough time to consult him, which is not shown from the minutes of the court 
session, then the higher court should try to answer the question, what would 
have been reasonable time for reasonable counsel to fulfill the duties that the 
accused claims he failed to do and therefore make the decision based on its own 
experience.  
The next questions are, what are the limits of interference into the attorney-
client relationship for the court (and other institutions) and when should court 
definitely interfere. 
The first subject I will discuss here is appointment of counsel and whether 
the court (in case of Estonia, the Bar) should take into account the accused’s 
wishes on the matter. First, it has to be mentioned, that the ECtHR has dealt 
with this subject as well. In Lagerblom v. Sweden276 Mr. Lagerblom com-
plained that he had not been allowed to be defended by counsel of his own 
choosing. The court appointed him H., but he had clearly requested that S. be 
appointed. H. had been unable to perform his duties effectively as defense 
counsel due to the accused’s refusal to co-operate with him and their difficulties 
in communicating, although this is crucial in planning an effective defense 
strategy. In addition to that, S. had his office in the same city as H., so there 
would not have been any increased costs in appointing him as public defense 
counsel. The ECtHR noted that the right to choose counsel cannot be considered 
to be absolute and then continued: “It is necessarily subject to certain limita-
tions where free legal aid is concerned. When appointing defence counsel the 
courts must certainly have regard to the accused’s wishes but these can be 
overridden when there are relevant and sufficient grounds for holding that this 
is necessary in the interests of justice…”277 Additionally the Court expressed an 
opinion that Article 6 paragraph (3) c cannot be interpreted as securing a right 
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to have public defense counsel replaced.278 Then the ECtHR solved the case 
before it. According to the Court’s opinion at the time the accused sought 
replacement of counsel, H. had been his counsel for about two and a half years 
and therefore had already undertaken a certain amount of work. Consequently, 
it is clear that the proceedings had reached a stage where the requested 
replacement would have caused a certain amount of inconvenience and entailed 
additional costs. The ECtHR emphasized that it “…does not find it unreason-
able, in view of the general desirability of limiting the total costs of legal aid, 
that national authorities take a restrictive approach to requests to replace public 
defence counsel once they have been assigned to a case and have undertaken 
certain activities.”279 Moreover, there is no evidence in the case that H. was 
unable to provide the accused with effective legal assistance or that he lacked 
confidence in H.280 Therefore, the accused’s wish is important when it comes to 
choosing appointed counsel, but interests of justice are important as well and 
state’s courts have to balance between those two values, especially when 
change of initially appointed counsel comes under the discussion. 
In Morris v. Slappy the Supreme Court of the United States agreed with the 
lower court that the accused does not have “an unqualified right to the 
appointment of counsel of his own choosing”.281 Although the United States 
Supreme Court did not recognize the accused’s right to choose appointed 
counsel in this case, Justice Brennan, the Justice of the United States Supreme 
Court wrote in his concurrence: “But the considerations that may preclude 
recognition of an indigent defendant’s right to choose his own counsel, such as 
the State’s interest in economy and efficiency … should not preclude re-
cognition of an indigent defendant’s interest in continued representation by an 
appointed attorney with whom he has developed a relationship of trust and 
confidence. To recognize this interest and to afford it some protection is not 
necessarily to afford it absolute protection. If a particular jurisdiction has 
sufficiently important interests, such as the structure of its public defender’s 
office, which make continued representation by a particular attorney im-
practical, the trial judge may take this into account in balancing the defendant’s 
interest in continued representation against the public’s interests. The fact that 
such interests might exist in some jurisdictions, however, is not a sufficient 
reason to refuse to recognize that an indigent defendant has an important 
interest in a relationship that he might develop with his appointed attorney. 
There is no need to decide on this record which state interests might be 
sufficient to overcome an indigent defendant’s interest in continued 
representation by a particular attorney with whom he has developed a 
relationship.”282 The theorists have also argued in the United States that 
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282 Ibid., 461 U.S. 29 Note 5. 
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although the choice of a legal aid lawyer is ultimately for the state, the wishes 
of the accused must be taken into account.283 
In Estonian criminal proceedings, an accused who has not chosen defense 
counsel himself and in whose criminal matter the participation of defense 
counsel is required by law or who applies for the participation of defense 
counsel may receive state legal aid, regardless of his financial situation (§ 6 (2) 
of the State Legal Aid Act284 (hereinafter SLAA); CCP, § 43 (2) 1) and 2)). 
Regardless of the accused’s financial situation, counsel is also appointed if 
counsel chosen by a person cannot assume the duties of defense within twelve 
hours as of the detention of the person as a suspect or, in other cases, within 
twenty-four hours as of entry into an agreement to defend the suspect or the 
accused or summoning to the body conducting the proceedings and counsel has 
not appointed substitute counsel for himself (CCP, § 43 (2) 3)) or if counsel is 
not able to appear to the court in case a criminal matter is heard in general 
procedure and counsel has not appointed substitute counsel for himself (CCP, § 
43 (2) 4)).285 Counsel is appointed by the Estonian Bar Association upon receipt 
of an application from a court and the court itself does not have the right to 
agree with an advocate upon the provision of state legal aid or to appoint an 
advocate who provides state legal aid (SLAA, § 18 (1) and (2)). Before the 1st 
January 2010 counsel was appointed by the body conducting the proceedings, 
including the court. This caused quite many problems: for instance counsel who 
was convenient or likable for the body conducting the proceedings was 
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285 The problem, which § 43 (2) 4) of the CCP that entered into force on the 1st of September 
2011 tries to solve, is appointing counsel to the accused who already has counsel, but whose 
counsel is not able to appear to the court session. 
The Estonian Supreme Court dealt with that matter before § 43 (2) 4) of the CCP entered 
into force. In court case no. 3-1-1-120-06 the accused was represented by the appointed 
counsel in the court of second instance not by the retained counsel he had chosen himself 
before. The Supreme Court of Estonia denied violation of defense rights and explained as 
follows. The participation of counsel in a court proceeding is mandatory (CCP, § 45 (4)). 
Counsel can be either retained or appointed. The circuit court notified counsel whom the 
accused had chosen of the time and place of the court session, but counsel informed the court 
twice that he is not able to appear, because he has to participate in another court session. He 
did not appoint substitute counsel and he did not inform the court of when it is possible for 
him to appear to the court. Therefore the circuit court was in accordance with § 43 (2) 3) of 
the CCP (§ 43 (2) 4) of the CCP had not entered into force yet) justified appointment of new 
counsel to the accused. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the accused did not request 
the removal of counsel and did not request to be represented by counsel chosen by him. 
Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 16 April 2007, court case no. 3-1-
1-120-06, p. 12. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=222499052, 29 April 
2011. 
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appointed (this problem arose especially with prosecutors).286 To avoid these 
kinds of problems counsel is now appointed by the Bar Association. While on 
the one hand this ensures that the body conducting the proceedings cannot 
appoint an advocate who will make its job easy, it also leaves no possibility for 
the courts to exclude advocates who are known to provide ineffective 
assistance, which is the main shortcoming of the new system.287  
The advocate appointed by the Bar Association assumes the obligation to 
immediately provide state legal aid and to organize his activity such that it 
would be possible for him to participate in procedural acts in time (SLAA, § 18 
(1), second sentence). In order to guarantee that the accused will know as soon 
as possible that counsel is appointed and has an opportunity to contact him, § 43 
(3) of the CCP provides that the body conducting the proceedings has an 
obligation to immediately notify the accused of the appointment of counsel and 
submit him counsel’s details.  
The ECtHR has weighed the latter issue in Sannino v. Italy.288 Mr. Sannino 
pointed out that, when the lawyer he had chosen, Mr. G., withdrew from the 
case, the Naples District Court officially appointed a defense lawyer, Mr. B. 
The Court did not notify the accused or Mr. B of the appointment and therefore, 
the accused did not find out that Mr. B. had been appointed to represent him 
until after the trial had ended. As a result of Mr. B.’s failure to appear, the court 
had appointed a different person at each hearing to replace Mr. B. Those 
lawyers had had no knowledge of the case, nor had they contacted the accused, 
who, on account of the lack of information from the court, had not even known 
who was representing him. The ECtHR first noted that although the replace-
ment lawyers did not have any knowledge of the facts of the case, they did not 
request an adjournment in order to acquaint themselves with their client’s 
case.289 The accused never informed the authorities of the difficulties he had 
been having preparing his defense and failed to get in touch with his appointed 
lawyers to seek clarification from them about the conduct of the proceedings 
and the defense strategy. But still the Court decided that the accused’s conduct 
did not free the authorities from their obligation to take steps to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the defense, because the above-mentioned shortcomings of the 
court-appointed lawyers were manifest, which put the onus on the domestic 
authorities to intervene.290 Because the court did not take any measures to 
guarantee the accused an effective defense and representation, the ECtHR 
concluded a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.291  
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In Estonia upon agreement of an advocate providing state legal aid and the 
recipient of state legal aid, legal services in the same matter may be provided to 
the person by another advocate who grants his consent for the transfer of the 
obligation to provide state legal aid to him. A new provider of state legal aid 
shall be appointed on the basis of the application of the court, Prosecutor’s 
Office or investigative body (SLAA, § 20 (1)). Consequently, although the 
Code of Criminal Procedure does not impose the obligation to consult with the 
accused regarding the choice of counsel prior to appointment of counsel, 
according to the State Legal Aid Act it is possible to consider the accused’s 
wishes after counsel is appointed: this counsel can be substituted with a new, 
more suitable counsel in the accused’s point of view if new counsel agrees with 
that. The word “may” indicates that there is still possibility to refuse, if refusal 
is justified. The question then arises as to what constitutes special circumstances 
justifying the refusal to follow the wishes of the accused. Such reason could be, 
for example, that former counsel has already spent lots of time to get familiar 
with the case, like it was in Lagerblom v. Sweden. But definitely the court 
should give a reason for its judgment as the ECtHR has recognized the 
accused’s right to choose appointed counsel. Therefore, one of the bases for 
annulment of a lower court’s judgment should be that the court did not weigh 
the right of the accused to choose counsel and the interests of justice while 
refusing to file an application to the Bar to appoint the counsel that the accused 
requested (see Standard 12.1).292  
The next question is whether a court is allowed to interfere into the 
accused’s choice of retained counsel. If counsel is an advocate and he is not 
suspended from professional activities, there is no formal ground for the court 
not to allow counsel to enter the proceedings. Of course, ground for removal 
may arise afterwards, but this is another subject. If counsel is not an advocate 
the court has to ascertain that he meets the educational requirements and verify 
whether counsel meets other requirements that the court considers necessary, 
e.g., whenever possible, the court should try to ascertain if that person has 
knowledge in criminal law and procedure. If in court’s opinion the person meets 
the requirements, it allows the person to participate in the criminal proceedings 
as counsel, and if not, it denies it. If the court does not allow the person to enter 
the proceedings as counsel without good cause, it should form a basis for 
annulment of court judgment afterwards, because the accused’s right to choose 
counsel, a right that comes from the European Convention on Human Rights, 
has been violated (see Standard 12.2).  
Here two more questions arise. First, how many counsels should the court 
allow for a person and second, should the court appoint additional counsel to 
the accused, if it deems it necessary. These questions arise also if the accused 
has appointed counsel(s). 
According to § 42 (2) of the CCP, a person being defended may, upon 
agreement, have up to three counsels. In ordinary criminal cases, an excessive 
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number of counsels may lead to technical difficulties and could even interfere 
with the successful course of the trial293 and therefore it is necessary to limit the 
number of counsels. In Croissant v. Germany the accused had two appointed 
counsels he had chosen himself and the third counsel was appointed to him 
against his wishes. He claimed during the criminal proceedings and also to the 
ECtHR that he did not have confidence in the third counsel. Therefore he 
claimed that by appointing the third counsel, Mr. Hauser, his right to choose 
counsel was violated. The judgment of the ECtHR formed a basis for a principle 
that the ECtHR has repeated in numerous cases: a principle that the right to 
choose counsel is not absolute, because it is subject to certain limitations where 
free legal aid is concerned and also where interests of justice require that the 
accused be defended by counsel appointed by the state’s court.294 From Court’s 
judgment in Croissant v. Germany it is possible to conclude that even if the 
accused already has counsel(s), either they are appointed or chosen by the 
accused himself, the court is still allowed to appoint an additional one, if the 
interests of justice so require. Of course, it can be argued that if the accused has 
retained counsel, the court may oblige him to retain an extra one, but it would 
mean that the accused is obliged to pay more in a situation where he himself 
does not have a wish to retain an additional lawyer and therefore the court 
should be allowed to appoint additional counsel to the person who already has 
retained counsel if it finds it necessary. 
Although § 42 (2) of the CCP provides that a person may have up to three 
lawyers as retained counsel, it would be reasonable and also compatible with 
the principle of equal treatment to apply the same limitation on the number of 
appointed counsels. Neither the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the State Legal 
Aid Act indicates that more than one advocate could be appointed as counsel. In 
my opinion there might nevertheless be criminal cases that are so complex that 
the appointment of one advocate as counsel would not guarantee the right to the 
assistance of counsel to the accused. In such cases, it should be possible to 
appoint several advocates as counsel, and even against the accused’s wishes, 
like it was in Croissant v. Germany.295 As the complaint of Mr. Croissant in 
Croissant v. Germany was directed against the order requiring him to reimburse 
to the state the fees of the three counsel officially appointed by the Stuttgart 
Regional Court to defend him, namely Mr. Baier and Mr. Kempf, at his request, 
and Mr. Hauser, against his wishes, he claimed that he was strongly against the 
appointment of the third lawyer. According to the judgment of the ECtHR, the 
appointment of more than one counsel is not of itself inconsistent with the 
European Convention on Human Rights and may be necessary in specific cases 
in the interests of justice. Complexity of the case may be one reason to appoint 
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more than one counsel. The Court emphasized that before doing that a court 
should ask the accused’s opinion.296 Still, as it comes from the Court’s opinion, 
it does not have to act in accordance with it if the interests of justice so require. 
I do not see how appointing additional counsel without the accused’s consent 
and a good reason could form a basis for annulment of the lower court’s 
judgment unless the accused can show that it precluded other counsels from 
fulfilling their duties. Otherwise the accused has counsel who he has confidence 
in (except of course from the one he claims he did not want to be appointed) 
and therefore there is no reason to conclude ineffective defense. Nevertheless, I 
do believe that refusing to appoint additional counsel if the accused insists and 
that appointment of additional counsel would be in the interests of justice (e.g., 
because of the complexity of the case), forms a basis for annulment of lower 
court’s judgment as the accused is left without proper defense (see Standard 
12.3). Here it does not matter if the original counsel is retained or appointed as 
the accused may not have additional resources to retain extra counsel, although 
it would be necessary for some reason. 
Another court’s interference into the attorney-client relationship in addition 
to prescribing the accused, which counsel and how many counsels should 
represent him, is interference after counsel has already entered the proceedings, 
i.e. removal of counsel. Grounds for removal of counsel I will discuss 
thoroughly in chapter four, but here it should be mentioned that if counsel is 
removed without grounds, it should form a basis for annulment of the court’s 
judgment per se, as unjustified removal is the form of interference that most 
affects the attorney-client relationship, because with that counsel loses the right 
to participate in the proceedings and the accused is left without the help of a 
person with whom he may already have developed a trustful relationship (see 
Standard 12.4).  
In addition to a court’s failure to respect the attorney-client relationship, 
failure to take into account the accused wishes while this relationship is formed 
and failure not to interfere into it while it has already been formed, there is a 
court’s failure to act while there is counsel in the proceedings, e.g., if the 
accused requests removal of that counsel because of counsel’s ineffectiveness, 
which may manifest in non-fulfillment of certain duties or maybe even in 
complete breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. Because these are 
failures related to counsel more than they are related to court, I will discuss 
them in the fourth subsection of this chapter. 
 
 
2. Conflict of Interest 
Prerequisite for counsel’s ability to exercise his duties zealously and defend the 
accused with every means that is not against the law is that counsel does not 
have an interest, which may be antagonistic to the interests of the accused. 
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Consequently, the Estonian Code of Criminal Procedure contains provisions 
that concern counsel’s conflict of interests. Although the ECtHR has not 
discussed this problem, this is the subject that has been widely analyzed in the 
United States judicial practice, especially by the judicial practice of the 
Supreme Court, and therefore the component of the standard of ineffective 
defense counsel that is related to possible conflict of interests could be worked 
out with taking the United States as an example and without referring to ECtHR 
position of the matter.  
Pursuant to § 54 clauses 1) and 2) and § 55 (1) of the CCP a person shall not 
act as counsel and if he does, the court shall remove him by a ruling on its own 
initiative or at the request of a party to the court proceeding, if he is or has been 
a subject to the criminal proceedings297 on another basis in the same criminal 
matter or if he in the same or related criminal matter, has previously defended 
or represented another person whose interests are in conflict with the interests 
of the person to be defended. Article 42 (3) of the CCP provides that counsel 
may defend several persons if the interests of the persons are not in conflict. 
List in the § 54 of the CCP is exhaustive, which means that the court is not 
allowed to remove counsel if any other possible conflict of interest arises. 
The notion “conflict of interest” for advocates is also explained in the Bar 
Association Act and in the Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association, 
but there the conflict of interest seems to have wider meaning. This raises an 
interesting question. Reasons that courts find to be enough to be sufficient for 
removal of counsel are not basis for removal and therefore do not justify the 
removal of counsel by the court unless they are provided for in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. This means that even if rules stipulated for members of the 
Bar or even by the Bar itself prohibit the advocate to act as counsel, the court 
still cannot remove him, unless the same basis for removal is provided for in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure.  
Pursuant to § 44 (4) of the BAA an advocate shall not provide legal services 
if he provides or has provided legal services in the same matter to a person 
whose interests are contrary to those of the client. This is a provision similar to 
§ 54 clause 2 of the CCP, although § 54 clause 2 does not mention current 
clients, which § 42 (3) of CCP actually does, even though it is not a ground for 
removal. Subsection § 44 (4) of the BAA on the other hand contains only the 
same, not related matter. According to the first sentence of Article 8 (1) of the 
Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association an advocate must always act 
in the best interest of his client and must put those interests before his own 
interests or those of third parties, including the interests of fellow members of 
the legal profession.298 This refers to the fact that interests that may become in 
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conflict with the accused’s interest may be something else than it is described in 
§ 54 of the CCP. In addition to that the Code of Conduct provides an interesting 
exception for advocates, which means that even if there is a conflict of interest 
the advocate is still allowed to represent a person under special circumstances. 
As Article 13 (1) of the Code provides: “An advocate may not advise, represent 
or act on behalf of two or more clients in the same matter if there is a conflict 
between the interests of those clients. An advocate shall not provide legal 
services to a client if there exist circumstances that affect or may affect the 
advocate’s ability to observe the requirements set out in Article 8 (1) of this 
Code and act only in the interests of the client (conflict of interest), unless the 
attorney has notified his client of such circumstances and the client does not 
desist from demanding provision of legal services by the advocate.”299 Should 
there arise any dispute in that matter later on, the advocate shall not render legal 
services to any of the clients in the same matter (Article 13 (3) of the Code). 
The principle that the advocate may represent the client in case of conflict of 
interest if he notifies the client, but the client still insists on receiving the 
assistance from the certain advocate, does not, however apply for criminal 
proceedings, because the Code of Criminal Procedure does not make such an 
exception. The same is with the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. 
According to this Code a lawyer may not advise, represent or act on behalf of 
two or more clients in the same matter if there is a conflict, or a significant risk 
of a conflict, between the interests of those clients (Article 3.2.1. of the Code). 
A lawyer must cease to act for both or all of the clients concerned when a 
conflict of interest arises between those clients and also whenever there is a risk 
of a breach of confidence or where the lawyer’s independence may be impaired 
(Article 3.2.2. of the Code).  
Because the state and therefore bodies conducting a proceeding, including 
the courts, have a duty to guarantee the accused’s right to defense, it can be 
concluded that in case of conflict of interest, the court should remove counsel 
from the proceedings even if the accused insists that counsel continues to 
represent him. Subsection § 55 (1) that provides procedural rules for removal of 
counsel in case of conflict of interest takes this into account and does not 
require the consent of the accused. It is highly probable that counsel is not able 
to represent conflicting interests equally effectively.300 Consequently, the right 
to defense is not only a matter between the accused and counsel, but also serves 
the right to fair trial and society’s expectation that the procedural rights are 
guaranteed in criminal proceedings.301 For instance in the United States the 
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Supreme Court held in Wheat v. United States, that a trial judge has discretion 
to disqualify defense counsel, even over the accused’s objection, if a serious 
possibility for a conflict of interest exists.302 
For the same reason, if there is a possibility of conflict of interest and the 
court is not able to ascertain the conflicts of interest with absolute certainty, 
every suspicion should be interpreted towards the conclusion that the conflict 
exists. Most certainly should this principle apply if counsel has previously 
defended or is defending another person in the same or in the related matter and 
the court has to decide whether the interests of this person are in conflict with 
the interests of the accused. According to the standpoint of the American Bar 
Association, the potential for conflicts of interest in representing multiple 
accused persons is so grave that ordinarily defense counsel should decline to act 
for more than one of several accused persons except in unusual situations when, 
after careful investigation, it is clear that no conflict is likely to develop or in 
case there is a possible conflict of interest, that common representation will be 
advantageous to each of the accused persons represented and, in addition to that 
in both cases, that all persons being defended give an informed consent to such 
multiple representation, which is made a matter of judicial record. In 
determining the presence of consent by accused persons, the trial judge should 
make appropriate inquiries respecting actual or potential conflicts of interest of 
counsel and whether the accused persons fully comprehend the difficulties that 
defense counsel sometimes encounters in defending multiple clients.303 Here I 
most certainly agree with the approach that the judge should be always the one 
who explains to the co-defendants the dangers of multiple representation. 
On the above mentioned reasons the ground for removal of counsel in case 
of conflict of interests in criminal proceedings should in my opinion be as 
follows (see Standard 2). 
1. If counsel is or has been a subject to criminal proceedings on another 
basis in the same criminal matter (provided for in the clause § 54 1) of 
the CCP). 
2. If counsel previously defended or represented another person whose 
interests are in conflict or may be in conflict with the interests of the 
person to be defended (provided for in the clause § 54 2) of the CCP, 
except for the fact that clause § 54 2) of the CCP demands an actual 
conflict of interest, but I propose that it would be necessary in order to 
protect the accused’s rights to remove counsel even if possibility of 
conflict arises). 
3. Counsel’s own interests are in conflict or may be in conflict with the 
accused’s interests (provided for in the Article 8 (1) of the Code of 
Conduct, but should be added to the Code of Criminal Procedure as 
there might be situations in which counsel is for some reason, e.g., 
because of a financial interest, interested in conviction of the accused). 
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4. There is a conflict of interest or possible conflict of interest between 
the accused’s interests and interests of the third party related to 
counsel (provided for in Article 8 (1) of the Code of Conduct, but 
should be added to the Code of Criminal Procedure as, for examples 
when counsel is a relative of the victim, which means that he might be 
interested in conviction of the accused, is not regulated in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure). 
5. In case of multiple representation there is a conflict or may be conflict 
between the interests of persons being defended (provided for in § 42 
(3) of the CCP, but not as a ground for removal).  
Further I suggest that in the case of multiple representation counsel may defend 
the accused if there is a possible conflict of interest only if it is advantageous to 
the accused persons represented and all of them give their informed consent in 
writing. The same is provided for in the ABA Standards. This means that 
whenever the court sees the possibility of conflict in case of multiple repre-
sentation, but it is not absolutely sure that the conflict exists, it should consider 
all circumstances of the case and if it finds multiple representation advanta-
geous for the accused persons (e.g., counsel has thorough knowledge of the law 
concerning the criminal matter and there is no other counsel that is familiar with 
that certain area of law) inform the accused persons immediately and ask their 
consent to continue with the same counsel. However, I would exclude the 
opportunity for multiple representation if real conflict of interest arises, because 
even if the accused persons would agree with counsel defending them all, it 
does not change the fact that counsel has real difficulties with representing them 
properly as it is almost impossible for a person to protect two conflicting 
interests at the same time. If there is not even possibility for conflict of interest, 
I do not suggest that courts should ask accused persons’ consent to be re-
presented by the same lawyer (like the American Bar Association suggests), 
because accused persons’ rights are not at stake. However, it does not mean that 
the courts should not talk with the accused persons and notify them about the 
good sides and bad sides of multiple representation.  
In addition to questions related to conflicts of interest as a ground for 
removal of counsel, other questions are: should it form a ground for annulment 
of judgment of the lower court in the appeal proceedings and what elements is 
the accused required to prove. The case law of the United States Supreme Court 
could be used as an example here. 
There are three major cases in the United States, which make up the Sup-
reme Court’s conflict-of-interest jurisprudence: Holloway v. Arkansas, Cuyler 
v. Sullivan,304 and Mickens v. Taylor.305 These cases show that trial judges have 
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a duty to protect the right to counsel by inquiring into conflicts of interest of 
which they are or should be aware, although the burden of proof may vary when 
the trial court fails to inquire.306  
In Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court held that when the trial judge is 
informed of a potential conflict through an objection, a failure to inquire will 
result in presumed prejudice. According to Court the trial judge’s failure either 
to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the 
risk of a conflict of interest was too remote to warrant separate counsel deprived 
accused persons of the guarantee of the assistance of counsel. The Court cited 
Glasser v. United States and said that the trial court has to refrain from insisting 
or even suggesting that counsel undertake to concurrently represent interests 
that might conflict, when the possibility of inconsistent interests is brought to 
the court’s attention by formal objections, motions, and counsel’s represen-
tations.307  
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court held that when the trial court is reasonably 
unaware of any potential conflict, prejudice will still be presumed but the 
accused must “…demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely 
affected his lawyer’s performance.”308 The Court stressed that unless the trial 
court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the 
court itself need not initiate an inquiry into the propriety of multiple 
representation. In addition to that the Court held that the possibility of a conflict 
of interest is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. In order to establish a 
violation of the sixth amendment of the Constitution, an accused must show that 
it adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.309 
In Mickens v. Taylor, the Court held that when the trial court knows, or 
reasonably should know, of a potential conflict from something other than an 
objection by defense counsel, and fails to inquire, the burden is the same as in 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, when there is no reasonable basis for the trial judge to be 
aware of a threat to the accused’s Sixth Amendment rights. The Court explained 
in Mickens that Holloway v. Arkansas creates an automatic reversal rule only 
where defense counsel is forced to represent accused persons over his timely 
objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. Absent 
objection, an accused must demonstrate that “…a conflict of interest actually 
affected the adequacy of his representation.”310 Therefore, the Supreme Court 
presumes that only when there is an objection, there is an actual conflict. 
So, in the United States what the accused has to prove in the case of conflicts 
of interest to the higher court depends mostly on his counsel’s ability to protect 
his client’s interests and bring any possible conflicts to the attention of the 
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court.311 Because defense counsels are presumed capable of bringing any threat 
of conflict of interest to the attention of the court, the United States Supreme 
Court believes that if this objection is not made, the conflict of interest does not 
exist.312  
Therefore Mickens creates the sad irony that an accused who has less 
effective assistance of counsel will have a heavier burden in proving ineffective 
assistance of counsel than an accused who has more effective assistance of 
counsel: the accused with the more effective conflicted counsel has only to 
show that the conflict existed, while the accused with the less effective 
conflicted counsel has to show also that the conflict adversely effected his 
representation.313 However the positive side of the United States Supreme Court 
judicial practice is that while the burden of proof depends on whether counsel 
objected or not, the court’s duty to inquire does not, because the duty to inquire 
does not apply only to cases where defense counsel objected. Therefore, the 
trial judge must also inquire when there is a reason for him to be aware of a 
potential conflict of interest, even if there is no objection.314 Here Justice Souter 
asks: “But why should an objection matter when even without an objection the 
judge knew or should have known of the risk and was therefore obliged to 
enquire further?”315 Then there is no reason to demand that the potential conflict 
is brought to court’s attention: “An objection would have been superfluous, 
since it would only have brought her own knowledge to her attention.”316 
In my opinion the annulment of a court decision in case of conflict of 
interest should not depend on whether counsel or the accused objected during 
the trial or not. Because the conflict of interest refrains counsel from fulfilling 
his duties thoroughly and advising the accused on every possible aspect of the 
case, the question for the higher courts should be whether the conflict of interest 
existed or not. If there was a conflict of interest, the accused should have an 
opportunity for new proceedings because he had ineffective assistance in the 
first proceedings and if not, a ground for the annulment of the judgment does 
not exist. Because of the principle of finality and need to save resources, I 
would be a little bit more modest here with interpreting every suspicion towards 
the conclusion that conflict existed: the reversal should be granted for cases 
where the conflict really existed. But what I am strongly against is the 
requirement for the accused to show that a conflict of interest had an effect on 
counsel’s performance. First, this is something that is almost impossible to 
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prove. Second, the conflict of interest always affects the person’s performance, 
which is why it is considered something that is a ground for removal in the 
criminal proceedings. The conflict of interest means that counsel has to 
represent two interests at the same time. The word “conflict” means that these 
interests are adversarial. Consequently, even if counsel tries to represent the 
accused as diligently as possible, his performance will be still influenced by the 
fact that there is another interest in his mind. Therefore actual conflicts of 
interest in my opinion means that there is another person who is in connection 
with counsel (even if it is counsel himself) whose interests are in conflict with 
the accused’s interests, not that in the result of this conflict counsel did 
something he would not have done when adversary interests would not have 
existed (see Standard 8.4). 
 
 
3. Violation of the Principle of Continuity 
In Estonian criminal proceedings the principle of consistency is highly valued 
when it comes to appointment of counsel. According to § 45 (5) of the CCP 
appointed counsel is required to participate in a criminal proceeding until the 
end of the review of the criminal matter by way of cassation procedure and he 
may refuse to assume the duties of defense on his own initiative or relinquish 
the duties of defense assumed by him on his own initiative only on the grounds 
provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Retained counsel acts in 
accordance with the agreement between him and the accused, but in § 45 (7) 
and (8) of the CCP it is specified that the performance of duties of defense by 
retained counsel in a county court or in a circuit court includes correspondingly 
drawing up an appeal against the decision or ruling of the county court or 
drawing up an appeal in cassation or appeal against the decision of the circuit 
court, if the accused so wishes and he may refuse to assume the duties of 
defense on own initiative or relinquish the duties of defense assumed by him on 
own initiative only on the grounds same as appointed counsel (CCP, § 45 (9)). 
Although the right of the accused to choose his appointed counsel is 
generally not recognized,317 because of the importance of counsel’s role, the 
criminal system should guarantee the accused the right to continuity of 
representation, which § 45 (5) of the CCP tries to do. The accused’s involve-
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ment at trial depends mostly on counsel and therefore the accused should have 
the right that the initially appointed counsel continue to represent him and this 
right can be overcome only under limited circumstances, e.g., only if there is a 
justification for counsel for relinquishing his duties (CCP, § 46), the accused 
agrees to the change (SLAA, § 20 (1)) or if the court finds a sufficient counter-
vailing interest like an absolute breakdown in the relationship between the 
accused and the defense counsel, there is a conflict of interest or circumstances 
exist that refer to any other counsel’s ineffectiveness.318 In addition to that it 
may be that something happens to counsel, which prevents him from partici-
pating in the proceedings in future (SLAA, § 20 (3)).319  
If the principle of continuity is violated, it most certainly does not constitute 
ineffectiveness of counsel per se: in addition to that the accused has to show 
that his new counsel did not fulfill his duties. One thing is absolutely sure: if the 
new advocate is appointed and court does not provide him with sufficient time 
to prepare the case, rendering the representation ineffective, the accused’s right 
to effective assistance is violated.320 If counsel changes during the proceedings, 
additional serious questions arise. Should the proceedings be repeated (as is 
possible in Germany321) or should new counsel continue from where everything 
was left when former counsel left the proceedings? If some witnesses have been 
already questioned, it is obvious that new counsel will not get a direct im-
pression of their testimony, even if he reads the minutes of a court session. This 
could mean that counsel loses an important opportunity to claim that the 
prosecutor’s witness was not reliable or he does not have a chance to ask further 
questions from the defense witness, although he has noticed that there are 
subjects left untouched by former counsel. Therefore new counsel should be 
allowed to request at least repetitive questioning of witnesses he considers 
necessary in order to ask questions he wants to ask from the defense witness or 
receive an impression of the prosecutor’s witness’s reliability. In Estonia the 
possibility of repetition of questioning a witness is not provided for in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure and by the judicial practice of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia, but this opportunity should not be discarded, because it allows new 
counsel to build his case according to his own strategy, not by the strategy that 
was worked out (or was not worked out) by the former colleague who is not in 
the proceedings anymore. 
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4. Failure of Counsel to Exercise the Skill  
of an “Effective” Lawyer: Types of Ineffectiveness  
Arising from this Failure 
4.1 Counsel’s Duties Generally 
Chronologically, when counsel enters the criminal proceedings, his first duty is 
to advise the client of his rights and then inform himself about the facts of the 
case, because otherwise he would not know how to approach the case; inform 
himself about relevant law; form the strategy and weigh what tactical decision 
has to be taken. In order to become acquainted with the facts of the case, 
counsel must talk to the accused, maybe ask some questions from witnesses, 
and when the prosecutor is ready to give counsel the copy of the criminal file, 
counsel has to examine the file as well. When counsel has informed himself 
about the facts of the case, his task is to evaluate the relevant law; formulate a 
theory of the case and possible strategy; determine the scope of the investi-
gation, e.g., compose a list of evidence he finds necessary to present to the 
court; determine what if any pretrial motions to make; draft, file, and litigate 
those motions; determine whether and if so how to plea bargain, and, if no 
bargain results, determine how to proceed on trial. In addition to that counsel 
has to weigh the options to conduct the case in other simplified procedures. If 
there is a trial in general proceedings, counsel must decide before the court 
session whether to call witnesses or not; give an opening statement; determine 
how and to what extent to conduct cross-examination; determine what trial 
motions to make and when to object; decide what charges (and punishment) to 
request and sum up.322 At all times defense counsel should avoid unnecessary 
delay in the disposition of cases and should be punctual in attendance of court 
and in the submission of all motions, briefs, and other papers.323 
Another important aspect of counsel’s duties that has to be discussed here is 
counsel’s ability to plan his time: if counsel is proficient in that, he is able to 
prepare the case thoroughly, if not, counsel will have problems providing a 
proper performance. In order to avoid a serious time-deficit, counsel should not 
accept too many cases. There is always the question about how much work is 
too much. It is clear that defense counsel should not carry a workload that 
interferes with the rendering of quality representation, endangers the client’s 
interest in the speedy disposition of charges, or may lead to the breach of 
professional obligations.324 According to Article 12 (4) of the Code of Conduct 
of the Estonian Bar Association an advocate shall not accept an assignment 
unless he can discharge those instructions promptly having regard to the 
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pressure of other work.325 But those provisions still do not answer the question 
how much is too much? In the Code of Criminal Procedure this problem is 
solved by giving counsel a timeframe, during which he has to participate in the 
court session. Namely, since the 1st of September 2011 the Code of Criminal 
Procedure provides that counsel has to refuse to assume the duties of defense in 
a criminal matter conducted pursuant to the general procedure or relinquish the 
duties of defense assumed by him no later than in a preliminary hearing if 
counsel is not able to participate in a court proceeding within three months after 
the preliminary hearing (CCP, § 46 (11)). In case counsel is already in the 
proceedings and he lacks time, there is an option to appoint new counsel 
(counsel is appointed if counsel chosen by a person cannot assume the duties of 
defense within twelve hours as of the detention of the person as a suspect or, in 
other cases, within twenty-four hours as of entry into an agreement to defend 
the suspect or the accused or summoning to the body conducting the pro-
ceedings and counsel has not appointed substitute counsel for himself (CCP, § 
43 (2) 3)) or if counsel is not able to appear to the court in case a criminal 
matter is heard in general procedure and counsel has not appointed substitute 
counsel for himself (CCP, § 43 (2) 4))). In addition, court has competence to 
ascertain whether counsel has prepared the case or not (according to § 274 (4) 
of the CCP if counsel is not familiar with the criminal matter, the court may 
adjourn the court session for up to ten days), as non-preparation is usually the 
main indicator of an excessive workload. 
In order to fulfill his duties effectively, counsel has to be present, fully aware 
of the facts and relevant law, diligent, sober and in good health, have a good 
and trustful relationship with the accused and provide him with the necessary 
advice and information, and what is also very important, get involved with the 
defense already in the pre-trial stage, not start to prepare shortly before the trial. 
All these duties will be discussed further below. As one of the goals of my 
thesis is to work out a standard for conduct of counsel in criminal proceedings 
for the courts, I will only analyze those duties counsel has at the pre-trial stage 
of the proceedings that have an effect on the relationship between counsel and 
the accused or on counsel’s performance in a court proceeding as these are the 
duties, which, in case they are breached, may in my opinion result in removal of 
counsel in the trial court proceedings or annulment of the court judgment of 
court of lower instance in higher court. I will mostly discuss duties that counsel 
has during the general proceedings, although I will bring out some duties 
peculiar to plea bargaining as this is a very distinct proceeding when it comes to 
counsel’s duties. At the same time it is obvious that many of the duties that 
counsel has in the general proceedings also apply to the simplified proceedings, 
as the main goal of counsel always is to be the accused’s advisor and provide 
him with help in exercising his rights, which is why most of the time I do not 
analyze the simplified proceedings separately.  
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4.2 Failure of Counsel to Show Up 
First and foremost, counsel has to be present in court session, because only the 
right to have counsel participating in the proceedings is guaranteed to the 
accused. According to § 270 (2) of the CCP if counsel fails to appear in a court 
session, the court hearing shall be adjourned. If counsel is an advocate, the 
Board of the Bar Association shall be notified of counsel’s failure to appear. As 
adjournment of a court session always means spending extra resources, I 
suggest that if counsel fails to appear to the court session repeatedly, which 
means that he has repeatedly been not diligent enough to notify the court that he 
is unable to appear, and what is more important, he has failed to appoint 
substitute counsel for himself, court should have competence to remove him 
(see Standard 3.1). If he has a good cause for not appearing to the court 
proceedings the court could still conclude that as a diligent counsel he should 
have acted in order to avoid causing the delay of the court session, which means 
that the court should have discretion to remove him if special circumstances so 
require. If a court proceeding is despite everything conducted without the 
participation of a counsel, which is material violation of criminal procedural 
law pursuant to § 339 (1) 4) of the CCP, the court judgment is annulled by a 
higher court and the case will be tried again (see Standard 8.1).  
It should be obvious to all concerned that counsel must be present through-
out an entire criminal trial since an accused has the right to be represented by 
counsel. Therefore, there is no dispute that it is a very serious violation of the 
accused’s rights when a portion of a criminal trial is conducted in the absence of 
the accused’s counsel,326 which should always result in annulment of the court 
judgment made as a result of the proceedings from where counsel was absent. 
Counsel’s participation in the pre-trial proceedings is a bit different. First, if the 
person does not ask for counsel, he is not provided by the assistance of counsel, 
unless it is mandatory according to the Code of Criminal Procedure. Second, 
even if he does and he is not provided with counsel, the result of this violation is 
that evidence collected in the course of the procedural act, which counsel did 
not participate, is declared prohibited by the court. Therefore, if the body 
conducting the proceedings wants to collect evidence that could be used in the 
court, it has to honor the accused’s wish to be represented by counsel during the 
procedural act. And third, at least according to case law of the ECtHR, counsel 
should, in order to participate in the pre-trial proceedings take the initiative. For 
instance, counsel must have the opportunity to attend the examination of the 
accused and witnesses during the pre-trial proceedings, but he must ask to be 
informed of the venue and to be permitted to attend.327 Once the ECtHR 
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emphasized the importance of counsel being active in order to participate in the 
court session as well. In Tripodi v. Italy Mrs. Tripodi complained that, at its 
hearing on the 6th of December 1985, the Court of Cassation had examined her 
appeal in the absence of her retained lawyer and had failed to appoint a lawyer 
to take his place. The Court noted that, despite knowing that he would be unable 
to attend the hearing set down for 6th of December 1985, the accused’s lawyer 
failed to take any action, although he should have taken steps to ensure that he 
was replaced for the day of the hearing.328 As counsel failed to take any action 
the Court concluded that there has been no breach of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. But in my opinion this case should be taken as an exception. 
Mrs. Tripodi’s complaint was not about her counsel not participating in the 
court proceedings of the court of first instance, but in the court proceedings of 
the cassation court. As the court noted in its opinion, the Italian Court of 
Cassation decides only on points of law. Its proceedings are essentially written 
and at the hearing the appellant’s lawyer may only present argument in relation 
to submissions already made in the appeal and the memorials.329 Therefore it 
could be concluded that the applicant’s lawyer’s participation in the session was 
not as essential as it is for example in the court of first instance, where evidence 
is presented and evaluated, and new arguments are made. 
If the accused has not one, but two or three counsels, it has to be decided 
whether absence of one of them results in a material violation of procedural law 
according to § 339 (1) 4) of the CCP. Pursuant to the judicial practice of the 
Supreme Court of Estonia, if the accused has chosen himself more than one 
counsel and one of counsels fails to appear to the court session, the continuation 
of the court proceedings does not automatically constitute a violation of the 
right to defense. The duty of state is to guarantee rights not only formally but 
also factually. Consequently, there might be exceptional situations when 
appearance of one of the retained or appointed counsels is not enough to 
guarantee the accused’s right to defense.330 If that kind of violation of the 
accused’s rights has occurred during the court proceedings of the court of first 
instance, it cannot be eliminated in the appellate proceedings.331 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court has held that conclusion on whether absence of one of 
several counsels from the court proceedings constitutes a violation of the right 
to the assistance of counsel depends on special circumstances of the case, but 
has not specified what those circumstances are. Therefore I suggest here that 
absence of counsel in case the accused has more than one counsel should form a 
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basis for annulment of court judgment under special circumstances that are left 
to the higher court to decide (see Standard 8.1). 
The most identifiable absence is when counsel is not physically present in 
court, either because he has not appeared at all, the judge has permitted him to 
leave during the trial, he has not arrived yet and the judge is too impatient to 
wait until counsel arrives or because of any other reason.332 Because the right to 
the assistance of counsel is one of the most essential rights the accused has in 
the criminal proceedings and absence of counsel in the court proceedings forms 
material violation of procedural law according to § 339 (1) 4) of the CCP, 
whenever counsel is absent in a court proceeding, even if it is just for a very 
short time, his absence should result in annulment of court judgment without 
any further examination. 
More difficult than counsel’s physical absence from trial are, however, cases 
in which counsel sits in court, but is still “absent”. These are so called “sleeping 
lawyer” cases. Sleeping at trial is absolutely improper for counsel, and 
generally, the court should be aware of the sleeping and should take steps to 
remedy the problem.333 The easiest remedy for the court to use is to make a 
remark about counsel’s behavior. If counsel does not react to court’s remark and 
continues napping, it should form a basis for removal of counsel as it refers to 
the fact that counsel does not take his duties and court’s remarks seriously (see 
Standard 3.2). Of course, the problem with counsel sleeping does not mean that 
counsel is sleeping during the whole trial. Usually counsel naps only occa-
sionally. Yet, it is clear that “…unconscious attorney is in fact no different from 
an attorney that is physically absent from trial since both are equally unable to 
exercise judgment on behalf of their clients…”,334 even if counsel is un-
conscious just for a while. When counsel sleeps during the trial, even if only for 
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a short period of time, he cannot object to the prosecutor’s motions, cannot 
advise his client or perform any analysis, and he cannot cross-examine properly 
either.335 Therefore I agree that, the situation where counsel is asleep during the 
trial is more analogous to the situation where an accused is without counsel than 
where an accused claims that counsel acted improperly, because when counsel 
is asleep, the accused basically is without counsel.336  
As it was already mentioned, if the trial judge notices counsel sleeping 
himself or he is notified by the prosecutor or the accused, he has an opportunity 
to correct counsel’s behavior, which he most certainly should do. But if he is 
not aware of that or does not react properly, higher court has to look into 
counsel’s behavior. Since higher courts have to take into account principle of 
finality also, it is obvious that not every nap taken by counsel during the court 
session should result in annulment of court judgment. Instead of that, one has to 
take into account the influence counsel’s sleeping had on the defense position. 
On the one hand, an accused’s interests are at stake at some stages of the trial, 
e.g. when the prosecutor is filing a motion. On the other hand, if the lawyer is 
absent for a few seconds during which time the prosecution says nothing, it 
might be possible to conclude that counsel did not fail to fulfill his duties. 
Therefore, sleeping lawyer jurisprudence in the United States requires counsel 
to have been sleeping during the substantial moments of the trial in order to 
conclude ineffective defense. The moments are substantial for example when 
evidence is being produced against the accused, e.g., when the prosecutor is 
cross-examining a witness.337 The other situations when it is possible to 
conclude that counsel has clearly breached his duties, at least what has been 
suggested in the United States, is when counsel sleeps “through a relatively 
large portion of the overall trial proceedings” (e.g., sleeps 10 minutes of a one-
hour trial) or “during a large amount of time” (although none of these moments 
are “substantial”) (e.g., sleeps several different times over a 30-day trial).338 The 
last two situations enable the higher courts to conclude that because counsel 
was absent from the proceedings for substantial amount of time, his failure 
might have influenced his ability to form the strategy and make decisions, 
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which in turn means that the accused did not receive effective assistance. 
Therefore I suggest the same approach for my standard (see Standard 8.2). 
Similar to the “sleeping lawyer” cases are cases where counsel is present and 
does not sleep but refuses to participate in the entire trial, an entire section of a 
trial or at some specific point during the trial. In the United States counsel 
silence cases, in which counsel was silent during the whole trial or entire 
section of the trial, are solved according to Cronic rules.339 In case a lawyer 
refrains from examining one witness or fails to voice every possible objection, 
the ineffective counsel claim is solved according to the Strickland rules.340 
According to Bell v. Cone341 the key distinction between the Strickland and 
Cronic is whether the accused alleges a defect in the whole proceedings or “at 
specific points” of the trial. The critics of Bell v. Cone have claimed that the 
Court did not take into account that “…a lawyer’s absence during specific 
points of a trial may cause a breakdown in the adversarial nature of the 
proceedings as a whole.”342 In my opinion a proper way to approach the “silent 
counsel” cases where counsel failed to act during some specific point of the trial 
would first make sure that what he failed to do was an essential duty of counsel 
in the criminal proceedings, and then look into what was behind his decision. 
Because there might be a thoroughly considered reason for counsel’s action, 
counsel should be asked to explain that before his performance is considered to 
be ineffective (see Standard 10.1). But if counsel fails to act during the entire 
trial or an entire section of a trial (for instance during the opening statement), 
his performance should be declared ineffective per se (see Standard 9.4). If 
counsel refuses to act during the trial and he does not have a proper explanation 
for that, the court should be allowed to remove counsel as it has appeared that 
counsel does not fulfill his duties (see Standard 3.3). 
 
 
4.3 Lack of Knowledge about the Facts 
If counsel is unaware of the facts of the case, he basically cannot perform in the 
proceeding. Thus, after counsel’s duty to be present, knowledge of the facts is 
                                                     
339 The difference between Cronic and Strickland rules are discussed in subsection 5.3 of this 
thesis. In short, according to the Cronic rules prejudice is presumed and according to the 
Strickland rules the accused has to prove the element of prejudice.  
340 Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's 
Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 827, p. 869. For instance, if an 
accused argues that his counsel failed to adequately represent him throughout the whole 
court proceeding, the prejudice exception from Cronic may apply. On the other hand, if an 
accused insists that his attorney failed to challenge the prosecution’s case at specific points 
during the proceeding, then the two-part Strickland test will apply. Stuart E. Walker, What 
we Meant was ... the Supreme Court Clarifies Two Ineffective Assistance Cases in Bell v. 
Cone Casenote, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 1271 (2002–2003), pp. 1271 and 1282. 
341 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
342 Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's 
Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 827, p. 871. 
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one of the most substantial obligations of counsel. The trial court should 
attentively observe that counsel is aware of the facts and higher courts should 
regard this failure most seriously. 
Pursuant to § 273 (4) of the CCP if counsel is not familiar with the criminal 
matter, the court may adjourn the court session for up to ten days, order that the 
expenses relating to the criminal proceedings due to the adjournment of the 
session be paid by counsel, and notify the Board of the Bar Association of such 
conduct of counsel if counsel is an advocate. In order to avoid spending extra 
resources and delaying the court proceedings, I suggest that if counsel appears 
to the court session repeatedly without knowing the facts of the case, court 
should have competence to remove him (see Standard 3.4). 
Counsel’s duty to investigate the facts is not, of course, confined to getting 
to know the facts shortly before the court session. The American Bar 
Association here emphasizes: “The effectiveness of advocacy is not to be 
measured solely by what the lawyer does at the trial; without careful pre-
paration, the lawyer cannot fulfill the advocate’s role. Failure to make adequate 
pretrial investigation and preparation may also be grounds for finding ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel.”343 Because counsel has to make many choices 
during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, he has to get to know the facts of 
the case as soon as he is retained or appointed, which in Estonia happens no 
later than when the prosecutor is ready to present the criminal file. Then counsel 
should investigate the file and ask relevant information from the client as soon 
as possible. After that he has many important decisions to make, before making 
some of which he has to consult the client first and some he is authorized to 
make on his own. Because some of those decisions, e.g., whether to choose the 
general procedure or plea bargaining, are the ones that may decide the fate of 
the case and the accused, counsel must know the facts thoroughly. Here one has 
to agree with the standpoint of the American Bar Association that counsel’s 
duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to 
defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused’s stated desire to plead 
guilty,344 because otherwise counsel cannot advise the accused fully, as he does 
not know what the possible solutions for the accused would be. Therefore, after 
counsel has investigated the facts and realized that there is not enough evidence 
to prove the accused’s guilt, although the accused is admitting his guilt, he has 
to suggest the accused that the case should be conducted in general procedure 
and plea bargaining is not a reasonable choice. 
Effective investigation by the lawyer affects also counsel’s representation at 
trial, because without proper knowledge of facts the lawyer is not in a position 
to make the best use of such mechanisms as cross-examination at trial.345 
Without good preparation counsel cannot do legal research in order to present 
his opinion about the relevant law to the court and he does not know what 
                                                     
343 Standard 4-4.1 commentary of the ABA Standards. 
344 Standard 4-4.1 (a) of the ABA Standards. 
345 Standard 4-4.1 commentary of the ABA Standards. 
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prosecutor’s positions should be objected. Therefore, the knowledge of facts 
forms a basis for effective defense, which in turn means that if counsel has 
appeared to the court session unprepared and the court of first instance has not 
paid attention to this flaw, it should constitute ground for reversal per se (see 
Standard 9.1). Other counsel’s shortcomings that come from unpreparedness, 
and result in for example, ineffective plea bargaining, ineffective assistance 
provided to the accused in the meaning of ineffective consultation, I will discuss 
further below.  
 
4.4 Lack of Competence 
As provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, counsel has to be an 
advocate or he has to have legal education, but in order to participate in the 
criminal proceedings, in addition to common knowledge of law counsel should 
have a thorough knowledge about penal law and law of criminal procedure: 
otherwise his help is of no assistance to the accused. In addition to that counsel 
should know how to exercise his rights and help the accused to exercise his 
rights in the criminal proceedings, how to present his case in the court 
proceedings and to file motions, which means that counsel should have good 
general lawyering skills. Additionally, he should be in a mental and physical 
condition that allows him to do that. These three duties I will discuss here 
further. In addition to that at the end of this subsection I will discuss the subject 
that is very important in the context of Estonian criminal procedure, because 
only advocates can be appointed as counsel to the criminal proceedings: a 
question what should court do if the person is disbarred, which means that he 
does not have legal competence to participate in the proceedings as advocate, or 
if he is suspended, which means that he is not allowed to provide legal 
assistance for a certain period of time? 
In order to provide the accused with competent assistance, counsel should 
know the relevant law. The lawyer’s duty to be informed on the law is very 
important.346 In the United States, there are a number of cases when counsel 
lacks knowledge of the procedural law or the criminal law,347 and there is no 
reason to believe that in Estonia the situation is remarkably better. Here I do not 
mean only that counsel should know the law that is applicable in the certain 
case, but he should know the general principles of penal law and law of criminal 
procedure also in order to protect his client’s interests. As the CCBE has 
expressed: “Keeping abreast of developments in the law is a professional 
obligation.”348 For counsels who are advocates this subject is much more 
regulated than for non-advocate counsels: according to Article 12 (4) of the 
Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association an advocate shall not handle a 
                                                     
346 Standard 4–5.1 commentary of the ABA Standard. 
347 Laurence A. Benner, Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors that Contribute to Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel in California, the, 45 Cal. W. L. Rev. 263 (2008–2009), pp. 327–
328. 
348 Article 5.8 commentary, the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers. 
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matter which he knows he is not competent to handle in the best interests of the 
client.349 Therefore if the advocate has so far handled only civil cases and has 
not developed his skills in the field of criminal law, he should not participate in 
the criminal proceedings as counsel. This is at least what the ethics recommends 
to advocates, although as there are many problems with the quality of assistance 
in Estonia, it can be guessed that advocates do not tend to follow that principle. 
With persons who are not advocates the subject is even more complicated. First, 
their conduct is not regulated by any act other than the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Second, although the Code of Criminal Procedure provides the 
educational requirement, this does not guarantee that the person is competent in 
the area of criminal law and procedural law, and the body conducting the 
proceedings whose task is to decide whether or not to give permission to the 
person to enter the proceedings as counsel often does not know whether that 
person is competent in that area or not. Therefore, as I discussed in the last 
chapter, the Supreme Court of Estonia has explicitly emphasized that the 
permission of the body conducting the proceedings for the person to participate 
in the criminal proceedings can be withdrawn if it turns out that the person is 
not competent, meaning that he does not have the knowledge and skills to 
participate in the criminal proceedings. In my opinion, whether counsel is an 
advocate or not, for the trial court, counsel’s serious lack of knowledge in penal 
law and law of criminal procedure should be a ground for removal (see 
Standard 1.1) and for the higher courts it should be indication that the accused 
did not receive adequate advice and therefore effective assistance, which in turn 
results in an annulment of the court judgment (see Standard 8.6). 
Of course, counsel has to be aware of the law imposable in the certain case 
also. As the first sentence of Article 14 (2) of the Code of Conduct of the 
Estonian Bar Association provides: “Legal services rendered by the advocate 
must be professional and based on the investigation of underlying circums-
tances, evidence, legal acts and court practice.”350 Counsel should have know-
ledge of imposable law in certain case and therefore § 273 (4) of the CCP, 
which allows the court to adjourn the court session for up to ten days if counsel 
is not familiar with the criminal matter, should be interpreted in the way that the 
court may adjourn the session if counsel does not know the facts or imposable 
law in certain case as well. For reasons I have discussed above, if counsel 
appears to the court session unprepared more than once, it should form a basis 
for his removal (see Standard 3.4). Also, counsel’s serious lack of knowledge of 
law imposable in certain cases should result in annulment of judgment of lower 
court in the appellate proceedings as counsel who does not know the law 
imposable in certain cases is not capable of providing adequate assistance (see 
                                                     
349 A lawyer shall not handle a matter which the lawyer knows or ought to know he is not 
competent to handle, without cooperating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it (first 
sentence of the Article 3.1.1. of the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers). 
350 Also provided for in § 40 (2) of the BAA. 
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Standard 9.1). What is a serious lack of knowledge of law should be left for the 
courts to decide in certain cases. 
In addition to that, counsel’s general lack of lawyering skills and experience 
may also be a problem. Counsel must provide the skill necessary to ensure 
reliable adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case at trial.351 For the advocates 
the Code of Conduct for European Lawyers, the Bar Association Act and the 
Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association impose a duty to improve 
professional skills. According to Article 5.8 of the Code of Conduct for Euro-
pean Lawyers, lawyers should maintain and develop their professional know-
ledge and skills taking proper account of the European dimension of their pro-
fession. According to § 44 (2) of the BAA advocates shall continuously enhance 
their professional knowledge and expertise. The second sentence of Article 14 
(2) of the Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association adds the premise of 
professional advice is constant advancement by an advocate of his professional 
knowledge and skills. Counsel’s overall competence is something that is very 
difficult to assess, especially for the higher courts, because they do not see 
counsel’s performance. In addition to that, indicators of the lack of overall 
competence are difficult to describe. Therefore I suggest that this should not be 
added in the standard for conduct of counsel and counsel’s lack of lawyering 
skills should be assessed through certain mistakes he has made (e.g., failure to 
question witnesses properly, presenting adequate closing arguments etc.).  
Closely related to counsel’s lawyering skills is the manner how counsel 
conducts himself towards other participants during the proceedings. Counsel 
should be respectful towards the court as well as towards other parties to a court 
proceeding and at pre-trial stage towards the investigative body. Pursuant to § 
267 (4) of the CCP if counsel violates order in a court session, fails to comply 
with the orders of a judge or acts in contempt of court, a fine may be imposed 
on him. The court also notifies the Bar Association if counsel is an advocate (§ 
267 (42) of the CCP). In my opinion counsel who acts disrespectfully towards 
the court or other parties to a proceeding shows that he lacks lawyering skills 
and therefore is not capable of defending the accused adequately. If he shows 
disrespect towards other participants repeatedly and even after court’s remarks, 
it should be concluded that he is not competent to participate in the criminal 
proceedings, which in turn means that the court should be allowed to remove 
him (see Standard 1.2).  
A problem arises, if counsel has a physical impairment or mental disorder or 
he is under the influence of drugs or alcohol. If he is mentally or physically 
impaired and it does not influence his lawyering skills, it should be concluded 
that he is able to participate in the proceedings and act diligently as counsel, 
although the judge should observe his performance during the proceedings 
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attentively and decide whether this person, especially the person with physical 
impairment, needs a support person (e.g. if counsel is blind he may need 
someone to help him to observe what is going on in the court room etc.). But if 
counsel has a mental or physical disorder and it appears that it affects his ability 
to make decisions and fulfill his duties in the proceedings (e.g., counsel is 
paralyzed, he is not able to speak clearly and he is not able to make himself 
understandable to the court even with help of a support person), ineffectiveness 
should be presumed and the trial court should remove that counsel (see 
Standard 1.3). If for some reason this counsel continues in the proceedings, the 
accused should be granted with the new proceedings if he claims his lawyer’s 
ineffectiveness to the higher court (see Standard 8.3). The same principles 
should apply if it has been ascertained that counsel acted under the influence of 
alcohol or drugs during the trial (see Standards 1.3 and 8.3) as intoxication 
most certainly affects counsel’s ability to perform his duties. 
The problem also arises if the advocate continues to practice law after being 
suspended or disbarred, which should be ineffectiveness per se according to 
some authors in the United States.352 Pursuant to § 38 (1) of the BAA if a person 
is excluded from the Bar Association or is disbarred, he loses the right to 
practice as an advocate. Upon exclusion of an advocate providing state legal aid 
from the Bar Association or his disbarment or upon suspension of the profes-
sional activities or long-term incapacity for work or the death of the advocate, 
and in other cases provided by law, the Bar Association shall appoint a new 
provider of state legal aid on the basis of an application of the former provider 
of state legal aid, the recipient of state legal aid, a court, Prosecutor’s Office or 
investigative body or on its own initiative (§ 20 (3) of the SLAA). Since the 1st 
of January 2010 § 19 (3) of the BAA stipulates that if the advocate provides 
legal services during the period he has been suspended the professional 
activities, he is disbarred. In my opinion if counsel loses the status of advocate, 
in order to proceed in representing the accused, he has to ask permission from 
the court as other non-advocate persons with legal education have to do too. If 
he is suspended, pursuant to § 19 (3) of the BAA, he is not allowed to provide 
legal services. Thus, the assistance provided by the person who is disbarred or 
excluded from the Bar Association and who has not asked the permission from 
the body conducting a proceeding should result in annulment of court judgment 
as formally there has been no counsel in the proceedings, as well as the 
assistance provided by a person who is suspended from professional activities 
(see Standards 1.4 and 8.5). 
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4.5 Failure to Act in the Pre-trial Proceedings 
Most counsel’s failure to act in a pre-trail stage of the proceedings can be 
eliminated by conducting a fair court proceeding and excluding evidence that 
was gathered through the violation of the right to the assistance, including the 
right to effective assistance of counsel. Still there are some duties counsel has to 
fulfill in order to perform effectively during the court proceedings, e.g., failures 
that may have influence on how fair the court proceedings are. One of them, 
counsel’s failure to get to know the facts I have already discussed, but there are 
some more I would like to mention here. 
If a Prosecutor’s Office declares a pre-trial proceeding completed, it gives a 
copy of the criminal file to defense counsel (CCP, § 223 (3) and 224 (1)) and 
since then the participation of counsel in the criminal proceedings is mandatory 
(CCP, § 45 (3)). Pursuant to § 2241 (1) of the CCP it is the task of counsel to 
introduce the criminal file to the person being defended. Counsel may submit 
requests to the Prosecutor’s Office within ten days as of the date of submission 
of the criminal file to counsel for examination. If a criminal matter is especially 
extensive or complicated, the Prosecutor’s Office may extend such term (CCP, 
§ 225 (1)). If a Prosecutor’s Office has submitted a criminal file for examination 
and is thereafter convinced that the necessary evidence in the criminal matter 
has been collected, it prepares the statement of charges and sends a statement of 
charges and a list of persons to be summoned to a court session at the request of 
the Prosecutor’s Office to the accused and counsel (CCP, § 226 (1), (2) and (3)). 
After receipt of the copy of statement of charges, counsel prepares the statement 
of defense and submits it no later than three weekdays before the preliminary 
hearing to the court and the copy to the Prosecutor’s Office. If a criminal matter 
is especially extensive or complicated, the court may extend such term by 
counsel’s reasoned request (CCP, § 227 (1)). In the statement of defense 
counsel has to set out his position about the statement of charges (CCP, § 227 
(3) 1)); evidence that counsel wishes to present and what counsel aims to prove 
with every single piece of evidence (CCP, §227 (3) 2)); a list of the persons 
whom counsel requests to be summoned to a court session (CCP, § 227 (3) 3)) 
and other requests (CCP,§ 227 (3) 4)). Before the 1st of September 2011 counsel 
did not have to prepare a statement of defense, he simply had to submit his 
requests and a list of the persons whom he requests to be summoned to a court 
session to the court and a copy of the abovementioned documents to the 
Prosecutor’s Office. The purpose of preparation of the statement of defense is to 
guarantee equality of arms and to conduct a court proceeding better prepared 
and therefore speedier.353 If counsel does not prepare the statement of defense 
on time, the court notifies the Bar Association immediately and makes the 
accused a proposal to choose within the term granted by the court, or turns to 
the Bar Association, for appointment of new counsel (CCP, § 227 (5)) (see 
Standard 3.5). The Code of Criminal Procedure does not specify what happens 
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if the accused refuses to change counsel in this situation, but in order to achieve 
the purpose set out in the explanatory memorandum, the court should be 
allowed to remove that counsel.  
Therefore in Estonia counsel’s preparation for the trial begins at least right 
after the prosecutor gives him a copy of the criminal file, if even not earlier. 
This is the time when counsel’s communication with the prosecutor, and later 
the court, begins with relation to future court proceedings. In addition to that 
counsel has to introduce the person being defended with evidence that the 
prosecutor has against him. And what is most important, counsel has an 
opportunity to submit a request to collect evidence, first to the prosecutor (CCP, 
§ 225 (1)) and after that to the court (CCP, § 227 (1)). Here two main mistakes 
can occur. Counsel may fail to contact the person being defended and introduce 
him to the evidence. It is the matter of counsel and client communication, which 
I will discuss further below. Second, counsel may fail to submit the request to 
collect evidence on time. In order to correct that mistake, counsel may submit 
that request during the court proceedings also, but according to § 2861 (2) 2) of 
the CCP the court may dismiss a request for the collection of additional 
evidence submitted by counsel if counsel has no material reason for failure to 
submit the request on time. In my opinion, if the court sees that the evidence is 
extremely relevant to the adjudication of the criminal matter in question, in the 
meaning that there is a probability that it would mitigate the accused’s situation, 
the court should not dismiss a request, although counsel has not filed it on time. 
Otherwise an important aspect of the case may be left out, which in turn may 
affect the accused’s position to the prejudice of him. Therefore I suggest that 
counsel’s failure to present this kind of evidence should be ground for 
annulment of the decision of the court of first instance in the higher court, a 
subject that never arises if the trial court satisfies counsel’s request to collect 
additional evidence, although it is filed too late (see Standards 3.6 and 9.5).  
In addition, one of the aspects counsel should also explore at the pretrial 
stage of the proceedings is whether there would be enough reason to enter into 
plea bargaining or not. I will analyze counsel’s failures that are related to plea 
bargaining further below. 
 
 
4.6 Lack of Trust between the Accused and Counsel 
Due to his position counsel is the closest person to the accused in the criminal 
proceedings. Therefore he should seek to establish a trustful relationship with 
the accused and follow ethical and confidentiality rules. Although the break-
down in the attorney-client relationship may be caused by many factors other 
than counsel’s own behavior (e.g., it might be that the accused has a conflicting 
nature) there are still some remarkable mistakes counsel may make himself. 
First, counsel may misuse the accused’s trust by revealing information he 
got from the accused to the third person. The CCBE declares: “It is of the 
essence of a lawyer’s function that the lawyer should be told by his or her client 
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things which the client would not tell to others, and that the lawyer should be 
the recipient of the information on a basis of confidence. Without the certainty 
of confidentiality there cannot be trust. Confidentiality is therefore a primary 
and fundamental right and duty of the lawyer. The lawyer’s obligation of 
confidentiality serves the interest of the administration of justice as well as the 
interest of the client. It is therefore entitled to special protection by the 
State.”354Article 5 (1) of the Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association 
provides: “The relationship between the advocate and his client is founded upon 
trust. Therefore, all information given or received by him in the course of 
rendering legal services is confidential.”355 The duty to confidentiality does not 
apply only to advocates in criminal proceedings: since the 1st of September 
2011 the duty of confidentiality comes also from § 47 (3) of the CCP and it 
applies to all counsels in criminal proceedings.  
In order to facilitate the accused’s trust in his counsel, the duty of 
confidentiality does not end when the proceedings are over. Subsection 47 (3) 
of the CCP does not express this principle explicitly, but it does not impose a 
time limit either. For the advocates Article 5 (7) and (8) of the Code of Conduct 
of the Estonian Bar Association provide that the obligation of confidentiality is 
not limited in time356 and only the client or his successor may in writing exempt 
the advocate from the confidentiality obligation.357 To make sure that the 
accused is aware of counsel’s duty, defense counsel should explain the 
necessity of full disclosure of all facts known to the client for an effective 
defense and explain the extent to which counsel’s obligation of confidentiality 
makes privileged the accused’s disclosures.358 The latter is not provided for in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but here the ABA Standards should be taken as 
an example and this duty should be added to the Code as it helps the accused 
understand the principle of confidentiality and encourages him to disclose 
information necessary for the defense to counsel. 
The duty to confidentiality is not, of course, an absolute one. Pursuant to § 
45 (4) of the BAA disclosure of information to the Board in the exercise of 
supervision over the activities of an advocate or to the court of honor in the 
hearing of a matter concerning a disciplinary offence shall not be deemed to be 
a violation of professional secrecy. In addition to that in order to prevent a 
criminal offence in the first degree, an advocate has the right359 to submit a 
reasoned written application for exemption from the obligation to maintain a 
professional secret to the Chairman of an administrative court or an admi-
nistrative judge of the same court appointed by the Chairman. A judge shall 
hear a submitted application immediately and shall issue or refuse to issue a 
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written permission (§ 45 (5) of the BAA).360 Justifications for non-advocate 
counsel to disclose the information received from the accused are not provided 
by law, although at least in order to prevent a criminal offence in the first 
degree, counsel should be allowed to disclose information, the principle that 
should be added to § 47 (3) of the CCP for non-advocate counsels. 
Second, counsel may misuse his position and make decisions in the name of 
the accused, which are not in his competence. In relation to that a question 
arises, which decisions are in the competence of the accused and which in the 
competence of counsel. It could be said that the relationship between counsel 
and the accused is a collaborative one, in which certain fundamental decisions 
are reserved for the accused, while other decisions are in the competence of 
defense counsel.361 In addition to that some decisions are divided between the 
accused and his counsel. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide us 
with the full list of decisions that are in the competence of the accused only. Of 
course, it is up to the accused to waive counsel if counsel’s participation is not 
mandatory. This is the decision the accused has to make himself. The accused 
also has the right to give or refuse to give testimony with regard to the content 
of the charges (CCP, § 34 (1) 1) and § 35 (2)). These are the rights that are 
exercised by the accused solely. In addition to that the accused has sole right in 
Estonia to give consent for termination of the criminal proceedings (e.g., § 202 
of the CCP). The same is with the right to give consent for application of the 
alternative proceedings (CCP, § 233) and the settlement proceedings, although 
the latter requires counsel’s consent also (but the accused can decline 
application of these proceedings irrespective of his counsel’s standpoint about 
the matter), as I will discuss further below.  
In Jones v. Barnes362 the United States Supreme Court held that certain 
tactical decisions would be left to counsel’s discretion, while four constitutional 
rights are reserved exclusively for the accused: “… [T]he accused has the 
ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as 
to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify on his or her own behalf, or 
make an appeal...”363 Court’s finding in Jones v. Barnes stems from general 
agreement in the United States that the accused absolutely controls the decision 
to waive constitutional rights and that decision is protected by the requirement 
                                                     
360 But it may be claimed that this is not a reasonable rule as it obliges counsel to first 
consult with the court and only after that reveal the information, which may be too late. The 
ABA Standards for instance provide that defense counsel should not reveal information 
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except that 
defense counsel may reveal such information to the extent he reasonably believes necessary 
to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that defense counsel believes is likely to 
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm (Standard 4–3.7 (d) of the ABA 
Standards). No court’s permission is needed here, which guarantees that counsel can act 
without any delay if necessary. 
361 Woessner, Criminal Law – the Crucible of Adversarial Testing: Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's Guilt Note, 315, pp. 340–341. 
362 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983). 
363 Ibid., 463 U.S. 751. 
107 
of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver by the accused.364 Of course, 
counsel is allowed to persuade and urge the client to follow his advice and to do 
what counsel thinks is the best option. The American Bar Association stresses 
here: “Ultimately, however, because of the fundamental nature of decisions 
such as these, so crucial to the accused’s fate, the accused must make the 
decisions himself or herself.”365 Consequently, if counsel overrides an accused’s 
decisions regarding how the accused wishes to exercise his personal constitu-
tional rights, counsel has ceased to function as his client’s advocate. Such 
betrayals are per se prejudicial, as it is claimed in the United States.366 Although 
it is not provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, one has to agree that it 
is the decision of the accused to say whether to appeal or not. The person’s right 
to appeal comes from the Constitution (§ 24 (5) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia) and it should not be taken from him or used against his 
will. In addition to that, because appellate procedure is a whole new procedure 
that takes additional money and time, it should be up to the accused to decide 
whether to spend it or not.367 In order to clarify the matter, this principle should 
be added to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Although the accused has the right to give consent to the application of the 
settlement proceedings, participate in the negotiations for the settlement pro-
ceedings, make proposals concerning the type and term of punishment and enter 
or decline to enter into an agreement concerning the settlement proceedings 
(CCP, § 34 (1) 10) and § 35 (2)), technically it is not his sole right. More 
specifically, according to § 239 (2) 2) of the CCP the settlement proceedings 
shall not be applied if the accused’s counsel does not consent to the application 
of the settlement proceedings. Therefore it could happen that the accused agrees 
with the settlement proceedings, but his counsel does not. Here it should be 
taken into account that counsel is a person with legal education and what is also 
important, most likely with previous experience in the criminal proceedings. 
This means that he is presumably able to assess whether there is enough 
evidence against the accused or not. If there is not or the prosecutor proposes 
legal assessment of the criminal offence or the category or term of the punish-
ment, which counsel finds unsuitable, he should not consent with the settlement 
proceedings no matter what the accused’s position is. Of course, he should 
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explain the rationale behind his decision to the accused and if the accused does 
not agree with him, he may decide to change his counsel (in case it is appointed 
counsel it would not be possible, as refusing to give consent for the application 
of the settlement proceedings is not ineffectiveness of counsel per se), but if 
counsel’s decision is well considered and explained to the accused it may even 
be that the accused provides his consent and agrees with counsel.  
In case a decision-making authority is shared between counsel and the 
accused, as it is for instance with submitting evidence and submitting requests 
and complaints in Estonia as both the accused (CCP, § 34 (1) 7) and 8); § 35 
(2)) and counsel (§ 47 (1) 2) and 3)) have the right to do that, the only viable 
option is to do that in a manner that allows the accused to shape the direction of 
his defense, but that also enables counsel to make appropriate tactical and 
strategic decisions.368 In the United States it has been argued that defense 
counsel should have discretion to make decisions concerning matters such as 
what motions to file, what witnesses to call, what objections to rise and what 
arguments to make,369 which basically means forming a strategy of the case, but 
it is not that way in Estonian criminal procedure. It might even be that that the 
accused spoils counsel’s questioning tactic, because he as a party to a court 
proceeding may question the witness during the cross-examination himself 
(CCP, § 288). In my opinion counsel’s right to form the strategy and make 
tactical decisions should be recognized in Estonia also, although this principle 
does not come directly from the law, which leads to my proposal that it should 
be added to the Code of Criminal Procedure. This assures that counsel is the 
“professional representative of the accused, not his alter ego”.370 This also 
assures that counsel is able to fulfill his duty provided for in § 47 (2) of the 
CCP. Furthermore, although decisions related to strategy and tactic should be in 
the competence of counsel, it does not mean that counsel does not have a duty 
to consult with his client. Unless it is contrary to law, the rules of professional 
conduct or to the interests of his client, the advocate shall always take into 
consideration the wishes of his client when choosing the means and measure of 
protection (second sentence of Article 8 (2) of the Code of Conduct of the 
Estonian Bar Association, a principle that should also guide non-advocate 
counsel actions in criminal proceedings). As the United States Supreme Court 
has stressed: “From counsel’s function as assistant to the defendant derive the 
overarching duty to advocate the defendant’s cause and the more particular 
duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the 
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defendant informed of important developments in the course of the pro-
secution.”371  
Consequently, the right to waive counsel, testify on his own behalf, give 
consent for application of the alternative proceedings and for termination of the 
proceedings are rights that the accused has to exercise himself in Estonia, 
although, of course, counsel is allowed to provide the assistance in these areas 
also. With the right to appeal the situation is not so clear, although it really 
should be the accused that makes the decision whether to appeal or not. Both 
the accused and his counsel have to give consent for the application of the 
settlement proceedings and if one of them does not give it, these proceedings 
are not applied. Procedural decisions which are in the competence of counsel 
alone (these are not listed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but in my opinion 
counsel should have sole competence to form a strategy and make tactical 
choices) or in the competence of counsel and the accused, should be exercised 
by counsel after consultation with the accused and because counsel is a 
professional lawyer, not the “alter ego” of the accused, he should be allowed to 
deviate from the accused’s wishes. 
Counsel’s duty of loyalty to, and advocacy of, the accused’s cause is limited 
to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as a 
search for truth. Although counsel must take all reasonable lawful means to 
attain his client’s objectives, counsel is precluded from taking steps or in any 
way assisting the client in presenting false evidence or otherwise violating the 
law.372 Counsel’s duty to follow the law is in Estonia stipulated in § 47 (2) of 
the CCP and in § 44 (1) 1) of the BAA. Therefore, if counsel has broken the law 
in the course of provision of assistance, and it has prejudiced the accused’s 
position in the proceedings, the court should be allowed to disqualify him (see 
Standard 1.5). If it has caused serious breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship or has prevented counsel in any other way from fulfilling his lawful 
duties, it should also form a ground for annulment of the court judgment of the 
court of lower instance. Then the higher court can refer to the breakdown of the 
attorney-client relationship or counsel’s failure to fulfill an important duty, 
which means that here is no need for a specific ground for annulment of the 
lower court’s judgment.  
As counsel is an advisor and representative to the accused, it is proper to 
assume that counsel is the accused’s confidant. If there has been a complete and 
total breakdown of the trust and confidence in the attorney-client relationship, 
and counsel has become the accused’s adversary, it is clear that the relationship 
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is ruined and therefore counsel should be allowed to withdraw so that the 
accused could try again with another counsel. Otherwise the result of this 
breakdown can lead to the denial of an accused’s right to effective assistance of 
counsel.373 Consequently, trial courts should be given wide latitude in granting 
or denying counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw as counsel (see Standard 
4.1), and their decisions should be reviewed only for abuse of that discretion.374 
But at the same time the United States Supreme Court has explicitly held that 
the Constitution does not guarantee the accused “a meaningful relationship” 
with counsel.375 The same principle could be derived from the case law of the 
Estonian Supreme Court also. In court case no. 3-1-1-70-10 the accused 
requested removal of counsel, claiming that there has been a breakdown in the 
attorney-client relationship. The Supreme Court of Estonia concluded that there 
was no violation of the right to defense, because it was already the appellate 
proceedings and changing an appointed counsel so late was not practical.376 
Although the Supreme Court of Estonia did not say it out loud, it could be 
derived from its judgment that in case of breakdown of the attorney-client 
relationship, courts still have to consider and weigh different values before they 
decide whether to remove counsel or not. I do not agree with either of the 
Supreme Courts, as in my opinion, a trustful attorney-client relationship is a 
precondition for counsel to be able to provide proper assistance to the accused. 
Thus, total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship results in ineffective 
assistance of counsel per se, and should form automatically a ground for 
annulment of the court judgment (see Standard 8.7). What is total breakdown 
should be up to the courts to assess based on certain facts of the case. 
 
 
4.7 Insufficient Consultation with the Accused 
In addition to defense counsel’s duty to try to seek to establish a relationship of 
trust and confidence with the accused, he should discuss the objectives of the 
representation with him as it was already mentioned above, which in turn results 
in a trustful relationship. Counsel should start consulting with his client 
promptly, discuss all aspects of the case with him and try to determine all 
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relevant facts. This helps counsel to understand the accused’s position about the 
case and in turn enables the accused to understand counsel’s position. During 
the proceedings counsel should keep the client informed of developments in the 
case, advise the client on all aspects of the case and consult with the client on 
decisions relating to direction of the case. Thereat, an accused’s right to 
communicate with his advocate out of hearing of a third person is part of the 
basic requirements of a fair trial and follows from Article 6 paragraph (3) c of 
the ECHR: “If a lawyer were unable to confer with his client and receive 
confidential instructions from him without surveillance, his assistance would 
lose much of its usefulness, whereas the Convention is intended to guarantee 
rights that are practical and effective…”377 According to § 34 (1) 4) and § 35 (2) 
of the CCP, the accused has the right to confer with counsel without the 
presence of other persons. 
Although the duty to consult with the accused is not provided for in the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, it should be, as it is essential for the trustful relationship 
between the accused and counsel and also necessary in order to keep the 
accused informed about what is going on in the proceedings commenced against 
him. According to Article 14 (4) of the Code of Conduct of the Estonian Bar 
Association an advocate shall keep his client informed as to the progress of the 
matter entrusted to him378 and respond to the inquiries of the client when due 
and as appropriate and, if possible, in the language of inquiry. The ABA 
stresses that existence of such consultations about the appropriate ends and 
means of representation do not mean that counsel must follow whatever 
decisions the client makes about how the representation should proceed: “A 
lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or employ means simply because a 
client may wish or demand that the lawyer do so.”379 This standpoint is 
absolutely logical in the light of principle that counsel is an independent party to 
the proceedings, not an accused’s alter ego and also if we consider the fact that 
it is counsel not the accused who has a legal education and therefore has 
knowledge of the law. 
As consultation with the accused is an essential duty of counsel in the 
criminal proceedings, it should be concluded if counsel fails to do that, the court 
should direct counsel to fulfill this duty and if counsel does not react after that, 
the court should be allowed to remove counsel (see Standard 4.2). The failure to 
consult with the accused should form a basis for annulment of court judgment, 
if the higher court finds the serious lack of consultation, which should be 
concluded if counsel did not consult with the accused at all or failed to do it in a 
complete way. The latter should be decided by a case-by-case approach (see 
Standard 9.2). 
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4.8 Improper Plea Bargaining 
In the United States it has been argued that given the high number of plea 
bargaining in the criminal justice system, its low visibility, and the crucial 
importance of the defense counsel’s role, it is appropriate to set out specific 
duties for defense counsel in these proceedings.380 In Estonia in 2010 only 8,6% 
of criminal cases were conducted in general procedure, 31,9% in alternative 
proceedings and 33,8% in settlement proceedings, which is similar to plea 
bargaining.381 This means that in Estonia the plea bargaining also plays an 
important role in criminal proceedings. 
In Estonia the settlement proceedings can be commenced by the Prosecutor’s 
Office or the accused. However, the settlement proceedings shall not be applied, 
if counsel does not consent to the application of the settlement proceedings 
(CCP, § 239 (2) 2)), as already discussed above. The accused and the prosecutor 
may submit a request for the application of the settlement proceedings to the 
court until the completion of examination by the court in the county court (CCP, 
§ 239 (3)). According to the Code of Criminal Procedure the obligation to 
explain the rights to the accused and also explain him the option of applying the 
settlement proceedings and its consequences lies on the prosecutor (CCP, § 240 
1)). Nevertheless, counsel participates in negotiations with the prosecutor in 
order to conclude a settlement and gives his consent to application of the 
settlement proceedings. In order to conclude the settlement a Prosecutor’s 
Office and the accused and his counsel has to reach a settlement concerning the 
legal assessment of the criminal offence and the nature and extent of the 
damage caused by the criminal offence, and also the type and the category or 
term of the punishment which the prosecutor requests in court for the com-
mission of the criminal offence (CCP, § 244 (2)). After the settlement is 
concluded the prosecutor, the accused and his counsel shall be summoned to a 
court session (CCP, § 246 (1)). The obligation of the judge is to ask from the 
accused whether the accused understands the settlement and consents thereto. In 
addition to that the judge makes a proposal to the accused to explain the 
circumstances relating to the conclusion of the settlement and ascertains 
whether conclusion of the settlement was the actual intention of the accused 
(CCP, § 247 (2)). Finally the judge asks the opinions of counsel and the pro-
secutor concerning the settlement and whether they will adhere to the settlement 
(§ 247 (3) of the CCP). 
There are quite many dangers for the accused when it comes to the 
ineffective defense during the plea bargaining. One of them is that innocent 
accused persons may be persuaded to plead guilty leading to a wrongful 
conviction. Although the judge should convict the accused only if he is satisfied 
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that the accused committed the offence, the difficulty for a court faced with a 
guilty plea is that it can be hard to examine its validity without the evidence 
being properly tested in court.382 In addition to that the accused, although 
factually guilty, may be convicted even if the prosecutor does not actually have 
enough evidence for the accused to be convicted in general procedure. And 
finally, the accused may agree with the severity of punishment he would not 
have received or legal assessment of the criminal offence the court would have 
not concluded in general procedure. 
It could be stated that a system of plea bargaining is a catalyst for ineffective 
representation. It subjects defense counsels to serious temptations to disregard 
their clients’ interests, and aggravates the harmful impact of ineffective repre-
sentation when it occurs.383 It is understandable that with agreement counsel is 
able to get rid of an unpleasant, uninteresting or for some other reason un-
wanted criminal case quickly and with minimal effort. But what makes this 
ineffectiveness very dangerous is the fact that usually the agreement leads to the 
court judgment on the conviction of the accused and on imposition of the 
punishment agreed upon in the agreement on the accused. Although the court 
has an obligation to ascertain the accused’s actual intent, the previous 
ineffectiveness of defense counsel may not appear in the court session, because 
the accused often affirms to the court that he fully agrees with the settlement. 
Because entering the settlement negotiations which may have very serious 
consequences to the accused, at minimum, his counsel should be required to 
investigate the case (the facts and the law) previously and give advice to the 
accused.384 Counsel should let the accused know that he does not recommend 
that the accused gives his consent to the agreement before counsel has learned 
the relevant facts and law and provided the accused a candid estimate of the 
probable outcome.385 It is the duty of counsel to ascertain that the Prosecutor’s 
Office has enough evidence against the accused that if the criminal matter were 
conducted in general procedure, the accused would be convicted. In addition to 
that counsel should investigate the facts and the law and ascertain that legal 
assessment of the criminal offence and the punishment proposed by the 
prosecutor are in accordance with the law and judicial practice. Consequently, 
counsel’s advice to an accused to plead guilty merely because the accused has 
admitted guilt to the lawyer, without exploring the relevant facts and law or 
attempting to determine whether the prosecution can establish guilt, is im-
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proper.386 After counsel has investigated the case and the law thoroughly, he 
should explain to the accused about possible choices and outcomes. In addition 
to that, although the prosecutor is obliged to explain the accused his rights, 
counsel should do that before the accused decides to enter the negotiations at 
all, because only then the accused could understand the nature of negotiations 
and his and his counsel’s role in it. Consequently, diligent counsel ensures that 
the rights of the accused are first introduced and afterwards recognized and 
respected in the plea negotiation process. The integrity of the plea bargaining 
process depends on the fundamental right to counsel.387 
It can be said that the decision to plead guilty can be an intelligent one only 
if the accused has been advised fully as to his rights and as to the probable 
outcome of alternative choices. In addition to that, the accused should also be 
aware of the consequences of settlement. In McMann v. Richardson the United 
States Supreme Court stated that if an accused’s plea is “…based on reasonably 
competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the ground that 
counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the defendant’s confession.”388 
The Court continued: “Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent, and therefore 
vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible in 
evidence depends, as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retro-
spectively consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that 
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 
cases.”389 But as the case concerned a coerced confession, I doubt whether 
counsel’s advice in this situation to plead guilty could ever fall within the range 
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. In Hill v. Lockhart,390 
the United States Supreme Court stated that the Strickland standard is also 
applicable in cases of plea bargaining. Where an accused enters a guilty plea 
upon counsel’s advice, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether the 
advice was within the range of competence demanded of counsels in criminal 
cases. The accused has to show that counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, and that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different, i.e. in order to satisfy the second, prejudice, requirement, 
the accused must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty, and would have insisted on 
going to trial.391Although the United States Supreme Court always requires that 
the accused’s decision should be based on reasonably competent counsel’s 
advice, it also emphasizes that the accused himself should have common sense 
to assess this advice: “The rule that a plea must be intelligently made to be valid 
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does not require that a plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not 
correctly assess every relevant factor entering into his decision. A defendant is 
not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea 
has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the State’s 
case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.”392  
When it comes to the quality of the advice, it should be noted that it is in-
sufficient for a lawyer merely to give an opinion, devoid of the predicate for the 
recommendation: it renders the advice hollow. Counsel should provide his 
opinion and the bases for it.393 This allows the accused to rely on counsel’s 
advice when it is time for the accused to make the decision whether to agree 
with the proposed settlement or not. In addition to that counsel should have 
bargaining skills: as the accused has an opportunity not only to decide whether 
to plead guilty to the charges or to go to trial but also to plead guilty to other, 
more lenient charges or receive more lenient punishment, it is possible that 
skilled counsel would obtain a better bargain.394  
I agree with those who claim that the most serious mistakes of a defense 
counsel in relation to plea bargaining are failure to inform of an offer at all, 
inaccurate information or inadequate advice provided for the accused, coercion 
and neutrality.395 The first one is the mistake that should not occur in Estonia, 
because according to the Code of Criminal Procedure if a Prosecutor’s Office 
considers application of settlement proceedings possible, the Office explains the 
option of applying settlement proceedings, the rights of the accused in the 
settlement proceedings and the consequences of application of the settlement 
proceedings to the accused (CCP, § 240 1)). Therefore, in order to commence 
settlement proceedings, the Prosecutor’s Office must contact the accused. The 
second mistake is the one that comes from counsel’s inadequate investigation of 
the relevant facts and the law and may even sometimes be intentional if counsel 
is interested in the case resulting in a settlement or on the contrary in going to 
trial. Coercion has the same goal – for some reason counsel wants that the case 
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is conducted in settlement proceedings or in the general procedure and for 
instance, threatens the accused with untrue consequences that can happen if the 
accused does not agree to act in the way counsel requires. The last one – 
neutrality – I have already discussed above. It means that counsel, although 
while advising the accused names the possible outcomes, but does not express 
his opinion based on investigation of relevant facts and law about the case and 
therefore provides no support to the accused. That leaves the accused alone to 
make the decision and gives the impression that he is not supported by his 
counsel, which is one of the duties of counsel. Although the consequences of 
neutrality could be reduced in Estonia by the fact that the prosecutor also 
explains the accused his rights and the results of the plea bargaining, it still 
means that the accused has not received advice and support from a person who 
should be by his side during the criminal proceedings. That leaves three 
mistakes, inadequate advice, coercion and neutrality, which should form a basis 
for annulment of the court judgment or if the trial court finds it out before the 
judgment is made, a court’s ruling on the return of the criminal file to the 
Prosecutor’s Office (see Standards 5 and 9.6). 
There are two main scenarios in case of ineffectiveness claims of counsel in 
plea bargaining. First, an accused ignorantly pleads guilty without exercising 
his right to a trial and then desires the opportunity for trial, and second, an 
accused exercises his right to a trial, is found guilty and then desires a lighter 
sentence than resulted from his trial because he missed an opportunity to 
effectively plea bargain.396  
In the United States courts are reluctant to overturn convictions stemming 
from guilty pleas.397 Although in order to plead guilty the accused does not have 
to confess guilt, as in order to conclude the settlement the accused does not have 
to confess his guilt in Estonia either,398 a guilty plea is seen as an admission that 
removes doubts about whether the accused is guilty. Consequently, judges in 
the United States see accused persons’ complaint over their counsels’ in-
effectiveness as an attempt to manipulate the criminal justice process by persons 
“who initially took the risk that they would fare better by pleading guilty than 
by standing trial and then, after seeing the result, concluded that they had made 
the wrong decision“. 399 In my opinion if it is ascertained that the accused’s 
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decision to agree with the settlement was intelligent, i.e., before he made the 
decision he was advised by counsel who knew the facts of the case and the 
relevant law, counsel’s advice based on the facts and the law was honest and 
true, counsel did not deceive the accused or did not coerce him to enter the 
decision, it could be said that there is no ground for annulment of the court 
judgment. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal cannot be 
filed against a judgment made by way of settlement proceedings except in the 
event of a violation of the provisions of the procedural rules of settlement 
proceedings or material violation of procedural law according to the first 
subsection of § 339 of the CCP (§ 318 (4) of the CCP).400 As ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel is in my opinion material violation of procedural law according 
to CCP § 339 (1) 12) as I will discuss further in the next chapter, it forms the 
basis for filing an appeal for the accused. 
It is theoretically possible, although not frequent at least in the United States 
that the accused argues after the conviction that the decision to reject a plea and 
proceed to trial was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. There are 
conflicting views about the matter in the United States. Some courts in the 
United States consider the performance of counsel during plea bargaining 
ineffective if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient 
performance, the outcome of the plea negotiations would have been different; 
i.e., the accused would have pled guilty and waived his right to a trial. Also, 
these courts request the accused to show that he was deprived of the opportunity 
to exchange a guilty plea for a lesser sentence.401 The rationale behind this 
position is that the result of an error during the plea bargaining stage can be 
significant, regardless of how the accused pleads.402 But others emphasize that 
there is no constitutional right to a plea bargain.403 Their position is that fair trial 
has produced a reliable final judgment and annulling that judgment would be 
against the principle of finality.404 They also claim that there is no appropriate 
remedy to cure ineffectiveness of counsel in these situations: the courts that 
support overturning the judgments have granted the accused a new trial or 
required the prosecution to reinstate the originally rejected plea offer, but the 
new trial is not a proper remedy, because the accused already received a fair 
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trial. Requiring the prosecution to reinstate the original plea offer harms the 
balance of power between the parties and the court: an offer was originally 
given by the grace of the prosecutor, not by the court.405 The United States 
Supreme Court has not, however, had the opportunity to express its opinion 
about the matter406 and therefore it is not possible to conclude what solution 
would be proper in the eyes of the Supreme Court.  
I agree more with the ones who are against overturning convictions than 
with the ones who support it. If the accused is convicted in a trial that is 
declared fair, i.e. his procedural rights, including his right to effective assistance 
of counsel were honored during the trial, the principle of finality automatically 
acquires a very important meaning. To conclude that even if the accused 
received a fair trial, he has the right to either a new trial or new settlement, may 
be in the interests of the accused and may even serve the principle of equal 
protection as the accused who has declined the plea agreement may claim that 
he received a more strict punishment than other accused persons who have 
similar charges and who accept the plea agreement (as plea agreements usually 
means more lenient punishment), but is still strongly against the principle of 
finality. As I have emphasized repeatedly, the principle of finality and the 
accused’s right to counsel are the main values that should be weighed in case of 
ineffectiveness of counsel claims. Sometimes the right to counsel overcomes the 
principle of finality and sometimes it is the other way round. As here the 
accused has already had a chance to effective assistance of counsel, in my 
opinion it erases the former ineffectiveness of defense counsel and therefore, the 
court judgment should not be annulled. Additionally, I also agree with those 
who claim that it is against the principle of independence of parties to a court 
proceeding to compel the prosecutor to offer an agreement once more to the 
accused, which would be only proper remedy if the court judgment would be 
annulled (but which I am strongly against). 
 
 
4.9 Improper Representation in the Court Proceedings 
There are quite a lot of mistakes counsel can make during the court pro-
ceedings. Failure to seek out or present evidence that may lead to the acquittal 
of the accused or mitigate his guilt is one possible violation. The duty to use all 
means and methods of defense which are not prohibited by law in order to 
ascertain the facts which vindicate the person being defended, prove his 
innocence or mitigate his punishment comes directly from § 47 (2) of the CCP. 
Two additional ones are the lack of overall strategy and failure to object to 
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inadmissible aggravating evidence.407 Counsel’s failure to prepare the case is 
the one I have already discussed above. In addition to that counsel may show 
incompetence in cross-examination of a witness or fail to object to a pro-
secutor’s questions to the witness. Although the list of counsel’s possible 
mistakes in trial is endless, I will discuss here the most serious ones, i.e. the 
ones that in my opinion lead to ineffectiveness of counsel. 
First, if counsel says during the trial that in his opinion the accused is guilty, 
although the accused has not confessed his quilt, it can be said that a very 
serious breach of counsel’s duties has occurred. Although it could be claimed 
that, if the accused could not convince his own counsel to argue his innocence 
at trial, there is virtually no likelihood that court acquits him, the question 
whether or not the accused is convicted is not relevant and the improper 
counsel’s representation can be concluded because of defense counsel’s 
unauthorized concession of guilt.408 As the United States Supreme Court has 
stated: “The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process 
can only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate on 
behalf of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.”409 In Estonia, this 
problem is only regulated if counsel is an advocate. Article 19 (3) of the Code 
of Conduct of the Estonian Bar Association provides: “If the client denies the 
accusations made against him the position of the client shall be binding upon 
the advocate. The advocate shall not be bound by the position of his client when 
rendering a legal opinion on the accusations made against his client, however, 
he shall inform the client about the defense position.” In my opinion this is an 
absolutely reasonable regulation that takes into account both the accused’s and 
counsel’s position in the proceedings and should be added to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. The accused is the one who has the best knowledge of 
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what really happened and what did not happen, which means that only he is the 
one who has the right to say whether the defense position is that he is guilty or 
not. Counsel, on the other hand is professional and has much more thorough 
knowledge about the law and judicial practice, which means that there is no 
way he should be obliged to present the same legal reasoning as the accused, 
who may not even be able to understand the law at all. Consequently, if counsel 
expresses opinion that the accused is guilty although the accused has not 
confessed his guilt, it should form a basis for removal of counsel and later the 
annulment of the court judgment.  
In Estonia counsel has to compose the list of evidence he wants to present 
and witnesses he wants to be questioned before the court session, as I already 
discussed above. The collection of additional evidence during the court pro-
ceedings at the request of counsel may be ordered in exceptional cases, which 
means that failure to present evidence is usually an issue of ineffective pre-trial 
representation, not trial representation. Therefore, usually counsel has all the 
evidence he wants to present listed before the trial. If counsel finds out that 
additional evidence exists after the deadline of statement of defense, he should 
file a motion to collect additional evidence during the court proceedings. How-
ever, if he does not do that, this may lead to the conclusion that counsel has 
been ineffective during the trial stage of the proceedings. 
After the prosecutor has given an opening statement, it is time for counsel to 
give his. The American Bar Association explains here: “The primary purpose of 
the opening statement is to give counsel an opportunity to outline the issues and 
matters counsel believes can and will be supported by competent and admissible 
evidence introduced during the trial.”410 As I already discussed, defense counsel 
should not express a personal belief or opinion in his client’s innocence.411 If 
counsel is aware of circumstances that show that there are no grounds for 
criminal proceedings, i.e. if the necessary elements of an offence do not exist, it 
is possible to preclude unlawfulness of the act or there are circumstances that 
preclude guilt, counsel should stress that and also refer to evidence that supports 
his conclusion. 
After opening statements the examination of evidence begins. Here counsel 
needs good lawyering skills, especially when it comes to questioning of 
witnesses. Because in most cases only testimony given by a witness during the 
court proceedings could be used as evidence, it is important that counsel asks all 
the questions he considers important from the witness and in case the witness is 
the prosecutor’s witness, tries to call credibility of the testimony into question. 
Therefore incompetent questioning of witnesses could also lead to ineffective 
defense. In addition to that ineffectiveness may also occur when counsel fails to 
object to prohibited questions asked by the prosecutor or even unlawful 
evidence that the prosecutor tries to present.  
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After examination by the court is completed, the summations commence. 
Here counsel has an opportunity to give his opinion about punishment. Even if 
the accused has not confessed his guilt, counsel should still have a say on the 
punishment requested by the prosecutor. In order to do that, first, counsel 
should be aware of the potential punishment that the client is facing, including 
whether the punishment could be only imprisonment or pecuniary punishment 
as well. In addition to that counsel should be aware of the potential term of 
punishment and also applicable supplementary punishments. Of course, counsel 
should also be aware of general principles of the imposition of punishments as 
well as facts of the certain case and the background of the accused. And last, 
counsel should investigate circumstances that the prosecutor claims to be 
aggravating and refer to circumstances he himself finds mitigating.412 
For the aforementioned reasons, the most serious individual mistakes of 
counsel during the trial, which in my opinion may constitute ineffectiveness and 
result in annulment of the court judgment, are: 
1. Failure to make an adequate opening statement, e.g., statement that does 
not include his opinion about the charges or other likewise superficial 
opening statement (see Standard 10.2). 
2. Failure to ask for an acquittal if counsel knows or should know that 
there are no grounds for criminal proceedings, i.e. if necessary elements 
of an offence do not exist or it is possible to preclude unlawfulness of 
the act (see Standard 9.8). 
3. Failure to bring out an existing circumstance that precludes guilt and 
that are known or should be known to counsel (see Standard 9.9). 
4. Failure to put material witnesses (material means that there is a 
probability that the testimony of this witness could mitigate the 
accused’s position) on the stand, if counsel did not know the necessity 
to hear the witness when he was composing the statement of defense. If 
he did, this is ineffectiveness of defense counsel during the pre-trial 
stage of the criminal proceedings, which was already discussed above 
(see Standard 9.5).413  
5. Failure to ask for collection of additional evidence, if additional 
evidence is extremely relevant (meaning that there is a probability that 
it mitigates the accused’s situation) and counsel did not know about the 
evidence when he was composing the statement of defense. If he did, 
this is ineffectiveness of defense counsel during the pre-trial stage of 
the criminal proceedings, which was already discussed above (see 
Standard 9.5).414 
6. Failure to object to unlawful evidence or to make other material 
objections or requests, e.g., failure to submit a petition of challenge 
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against the judge if there is a basis for the judge to remove himself (see 
Standard 10.6).  
7. Ineffective cross-examination, which means failure to question the 
witness with the required thoroughness (see Standard 10.3). 
8. Failure to make adequate closing arguments (see Standard 10.4).  
9. Failure to give adequate opinion about the punishment required by the 
prosecutor. This opinion should be based on the facts of the case and 
relevant law and both refer to mitigating circumstances and object to 
aggravating circumstances (see Standard 10.5). 
10. Expressing the opinion that the accused is guilty although the accused 
has not confessed his guilt (which should also form a basis for removal 
of counsel as it shows that counsel goes strongly against the standpoint 
that the accused has taken about the subject known to the accused only) 
(see Standards 4.3 and 9.3).  
11. Lack of overall strategy, which means that counsel is there and acts but 
for an observer it is obvious that he does not have a proper goal for his 
actions, e.g., he acts in the proceedings, but from his opening statement 
and from the evidence he presents, it cannot be concluded what in his 
opinion the best result of the proceedings for his client could be (see 
Standard 9.7). 
Failures 1 and 6–9 are the ones that could be concluded only by considering 
counsel’s overall strategy in the criminal proceedings. For example, the higher 
court may think that counsel made an inadequate opening statement, but after 
counsel has explained the rationale behind making such a statement, the higher 
court may decide that in the light of the counsel’s strategy the opening 
statements were not inadequate at all. Therefore these failures do not constitute 
ineffective defense per se. The last failure, the failure of counsel to form his 
strategy is obviously quite difficult to assess. Here it would be useful if counsels 
had a duty to compose a written overview of their strategy before trial, seal it 
and put it in the criminal file. This document should be allowed to be used only 
by higher courts in the case of an ineffectiveness claim. 
 
 
4.10 Improper Representation in Higher Courts  
In the United States claims of ineffectiveness of appellate counsel have focused 
on three major categories of ineffectiveness, which I will now discuss further. 
These claims arise from the duties of an appellate counsel. Appellate counsel 
must be familiar with procedural rules for protecting the accused’s right to 
appeal; must review the court file for possible appellate issues and be familiar 
with the facts of the case and relevant law; must determine what issues to raise 
in appeal and how to formulate those issues. And finally, counsel must write 
persuasively.415 The Supreme Court of Estonia has held that the duties of 
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counsel do not only consist of assisting the accused with composing an appeal 
against the decision or ruling of the court. Counsel also has to ascertain the 
position of the accused and to file an appeal in cassation that considers the 
accused’s interests and is in accordance with requirements provided by the 
law.416  
First, accused persons have referred to the failure to gain or protect access to 
the appeal, such as failure to file a notice of appeal, appeal itself or the failure to 
advise the client concerning his right to appeal.417 The Court of Honor of the 
Estonian Bar Association held on the 6th of March 2008 in its decision that 
when it comes to the accused’s right to appeal, the advocate has to act and not 
stay passive: the accused is not the one who has to notify the advocate of his 
wish to file an appeal. Instead, the advocate has to be the one who contacts the 
accused, via e-mail or fax if necessary, and finds out his intentions.418 However, 
this only forms a basis for disciplinary action in Estonia: the courts have not 
held that in this case the accused should have a new chance to file an appeal. 
According to Estonian judicial practice, if counsel fails to file a notice of appeal 
or the appeal itself, no matter if he has advised the accused about his 
opportunity to file an appeal or not, the accused loses this opportunity, unless 
there is a ground for restoration of the term of appeal, which according to 
judicial practice of the Supreme Court of Estonia is objective impediment, for 
instance natural disaster, traffic accident, illness of counsel, etc.419  
However, the courts in the United States have concluded that an accused 
who loses his right to appeal because of counsel’s error prejudice per se. As 
long as the appellant establishes an intention to appeal and a reliance on counsel 
to preserve the right to do so, the appellant does not have to show that he had 
some chance of success on appeal in order to achieve a new chance for an 
appeal.420 Thus, in Roe v. Flores-Ortega421 the United States Supreme Court 
stressed that when counsel fails to file a requested notice of appeal (or an appeal 
itself, like the Court had stated in Peguero v. United States422), an accused is 
entitled to a new appeal without showing that his appeal would likely have had 
merit. “This is so because a defendant who instructs counsel to initiate an 
appeal reasonably relies upon counsel to file the necessary notice. Counsel’s 
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failure to do so cannot be considered a strategic decision; filing a notice of 
appeal is a purely ministerial task, and the failure to file reflects inattention to 
the defendant’s wishes.“423 The Court also emphasized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega 
that counsel has a duty to consult with the accused about an appeal when there 
is reason to think either that a rational accused person would want to appeal (for 
example, because there exist grounds for appeal in counsel’s opinion), or that 
this particular accused demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in 
appealing.424 I agree with the standpoints of the United States Supreme Court. 
When the accused has put his hopes on filing the appeal or the appeal on 
cassation and counsel has not done it, the accused loses the opportunity in his 
case because of failure of his counsel not himself. Therefore if counsel fails to 
file a notice of appeal or the appeal, the accused should have a second chance 
(see Standard 7.2). When it comes to the question whether counsel should ask 
from the accused if he wants to file an appeal or not or the accused should 
notify counsel about his wish to do that, I support the latter approach. After the 
pronouncement of a court judgment the trial court has an obligation to explain 
the procedure for appeal to the accused (CCP, § 315 (5) 2)) and procedure for 
appeal and appeal on cassation are also explained respectively in the judgment 
of court of first instance (CCP, § 313 (1) 13)) and second instance (CCP, § 342 
(1) and § 313 (1) 13)). Therefore the accused has knowledge about the appeal 
procedure and as he is the one who should give an ultimate opinion whether to 
appeal or not, he should show some initiative. Otherwise counsel who has many 
cases and who represents many accused persons should contact every one of 
them and ask their opinion about an appeal, which in turn would raise his 
workload substantially. 
According to case law of the ECtHR if counsel makes an insignificant 
mistake while he files the appeal, the court should give counsel opportunity to 
correct the mistake. In Czekalla v. Portugal the Supreme Court declared in-
admissible the accused’s appeal against his conviction, lodged through Ms. 
T.M., ruling that the grounds of appeal had not been satisfactorily explained. 
The appeal contained no submissions and did not indicate in what way the legal 
provisions, which breach it alleged, should have been interpreted and applied. 
Mr. Czekalla complained of the inadequacy of the legal assistance he had been 
given, as a result of which he had been deprived of access to the Supreme Court 
on account of the mistake made by the lawyer officially appointed to assist him, 
Ms. T.M., who had omitted to include submissions in her pleading. The ECtHR 
concluded that “…the decisive point is the officially appointed lawyer’s failure 
to comply with a simple and purely formal rule when lodging the appeal on 
points of law to the Supreme Court. In the Court’s view, that was a “manifest 
failure” which called for positive measures on the part of the relevant 
authorities. The Supreme Court could, for example, have invited the officially 
appointed lawyer to add to or rectify her pleading rather than declare the appeal 
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inadmissible.“425 The Court added: “In the first place, it does not see how the 
independence of the legal profession could be affected by a mere invitation by 
the court to rectify a formal mistake. Secondly, it considers that it cannot be 
said a priori that such a situation would inevitably infringe the principle of 
equality of arms, given that it would be more in the nature of a manifestation of 
the judge’s power to direct the proceedings, exercised with a view to the proper 
administration of justice.”426 In my opinion this case shows that the ECtHR 
accepts that in case counsel makes a procedural mistake, the court could declare 
the appeal inadmissible unless the mistake counsel made was manifest in the 
meaning that, e.g., in this case the appeal the advocate filed did not meet some 
formal conditions and in the ECtHR’s opinion the state should have acted in 
order to guarantee the accused’s right to appeal. Still it is difficult to say what is 
in the ECtHR’s opinion “a manifest failure” which calls for positive measures 
on the part of court. In the light of Czekalla v. Portugal it could be said that 
these are some formal requirements counsel fails to meet, but in order to give 
this notion a little wider meaning, one has to wait for further judgments from 
the ECtHR. 
Second, in the United States accused persons have complained over deficient 
perfection of the appeal, such as deficient briefing or failure to appear at an oral 
argument, which basically means that counsel’s preparation or presentation was 
deficient.427 These claims are hardly ever successful in the United States.428 In 
Estonia requirements for appeal are provided for in § 321 of the CCP. If an 
appeal is not in compliance with these requirements, the court shall, by a ruling, 
refuse to accept the appeal and set a term for the elimination of deficiencies 
(CCP, § 323 (1)). Only if the appellant has failed to eliminate the deficiencies 
contained in the appeal within the specified term or to substantiate such failure, 
a judge shall prepare a ruling on refusal to hear an appeal and return the appeal 
to the appellant (CCP, 323 (2) 3)). Therefore the question of ineffective defense 
may arise after the court has refused to hear an appeal, because counsel has not 
eliminated the deficiencies (see Standard 7.3). The same is with the appeal on 
cassation: requirements for that appeal are provided for in § 347 of the CCP. If 
those requirements are not followed, the Court shall set a term for the 
elimination of deficiencies (CCP, § 350 (1)) and refuse to hear an appeal of 
cassation if these deficiencies are not eliminated on time (CCP, § 350 (2) 3)). In 
the court hearing of the criminal matter in circuit court an appellant or the other 
parties to a court proceeding do not have the right to exceed the limits of the 
appeal (CCP, § 331 (4)). Therefore the circuit court has everything the appellant 
found necessary to claim already on the paper. If the appellant does not appear 
to the court session and he has not notified the court about a good reason for 
failure to appear or he has not explained that failure, the court may refuse to 
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hear an appeal or hear a criminal matter in the absence of the appellant (CCP,  
§ 334 (4)). This means that in case counsel as an appellant fails to appear 
without good reason, he may not even get the chance to express his views 
orally, which is not of great importance as counsel has already written them 
down and presented to the court as an appeal. But if the result of counsel’s 
failure is court’s refusal to hear the case, the question of possible ineffective 
defense is raised (see Standard 7.5). In the Supreme Court of Estonia generally, 
the Supreme Court shall hear a criminal matter by way of a written proceeding 
(CCP, § 352 (2)). If a matter is heard by way of an oral proceeding and a party 
to the proceedings fails to appear, the matter is usually heard in their absence 
CCP, § 352 (3)). 
Third, deficient selection of appellate issues has been a subject in the United 
States.429 This could be a problem in Estonian criminal proceedings, because the 
accused may not either want or be able to compose an appeal to the circuit 
courts and therefore gives this task to counsel with the list of issues he himself 
would want to rise in the appeal. It might be that counsel does not agree with 
the issues and arguments brought out by the accused and writes in the appeal his 
own ones. Then the question arises if counsel has been ineffective, because he 
ignored the accused’s wishes. The same question arises with the appeal of 
cassation to the Supreme Court of Estonia even more sharply, because only an 
advocate has a competence to file it to the Supreme Court. 
According to judicial practice of the United States and also opinions 
expressed in the law reviews, while choosing issues, defense counsel can leave 
aside every frivolous issue430 and does not have a duty to raise every non-
frivolous issue requested by the accused either. Experienced advocates in the 
United States have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker argu-
ments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible or at most on a 
few key issues. Selecting the most promising issues for review has assumed a 
greater importance in an era when the time for oral argument is strictly limited 
in the United States in most courts and when page limits on briefs are widely 
imposed.431 The Supreme Court of Estonia has never expressed the view that 
counsels are allowed to leave some issues the accused wants to be added to the 
appeal or appeal on cassation aside. However, although it is the accused’s 
ultimate choice whether to appeal or not, it should be in counsel’s authority to 
choose from issues the accused wants to raise the ones that are in counsel’s 
opinion the best ones. Raising frivolous and unimportant issues is very 
expensive for the accused himself, as he usually has to pay for counsel’s work 
no matter if counsel is retained or appointed, and expensive also to the whole 
justice system. Although in Estonia time for oral arguments and number of 
pages of the appeal is not limited, it should be noticed that everything from 
reading to listening takes court’s time. If court has to waste its time and 
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attention on frivolous and unimportant issues, it means the waste of society’s 
resources. Therefore, in my opinion, counsel should be allowed to leave aside 
unimportant and frivolous issues as in exceptional circumstances he should also 
be allowed to refuse to compose an appeal if he thinks all the issues the accused 
wants to raise are frivolous and after he has examined the court file, he cannot 
raise any other issues himself. The latter proposal however, needs a serious 
debate in society as the principle that comes from the Constitution of Republic 
of Estonia and from the judicial practice of the Estonian Supreme Court is that 
the accused has an indefeasible right to appeal to a higher court against the 
judgment, a right that is restricted if counsel is allowed to refuse from 
composing an appeal. One thing is certain: it would definitely save a remarkable 
amount of resources. However, in order that counsels would not abuse this 
discretion, it would be important to supervise such a decision by counsel, 
maybe with an explanation he has to write to the court or to the Bar if counsel is 
an advocate.  
The ECtHR has judicial practice about frivolous appeals also. In Kulikowski 
v. Poland432 the ECtHR held that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure 
that the proper balance between, on the one hand, effective enjoyment of access 
to justice and the independence of the legal profession on the other, is achieved. 
The mere fact that an appointed lawyer can refuse to represent an accused in the 
proceedings before the highest court does not lead to denial of legal assis-
tance.433 The Court noted: “… [A]rticle 6 of the Convention does not confer on 
the State an obligation to ensure assistance by successive legal-aid lawyers for 
the purposes of pursuing legal remedies which have already been found not to 
offer reasonable prospects of success. In the present case the first lawyer 
appointed under the legal-aid scheme found no legal grounds on which to 
prepare a cassation appeal. In the absence of indications of negligence or 
arbitrariness on the lawyer’s part in discharging her duties, the State can be said 
to have complied with its obligations to provide effective legal aid to the 
applicant in connection with the cassation proceedings.”434  
Consequently, counsel in the appellate proceedings has the following duties, 
the duties that the ABA Standards express verbatim and which in my opinion 
should be recognized in Estonia also. First, in order to make sure that the 
accused acquires the chance to file an appeal, defense counsel should give the 
accused proper advice after the accused has expressed his wish to file an appeal. 
He also should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the accused’s rights 
to appeal, e.g., file a notice of appeal.435 Counsel should give a client his best 
professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. 
When inquiring into the case, counsel should consider all issues that might 
affect the validity of the judgment of conviction and punishment. Counsel 
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should also advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction and 
should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a wholly frivolous appeal or 
to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.436 Appellate counsel has the 
ultimate authority to decide which arguments to make on appeal,437 but when 
appellate counsel decides not to argue all of the issues that his client desires to 
be argued, appellate counsel should inform the client about it, after which the 
accused may decide to change counsel if it is possible for him. When it comes 
to claimed ineffectiveness, if counsel has neglected an issue on appeal and the 
accused claims it was not a right decision, the standard should be whether the 
neglected issue has sufficient merit, in light of the other available issues, that a 
reasonably competent counsel would have pursued it (see Standard 7.4),438 as 
when it comes to determining counsel’s ineffectiveness, the courts should 
always ask themselves, what would a reasonable lawyer have done. 
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IV. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OVER  
THE PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN  
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
1. Judicial Supervision in the Courts of First Instance 
1.1 The Form of Supervision 
Considering that the interpretations of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR by 
the ECtHR are an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system,439 Estonian 
state authorities, including the courts, are obliged to guarantee the right of 
defense to persons charged with a criminal offence that is practical and 
effective, not theoretical or illusory. On the basis of the case law of the ECtHR, 
the Estonian courts have a duty to intervene where the ineffectiveness of 
counsel is manifest or sufficiently brought to their attention in some other way. 
S. Trechsel has expressed a following opinion about the matter: ”This may not 
be a very appropriate formulation, because the essential element seems to be 
that the shortcomings are brought to the attention of the authorities; the decisive 
aspect is, in fact, that the shortcomings are so blatant as to prevent there being 
the possibility of “effective representation”. The requirement that this lack of 
effectiveness be brought to the attention of the competent authorities is very 
much of secondary importance.”440 Therefore Estonian courts have to react if 
the serious breach of counsel’s duties has occurred and the accused is left 
without effective defense. Given the degree of reluctance which the ECtHR has 
been showing when it has been hearing claims concerning ineffective assistance 
of counsel, there is a significant chance that if a person who has been convicted 
in Estonia were to file an application regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 
other than absence of counsel or complete lack of counsel’s action, the 
application would not be satisfied by the ECHR. This does not, however, mean 
that the Estonian courts may turn a blind eye and fail to react to a violation of 
the right set out in the European Convention on Human Rights and interpreted 
by the case law of ECtHR in the hopes that, should an application be filed, the 
ECtHR might for some reason (e.g., reference to independence of counsel) find 
that no violation of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR has occurred.441  
Therefore I am convinced that Estonian courts should act if the accused’s right 
to effective assistance of counsel is jeopardized. Next I am going to discuss why 
the trial court is the one to perform supervision over the performance of counsel 
in criminal proceedings and to react if it notices ineffective representation, name 
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different forms of supervision that could be used by the courts of first instance 
and analyze justification for each form. I am also going to discuss the possibilities 
of Estonian courts to perform supervision over counsel’s activities that are or 
should be enacted by the Code of Criminal Procedure.  
The United States Supreme Court has strongly emphasized the importance of 
judicial supervision in criminal proceedings: “... [T]he judge is not a mere 
moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper 
conduct...”442 In addition to Quercia v. United States, in many cases, the United 
States Supreme Court has demanded that lower courts “…must ever be con-
cerned with preserving the integrity of the judicial process.”443 Justice Souter 
pointed out in his dissent in Mickens v. Taylor: “What is clear from Strickland 
and Holloway is that the right against ineffective assistance of counsel has as 
much to do with public confidence in the professionalism of lawyers as with the 
results of legal proceedings.”444 Almost 25 years before that the United States 
Supreme Court emphasized that judges “…must be alert to factors that may 
undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process.”445 Also the ECtHR has 
considered court to be “an ultimate guardian of the fairness of the pro-
ceedings”.446 As guardians of the conduct of the proceedings judges are 
expected to ensure the fairness of the justice system, which means that they 
have to make sure that lawyers behave in a way consistent with the rules of 
conduct.447 Consequently, it is the trial judge’s obligation to observe what is 
going on in his courtroom and to oversee the representation of parties to a court 
proceeding. This role corresponds to the court’s institutional role: judge is the 
one who sees conduct of parties and the consequences of it, and based on his 
experience he knows what to demand from the parties.448 Therefore I definitely 
agree that the administration of justice is the judge’s “ultimate responsibility”449 
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and he cannot be indifferent to events which diminish the quality of adjudi-
cation in his court.450 In addition to that, the judge is really the only subject to 
the proceedings in addition to the accused that is authorized to make remarks to 
the parties to a court proceeding (the accused can make remarks, of course, only 
to his counsel). It is absolutely inappropriate for the prosecutor to oblige 
counsel to take some steps in the court proceedings or the other way around. Of 
course, they can always observe each other’s behavior and notify the judge of 
mistakes, but it is still the judge who is responsible for conduct of the 
proceedings and should be therefore allowed to instruct the parties to a court 
proceeding.  
In case of ineffectiveness of defense counsel the judge has basically three 
options. He may take the role of defense counsel over from counsel, remain 
passive, i.e. allow the case to stumble toward a fortuitous (or disastrous) 
result,451 or to act as a responsible person while trying to stay as neutral as 
possible, i.e. assist the defense side, but to try not to take over counsel’s role. 
The first option is excluded in the adversary system, because the judge has his 
own role – the role of a person who fulfils a duty to adjudicate and he cannot be 
counsel at the same time as he is the judge. The second option would mean that 
the judge tolerates the fact that one of the opposing parties ceases to exist to the 
prejudice of the accused, which means that the principle of fairness is violated 
in the judge’s courtroom. Both options would mean that the judge backs away 
from the basic principles of the adversary system. The last option, which is the 
best one in my opinion,452 as the judge tries to stay neutral and at the same time 
has an intention to retain the balance of the opposing parties performing in his 
courtroom, is unfortunately not without complications either.  
Intervention by the judge in adversary proceedings never goes without 
difficulties. It always requires the judge to depart from his traditional neutral 
role and step towards the situation where court aids one adversary. In addition 
to that, inquiry into counsel’s strategy means the possibility of jeopardizing the 
confidential relationship between counsel and the accused, which in turn 
impairs the adversary process.453 By intervention the judge risks either getting 
to know facts that he was not supposed to know or to guide the defense in the 
direction the defense had no plan to go. Basically intervention by the judge for 
the defense means that the judge does something that is against the principle of 
two autonomous contestants and one impartial judge, which is the basis for the 
adversary system. 
But yet again the judge is the one who is obliged to preserve the adversary 
proceedings and that is why the intervention is more favorable than remaining 
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passive or becoming counsel himself. Basically it is the best option of three bad 
options. It is the obligation of the trial court to ensure that the adversary system 
is truly functioning, which it is not if one contestant is really absent or “absent” 
because he is ineffective or the judge is missing, because he has acquired the 
role of counsel.454 Like many other issues in the field of ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel this is a coin that has two sides: “Government violates the right 
to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability of 
counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. … 
Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to effective 
assistance, simply by failing to render “adequate legal assistance,” …”455 The 
judicial intervention may threaten the autonomy of lawyers that is at the heart of 
the adversary system, but if the lawyer is ineffective, it may be that the 
proceeding is not adversary at all.456 If one of the parties is not an effective 
advocate, a judge who seeks to be “neutral and detached” might risk the chance 
that important factual or legal aspects of the case go inadequately explored or 
even entirely undeveloped or the accused’s substantial interests remain 
defenseless.457 If he takes the place of counsel, he loses the neutral position 
completely and consequently his impartiality is called into question. In addition 
to that if he takes counsel’s position, there is a danger that the equality of arms 
is violated, but now to the prejudice of the prosecutor. Therefore a middle way 
is needed, which means that the adversary nature of the proceedings does not 
relieve the trial judge of the obligation to intervene but rather obliges him to do 
that, but only as far as the judge does not become counsel himself: when it 
appears that competent representation has been compromised, the trial judge has 
an obligation to act and restore the balance,458 and at the same time try not to 
unbalance the proceedings even more. William W. Schwarzer has described the 
situation very precisely: “The trial judge therefore has a responsibility, 
grounded on and tempered by the adversary process and constitutional 
principles and reinforced by the absence of adequate alternatives, to ensure a 
fair trial by maintaining minimum standards of the performance by counsel.”459  
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If we conclude that the intervention by the judge during a trial is an 
appropriate measure to guarantee that the assistance given by counsel to the 
accused is effective, two concerns arise. First, in what form should the 
intervention be? Second, how should the judge know that there is a risk of 
ineffective defense? These questions I am going to discuss here further. 
As ineffective assistance of counsel “…disturbs the assumptions of the 
adversarial model, since neither truth nor justice may result if the prosecution 
fights hard for its position but the defendant’s advocate is not equally 
vigorous…”460 it can be said that the question for the judge is not whether the 
intervention itself is in accordance with the adversary process, “…but how to 
exercise the discretion to intervene so as to accommodate the competing 
demands of that process.”461 What form any intervention should take, ne-
cessarily varies with the circumstances of the case, the extent of the problem, 
and the personalities and abilities of the parties and the court. It is obvious that 
choosing a right form of judicial intervention that is with the right vigour is very 
complicated. When a trial judge intervenes with undue restraint, the accused’s 
right to effective counsel may be violated. On the other hand, when the judge’s 
intervention is too intrusive, it can interfere with the legitimate strategy of 
counsel and undermine the relationship between the accused and his counsel.462 
There are quite many options to intervene available to the judge, but for the 
above mention reasons he always has to be careful not to underreact or overact 
and for instance, not to refrain from removing counsel when gross ineffective-
ness has appeared or not to remove counsel for a minor mistake. In order to 
choose an appropriate form of intervention, the one from the many aspects that 
the judge has to take into consideration is independence of profession of 
counsel. For instance, in accordance of principle of independence of the Bar it is 
unquestionable that the appropriate intervention in a form of giving instructions 
would more likely consist of orders to do more work than of requirements that 
counsel should alter his fundamental strategy for protecting the accused’s 
interests.463  
The trial judge’s discretion, consequently, must be guided by awareness that 
his intervention can have serious consequences for the independence of counsel, 
the trustful attorney-client relationship, and therefore the proper functioning of 
the adversary proceedings.464 Of course it is easier to say than to actually apply 
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in the particular case.465 The trial judge does not have all the information 
available to a defense counsel. If the judge intervenes to the representation he 
considers being ineffective, but it’s not, he might later be blamed for improper 
handling of the case. Thus his action, which was originally designed to help the 
accused, may actually harm the defense.466 The same is with choosing an 
appropriate form of intervention – if the facts known to the judge indicate that 
the only way to guarantee effective defense to the accused is to remove counsel 
and afterwards it turns out that it would have been possible to use more lenient 
measures, the judge may be accused of overreacting, although he did the best he 
could in the light of information available. And if he does not act or uses too 
lenient measures in case of gross ineffectiveness of counsel, because he did not 
have enough information, it may be concluded that he did not guard his 
proceedings properly. 
The intervention by a trial judge compared to intervention by courts of 
higher instances has at least one considerable advantage. It guarantees a wider 
range of remedies: while a higher court is limited to reversing the conviction, an 
intervention of a trial judge may urge a counsel on preparing a defense and 
taking his duties more seriously. Therefore it can be said that the intervention 
by a trial judge is in compliance with society’s pursuit of the conservation of 
resources.467 Postponing an inquiry into ineffectiveness known at the time of 
trial is illogical and unresponsive to the hardship that faces accused persons 
trying to show counsel errors later on appeal.468 It is also an irresponsible waste 
of resources. In addition to that, appellate proceedings will take its own time 
and it is possible that prisoners may have served their sentences before the 
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higher court makes its decision.469 If a society acknowledges a trial judge’s right 
to intervene, it also gives an accused the right to challenge the effectiveness of 
counsel preemptively, i.e. instead of challenging counsel’s work ex post, the 
accused has an opportunity to do it ex ante, i.e. before the verdict is reached by 
the court.470 The trial judge’s function is to remedy observed deficiencies before 
it is too late, and ideally resorting always to the least intrusive measure possible 
in a certain situation.471 No ex post proceedings can remedy the real defects of 
the defense function, because it always comes too late. In the first place, ex post 
review is simply much less powerful in detecting ineffective assistance: the trial 
judge has immense advantages over the appellate courts in observing the quality 
of representation, because he may become aware of ineffective lawyering that 
would not be obvious by the mere review of the record.472 In the second place, 
ex post review can remedy ineffective assistance only at the expense of the 
finality interest.473 The duty to intervene may seem at first sight an additional 
burden on the trial courts, the long-term benefit from it is a potential general 
improvement of the performance of defense.474  
I absolutely agree with the standpoints I just described. During the court 
proceedings of the court of first instance the judge has a chance to react 
immediately in case ineffectiveness of counsel occurs. Although making re-
marks and guiding counsel’s actions, which sometimes may even lead to an 
argument between the court and counsel, take its time also, it still is a less 
expensive option than annulment of the judgment afterwards. Even if counsel is 
removed and new counsel enters the proceedings, asking for repetition of the 
former proceedings, it still does not demand so many resources as the annul-
ment of the judgment would do. Therefore, I strongly support ex ante super-
vision meaning that it is performed by the court conducting the proceedings. 
For the aforementioned reasons, the judge of the trial court in the adversary 
process has an obligation to depart from traditional paradigms of judging and 
being passive, and directly intervene when confronted with counsel’s in-
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effective representation. This intervention may take various forms, ranging from 
a remark to the questioning of witnesses or removal of counsel, but the nature of 
the judge’s duty is to accept responsibility for the proper functioning of the 
adversarial proceedings and therefore whole legal system. The judge’s 
obligation is a natural extension of the judge’s role as a guardian of the process. 
There is no reason for the judge to believe that some other part of the legal 
system (i.e. higher court, civil courts, bar disciplinary action system) will 
remedy the harm done to the accused in the proceedings. First, for many 
reasons, there is no guarantee that other mechanisms will be more effective than 
direct intervention during the trial. Second, passive acceptance of a deficient 
counsel’s performance decreases the parties’ to a court proceeding and 
spectators’ confidence in the justice system.475 For these considerations I 
strongly support the trial judge’s obligation to supervise counsel’s activities in 
the criminal proceedings and to react and intervene when there is reason to 
believe that counsel renders ineffective assistance to the accused. 
Now it is time to look for the sources, from where the judge may receive 
information about counsel’s ineffectiveness. It is more than obvious, that trial 
counsel will not identify his own act or omission as ineffective assistance and 
turn to the judge.476 Of course, it is more probable that counsel will act if he is 
not able to perform his duties because of interference by the state or there is 
another hindrance to provide the accused with an appropriate assistance (e.g., he 
has too little time to prepare for trial or he cannot find the witness he wants to 
call to testify), but if he himself is reason for an ineffective defense, it is 
obvious and human that he is not going to notify the judge. Naturally, the judge 
as he is present in the court room and observes counsel’s behavior may notice 
counsel’s mistake himself. And if the judge is not able to recognize poor 
lawyering, the accused may inform him about it. However, even if the accused 
notices that something is wrong with the conduct of the defense during the 
proceedings, which he may not do because he usually has a knowledge 
deficiency in the field of law,477 it is very unlikely that he will raise it in court, 
especially in the presence of his counsel, because an average person without 
legal knowledge places great trust in his lawyer and gives him complete control 
over the activities of the defense.478 
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The question of form of intervention is even more troublesome. In Estonia, 
there is nothing prohibiting the court from ordering counsel in the course of the 
proceedings to study the case file, confer with the client, etc. The obligation of 
counsel to become familiar with a criminal case is even set out separately in § 
273 (4) of the CCP, which provides that if counsel is not familiar with the 
criminal matter, the court may adjourn the court session for up to ten days. An 
equally or even more important duty is, of course, the obligation to participate 
in court sessions in accordance with § 270 (2) of the CCP. It should also be 
noted that if a court finds that counsel has failed to present an important piece of 
evidence, the court may under § 297 (1) of the CCP order the collection of 
additional evidence on its own initiative. However, the Supreme Court of 
Estonia has in numerous judgments held that the exercise of this right by the 
court is nevertheless an exception.479 In some cases, which I will discuss later, 
the Estonian courts have an authority to remove counsel. But from the possible 
intervention further questions arise: what kind of intervention should the court 
choose, should the intervention be possible even if the ineffectiveness has not 
yet appeared and should it be possible even if the accused does not approve it? 
These questions arise in the context of the Estonian justice system also and in 
addition to the question whether there should be any other form of intervention 
available in Estonia that is not described in the Code of Criminal Procedure 
now, should be answered. 
The first question has been already discussed above. The court has to choose 
the least intrusive way to intervene into counsel’s work, but should still act 
strongly to the most erroneous assistance provided by counsel. The court has 
many options to choose starting with remarks and ending with removal of 
counsel and selecting one of them is a decision made by a case-by-case 
approach.  
In the United States it has been suggested that defense counsel’s perfor-
mance may be monitored either passively or actively in trial courts. Passive 
monitoring requires only that the trial judge be alert to visible mistakes and also 
complaints made by other parties to a court proceeding. Should mistakes 
become evident, the judge may use a variety of intervention techniques ranging 
from inquiry, to admonition, to adjournment for further preparation, and finally 
to disqualification of counsel.480 Active monitoring places the trial judge in the 
position of seeking to discover errors and even act before the errors have 
occurred in order to guarantee effectiveness of counsel. The procedures sug-
gested for the latter are either written or oral, that is worksheet and confe-
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rences.481 In the United States some legal theorists and practitioners are 
convinced that intervention before the mistakes have occurred, which cannot be 
actually called intervention in its classical meaning, is absolutely necessary to 
prevent ineffective assistance from happening. But they also admit that both 
worksheets and conferences are work, time and money consuming measures, 
i.e. demand a lot of resources. 
Judge William W. Schwarzer has recommended the use of the pretrial 
conference as a measure to monitor counsel’s behavior before mistakes have 
actually occurred.482 The best way to conduct an inquiry is in private with the 
accused and separately with counsel, because otherwise it is likely that the 
accused does not want to expose doubts he has about his counsel’s performance 
so far. During this conference the accused can give his opinion about his 
counsel’s performance and counsel has an early opportunity to defend his 
actions and also adjust his behavior.483 In addition to that the conference will 
help outline the contours of the upcoming trial and alert the judge to potential 
evidentiary problems.484 If one is concerned that if the same judge presided over 
the pretrial monitoring as presided over the trial, the information gained from 
conferencing might affect his judgment of the accused’s guilt or innocence, then 
it is possible to arrange a conference with another judge or court magistrate.485 
The pretrial conference might even be documented: then it will provide a record 
of what counsel did and why he did not do something.486 The record would 
promote an informal exchange of information as everyone would be aware that 
their comments are preserved for the appellate review.487 
The pre-trial conference would inform the judge as to whether counsel is 
acquainted with the facts of a case and relevant law, whether counsel knows 
what evidence the prosecutor has against the accused and are there any potential 
evidentiary problems, whether counsel has thought about what evidence he 
should present himself and what are the possible defenses (e.g. alibi, insanity). 
If the pretrial conference suggests a serious lack of preparation, the judge has an 
opportunity to make discreet inquiries, whether counsel has a plan to investigate 
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483 Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New 
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might not easily provide the necessary review if he knew little about the case. Tague, 
Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, the, 109, p. 164. 
486 Ibid., p. 162. 
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the case further488 and even adjourn the court session, which has already been 
settled. Where counsel’s activity (inactivity to be more exact) indicates a risk of 
ineffective representation, the court should also advise the accused of the right 
to change counsel if counsel is retained.489 Therefore pretrial conferences pro-
vide the opportunity of effective monitoring. One obvious advantage of a pre-
trial conference is the face-to-face discussion which enables the judge to detect 
circumstances which would be hidden in a normal situation. At the same time 
conferences would also require judicial self-restraint, because lawyers would 
fear violating the attorney-client privilege and affecting the judge’s impartia-
lity – any routine procedure which singles out defense counsel’s conduct for 
special oversight is demeaning and may be vigorously resisted by lawyers.490 
But if the focus of a pre-trial conference is shifted to include the preparation of 
all participants (i.e. the court monitors not only counsel’s but also the 
prosecutor’s preparation), conferences become a means of improving the 
efficiency and fairness of the entire criminal justice system.491  
In addition to cases conducted in general proceedings, it is possible to arrange 
the pre-trial conference in plea-bargaining also.492 Because during plea-bargaining, 
no record is kept of counsel’s performance and he is not required to demonstrate 
any preparation, it is not possible to ascertain afterwards whether counsel was 
familiar with the case or not. Accordingly, it is proposed the trial judge to require 
counsel to indicate for the record the extent and results of his investigation of the 
facts of the case and explain how he prepared the case.493 While asking from 
counsel about what he has done to prepare the case, court should try to figure out 
whether counsel has investigated facts and law enough to conclude that the best 
option for the accused was plea-bargaining. The judge should ask the accused also 
whether in his opinion counsel has fulfilled his duties properly.  
The other, and less time and money consuming, and less intrusive way to 
find out the preparation level of counsel, is to require counsel to file a pretrial 
worksheet. This approach requires the lawyer to indicate on the worksheet what 
he has done and not done, including explaining why he has not done it and what 
he is planning to do more.494 The worksheet would specify the time spent in 
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consultation and investigation of facts and law.495 The accused reviews the form 
and if he disagrees, he can object to the judge. By objecting, he waives the 
attorney-client privilege, at least on some level.496 If he does not object, the 
judge will not see the form and it will be added to the court file to be used in 
case an accused files a complaint to the higher court about his counsel’s 
representation.497 The judge can ask counsel to complete a second worksheet 
form as he could arrange a second conference if necessary. The second review 
requires counsel to document his treatment of any further problems.498 Although 
the pretrial worksheet does not give the judge his primary impression about how 
counsel has prepared the case if at all, it is still counsel’s documented expla-
nation about his preparation and therefore great assistance for the appellate 
review of ineffective assistance claims. On the other hand, counsels may view 
the worksheet merely as another form he must fill out and only concern himself 
with the worksheet in a routine manner. But if the pre-trial worksheet is found 
appropriate to check counsel’s activities, like with the pretrial conference, there 
is no need for the trial court judge to scrutinize strategies or tactics. Rather, the 
court’s focus should be on whether the lawyer has prepared and investigated the 
accused’s case properly.499  
One of the most significant advantages in instituting a system of pretrial 
conferencing or worksheets would be the message it gives to judges and 
counsels. Pretrial review would force counsel strongly to prepare and would 
deny him the opportunity to rationalize why he failed to do something. Lawyers 
must conduct full investigations and adequately prepare before a trial can begin 
and pre-trial supervision is an effective measure to guarantee that they have 
done so. In addition to that, if counsel informs the court at conference or in the 
worksheet that he is not ready to begin trial because he has not had sufficient 
time to prepare, the judge would find it very difficult to disregard such a claim 
and order counsel to begin the trial.500 In order to guarantee that counsels 
prepare in case of plea bargaining too, an ideal system of monitoring defense 
counsel’s performance would also provide the judge with an opportunity to 
check the homework done by counsel before an accused is allowed to plead 
guilty.501  
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For Estonian courts I would disregard pre-trial conferences, because of the 
resources they would need. In addition to that I am a bit wary about judges 
asking during informal conversation from accused persons and from counsels 
how the defense side has prepared the case: even if the judge does not look into 
tactical questions, counsel’s disclosure to the judge of actions he has taken to 
prepare the case means that at least some of the strategy is also revealed and 
during the conversation the danger of such a revelation is much greater than in 
writing when counsel can think his answers through very thoroughly. Therefore 
I support the idea of pre-trial worksheets. Actually, Estonian criminal 
proceedings are moving towards that idea as from the 1st of September 2011 
before beginning of the court proceedings counsel has to prepare a statement of 
defense, in which he has to show the evidence he is going to present in the court 
proceedings.502 In order to verify counsel’s readiness for the trial the statement 
of defense is still not enough as it does not reflect the fact that counsel really 
has prepared the case. Therefore, an additional worksheet is needed in which 
counsel could specify actions taken and justify his inaction if needed. Then trial 
courts would have a chance to react preemptively when they see that the 
accused’s right to effective assistance might be jeopardized. Here I would not 
preclude that after the accused has expressed discontent with what counsel has 
written in the worksheet, Estonian courts would have an opportunity to organize 
a pre-trial conference. By doing that many problems could be solved before the 
court proceedings actually begin. As it has been suggested above, this work-
sheet could be used in the appellate proceedings also to show whether counsel 
fulfilled his duties in the court of first instance or not. If counsel sees the 
worksheet as an annoying additional duty and fills it out superficially, he risks 
the possibility that his behavior is found ineffective during the proceedings in 
the trial court or afterwards by the appellate court when the court decides the 
matter taking into account what has been written in the worksheet. I think it is a 
good idea that the trial judge only looks into counsel’s activities if the accused 
does not agree with what has been written down by his counsel in the 
worksheet – this helps to save resources and at the same time enables the court 
to react when the accused thinks that something is wrong with his counsel’s 
performance. That way the accused’s interest in preserving the attorney-client 
relationship and at the same time in avoiding the threat of ineffective assistance 
is honored.503  
Even if the system for some reason does not allow active monitoring of 
representation of defense counsel, like it is presently in Estonia, the judge should 
still start taking some steps that do not involve looking into counsel’s 
performance directly to guarantee effective assistance of counsel before the court 
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session, for instance in a preliminary hearing. First, the judge should explain 
counsel’s obligations to counsel, inform counsel what kind of preparation is 
expected of him and explain to him what measures could be taken against him if 
he does not fulfill his duties.504 The judge should explain counsel’s duties to the 
accused also to make sure that the accused at least on some level is familiar with 
what kind of assistance he should expect from his counsel.505 The judge should 
also try to discreetly figure out, if the accused is contented with the quality of the 
assistance provided to him so far. In addition to that the court should try to do the 
same with accused persons who offer guilty pleas to determine whether their 
pleas are being prompted by ineffective representation.506 But still one has to take 
into account that even with a general introduction to the defense counsel’s role, 
most accused persons will be unable to assess their counsel’s explanations for 
why legal decisions were made or why counsel took some action or refrained 
from action,507 and even if they are able to do that and are discontented with what 
their counsel is doing in the proceedings, they are not willing to take action or are 
unable to express their discontent properly. The ECtHR has addressed the latter 
issue in the following case. 
In Sakhnovskiy v. Russia the accused refused to accept Ms. A.’s services but 
had not asked to be assigned somebody else as a lawyer. Neither had he asked 
for additional time to meet the court-appointed lawyer or to find a lawyer of his 
own choosing. The ECtHR emphasized that the accused could not be expected 
to take procedural steps which normally require some legal knowledge and 
skills. Mr. Sakhnovskiy did what an ordinary person would do in his situation: 
he expressed his dissatisfaction with the manner in which legal assistance was 
organized through the Supreme Court. In such circumstances, the accused’s 
failure to formulate more specific claims cannot count as a waiver.508  
The trial judge’s obligation does not end with a determination that counsel is 
prepared for trial. During the trial the judge acquires the role of passive 
observer. This means that whenever during the course of the trial it appears that 
defense counsel is not properly fulfilling his obligations, the judge must take 
appropriate action to prevent violation of the accused’s rights. As it has already 
been discussed repeatedly, it is the judge, not counsel, the accused or the 
prosecutor, who has the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of a fair and 
lawful trial.509 
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If the issue of ineffectiveness rises during the trial, the judge has to act very 
discreetly ensuring that the attorney-client relationship is not impaired in case 
counsel will proceed in the proceedings and trying to avoid putting counsel into 
a humiliating position in front of his contestant – the prosecutor. Therefore it is 
appropriate to discuss the matter in private with counsel and with the accused.510 
The trial judge should stop the proceedings, take the defense counsel aside, and 
inform him of the concern. The purpose of the inquiry, done by the judge, is to 
allow the judge to share, with counsel, the reasons for the judge’s concern. It is 
not formal and it is a preliminary information gathering session.511After that the 
judge can decide whether to take more intrusive steps. There are ways other 
than asking counsel to do something in case of ineffective assistance provided 
by counsel and they involve taking a smaller step away from a judge’s neutral 
position than compelling counsel to fulfill his duties. In some circumstances a 
judge need do very little, e.g., by interjecting a single question, or by beginning 
a line of questioning, the judge may affirmatively provoke the development of 
the relevant facts. In an extreme case, a judge may reveal an area neither side 
has touched so far. In addition to that, the judge may interrupt the trial and point 
out an unraised or inadequately developed issue, leaving to defense counsel the 
choice of whether or not to pursue it.512 It is a significant departure from the 
court’s neutral role but still leaves room for counsel to decide whether he wants 
to proceed with the subject raised by the court or not. Therefore, these little 
hints are more preferable than making counsel do something when the prin-
ciples of adversary proceedings are taken into account, because they guarantee 
that counsel remains independent in the proceedings. 
In addition to the measures mentioned above, it has been also proposed that 
counsels should file reports explaining their action during the trial at the 
conclusion of trial.513 It is not a form of monitoring by the trial judge, but a 
written document for higher courts. The trial court would not see this file but 
the file would be available to the higher court should ineffective assistance of 
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counsel be litigated in appeal.514 For Estonian courts I see this suggestion as an 
additional chance for counsel to justify his actions during the court proceedings 
for appellate courts and it should not be excluded, if counsel wants to add 
something to the pre-trial worksheet. 
 
 
1.2 The Test for Judging Ineffectiveness 
In Estonia there is no test for judging ineffectiveness of defense counsel for trial 
courts (which are in Estonia called county courts) and therefore Estonian courts 
have to assess counsel’s activities ad hoc. Counsel must be present obviously 
(CCP, § 270 (1)) and be prepared (CCP, § 273 (4)), but that is about all that the 
Code of Criminal Procedure requires. In addition to that the court can use the 
provisions of the Bar Association Act and the Bar acts as an example if counsel 
is an advocate, and State Legal Aid Act also if an advocate is appointed 
counsel. If counsel is not an advocate, court can be guided by its conscience and 
common conception of lawyer ethics, which both could be used if counsel is an 
advocate as well. 
The question is whether the courts of first instance in Estonia need an 
established standard for evaluating counsel’s work quality. Until now the courts 
have been using case-by-case analysis, which enables them to take into account 
circumstances of a specific case and take a flexible approach to counsel’s 
duties. But there is another side of the coin. If a court intervenes into counsel’s 
activities, especially if it decides to remove counsel, accusations of the court 
being biased are quick to come. If there would be set guidelines for counsel’s 
conduct in criminal proceedings, it would be easier for the court to point out the 
certain duty counsel has not fulfilled and consequently conclude that counsel 
has not been effective, which in turns enables the court to apply some measures 
in order to guarantee effective defense for the accused. Then it would be much 
more difficult to question court’s impartiality and blame the court in trying to 
get rid of a difficult counsel, which is the most common accusation referred to 
in law reviews. Therefore, in the last chapter of this dissertation, I will introduce 
a standard I think would be appropriate for the courts of first instance in Estonia 
to use to decide whether counsel has been ineffective or is ineffective in the 
criminal proceedings.  
It is understandable that the requirement to show an element of prejudice in 
case the question of possible ineffectiveness of defense counsel arises in the 
trial court, is irrelevant, because the court has not reached its verdict yet. 
Therefore the accused cannot show to the court of first instance that without 
counsel’s mistakes the result of the case would have been different. It is 
possible to require the accused to show that because of his counsel’s ineffecti-
veness his interest will be not protected in the criminal proceedings or there is a 
possibility that his other rights will be violated, but it means that we require the 
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accused to show something that might or might not happen in the future, which 
is a very heavy burden for the accused. In addition to that it has to be taken into 
account that in some cases courts may act without consent of the accused, 
which means that it is absolutely unfair to oblige the accused to prove some-
thing. If guidelines for duties of defense counsel are worked out in order to use 
them for evaluating effectiveness of counsel in criminal proceedings, instead of 
trying to predict the future, the accused has a chance to refer to the specific 
guideline, and nothing further is required from the accused to prove. If the court 
is the one who has discovered counsel’s deficiencies, it can also refer to the 
guidelines. But one has to take into account that only those duties that are 
absolutely essential will be provided in these guidelines, at least in those 
guidelines, which are meant for the courts to be used in case they want to 
remove counsel. Guidelines that would allow removing counsel too easily 
would result in a serious breach of counsel’s independence and groundless 
interference into the attorney-client relationship. 
 
 
1.3 The Outcome of Supervision 
There are different possible outcomes of the supervision performed by the 
courts depending on whether we are talking about active or passive monitoring. 
The conclusion of active monitoring could be that counsel is well prepared and 
ready to go to trial and that the accused is satisfied with the work done by 
counsel so far. The other possible conclusion of the supervision is the opposite 
one and might be that counsel has not prepared or the accused is not satisfied 
with his work and the court has to give him more time and order him to work at 
the case (it may lead to adjournment of the court session already settled).515 If 
counsel ignores court’s instructions to prepare repeatedly, the question of 
possible removal arises.516 Therefore the result of active monitoring starts with a 
remark and goes up to disqualification of counsel. The useful byproduct of 
active monitoring is a written paper, at least when the monitoring is done by the 
worksheet approach, which means that courts of higher instances will have a 
chance to use the document for giving their opinion about the quality of the 
performance of counsel in case the accused claims that his counsel has been 
ineffective.  
The outcome of passive supervision, which is performed during the trial and 
which means that the court only acts if counsel’s mistakes are brought to its 
attention or it notices counsel’s mistakes itself, is manifold. The court may ask 
counsel to prepare the case and adjourn the court session as it is provided for in 
§ 273 (4) of the CCP or may instruct counsel to take some steps during the court 
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session, for instance to ask questions from the witness. The court may ask 
questions from the witness itself (CCP, § 288 (6)) or even order the collection 
of additional evidence on its own initiative, as it was discussed above. In order 
to do that, the court may adjourn the court session (CCP, § 273 (1) 2)) if ne-
cessary. If another form of counsel’s ineffectiveness than the fact that counsel 
has not prepared arises, the court may also adjourn the court session (CCP, § 
273 (1) 3)).  
Finally, the court may remove counsel as a result of passive monitoring, 
which should be used as ultima ratio. Removal of counsel is the most serious 
intervention into the independence of counsel and into the attorney-client 
relationship, especially when it comes to the retained counsel, because retained 
counsel is counsel chosen by the accused himself. If retained counsel is 
ineffective and the accused notices it or is notified by the court, the accused has 
an option to choose another counsel. Therefore the question of possible removal 
of retained counsel on the ground of ineffectiveness raises only if the accused 
has decided not to change counsel, even if counsel is ineffective, which in turn 
means that the court has to remove counsel itself and without the consent of the 
accused. Is it possible at all to remove retained counsel because of his in-
effectiveness, is the subject I will discuss next, but even if it is, it must be 
understood that this constitutes a very serious restriction to the accused’s right 
to choose his counsel. And even if counsel is appointed by the state, removal of 
counsel without the accused’s consent means that the attorney-client relation-
ship that has been formed and the trust developed between the accused and his 




1.4 Removal of Counsel and the Consent of the Accused  
as a Prerequisite to Remove Counsel 
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides four bases for removal of counsel. 
First, if basis provided for in § 20 (31) of the SLAA exist, the court shall remove 
counsel by a ruling on its own initiative or at the request of a party to the court 
proceeding (CCP, § 55 (1)). According to the first sentence of § 20 (31) of the 
SLAA the court shall, at the request of the recipient of legal aid or on its own 
initiative, remove an advocate from the provision of state legal aid by a ruling if 
the advocate has shown himself to be incompetent or negligent. Second, if 
counsel does not remove himself on a basis provided for in § 54 of the CCP (i.e. 
on a basis of conflict of interest), the court shall remove counsel by a ruling on 
its own initiative or at the request of a party to the court proceeding (CCP, § 55 
(1)). Pursuant to § 54 clauses 1) and 2) a person shall not act as counsel if he is 
or has been a subject to criminal proceedings on another basis in the same 
criminal matter or in the same or related criminal matter, has previously 
defended or represented another person whose interests are in conflict with the 
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interests of the person to be defended.517 Third, the court shall remove counsel if 
it becomes evident in a proceeding for removal provided for in §§ 56 and 57 of 
the CCP that counsel has abused his status in the proceedings by com-
municating with the person being defended, after the person has been detained 
as a suspect or arrested, in a manner which may promote the commission of 
another criminal offence or violation of the internal procedure rules of the 
custodial institution (CCP, § 55 (2)). Fourth, the court shall remove counsel if 
counsel violates the condition provided by § 46 (11) of the CCP, this violation 
prevents him from performing duties of defense properly and he has not 
appointed substitute counsel for himself (CCP, § 55 (3)). Pursuant to § 46 (11) 
of the CCP counsel has to refuse to assume the duties of defense in a criminal 
matter conducted pursuant to the general procedure or relinquish the duties of 
defense assumed by him no later than in a preliminary hearing if counsel is not 
able to participate in a court proceeding within three months after the pre-
liminary hearing. The aim of the last basis for removal of counsel is to give the 
court an option to remove counsel in case counsel has an excessive workload or 
he has any other reason why he cannot participate in a court proceedings within 
the term of three months, and therefore to guarantee a speedy and efficient 
hearing of criminal matters sent to court to be conducted in adversarial pro-
cedure.518 If counsel removes himself or is removed on a basis provided for in § 
55 of the CCP, the person being defended may choose new counsel within the 
term granted by the court or new counsel is appointed for him (CCP, § 58).  
The proceeding for removal of counsel is provided in §§ 56 and 57 of the 
CCP. The Supreme Court of Estonia has stressed in a court case no. 3-1-1-70-10 
that rules of procedure provided in §§ 56 and 57 of the CCP are applied only if 
the party to the court proceeding has requested removal of counsel stating that 
counsel has abused his status in the proceedings.519 If a request for initiation of a 
proceeding for the removal of counsel is submitted in a court proceeding, the 
court session shall be adjourned for up to one month (CCP, § 56 (3)). On the 
first working day following the date of receipt of a request for initiation of a 
proceeding for the removal of counsel, the judge schedules the time for a court 
session for the conduct of the proceeding and notifies the Prosecutor’s Office 
which submitted the request, counsel to be removed, the person being defended 
by counsel and, if counsel to be removed is a member of the Bar Association, 
the leadership of the Bar Association of the scheduled time (CCP, § 56 (4)). 
Proceeding for the removal of counsel is conducted within five days as of the 
receipt of the request for the initiation of the proceeding (CCP, § 57 (1)). If 
counsel fails to appear, and he has a good reason for that, the proceeding is 
adjourned for up to three days (CCP, § 57 (3)). If counsel who has received a 
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summons fails, without good reason, to appear in a court or if the reason for his 
failure to appear is unknown or if he fails to appear in a court session which has 
been adjourned, the proceeding for the removal of counsel is conducted in his 
absence (CCP, § 57 (4)). In a proceeding for the removal of counsel, the court 
hears the person who submitted the request for the removal, and counsel, and 
the person and counsel may submit evidence and pose questions to each other 
with the permission of the court (CCP, § 57 (5)). Very questionable is § 57 (7) 
of the CCP, according to which counsel who has been removed pursuant to the 
above described procedure, has the right to re-enter the criminal proceedings 
after the basis for removal provided for in § 55 (2) of the CCP has ceased to 
exist. Of course, it is possible that counsel stops abusing his status in the 
proceedings, but it is more than doubtful whether counsel acting that way 
should re-enter the criminal proceedings, because he has shown himself as a 
person who does not follow the rules. 
Although the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide rules of the 
procedure for removal of counsel in case basis for removal of counsel stipulated 
in § 55 (1) or (3) of the CCP exists, in my opinion the court should still conduct 
hearing, if it thinks that there might be a ground for removal of counsel. This 
principle and rules of that procedure should be added to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Conduct of hearing produces a court’s record of this hearing, which 
is critical, because a removal action has potential consequences for both the 
resolution of the case itself and the participants. The trial judge’s decision to 
remove counsel might form the basis on appeal of a claim of denial of the right 
to counsel of choice.520 A written record is also necessary for collateral matters 
that might arise, involving trial counsel or the trial judge, e.g., disciplinary 
actions against trial counsel or allegations of judicial misconduct on the part of 
the judge.521 And last but not least, a written record is also necessary for a less 
obvious, but possibly more compelling reason: the potential for abuse on the 
part of the trial judge and the reputational harm suffered by the defense 
counsel.522 The hearing, which is documented, disciplines the judge to reason 
his decision to remove counsel very carefully. The judge should definitely ask 
the position of counsel about this matter and also from the prosecutor, if 
necessary. To avoid a danger that a disqualification motion results in the 
disclosure of otherwise confidential information, which may then be used by the 
prosecutor against the accused,523 the prosecutor should not attend the hearing 
itself, at least when a question about ineffectiveness concerning how counsel 
has prepared the case has arisen. In order to protect the attorney-client 
relationship and the strategy counsel has worked out for the case, before 
conducting a formal hearing, the judge should give counsel an opportunity to 
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explain his actions in private. If counsel gives an explanation that satisfies the 
judge, the proceeding with the formal hearing is not necessary. But when the 
formal hearing is conducted, the accused should be assured the right to be 
present at all hearings related to the possible removal of counsel524 and at least 
to give an opinion about his counsel’s work, even if he has not requested 
removal himself. Whether the court should act against the wishes of the accused 
is another question, but the court should at least listen to the accused and if it 
does not agree with his opinion, give its reasons. 
Removal of counsel is not very common and it evokes different reactions. 
Once counsel has been hired or appointed, the common wisdom is that judges 
should take a hands-off approach.525 But judges should be authorized to remove 
counsel in some circumstances: to prohibit judges from exercising removal 
options creates an ethical dilemma for judges who must sit back and relax while 
it is clear that because of counsel’s ineffectiveness there is a possibility that the 
accused is left without defense,526 and the adversary process will be distorted.527 
Removal of counsel with instructions to the accused to choose another one 
(which always means that the judge acts without the accused’s consent) or 
removal of counsel with appointing new counsel to the accused (which may be 
with or without the accused’s consent) are serious steps with high costs and if a 
judge decides whether to disqualify counsel, he must take into account the same 
consequences that arise from judicial supervision generally, but with the 
decision to remove counsel these consequences arise even more sharply. The 
judge should take into account that even prior to trial, a bond of trust is created 
between the accused and counsel, at least ideally. The trial judge should be 
reluctant to break that bond and compel the accused to go through the same 
process again with new counsel. Additionally, removal of counsel always 
results in a delay in the court proceedings. It is obvious that the court 
proceedings cannot continue unless new counsel is there and ready and in order 
to prepare the case a new counsel needs time.528 
In Estonia before the 1st of January 2009 the courts had very limited 
competence in removing ineffective counsel: they were only allowed to remove 
counsel in the case of conflicts of interest and in cases counsel abused his 
procedural status in the proceedings. Today § 20 (31) of the SLAA together with 
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§ 55 (1) of the CCP enables the court, at the request of the accused or on its own 
initiative, to remove an advocate from the provision of state legal aid by a ruling 
if the advocate has shown himself to be incompetent or negligent. What 
“incompetent” or “negligent” means is not provided for neither in the State 
Legal Aid Act nor in the Code of Criminal Procedure. There are no guidelines 
of conduct of counsel in the criminal proceedings for the courts to use in 
Estonia either, which means that Courts’ decision that counsel was “in-
competent” or “negligent” is a result of case-by-case analysis. Pursuant to the 
second and third sentence of § 20 (31) of the SLAA the court may in advance 
request submission of explanations from the accused and the advocate and the 
court forwards the ruling concerning the removal of an advocate from the 
provision of state legal aid to the Bar Association for the commencement of the 
proceedings of the court of honor and, if necessary, for the appointment of a 
new provider of state legal aid. Subsection 20 (31) of the SLAA entered into 
force in afore cited wording on the 1st of January 2010. Before that amendment 
§ 20 (31), which was valid since the 1st of January 2009 required the consent of 
the accused if court was planning to remove counsel. Today, as it is obvious 
from the wording of § 20 (31), that no consent of the accused is needed and the 
court is allowed to remove ineffective (according to the State Legal Aid Act 
wording incompetent or negligent) appointed counsel without consulting with 
the accused and even if the accused is against it. It would appear that this 
amendment was intended to regulate situations in which the accused need not 
yet be aware that counsel’s assistance is ineffective, or the accused is aware but 
for some reason fails to demand that counsel be removed. In such case, the 
court must intervene on its own initiative. Nevertheless, no comment has been 
made concerning this amendment in the explanatory memorandum.529  
On the 1st of September 2011 § 267 (41) of the CCP entered into force. 
According to this subsection a court may withdraw counsel from procedure if 
the person is not capable to act in court properly or has shown he is dishonest, 
incompetent or irresponsible in the court proceedings or he has maliciously 
impeded the correct and speedy hearing of the criminal matter or has failed to 
comply with the order of a judge repeatedly. After withdrawal of counsel the 
court immediately proposes the accused to choose another counsel within the 
term granted by the court. The court also notifies the Bar Association if counsel 
is an advocate (CCP, § 267 (42)). It is absolutely unclear what this “withdrawal” 
is. Formally it is not a basis for removal, because it has not been provided for in 
§ 55 of the CCP, where all other bases for removal are. Not a word has been 
mentioned about this opportunity to withdraw counsel in the initial explanatory 
memorandum of the Code of Criminal Procedure or in the additional 
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memorandum.530 And last but not least, the heading of section 267 is “Measures 
applicable to persons who violate order in a court session”. Therefore, although 
the formulation of § 267 (41) of the CCP seems to indicate that it enables court 
to disqualify counsel from the proceedings indefinitely, in my opinion the above 
mentioned arguments overturn this conclusion, which in turn means that this 
may be a temporary measure. But it may be also that the Estonian legislator has 
added a new basis for removal, which is hidden in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure either because the aim of the legislator was to refrain from wider 
discussion by adding the basis for removal that at first remains unnoticed or it 
forgot to add the basis to the § 55 of the CCP. If it indeed was meant to be the 
basis for removal I condemn the attempt to bring a possibility to remove 
ineffective retained counsel (which a dishonest, incompetent or irresponsible 
person certainly is) from the proceedings without the consent of the accused 
into the Code of Criminal Procedure without proper discussion in society, as 
removal of retained counsel means removal of counsel that the accused has 
chosen himself, which means that the removal goes strongly against the 
accused’s wishes. 
The question of whether the removal of counsel due to ineffectiveness 
should be possible only with respect to appointed counsel or also with respect to 
retained counsel merits separate and thorough consideration. With answering 
this question the question whether the court should be allowed to remove 
appointed counsel without the consent of the accused is also answered as 
removal of retained counsel always occurs without consent of the accused: 
otherwise the accused would choose new counsel himself. 
According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, retained counsel participates 
in the proceedings only so long as he has the approval of the accused. It can 
thus be asserted that wishes of the accused concerning retained counsel are 
considered important in criminal proceedings. If the accused decides that he is 
not pleased with how his counsel fulfills his duties, he has always the right to 
choose another counsel. Nevertheless, there might be situations where the 
accused does not or cannot see what the court can see: that counsel is not 
performing his duties correctly. And even if he has noticed his counsel’s in-
effectiveness or is notified by the court, he might decide not to react and not to 
replace counsel for some reason. Granting a court the right to remove retained 
counsel in cases where the accused does not agree to removal is very 
problematic. This would infringe both the independence of counsel and the right 
of the accused to freely choose counsel. On the other hand, as I have already 
discussed at length, it is the duty of the court to monitor that the rights of the 
accused, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, are not violated. 
It would be against the court’s role as supervisor to the adversary proceedings to 
ask the judge to turn a blind eye towards counsel’s ineffective representation 
and let the proceedings continue even if he can see that balance between the 
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parties is disturbed. In this case the accused’s right to obtain private counsel of 
his own choice must be weighed and balanced against an equally desirable 
public need for the effective administration of criminal justice.531 Maybe 
because of this deliberation the Estonian legislator added § 267 (41) into the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, if § 267 (41) of the CCP is considered to be a basis 
for removal at all. The legislator at least seems to be convinced that the court is 
responsible for retaining an adversary system and the right balance of parties in 
case counsel is appointed and has therefore brought § 20 (31) into State Legal 
Aid Act on the 1st of January 2009 to guarantee effectiveness of appointed 
counsel through the court’s competence to remove ineffective defense counsel, 
which was amended a year later in the way that consent of the accused is not 
needed anymore. Therefore I am convinced that Estonia is moving towards 
preferring the right to effective assistance to the right to choose counsel and as 
long as the court is not going to misuse this competence, it advances the 
adversary system and the right to the accused to receive actual assistance from 
counsel during the proceedings.  
Another basis for removal of counsel, which is also related to the in-
effectiveness of counsel is counsel’s excessive workload. As I already cited § 
46 (11) of the CCP above, counsel has to refuse to assume the duties of defense 
in a criminal matter conducted pursuant to the general procedure or relinquish 
the duties of defense assumed by him no later than in a preliminary hearing if 
counsel is not able to participate in a court proceeding within three months after 
the preliminary hearing. Ability not to participate in a court proceeding within 
time set by the law is usually related to counsel’s busy schedule. It does not 
matter if counsel is retained or appointed, according to § 55 (3) of the CCP the 
court removes counsel if counsel violates condition provided by § 46 (11) of the 
CCP, this violation prevents him from performing duties of defense properly 
and he has not appointed substitute counsel for himself. The addition “this 
violation prevents him from performing duties of defense properly” is a little bit 
confusing in § 55 (3) of the CCP. It is obvious that if counsel is not able to 
participate in a court proceeding within three months after the preliminary 
hearing, he is not able to perform the duties of defense properly, at least within 
this period. Therefore in my opinion § 55 (3) of the CCP should be interpreted 
in a way that if counsel is not able to participate in a court proceeding within 
three months after the preliminary hearing and he has not appointed substitute 
counsel for himself, he shall be removed by the court. This basis for removal 
does not require the accused’s consent, which means that the principle of 
speedy trial is preferred over the accused’s right to choose his counsel. 
In addition to the removal of counsel without the accused’s consent, the 
judge should obviously consider objections to the appointed counsel made by 
the accused.532 This principle is provided for in the § 20 (31) of the SLAA. If at 
any time during the proceedings the accused makes a seemingly substantial 
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complaint about the ineffectiveness of representation by counsel (here I mean 
appointed counsel, because retained counsel the accused can choose himself) 
the judge should conduct an inquiry and try to find out whether the complaint is 
justified or not. The court should discuss the matter with the accused, ideally in 
camera.533 Then the judge can decide if grounds exist for a change of counsel.534 
Of course, it is understandable that courts are often wary of the motivations of 
an accused who alleges ineffectiveness of counsel. One possible reason for this 
guarded response is judges’ concerns about being fooled by an accused’s 
manipulative efforts to delay his trial. Another possible reason is a more general 
concern that, if given the opportunity, the accused will somehow abuse his 
rights and privileges in the judicial process.535 Judges also attribute the ac-
cused’s reluctance to counsel to a number of factors, including the accused’s 
objection to being prosecuted and the accused’s inability to work with other 
people.536 But still the judge should at least listen to what the accused is com-
plaining about and then decide whether reasons to remove counsel exist or not. 
Sometimes counsels seek a permission to withdraw, but here they can also 
meet skepticism: this is partially because judges suspect that a defense counsel 
may make the claim for tactical reasons (e.g., in order to delay the trial).537 In 
Estonia, as it was discussed above, the bases for counsel to remove himself are 
provided for in § 54 clauses 1) and 2) of the CCP. In addition counsel has to 
refuse to assume the duties of defense in case of excessive workload (or for any 
other reason he is not able to attend the court session within the term provided 
by law) as it is provided for in § 46 (11) of the CCP. Counsel may also, on his 
own initiative and with the consent of the management of the law office, refuse 
to assume the duties of defense or relinquish the duties of defense assumed by 
him if counsel has been exempted from the obligation to maintain a professional 
secret pursuant to the procedure provided for in § 45 (5) of the BAA538 or if the 
suspect or the accused has requested the performance of an act which is in 
violation of the law or the requirements for professional ethics (CCP, § 46 (1) 
1)); if the performance of the duties of defense by counsel would be in violation 
of the right of defense (e.g., existing conflict of interest) (CCP, § 46 (1) 2)) or 
the person being defended violates any of the essential conditions of the client 
contract (CCP, § 46 (1) 3)). In the Code of Criminal Procedure there are no 
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other grounds for counsel to refuse to assume duties of defense or relinquish 
duties of defense assumed by him. A serious breakdown of the attorney-client 
relationship is not a ground to relinquish assumed duties according to the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, although in my opinion it should be. It is obvious that if 
counsel and the accused are not able to work together towards the same goal 
because of differences, the right to effective assistance is not guaranteed to the 
accused. It might be that counsel is not motivated anymore because of 
differences between him and his client or the accused does not follow his advice 
anymore, because he does not trust his counsel. Then the accused is basically 
without defense and the assistance he should be provided by counsel. Therefore 
the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship should be grounds for 
releasing counsel from his duties. Because it is a very subjective ground and 
enables parties to a court proceeding to misuse their procedural rights, approval 
of the court should be necessary. That is why I propose that counsel’s or the 
accused’s claim that there has been a breakdown of the attorney-client 
relationship should be a basis for removal, which means that the court is the one 
that makes the final decision about the matter. Here the court has an opportunity 
to consider the removal of counsel also if counsel is the one who claims that he 
cannot defend the accused further because of a total breakdown in the attorney-
client relationship.  
 
 
2. Judicial Supervision in Appellate Courts and  
in the Supreme Court 
2.1 The Form of Supervision in Higher Courts 
One way to improve counsels’ performance in the criminal proceedings is to 
give accused persons a chance to challenge counsel’s mistakes in the appellate 
proceedings and in case of Estonia also in the cassation proceedings.539 It is 
understandable that although the accused has an opportunity to do that,540 he 
may face the reluctance of the higher courts. Courts have an interest in 
conserving resources that otherwise would be spent on additional proceedings. 
They seek to be fair to the prosecution, whose ability to try an accused suc-
cessfully may diminish with the passage of time.541 There is an important factor 
higher courts have to consider when they decide whether to annul the judgment 
made by the lower court. If the conviction is reversed and the criminal matter is 
returned to the lower court for a new hearing, the passage of time before the 
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new trial may render the trial a pointless exercise because witnesses may have 
forgotten important aspects of the event.542 In addition to what has already been 
mentioned, higher courts also seek the respect of society that may be of the 
opinion that “criminals are let loose because of technicalities”.543  
The Supreme Court of Estonia for instance held that it cannot assess 
counsel’s tactical choices and condemn counsel’s decision not to request an 
expert assessment before the prosecutor filed charges.544 The Supreme Court 
also added that if the accused is not satisfied with the assistance provided by his 
appointed counsel, he has an opportunity to choose himself a retained 
counsel.545 The last argument is easy to criticize, because an indigent accused is 
not able to do that due to his financial condition. Nevertheless, later has the 
Supreme Court evaluated counsel’s effectiveness in order to verify if the right 
to defense was violated546 and also in order to decide whether the state has to 
compensate for the accused remuneration paid to the chosen counsel in the case 
criminal proceedings were terminated.547 In addition to that the Supreme Court 
regularly evaluates counsel’s effectiveness when it decides fees payable to 
appointed counsel.548 Therefore, it could be concluded that the Supreme Court 
of Estonia considers evaluation of counsel’s effectiveness in the proceedings of 
lower court to be in its competence, but has not shown great enthusiasm about 
the matter. 
Although the accused may encounter the reluctance of the higher courts, the 
appellate and cassation proceedings still have their own advantages. Where the 
higher courts take ineffective assistance claims seriously, defense lawyers have 
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reason to believe that their incompetent actions are followed by judicial 
condemnation. In addition to that if higher courts publicize their findings of 
ineffectiveness in judgments in which lawyers’ names are mentioned, defense 
lawyers have significant reputational damage to fear.549 Especially humiliating 
would be finding that his work was not effective to counsel, whose behavior is 
analyzed and criticized by the Supreme Court of Estonia, that presents its 
judgments online and is therefore easily accessible for everyone. In Estonia in 
addition to the appellate and the cassation proceedings, it is possible, at least 
theoretically, that the Supreme Court of Estonia evaluates counsel’s perfor-
mance in the review procedure, which I will discuss in the third subsection of 
this chapter. 
The problem with a supervision performed by the higher courts (i.e. in 
Estonia the supervision performed by the circuit courts after the accused is 
convicted in the county court and by the Supreme Court of Estonia after the 
circuit court has made its judgment giving its opinion about the correctness of 
the judgment made by the county court) is that it alone is not likely to improve 
the quality of the assistance rendered by counsels in criminal proceedings. 
When done by the higher court, any assessment may prove too little, too late. 
When an ineffectiveness claim comes before a circuit court or the Supreme 
Court, the damage caused by the ineffective representation has already been 
done.550 A circuit court or the Supreme Court sees only a record that may not 
reflect the whole performance of the defense counsel.551 In addition to that a 
review performed by the higher court in case of a counsel’s ineffectiveness 
claim requires two levels of second-guessing: it places in doubt counsel’s 
effectiveness, and questions the judgment of the judge of the trial court who 
observed defense counsel’s performance and actions in person. It is obvious that 
higher courts are reluctant to reverse judgments made by judges in lower court 
instances, especially if the accused refers to a subjective factor – the perfor-
mance of counsel in a county court – unknown to the higher courts, because the 
higher court has not seen the performance itself.552 And most importantly, the 
mere possibility of being found ineffective by the higher court may not change 
the defense counsel’s attitude towards the quality of his work, because reversals 
for ineffective assistance are likely to remain infrequent because of the higher 
courts’ reluctance.553 Of course, if there was a considerable activity of the 
higher courts in the field of ineffective defense and higher courts were not 
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reluctant to conclude that ineffective counsels really were ineffective, then 
supervision performed by the higher courts may be quite an efficient measure to 
improve the quality of counsel’s performance.  
 
 
2.2 The Test for Judging Ineffectiveness Claims 
In order to work out a specific standard for higher courts to be used in 
evaluation of counsel’s effectiveness, one has to keep in mind that the fact that a 
higher court is analyzing counsel’s performance afterwards does not change the 
duties counsel had to fulfill during the trial. The question is rather, whether to 
work out a one step standard or two steps standard. This means that whether the 
court has only to verify that counsel did not fulfill duties or it has to verify a 
little bit more, e.g., that the non-fulfillment of the duties had an effect on the 
outcome of the case. The second element of this standard, called also element of 
prejudice, is not a part of counsel’s performance evaluation. Counsel’s perfor-
mance is evaluated on the first level of the standard and the outcome may be 
that counsel did or did not fulfill his duties. On the second level of the standard, 
the court decides after it has found that counsel did not fulfill his duties, 
whether there is a ground for annulling the judgment of the lower court, because 
breach of duties affected the outcome, but no matter if the final decision is to 
annul the judgment or not, it does not change the fact that the court has found 
that counsel breached his duties. The second element of the standard may be or 
may not be found acceptable, which I will discuss further below.  
The question for the higher court evaluating counsel’s performance is 
whether to do it in accordance with the evaluation ex ante or ex post. The 
United States Supreme Court has emphasized that a fair assessment of counsel’s 
performance requires that “…every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”554 
Although evaluation ex post could be much more beneficial to the accused, it 
would be an approach with high costs for counsels and for the society generally. 
Counsel makes decisions at a certain instant and based on facts known to him 
then. If we say that the assessment of his performance afterwards should include 
every fact known to the assessor, we oblige counsel to know every single detail; 
including those not known to him at the time he makes a decision, which is 
obviously impossible. Therefore ex ante evaluation is the only possibility for 
assessing counsel’s performance.555  
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2.2.1 The Burden of Proof 
The initial burden of proving counsel’s ineffectiveness must remain on the 
accused, as it is he who is challenging the veracity of the adversarial process 
and the starting presumption is that the proceedings were conducted fairly and 
properly.556 Thus, the distribution of the burden of proof for ineffectiveness 
claims stem from the principle of finality. The accused must at least show that 
his counsel did not fulfill his duties in the criminal proceedings, after which the 
prosecutor has a chance to prove that counsel indeed fulfilled his duties. The 
question of whether the accused has to show that this affected the outcome of 
the proceedings or the prosecutor has to show that it did not, is the one I am 
going to answer when I discuss the element of prejudice further. 
There is always a question which evidence should the accused present while 
challenging his counsel’s performance and which evidence should the higher 
court take into account when deciding whether the performance of defense 
counsel was ineffective in the lower court proceedings or not. In order to 
answer that question, one has to grasp the two main breach of counsel’s duty 
claims: 
(1) Claims arising out of determinations made by the accused’s lawyer 
long before trial or what counsel failed to do before trial (e.g., did not 
investigate the facts of the case thoroughly). These claims also include 
claims arising out of the failure of counsel to preserve some other 
procedural right of the accused, if the decision was made before the 
trial. 
(2) Claims arising out of decisions made in the course of trial or the 
decisions counsel failed to do during the trial. These claims also 
include claims arising out of the failure of counsel to preserve some 
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other procedural right of the accused, if the decision was made during 
the trial.557  
 
The first category of ineffectiveness is something that the judge does not 
witness himself,558 although he may see the consequences of it during the trial 
and therefore these mistakes may be reflected in the minutes of the court 
session. Thus, if the court had access to the rationale of counsel’s pre-trial 
decisions, including why he did something or decided not to do something, the 
judge could determine whether or not counsel exercised informed and reason-
able judgment. That is why the first category of ineffectiveness claims presumes 
recording of defense counsel’s considerations. Therefore pre-trial conferences 
and worksheets that provide documented proof about counsel’s action would be 
very useful for the higher courts. Another possible way to ensure that the higher 
court would be informed about the rationale behind counsel’s decisions is to 
oblige every counsel to submit brief but reasoned description of decisions made 
before trial. The trial court would seal this description and give it to a higher 
court only in case of an ineffectiveness claim.559 Nevertheless it would be 
necessary only if the judicial system does not enable pre-trial conferences or 
worksheets.  
But not all counsel’s decisions can be recorded. These are the second 
category judgments, the judgments made by the defense counsel during the 
courtroom proceedings. Then counsel has to make many decisions without 
adequate time for extended consideration and recording the reasoning, which 
makes claims arising from judgments made by counsel during the court 
proceedings difficult to evaluate by higher courts. One option would be to ask 
counsel to reason his judgments in writing after the trial, but it would be very 
burdensome for counsel as he has to make many decisions during the trial and 
he may not even remember what the specific considerations behind every 
decision were.  
In addition to the above mentioned documented reasoning written by 
counsel, a conclusion made by the higher court may be based on the record, 
information given by the accused, the trial judge’s view of the matter (at least in 
cases where the ineffectiveness charges involve trial conduct that might have 
been visible to the judge), testimony of witnesses who were present at trial and 
the statements of trial counsel.560 But to assume that the ineffectiveness of 
counsel is shown from the record may be a very naive approach: ineffectiveness 
of counsel may not appear in the record precisely because counsel was 
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ineffective.561 One opportunity for counsel’s mistakes to be seen from the 
record is if the accused objects during the trial to his counsel’s representation. 
But this is not likely to occur, because as I have already discussed before, the 
accused may be unaware of his counsel’s failures or might fear the displeasure 
of either the judge or his own counsel.562 In addition to that, because the trial 
record will be limited to defense counsel’s performance during the trial, in-
vestigation and preparation will not be in the record at all.563 Claimed deficien-
cies such as the failure to file a motion or cross-examine a witness are not 
reflected in a trial record either. It is even less likely that deficiencies related to 
the failure to sufficiently consult with a client or improperly advising him will 
be reflected in a trial court’s record.564 Therefore the higher courts cannot 
decide the matter by just reading the record and they have to take into account 
what the persons involved have to say.  
Another obstacle for bringing a successful ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim is the difficulty involved in obtaining the cooperation of the lawyer, 
whose performance did not satisfy the accused. A successful claim often 
inquires into defense counsel’s communication and conversations with the 
accused565 and the two parties competent to testify as to those conversations are 
usually the accused and his counsel.566 But to assume that counsel readily 
cooperates is also very naive.567 When the ineffectiveness claim is presented, 
the lawyer’s reputation is at stake and it does not make him happy and talkative. 
It is obvious that the lawyer has a significant interest in avoiding the humiliation 
associated with a court’s determination that he rendered ineffective assistance to 
the accused.568 The lawyer also knows that talking and revealing too much may 
prove his ineffectiveness and in turn lead to civil liability, disciplinary action 
and even losing prospective clients.569 Thus, in case counsel decides to speak, 
the court has to evaluate the reliability of his words very carefully,570 because 
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there is much at stake for counsel and he may even be willing to distort the facts 
in order to avoid responsibility. 
When the accused claims counsel’s ineffectiveness, he waives the principle 
of confidentiality as far as the information refers to claimed breach of duties. 
Therefore if counsel decides to speak, he can explain his actions freely, because 
he is not tied to the obligation to keep information concerning the alleged 
violation of his duties confidential anymore.571 The ABA Standards state that 
defense counsel whose conduct of a criminal case is drawn into question is 
entitled to testify concerning the matters charged and is not precluded from 
disclosing the truth concerning the accusation to the extent defense counsel 
reasonably believes necessary, even though this involves revealing matters 
which were given in confidence.572 However, the ABA Standards emphasize 
that counsel may only reveal that confidential information he reasonably 
believes to be related to the particular matters at issue.573 
In addition to that the court has to take into account that at the same time the 
accused has his own interests. It is common that the accused seeks annulment of 
a court judgment no matter what. Even if the accused knows that in case the 
higher court annuls the trial court’s judgment, he is not acquitted, but the case is 
sent back to the trial court for retrial, the accused is more than willing to do 
whatever it takes to achieve the annulment, because he still sees it as one 
possible way out. It may also be probable that an accused holds a grudge against 
his counsel, because he might think that the lawyer did not deliver what he 
expected of him – an acquittal.574 That is why the court has to look into the 
reliability of the accused’s words as thoroughly as into the counsel’s words.  
Consequently, objective means for monitoring counsel’s behavior that would 
conclusively show what counsel did during the trial and what he did not do is an 
ideal solution in case an accused claimed that counsel breached his duties 
during the trial. One option is to ask from the trial judge or from witnesses, 
what happened in the courtroom. The other and more objective way is to use 
audio recording or video cameras placed in the courtroom. Both would record 
the proceedings, acting as a sound or video supplement to the trial record. Video 
recording of course is more effective, because it produces both a sound and 
video record. Rather than relying on courtroom participants who are either 
interested in the outcome or give their personal view about what happened, a 
reviewing court could simply hear the record or watch the video and after that 
make a decision. In addition, it would help to protect an accused’s interests in 
the event no one other than him came forward with evidence, or the evidence 
did not illustrate the full extent of his counsel’s mistakes.575 Without the benefit 
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of an audio- or videotaped record, appellate courts admittedly have difficulty 
evaluating qualitative claims of error.576 Still it is obvious that an audio- or 
videotaped record would help in case the accused claims ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel during the court proceedings. If he claims that counsel did not 
fulfill his duties in the pre-trial stage of the proceedings and these mistakes did 
not come into view in the courtroom, this could be unnoticed from the record. 
In Estonia, the option to audio or video record the court session exists since the 
Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force. According to the § 156 (1) of 
the CCP if the case is tried in a general procedure, the court session is audio 
recorded and if the court finds it necessary, video recorded. Therefore the higher 
courts can use the audio or video record if the performance of counsel in trial 
court is challenged by the accused, and that is why it can be claimed that the 
Estonian Supreme Court’s, over ten years ago, expressed standpoint according 
to which the Supreme Court cannot evaluate counsel’s effectiveness, should be 
history by now. 
If counsel’s failures are not apparent from the minutes of the court session, 
video or audio record and court file, the question arises whether the higher court 
should accept additional evidence. In circuit courts collection of additional 
evidence is possible (CCP, § 321 (2) 5)). Therefore it should be possible to 
interrogate the accused and examine witnesses and counsel on this matter and 
also examine the trial judge. Although according to § 66 (2) of the CCP the 
judge conducting the proceedings in the criminal matter is not allowed to 
participate in the same criminal matter as a witness, the Supreme Court of 
Estonia has held repeatedly that this principle does not mean a prohibition to 
examine the body conducting the proceedings about the course of investigative 
activity.577 According to the recent judicial practice of the Supreme Court of 
Estonia, although the collection of new evidence is not allowed in the cassation 
proceedings,578 when violation of procedural law is claimed, the higher court 
(including the Supreme Court of Estonia) can rely on documents that are not in 
the court file.579 
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For the accused the biggest problem with an ineffectiveness claim is the 
question: who will represent him. According to §§ 318 (1) and 17 (1) of the 
CCP the accused has the right to file an appeal to the circuit court. That means 
that he can draft and file an appeal himself in case he wants to and is able to do 
that. Therefore he does not have to rely on counsel who turned out to be 
ineffective in the court proceedings in the court of first instance and he does not 
have to choose a new one or ask the court to appoint a new one either. But only 
an advocate has the right to file an appeal in cassation to the Supreme Court of 
Estonia (§ 344 (3) 2 of the CCP). Thus if the accused wants to file an appeal in 
cassation or he is not willing or able to file personally an appeal to the circuit 
court, he evidently needs a new lawyer, because counsel cannot be expected to 
plead his own ineffectiveness, either because he sees no error in his actions or 
does not wish to uncover any error.580 Then again, it must be taken in account 
that new counsel may be reluctant to challenge his colleague’s work.581 He 
knows or perceives what might happen to the colleague if his ineffectiveness is 
exposed. He also knows that when the case is over he will have to continue 
operating, professionally and sometimes socially, in the environment of other 
lawyers, who might not like the fact that he challenged the conduct of their 
fellow professional.582  
In addition to that there are cases where the accused is unaware of his 
counsel’s ineffectiveness and therefore does not express the wish to claim it in 
the appeal. If the same counsel continues in the appellate proceedings, it is 
almost certain that he is not challenging his behavior in the court of first 
instance proceedings. If the accused has new counsel for some reason in the 
appellate proceedings, whether new counsel raises the ineffectiveness problem, 
depends on his willingness discussed above and also whether he notices it at all 
or not. If the issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness is not record-based, it is 
unlikely that new counsel will identify and present the issue on appeal583 unless 
the accused is aware of the former counsel’s ineffectiveness and explains it to 
the new counsel. The ABA Standards provide that if defense counsel, after 
investigation, is satisfied that another defense counsel who served in an earlier 
phase of the case did not provide effective assistance, he should not hesitate to 
seek relief for the accused on that ground.584 Here the ABA explains: “The 
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traditional position of the bar that a lawyer must stand ready to challenge the 
conduct of a colleague when that is necessary to the protection of a client’s 
rights is essential to our system of justice. Nothing would be more destructive 
of the goals of effective assistance of counsel and justice than to immunize the 
misconduct of a lawyer by the unwillingness of other lawyers to expose the 
inadequacy.”585 The ABA is also convinced that “[s]ince counsel must zealously 
represent his or her client’s interests at all times, where appellate counsel was 
also trial counsel, such post-trial representation should also include scrutiny of 
counsel’s own representation of the client at trial. Where counsel concludes that 
his or her prior representation was ineffective, in the interests both of effective 
representation and avoidance of conflicts of interest, counsel should explain this 
conclusion to the client and seek permission from the court to withdraw from 
further representation on this basis.”586 But still, it could be claimed that the 
Bar’s standpoint about the matter is a bit too idealistic and although looking 
good on paper, the duty of counsel to challenge colleague’s and his own repre-
sentation is of course much easier to say than to do, because it might happen 
that counsels do not want to admit that they or their colleagues have done a bad 
job.  
 
2.2.2 The Element of Prejudice 
Only if the accused has shown that the defense counsel’s performance was 
below the level of required representation and the prosecutor has not managed 
to prove contrary, the question of element of prejudice arises. The burden of 
proving a violation of the right to effective defense is always on the accused, as 
it has been already discussed above. The prejudice requirement is an issue if 
and only if the accused has already established to the court’s satisfaction that his 
lawyer’s representation did not meet the relevant standard.587 As I have already 
discussed, requirement to show prejudice does not mean that if counsel has 
failed to fulfill his duties and prejudice is not verified, counsel has not provided 
ineffective defense. Vice versa, counsel has provided ineffective defense, but 
because it did not affect the outcome of the proceedings, the higher court does 
not annul a lower court’s judgment. 
In the United States, the prejudice requirement is handled historically in 
three different ways. First, some theorists and practitioners say that no showing 
of prejudice is required and that any accused, who proves that he was given less 
than effective representation should be automatically entitled to relief, i.e. the 
judgment of the lower court should be annulled by the higher court.588 
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According to this standard the only thing that the Prosecutor’s Office can do is 
to prove that counsel’s performance met the standard although the accused 
claims otherwise. Others say that the accused is required not only to 
demonstrate conduct below the prevailing standard, but also to prove that this 
violation of his rights harmed him.589 Here the prosecutor can prove either that 
counsel’s performance met the standard or that the accused was not harmed by 
violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Finally, an intermediate 
position is to shift to the state the burden of proving an absence of prejudice 
once the accused establishes that his representation was ineffective. The last 
approach is called the harmless error rule.590 The nature of this rule is that the 
state has to prove an absence of prejudice, i.e. that the mistakes counsel made 
were harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.591 Of course, the prosecutor can 
also prove that the ineffective defense did not occur. Some commentators 
suggest that it should be counsel who proves a lack of prejudice. However, 
counsel in the process of defending themselves against multiple claims by 
former clients will have less time out of their already hectic schedules to 
dedicate to their other clients.592 In addition to that, it is still the state that is 
responsible for conduct of the proceedings and that the rights of the accused are 
guaranteed in the course of that. Therefore I agree that no matter which standard 
to use, it is still the prosecutor who has to prove necessary elements or absence 
of those elements, not counsel. 
The first proposal – automatic annulment of court judgment after it is 
verified that counsel has not been effective, means that besides counsel’s failure 
to fulfill his duties there is nothing further to prove by the accused or the 
prosecutor. Therefore, to be exact, element of prejudice does not exist in this 
standard. How burdensome is this test for the principle of finality depends on 
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the element of ineffectiveness, i.e., which failures of counsel constitute in-
effective defense and which not. 
The second proposal – the accused’s burden to prove prejudice has been 
used by the United States Supreme Court since 1984.593 Although classically the 
standard of prejudice means that the accused has to show that without the 
mistakes of his counsel he would not have been convicted, and that is how the 
Strickland Court understood the element of prejudice, it is not nowadays the 
only way to show element of prejudice according to the judicial practice of the 
United States Supreme Court. In 2003, the United States Supreme Court held in 
Glover v. United States594 that an increase in the length of a prison sentence 
constitutes prejudice for the purposes of the Strickland standard, which made 
Glover “an important step in the right direction”, as it was rejoiced in the United 
States.595 As the Strickland Court had laid down a framework for ineffective 
assistance challenges to convictions and death sentences, it did not take a clear 
position on claims alleging merely that defense counsel’s errors resulted in a 
longer sentence. But from Glover it is possible to extract a broad principle that 
convicted accused persons who bring length-of-sentence claims should be able 
to establish Strickland prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, 
but for defense counsel’s errors, they would have received a shorter sentence.596 
Nowadays the Strickland standard and its requirement to element of prejudice 
essentially allows two types of accused persons to have any chance of winning 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The first is a truly innocent accused, 
who is able to prove his innocence. The second is an accused who claims that if 
counsel would have been effective, he would have received a more lenient 
punishment.597  
There are several arguments that support requiring the accused to show 
prejudice to ensure the annulment of the court judgment on the basis of 
ineffectiveness of defense counsel. First, it would seem that in order to have 
been really ineffective, defense counsel’s performance must logically have had 
some adverse effect on the accused’s rights, and only the outcome of the trial 
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can determine what that effect was.598 The need to show prejudice limits the 
scope of appellate review to only those actions which have an effect on the 
determination of guilt,599 and since 2003 in the United States also the length of 
sentence. It has also been proposed that meaning of prejudice should be 
changed and the burden of proving that counsel acted in a way that prejudiced 
the assertion of one or more of the accused’s rights should be placed on an 
accused. This burden requires the accused to prove that a particular failure of 
counsel was not a valid tactical decision, i.e., that counsel did not exercise a 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the accused’s rights.600 However, 
this proposal has not found attention in the special literature for some reason. It 
could actually be that this proposal would be suitable for supporters of prejudice 
standard, if it would be noticed, because according to this standard the accused 
also has to show that counsel’s failures affected him, although not the outcome 
of his case, but his procedural rights. However, as counsel is the one who also 
provides the assistance to the accused, the breach of his duties may lie not only 
in waving the accused’s rights, but also in failure in consulting with the accused 
and informing him about the course of the proceedings, very important 
counsel’s duties, which form the basis of communication between the accused 
and counsel, which means that this standard is not without its flaws either. 
Secondly, the supporters of the element of prejudice claim that in the society, 
there is always interest in preserving the finality of the court judgments601 and if 
the accused fails to show an effect his counsel’s failures had on the outcome of 
the proceedings, there is no need to repeat the adjudication. Therefore, a 
prejudice requirement is supported by a number of pragmatic concerns. It 
reflects a realistic view that lawyers cannot perform perfectly in every trial and 
therefore avoids spending time and money on a second trial likely to end in the 
same way result as the first trial.602 After all, it seems somewhat wasteful to 
reverse for “ineffective assistance” when there is no “reasonable probability” 
that the result in the case would have been different. One always has to keep in 
mind, that when an accused is retried, it means the expenditure of substantial 
additional resources.603 In addition to that, an abolishment of prejudice claim 
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would multiply the number of claims,604 which means that even if court find 
most of those claims groundless, it still has to deal with them and solve them, 
i.e. to spend extra resources on them. 
Yet, opponents to the prejudice element in the United States emphasize that 
promoting finality cannot be an acceptable goal if the process which led to the 
judgment was unfair in the first place.605 The right to effective assistance should 
ensure that “convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair 
procedures”; otherwise we emphasize efficiency over fairness.606 The system’s 
ultimate goal is not to convict the guilty no matter what, but to ensure a fair 
proceeding “designed to end in just judgments.”607 The prejudice prong, on the 
contrary, inherently assumes that no injury is caused solely by the denial of 
procedural due process.608 
When it comes to the meaning of prejudice that the United States Supreme 
Court used since 1984 until 2003 it has been claimed that requiring the accused 
to show that his counsel’s ineffectiveness was likely to have led to the finding 
of guilt in effect obliges the accused to demonstrate that the prosecution did not 
prove its case, i.e. the accused has to prove his innocence, which is a require-
ment against the presumption of innocence.609 When it comes to judicial 
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practice of the United States Supreme Court after 2003, it seems that most 
authors are rather happy, because the Supreme Court has widened the notion of 
prejudice and what they do in the law reviews is to figure out in which cases the 
Glover findings are actually applied.610 Nevertheless, it has been emphasized in 
the special literature that once ineffectiveness of defense counsel is determined, 
the accuracy of the finding of guilt (and imposing of punishment) is always 
called into question:611 after establishing counsel’s ineffectiveness, the accused 
has demonstrated that he was convicted without a full adversarial hearing which 
is supposed to be critical to the adversary system612 and therefore the result 
obtained that way should have no legacy.613 In an adversarial system, one is 
never “clearly guilty” until one has been convicted through fair procedures.614 
The opponents of the element of prejudice do not spend much attention to the 
problems related to spending additional resources. They just stress, that if a 
higher court annuls the lower court’s judgment, it does not mean that the 
accused escapes conviction, but rather receives a new trial with a better shot at 
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an accurate verdict.615 Moreover, every reversal teaches a general lesson about 
counsel’s obligations, and potentially requires a greater investment in defense 
resources from state and from counsels themselves.616  
The opponents of the prejudice standard also claim that if no prejudice is 
found, but it has been determined that counsel did make some serious mistakes, 
poor lawyering is left unremedied in the criminal proceedings when a new trial 
is denied. This erodes the faith of the accused and the public in the fairness and 
integrity of the adversary system.617 In addition to that already in 1973 the 
Judge Bazelon warned that courts can misuse the requirement of prejudice very 
easily: in order not to deal with ineffectiveness claims the prejudice element 
allows courts to make a presumption that as long as there was a lawyer seated at 
the defense table, the defense was adequate.618 The experience of the United 
States has shown this warning has to be taken seriously: lots of scholars and 
journalists have reported that where there was overwhelming proof of guilt at 
trial, malpractice is excused even if that malpractice involves sleeping, taking 
drugs, drinking during trial or suffering through a psychotic break.619  
In addition to the above mentioned objections to the element of prejudice it 
has been claimed that the ones who support the accused’s burden to show 
prejudice tend to forget that this is an element which is almost impossible to 
prove and it is often impossible to conclude whether there was a reasonable pro-
bability that the outcome would have been different.620 Although the prejudice 
requirement assumes we can accurately assess the impact of bad lawyering on 
the outcome of the case, in reality such an assessment is very difficult.621 One 
reason for that is the psychological bias of people I have discussed above. 
Secondly, it can be asserted that when counsel does an ineffective job, the 
prosecution’s case always looks overwhelming, because it was unopposed.622 It 
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can be even that the absence of effective representation may “…have had an 
effect on the entire proceeding that was so pervasive that it is not possible to 
accurately determine the degree of prejudice.“623 In addition to that, court 
decision, especially the judge’s decision about punishment is based on an 
infinite variety of subjective data, and one can rarely state that it is reasonably 
probable that a court would have reached a different result than it did.624 When 
it comes to determination of punishment, it must be remembered that often 
judges not only decide the amount of punishment, but also what kind of 
punishment should be imposed. The effect of counsel’s performance on an 
accused’s sentence is very difficult to assess because a judge may elect to 
impose a particular sentence for any number of reasons, and it may not be 
clear – even to the sentencing judge himself – how much weight was assigned 
to various sentencing factors. Therefore it is difficult for the higher court to 
conclude how any particular argument or evidence affected a sentence, which in 
turn makes it difficult to assess the impact of counsel’s performance.625 So the 
higher court has to determine the effect of errors on this subjective decision and 
also remove itself from the context of the decision626 trying to figure out what 
types of mitigation arguments defense counsel should have investigated.627 
Carissa Byrne Hessick explains the situation and it could be said that these 
words describe the situation very accurately: “There is an irony associated with 
ineffective assistance claims at sentencing: the greater the discretion afforded to 
the sentencing judge to identify mitigating factors and determine the final 
sentence, the more important defense counsel’s performance may be in reducing 
her client’s sentence. But the more discretion the sentencing judge has, the more 
difficult it becomes for a defendant to obtain judicial review of the adequacy of 
counsel’s performance at sentencing.”628  
It is not clear whether an accused could prove in Estonia that a lighter 
sentence would have been imposed by the court if counsel’s assistance had been 
effective, given that the only requirements for a specific sentence is that it has to 
be justified and in accordance with bases of punishment provided for in § 56 (1) 
of the Penal Code629. It is, therefore, possible that even if counsel submits 
mitigating evidence, a court will find the guilt of the accused to be such as 
merits the same sentence as would be imposed without any mitigating 
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circumstances. Therefore I find it probable that the element of prejudice could 
be proven in Estonia primarily where counsel has failed to present evidence that 
would prove that the act does not involve the elements essential to the offence, 
the act is not unlawful, or the defendant is not capable of guilt or there are other 
circumstances which preclude guilt. In such a case, the accused could clearly 
claim that if counsel had provided effective assistance, the criminal proceedings 
would have culminated in an acquittal. The possibility that a reviewing court 
would actually find that a failure to present important mitigating evidence by 
counsel also constitutes grounds for annulment of the decision of the lower 
court cannot still be completely ruled out either.630 
As proving that without counsel’s mistakes the punishment would have been 
more lenient is almost impossible because of the above mentioned reasons, 
prejudice element usually boils down to the accused’s attempt to prove that 
without counsel’s mistakes he would have been acquitted. In addition to the fact 
that this goes strongly against the principle of presumption of innocence, it 
should be also added that it means that in a case in which the prosecutor has 
extremely strong evidence against the accused does not have to prepare at all, 
because defense counsel owes his best effort only to the accused with a hopeful 
case.631 Therefore, the question arises why the state needs to bother to supply an 
effective counsel or even counsel to represent the accused with a weak defense 
position.632 In that sense the prejudice requirement seems to demand effective 
representation only for the innocent.633 Nevertheless the aim to “reduce the 
chance that innocent persons will be convicted” is only a narrow purpose of the 
right to counsel, as I have discussed in detail in chapters one and two. 
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Procedural rights should extend not only to the factually innocent, but also to 
“guilty” accused persons as well, i.e. to all people charged of crime.634  
The last proposed standard, a harmless error rule means that it is the 
prosecutor who has a burden to prove that counsel’s mistakes did not affect the 
outcome. This standard is in accordance with presumption of innocence, 
because the accused does not have a burden to show prejudice: therefore it is 
consistent with the basic concept of justice that the state has the burden of 
proving the accused’s guilt.635 That way the standard is much more lenient for 
the accused, because the accused does not have to face the difficulties that he 
has when he is asked to prove prejudice, but it still ignores the understanding 
that the right to effective assistance of counsel can be violated even if counsel’s 
mistakes did not have an effect on the outcome of the proceedings.636 As the 
right to effective assistance of counsel is so important to protect the accused’s 
other rights and provide him with the opportunity to be an equal contestant to 
the prosecutor, I generally agree with those who claim that the courts should not 
require the accused to establish element of prejudice in counsel ineffectiveness 
cases as they should not allow the prosecutor to prove that counsel’s mistakes 
did not prejudice the accused. In my opinion this principle should apply to the 
most egregious mistakes of counsel, which means that the accused should be 
granted a relief after he has managed to prove that his counsel made the 
“egregious mistake”, and the prosecutor cannot argue here that the conviction 
should not be overturned, because counsel’s mistake did not affect the outcome. 
If it can be concluded that the right to effective assistance of counsel was 
violated even if it is possible to say that in case counsel would have not done 
this kind of mistake, the result would have been the same, rights of the accused 
and his position in the adversary proceedings are better guaranteed. The society 
has an interest in the criminal process beyond guaranteeing accuracy of result. 
That is why it is necessary to overturn a guilty verdict, notwithstanding the 
overwhelming evidence of guilt, because the procedure for obtaining that 
verdict was unfair in the way that counsel who participated in the proceedings 
made an egregious mistake.637 But here it should be decided, what to do with 
cases where counsels made mistakes not listed as “egregious”. 
In the United States it has been suggested that justice and the specific goals 
of the right to counsel would be better served if courts, after analyzing a list of 
minimal criteria essential to effective representation, were to reverse con-
victions without requiring a showing of prejudice when counsel unjustifiably 
failed to satisfy one of these basic components (i.e. his mistake was 
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“egregious”).638 If the accused claims that although his counsel fulfilled all 
duties described in the list was nevertheless ineffective under the special 
circumstances of a case, the court should look into the facts and declare an 
action “basic” and therefore necessary if the circumstances of the case indicate 
that counsel’s actions prejudices the accused.639 Abandoning the prejudice 
requirement for at least many of the ineffectiveness claims would send a 
powerful message to those responsible for guaranteeing to accused persons 
effective assistance.640 It is probable that abandoning the prejudice element 
produces an immediate increase in ineffective assistance claims and also in 
reversals, which is still a short-term effect.641 In the long run, reversals will 
likely decrease as defense counsels become better acquainted with the 
requirements of the new approach. In addition, a short-term increase in reversals 
could produce several positive side effects: trial judges would react in case of 
poor performance by counsel more willingly; the Bar would receive a strong 
message if the same defense counsels consistently are declared ineffective by 
courts and client would be less ready to retain those counsels. There is another 
possible positive side effect also, that I only mention here and will not discuss 
further: frequent reversals could yield negative publicity, that might in turn 
encourage the passage of remedial legislation such as increased expenditures for 
appointment of counsels.642 On the other hand, losing the prejudice prong and 
asking prejudice to prove only in exceptional situations means that courts have 
to have an adequate standard for evaluating defense counsel’s performance. 
Otherwise the result would be chaotic and arbitrary. But it is almost impossible 
not to agree with the opinion that it is extremely hard to devise a standard for 
evaluating defense counsel’s performance that captures all the cases in which 
one would conclude that counsel performed inadequately,643 which means that 
in order to protect an accused persons interests and the principle of finality at 
the same time, it is obvious that the prejudice prong has to be retained, at least 
for some ineffective counsel claims. 
When it comes to the judicial practice of the ECtHR one has to take into 
account that the ECtHR does not search for a ground for annulment of the state 
court’s judgment, but only establishes violations of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and it is up to the state after the ECtHR has established the 
violation to decide whether to annul the judgment or not. Therefore the ECtHR 
does not have to consider the principle of finality and in turn does not have to 
restrict itself with the element of prejudice. However, in my opinion the ECtHR 
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seems not to have a clear opinion about the element of prejudice when it comes 
to ineffective assistance claims. Although some authors claim that the right to a 
defense is absolute in the sense the fact that the applicant has not suffered any 
damage from the non-fulfillment of the requirement under Article 6 paragraph 3 
(c) does not exclude that this provision has been violated by the state.644 But if 
one analyzes ECtHR’s case law, the picture is not that clear anymore. In Artico 
v. Italy the ECtHR held that Article 6 paragraph (3) c does not indicate that 
proof of prejudice is necessary. According to the Court’s understanding, the 
existence of a violation is conceivable even in the absence of prejudice.645 
Although the Court stated that it cannot be proved beyond all doubt that a 
substitute for an applicant’s lawyer would have pleaded statutory limitation and 
would have convinced the Court of Cassation, the Court added that in the 
particular circumstances it appears plausible that this would have happened,646 
which means that in the Court’s opinion there is a possibility that the outcome 
of the case would have been different. In Alimena v. Italy647 the Court noted, 
citing Artico, that a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights is 
conceivable even where no damage arises. The Court concluded that the 
competent Italian authorities were under a duty to take steps to ensure that the 
accused enjoyed effectively the right to which they had recognized he was 
entitled, namely the possibility of being represented by a lawyer at the 
examination of his appeal, but added that Italian authorities deprived the 
accused of legal assistance which could have helped him in his attempt to 
secure an unqualified acquittal.648 This again refers to the possibility that when 
counsel would have been present, the outcome of the case could have been 
different. Therefore, although word for word denying need to prove element of 
prejudice, the ECtHR has still gradually incorporated it into some of its 
judgments that deal with ineffective assistance claims. In order to get some 
clarity, one has to wait for further judgments from the ECtHR. 
In this thesis I refrain from suggesting the prejudice prong for counsel’s 
most egregious mistakes because I am convinced that all accused persons 
should be treated equally and they all should be guaranteed the same procedural 
rights, including the right to effective assistance of counsel. If the right to 
effective assistance is violated, the proceedings have not been fair, because the 
basis for adversary proceedings is a diligently acting counsel, an equal or 
basically equal contestant to the prosecutor. If the proceedings have not been 
fair, the outcome of it cannot be valid. Because I agree with authors in the 
United States that claim that in order to lose the prejudice element, a specific 
standard for counsel’s performance should be worked out, because otherwise 
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judicial practice in the field of ineffective counsel claims would be 
unpredictable and chaotic, I am going to try to elaborate a standard for higher 
courts in Estonia that in my opinion consists of absolutely essential duties of 
counsel, i.e. the duties, which non-fulfillment always constitutes violation of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel and therefore should always result in 
annulment of a lower court’s judgment. However, when it comes to counsel’s 
violations that are not listed, but which the accused could still claim to be 
egregious under special circumstances, in order to respect principle of finality, 
the prejudice prong should be retained. Otherwise it would be possible to 
conclude that every mistake of counsel can lead to annulment of the court 
judgment, which would put an enormous burden on the justice system and 
society overall. In order for the accused not to be obliged to prove his 
innocence, it should be the prosecutor who has to prove that mistake the 
accused claims to be egregious did not affect the outcome of the case or the 
accused’s rights in the proceedings. 
 
 
2.3. The Outcome of Supervision 
The ECtHR has given its opinion about how the state should act when a 
person’s rights are violated depending on whether the case has already reached 
the ECtHR or not. The ECtHR has stressed that in case the ECtHR has 
established violation of the accused’s rights, it is not its duty to impose new 
proceedings in a new form on a state. A state has the right to decide for itself 
what means it will use to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he 
would have been in had there not been a breach of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In so doing, the means chosen by the state must be compatible 
with the conclusions of the ECtHR and the rights of the defense.649 In Quaranta 
v. Switzerland, the Court stressed that a state should mend the defect before the 
case reaches the ECtHR at all. According to this judgment, if a person’s right to 
the assistance of counsel has been breached in a lower court, the case should be 
tried anew, in a higher court.650 If limitations on the cases within the jurisdiction 
of the court render this impossible, the person should be guaranteed new 
proceedings in a lower court.651 
According to § 339 (1) 3) of the CCP violation of criminal procedural law is 
material, and therefore results in an abolishment of the court judgment, if a 
court proceeding is conducted without the participation of counsel, although the 
participation of counsel was mandatory in court proceedings, which means that 
violation of procedural law is material if the right to have counsel present was 
violated. Clause 339 (1) 12) of the CCP provides another relevant material 
violation of criminal procedural law: violation of criminal procedural law is 
material if in the course of the court hearing the principle of a fair and just court 
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procedure is violated. Clause 339 (1) 12 was brought into the Code of Criminal 
Procedure on the 1st of September 2011 with the argument that the principle of 
the right to a fair and just trial is also provided in Article 6 paragraph (1) of the 
ECHR.652 Pursuant to § 339 (2) of the CCP a court may declare any other 
violation of criminal procedural law to be material if such violation results or 
may result in an unlawful or unfounded court judgment. Until the 1st of Sep-
tember 2011 the Supreme Court of Estonia considered violation of the principle 
of a fair and just trial to be material violation of procedural law in the meaning 
of § 339 (2) of the CCP.653 It is in the competence of the Estonian courts to 
specify what the principle of “fair” and “just” trial means, but in the context of 
this dissertation I suggest that the right to effective assistance of counsel is the 
right that should be followed in order to declare a trial “fair” and “just”. 
Therefore I propose that violation of § 339 (1) 12) can be concluded if counsel 
has not fulfilled the duties, I am going to suggest shortly, are essential to 
effective assistance of counsel or if counsel has not fulfilled any other duty and 
the prosecutor is not able to prove that it did not affect the outcome of the case. 
The violation provided for in 339 (1) 3) of the CCP leads to annulment of the 
judgment of the court of lower instance (either judgment of trial court or 
judgment of circuit court) and returns the criminal matter to the court of lower 
instance for a new hearing by a different court panel (CCP, § 341 (1), § 361 
(2)). If material violation of criminal procedural law is ascertained in the course 
of a court session pursuant to the procedure provided for in § 339 (1) 12) of the 
CCP and the violation cannot be eliminated in the court session, the higher 
court has to annul the judgment of the court of first instance and return the 
criminal matter to the lower court for a new hearing by the same or different 
court panel654 (CCP, § 341 (3); § 361 (2)). Therefore in case counsel is absent 
from the proceedings, the case always has to be retried in the lower court. In 
case counsel has been ineffective any other way, the higher court, if possible, 
can make a new judgment. If due to counsel’s ineffectiveness the accused was 
wrongfully convicted or too severe a punishment was imposed on him, the 
higher court can accordingly acquit him or if possible impose a more lenient 
punishment. But if counsel’s ineffectiveness did not affect the outcome, in 
accordance with the principle of fair trial, an only option is to annul the 
judgment of the lower court and to return the criminal matter to the lower court 
                                                     
652 Explanatory Memorandum to the Act to Amend the Code of the Criminal Procedure and 
Other Related Acts. 599 SE, 11th Riigikogu.  
653 Judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, 8 April 2011, court case no. 3-
1-1-19-11. Online. Available: http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-1-1-19-11, 29 April 
2011. 
654 Explanatory Memorandum to the Act to Amend the Code of the Criminal Procedure and 
Other Related Acts (599 SE, 11th Riigikogu) does not explain in which case the case should 
be returned to the same panel and which case to the different panel. It seems that the case 
should be returned to the same panel if there is no need to start with the procedure all over 
again and a lower court can continue from the stage during which the mistake occurred. 
178 
for a new hearing, i.e. to give the accused a new chance to participate in the 
criminal proceedings with effective counsel by his side.655  
Sometimes the court of higher instance notices the possible ineffectiveness 
of defense counsel occurred in the court proceedings of the court of lower 
instance itself, although the accused or his counsel (in case of the cassation 
proceedings the advocate) has not referred to it in appeal or in appeal in 
cassation. According to § 331 (2) of the CCP a circuit court hears a criminal 
matter within the limits of the appeal filed, which means that it does not have 
competence to ascertain violations that are not referred to in an appeal. The 
Supreme Court of Estonia has much wider competence. Pursuant to § 3602 (3) 
of the CCP the Supreme Court of Estonia shall extend the limits of hearing a 
criminal matter to all the persons accused and all the criminal offences they are 
accused of regardless of whether an appeal in cassation has been filed with 
regard to them if incorrect application of substantive law which has aggravated 
the situation of the accused or a material violation of criminal procedural law 
becomes evident.656 Therefore, at least according to law, the higher courts in 
Estonia (especially the Supreme Court of Estonia) should cure the consequences 
of ineffective assistance even it is not referred to in an appeal). 
 
 
3. Ineffective Representation as a Ground for Review 
Every effort should be made to deal with the claim of ineffectiveness of the 
defense counsel on a direct appeal rather than in a review proceeding because 
examining the conduct of trial counsel becomes increasingly difficult with the 
passage of time.657 In Estonia the grounds for review are extremely limited and 
that makes it even harder for the convicted offender to claim successfully that 
his counsel has been ineffective in the criminal proceedings. Pursuant to § 365 
(1) of the CCP review procedure means the hearing of a petition for review by 
the Supreme Court of Estonia in order to decide on the resumption of 
proceedings in a criminal matter in which the court decision has entered into 
force. The grounds for review are provided for in the § 366 of the CCP. 
According to clause 5 of this section the grounds for review are any other facts 
which are relevant to the just adjudication of the criminal matter but which the 
                                                     
655 Soo, Ebaefektiivne kaitse kriminaalmenetluses: mõiste ja probleemistik, 359, p. 365. 
656 According to § 331 (3) a circuit court shall extend the limits of hearing a criminal matter 
to all the persons accused regardless of whether an appeal has been filed with regard to 
them, if a material violation of criminal procedural law or incorrect application of 
substantive law which has aggravated the situation of the accused becomes evident. In order 
to guarantee the rights of the accused with regard of whom the appeal has been filed, it is 
possible to interpret this provision in the way that the circuit court has to extend the limits of 
hearing to all criminal offences he is accused of, in order to assure that he is treated equally 
in respect of the accused persons, who did not file and whose counsel’s did not file appeal at 
all. 
657 Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: 
Principles for Appellate Review, 1, p. 87. 
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court was not aware of while making the court judgment or a court ruling in the 
criminal matter subject to review and which independently or together with the 
facts previously established may result in a judgment of acquittal or in 
mitigation of the situation of the convicted offender. Therefore, even if it is 
possible to interpret § 366 5) of the CCP the way that “any other facts which are 
relevant to the just adjudication” might be possible ineffectiveness of counsel, 
this clause clearly requires the showing of an element of prejudice.  
In addition to that according to § 366 7) the grounds for review are 
satisfaction of an individual appeal filed with the European Court of Human 
Rights against a court judgment or ruling in the criminal matter subject to 
review, due to violation of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or a Protocol belonging thereto if the 
violation may have affected the resolution of the matter and it cannot be 
eliminated or damage caused thereby cannot be compensated in a manner other 
than by review. From this clause it is also possible to deduce requirement of 
prejudice. Because the grounds for review are very limited and there is no case 
law about the subject, it is impossible to say whether the convicted person 
claiming that he did not know his counsel was ineffective in the criminal 
proceedings (and his other counsels and the courts did not know that either) 
would be successful or not. As the ECtHR itself is reluctant to hold violation of 
the right to effective assistance of counsel, as I have already discussed above, I 
do not have faith in § 366 7) of the CCP. 
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V. STANDARDS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF 
COUNSEL IN THE UNITED STATES 
1. Why to Use the Experience  
of the United States as an Example? 
As it has already been analyzed, the case law of the ECtHR is quite modest in 
the field of evaluating effectiveness of defense counsel according to standard. 
The only thing that the ECtHR has emphasized is that counsel has to be present 
and not remain completely idle. The standard to solve ineffectiveness claims 
seems to consist of one element only, as according to the judicial practice of the 
ECtHR it is not necessary for the accused to prove the element of prejudice 
(although in my opinion the ECtHR has expressed opinion contradictory to this 
principle at the same time658). As it seems that the ECtHR usually holds 
violation of Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) of the ECHR only if counsel has not 
participated or has been completely inactive in the proceedings, it must be 
stated that this is a very primitive standard to evaluate effectiveness of defense 
counsel and to be exact, this standard mostly helps to ascertain only whether the 
right to have counsel present, not the right to effective assistance, was violated.  
In order to work out the Estonian standard for effectiveness of defense counsel, 
one has to look for examples from somewhere else, much farther away to be 
more exact. The judicial practice of the United States has recognized that the 
right to effective assistance of counsel does not just mean ascertaining whether 
counsel was there or not or whether he completely failed to fulfill his duties. 
The courts of the United States have taken a big step further and although 
maybe holding too much on to the principle of finality, in spite of that are trying 
to assess quality of counsel’s participation too. That is why I am using the case 
law of the United States courts, especially the case law of the United States 
Supreme Court as an example of how to impose a proper standard for assessing 
the effectiveness of defense counsel in the criminal proceedings.  
As in Estonia there is no such standard for the courts and the Supreme Court 
has handled this problem a couple of times very superficially, there is not much 
to take from the Estonian case law. In order to work out a standard for Estonian 
courts I also looked in addition to the United States into the experience of some 
other countries, mostly searching for judicial practice of countries with the 
adversarial criminal system, but also Germany, which has been a great role 
model for the Estonian legislator. I have to emphasize that I did not find a 
standard that has been developed so thoroughly and for so long a time, as it has 
been done in the United States.  
Geoffrey Bennett has given an overview about the judicial practice con-
cerning ineffectiveness of defense counsel in England, stating that there alle-
gations of lawyer’s ineffectiveness seem to have been comparatively rare. He 
continues: “Compared to the United States, with its Sixth Amendment pro-
                                                     
658 See the discussion in subsection 4.2.2.2 of this dissertation. 
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tection, English Law seems to contain relatively few cases where the com-
petence of counsel has received exhaustive consideration at the appellate level. 
There is nothing to compare with the detailed analysis of the problem by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in for example, Strickland v. Washington and United States 
v. Cronic.”659 And finally he concludes: “… [I]t is curious how undeveloped 
English law appears to be in this area compared to American law.”660  
Dales E. Ives has described the judicial practice in Canada as follows. The 
Supreme Court of Canada had a goal to develop a distinctly Canadian approach 
to the interpretation of the rights of the accused, cautioning in several cases that 
the United States’ approach to the right to counsel may not be suitable in the 
Canadian context. However, recently the Supreme Court of Canada ignored its 
own advice and simply adopted the United States’ approach to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.661 Dales E. Ives adds that Canadian courts rely on 
the lawyer-control model, in which counsel is given control over almost all 
conduct of the defense subject only to a few fundamental decisions, e.g., the 
decision to plead guilty and the decision to testify on one’s own behalf that are 
reserved for accused persons. This approach has significant implications for the 
solving of counsel’s ineffectiveness claims and therefore appeal courts are 
reluctant to go behind trial counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions in 
Canada.662  
In Germany the court has no right to remove the retained counsel in case 
counsel turns out to be ineffective.663 When it comes to appointed counsel, 
court’s discretion is a bit broader. For instance the court is allowed to remove 
counsel if counsel refuses or is not able to perform his tasks, refuses to apply 
judicial remedies or to justify them. But the mere fact that counsel abuses 
                                                     
659 Geoffrey Bennett, Wrongful Conviction, Lawyer Incompetence and English Law – some 
Recent Themes Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum, 42 Brandeis L. J. 189 (2003–2004), 
p. 194. 
660 Bennett, Wrongful Conviction, Lawyer Incompetence and English Law – some Recent 
Themes Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum, 189, p. 196. 
In Regina v. Ensor ([1989] 1 W.L.R. 497) it was stated that “…it should clearly be 
understood that if defending counsel in the course of his conduct of the case makes a 
decision, or takes a course which later appears to have been mistaken or unwise, that 
generally speaking has never been regarded as a proper ground for appeal.” Ibid., p. 500. In 
Regina v. Clinton ([1993] 1 W.L.R. 1181) the court concluded that counsel’s conduct 
resulted in conviction being “unsafe“ and “unsatisfactory“ and annulled the lower court’s 
judgment. In Regina v. Nangle ([2001] Crim LR 506) the court concluded that although 
there were some deficiencies in counsel’s job, they had not caused “unfairness” to the 
accused. Bennett suggest that the dimension of the “fair trial” was brought into the judicial 
practice due to the European Convention on Human Rights and its sixth article. 
661 Dale E. Ives, Canadian Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, the 
Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum, 42 Brandeis L. J. 239 (2003–2004), p. 239. In 
Regina v. G.D.B ([2000] S.C.R. 520) the Supreme Court held that “… [t]he approach to an 
ineffectiveness claim is explained in Strickland v. Washington…” Ibid., p. 26. 
662 Ives, Canadian Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, the Criminal 
Procedure Discussion Forum, 239, pp. 251–252.  
663 Rolf Hannich, Karlsruher Kommentar Zur StPO (2008), § 138a, I, 3, Column no. 3. 
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procedural rights or acts irrationally does not form a basis for removal of 
counsel.664 The court should also consider in Germany removal of appointed 
counsel if the attorney-client relationship is permanently ruined. In order to 
decide that the court has to take into account “reasonable” accused’s point of 
view.665 The German Federal Court of Justice has found counsel’s performance 
to be ineffective and consequently annulled judgments of the lower courts, if 
counsel participating in the proceedings did not have the right to act as an 
advocate,666 if the court did not take into account the accused’s wishes while 
appointing counsel,667 if due to late appointment counsel had too little time to 
prepare the case668 or due to the change of retained counsel new counsel did not 
have enough time to prepare the case.669 In the latter case new counsels 
requested canceling the court session and repeating it, which is an opportunity 
in German criminal procedure, as I have already mentioned above. They 
claimed that they were not present when witnesses were examined and therefore 
missed an important stage of the court proceedings. The Federal Court of 
Justice emphasized that the lower court should have considered this opportu-
nity. In addition to the above mentioned cases the Federal Court of Justice has 
held that if counsel is unable to appear to the court session, it is up to court, who 
is in charge of the proceedings, to decide whether to adjourn the court session, 
to ask the accused to choose another counsel or appoint counsel to the 
accused.670 When it comes to actually assessing counsel’s performance, the 
Federal Court of Justice has been extremely cautious. It has held that courts and 
Prosecutor’s Offices are not obliged to perform supervision over the perfor-
mance of counsel except in extreme circumstances.671 As long as counsel is 
capable of acting appropriately, the court is not authorized to intervene into 
counsel’s performance.672 In the latter case the Federal Court of Justice even 
                                                     
664 Michael Heghmanns & Uwe Scheffer, Handbuch Zum Strafverfahren (2008), VI Column 
no. 93. 
665 Gerd Pfeiffer, Strafprozessordnung (StPO), Kommentar, (2005), § 143, Column no. 1; 
BGH 1 StR 5/00, 16 February 2000. 
666 BGH 5 StR 617/01, 5 February 2002; BGH 4 StR 192/06, 20 June 2006. 
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Criminal Procedure (Code of Criminal Procedure in the version published on 7 April 1987 
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474/06, 9 November 2006. 
671 BGH 5 StR 495/00, 5 April 2001; BGH 1 StR 147/06, 27 July 2006. 
672 BGH 1 StR 341/07, 15 July 2007. 
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held that it is not necessary that appointed counsel is specialized in the penal 
law. However, the approach that it is not the court’s duty to intervene is not in 
accordance with principles of the adversary system, as it is the role of counsel to 
be the accused’s legal advisor and equal contestant to the prosecutor, and the 
court has an obligation to guarantee that counsel fulfills his role (see chapter 
four of this dissertation). For the same reasons counsel has to be specialized in 
penal law, as I discussed in the subsection 3.4.4. In sum, the German approach 
to the ineffective assistance claims does not suit for adversary systems. 
In my opinion there is considerable experience in the United States in setting 
a standard for evaluating counsel’s effectiveness, an experience that other states 
do not have, but from which many states, including Estonia, could learn a 
valuable lesson. The other aspect that makes the United States a good example 
is the fact that the criminal system in the United States is adversarial and our 
criminal system moves in that direction as well. That is why it can be concluded 
that counsel’s role in the United States, the role of equal adversary to the 
prosecutor and zealous advisor to the accused, should ideally be the same as it 
should be in Estonian criminal proceedings. That makes the United State’s 
approach suitable to our criminal justice system too, at least with some 
reservations I will soon discuss further. 
Another thing that makes the United States a very good example is the fact 
that its experience in the field of setting a proper standard for assessing 
counsel’s performance is long-lasting. That gives us a chance to see the ups and 
downs of the development of such standards, how the proponents and critics of 
certain standards have reacted to the imposing or overturning of that standard 
and what future will be predicted for the standards of effectiveness of counsel in 
the United States. It is not only interesting, it is also informative, because it 
gives us an opportunity not to make the mistakes that the United States has 
made in the course of history and only take over what seems to be successful 
and at the same time suitable for us. Of course, while trying to set our own 
standard, we have to take into account what is unique for us – the fact that our 
system is not as “adversarial” as the United States system, the fact that we have 
some of counsel’s duties already provided for in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and in laws and acts that are related to our Bar and the fact that 
Estonia is in Europe and for instance legislation of the European Union and the 
guideline of the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe has to be taken 
into account. In addition to that, there is also the European Convention on 
Human Rights we have to keep in mind.  
 
 
2. Standards of Effectiveness  
of Counsel That Have Been Used in the United States 
The oldest and for a long time the most commonly used test for judging claims 
of ineffective representation was in the United States “…where the circums-
tances surrounding the trial shocked the conscience of the court and made the 
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proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice.”673 The “mockery” test caused 
much irritation among critics who pointed out that this standard requires 
“…such a minimal level of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery 
of the sixth amendment.”674 It is obvious that this standard was too narrow and 
too vague to set forth any of the elements of effective representation. In addition 
to that the test placed a heavy burden on the accused and showed clearly that 
courts do not look favorably on an accused, who claims that his counsel has not 
performed effectively: only the most egregious errors are the ones which meet 
the standard and even those are sometimes not enough.675  
But there were justifications for implementation of the “mockery-of-justice” 
standard also. First it was claimed that its goal is to lessen the overwhelming 
caseload of most appellate courts and therefore it was justified with the need to 
decrease ineffective assistance claims.676Another justification for the “mockery-
of-justice” test was the need to prevent cases of feigned ineffectiveness, because 
courts were afraid that a less demanding test would encourage counsels, 
separately or in conjunction with their clients, to conspire to intentionally 
mishandle a weak case in order to get the conviction overturned on appeal and 
gain a new trial, hoping that witnesses have forgotten most of the information 
by that time.677 The critics of this test found those fears to be groundless and 
expressed their opinion that feigned ineffectiveness is an unlikely strategy, 
because lawyers are afraid of ruining their reputation and disciplinary action by 
the bar.678 For accused persons, feigned ineffectiveness means a high risk, 
because they never know whether the higher court will annul the trial court’s 
judgment or not and by agreeing with the less than the best possible defense 
they risk more severe punishment than they would have received if counsel 
would have been as effective as possible.679  
                                                     
673 Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669–70 (D.C. Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 
(1945). See also Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from 
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Another test, the “reasonable lawyer” test dates back to the Fifth Circuit’s 
opinion in MacKenna v. Ellis.680 Judge Wisdom, writing for the majority, wrote: 
“We interpret the right to counsel as the right to effective counsel. We interpret 
counsel to mean not errorless counsel, and not counsel judged ineffective by 
hindsight, but counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably 
effective assistance.” Therefore the Fifth Circuit looked directly into counsel’s 
performance and left the characteristics of the proceedings as a whole aside. It 
can be said that this test was not so demanding for the accused than the 
“mockery-of-justice” standard was, but still it was quite hard to give meaning to 
the notion “reasonable”, because the court did not explain anything further or 
tried to set specific guidelines. As state and federal courts one by one adopted 
the “reasonable lawyer” test, some of them soon began to require that prejudice 
must have resulted in order to conclude ineffective assistance of counsel.681 
The “community standard” test was another alternative.682 Representation 
was evaluated by comparing it not to the conduct of a hypothetical reasonable 
lawyer but to the level of practice actually prevailing in the area. This standard 
derived from language in the Supreme Court’s opinion in McMann v. Richard-
son.683 Like the “reasonable lawyer” test the “community standard” does not 
look into characteristics of the proceedings, At the same time the “community 
standard” test is more precise compared to the “mockery-of-justice” and to the 
“reasonable lawyer” standard, because it enabled courts to use for evaluating 
lawyer’s performance specific rules, which were applied to the performance of 
lawyers in a certain community, e.g., local bar guidelines. 
Related to all “mockery-of-justice”, “reasonable lawyer” and “community 
standard” there is a never ending discussion that has been held in the United 
States since different counsel’s performance standards appeared in the case law 
of the United States courts. Thus, some courts and authors have tried to state 
that it is possible to test ineffectiveness claims by asking whether defense 
counsel’s performance met a minimum standard of professional representation 
(e.g., in case of “community standard” local bar guideline). If the standard of 
assessing counsel’s performance is “mockery-of-justice” or “reasonable lawyer” 
standard, then the minimal duties of counsel are not specified and assessing 
counsel’s performance is a matter of ad hoc analysis, which makes the standard 
vague and arbitrary, because every court, and every judge separately to be more 
exact, sees counsel’s basic duties differently. That is why the minimum 
standard, e.g., the “reasonable lawyer”, is what the certain judge thinks it is in a 
certain case. It actually gives the judge the freedom to take into account that 
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there are more difficult and less difficult cases, in which counsel accordingly 
has to do more or less work, but it does not remove the possibility that different 
judges treat similar cases differently. Imposing a more specific standard would 
result in a decrease in arbitrariness by courts and would give counsels’ a chance 
to get to know what they are expected to do in the criminal proceedings, at least 
the supporters to the minimum checklist say it would do.684 
Consequently, in the United States there has been a long running antagonism 
between the “categoricalists” and the “judgmentalists”. The “categoricalists” are 
the supporters of a checklist based approach. They believe that there are some 
essential duties of counsel that the courts could take into account while 
assessing counsels’ performance.685 Some authors even claim that the problem 
of ineffective assistance of counsel can only be solved by establishing a uniform 
categorical standard for reviewing ineffective assistance claims.686 The enthu-
siasm of those authors is actually understandable. If the accused wants to claim 
successfully that his counsel was ineffective, he would have to prove that 
counsel failed to satisfy one or more of the rules from the list and nothing 
more.687 Then the courts would have to take the accused’s claim seriously and 
could not hide behind a vague understanding of “reasonable performance”. 
Therefore, defense counsel’s failure or inability to complete one or more of 
these necessary components of effective representation automatically es-
tablishes ineffectiveness of counsel and ordinarily provides per se grounds for 
granting the accused relief, unless for instance a harmless error rule in some 
form is used together with the categorical approach. Therefore the “categori-
calists” do not support ad hoc analysis and believe that it is possible to make a 
list composed of duties that counsel has certainly to fulfill in the criminal 
proceedings. 
The “judgmentalists”, on the other hand, argue that categorical rules are 
inappropriate because each counsel and each trial is different and that therefore 
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ineffective assistance claims must be judged on a case-by-case basis.688 Thus 
the “judgmentalists” do not believe that setting a guideline is possible – counsel 
has to perform his duties in the light of certain circumstances and even if there 
are some steps counsels usually take there is still no ground for imposing 
guidelines – there might be some cases where these steps are not necessary. The 
perfect example of this approach is the “reasonable lawyer” test: counsel has to 
render reasonably effective assistance and what is “reasonably effective” 
depends on the special circumstances of the case. 
At first, when the courts in the United States started to argue over a proper 
standard of effectiveness, the United States Supreme Court was silent. To be 
more specific, the United States Supreme Court did not say anything about the 
standard of effectiveness of defense counsel until 1984. Before the United 
States Supreme Court finally expressed its opinion about ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel and created its own standard in 1984, there was a case in the 
United States Court of Appeals For The District of Columbia Circuit, a very 
well known case in the United States, which shows very clearly the adversity of 
the “judgmentalists” and “categoricalists”. This case is United States of Ame-
rica v. Willie DeCoster, the case that has been discussed in law reviews almost 
as much as the United States Supreme Court’s case Strickland v. Washington. It 
is not my goal to present a thorough overview of the case here, but I am going 
to give this case as a great example of how in the course of one criminal 
procedure categorical rules were rejected and the case-by-case analyses was 
found to be more preferable. In my opinion the final judgment of the Court of 
Appeals might even have been the one that the United States Supreme Court 
took as an example for Strickland v. Washington. 
When the first appeal was before the Court of Appeals in United States of 
America v. Willie DeCoster, the opinion was written by the “categoricalist” 
Judge Bazelon. Judge Bazelon relied in his opinion on the ABA Standards and 
found the assistance of counsel provided to the accused in the court of first 
instance ineffective. The court remanded the accused’s conviction and sentence 
for aiding and abetting in an armed robbery and assault with a dangerous 
weapon for a supplemental hearing on trial counsel’s preparation and 
investigation. In court’s opinion Judge Bazelon in addition to relying on the 
ABA Standards, was also strongly against the element of prejudice, saying that 
in the adversary system the burden is on the state to prove guilt. A requirement 
that the accused showed prejudice shifts the burden to him and makes him 
establish the likelihood of his innocence, which is against the principle of 
presumption of innocence. It is no answer to say that the appellant has already 
had a trial in which the government already proved his guilt, because the 
substance of his complaint is that the absence of the effective assistance of 
counsel has deprived him of a full adversary trial, which means that his guilt 
was found as a result of a possibly unfair trial. In addition to that, proof of 
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prejudice may well be absent from the record precisely because counsel has 
been ineffective, which makes the prejudice almost impossible to prove.689 
The same matter reached to the court of appeal two more times. In the third 
judgment the court finally affirmed the accused’s conviction for aiding and 
abetting an armed robbery.690 The court held that in order to ascertain 
ineffective assistance of counsel, it had to be a serious incompetency that fell 
measurably below the performance ordinarily expected of fallible lawyers. In 
court’s opinion the accused bore the burden of demonstrating likelihood that 
counsel’s inadequacy affected the outcome of the trial. Once the accused made 
this showing, the burden passed to the government, and the conviction could not 
be sustained unless the government demonstrated that it was not affected by the 
deficiency, i.e. that no prejudice resulted.691 So the judgmental approach with 
the element of prejudice was warranted in this judgment. 
Justice Leventhal who wrote the opinion described ineffectiveness cases as a 
continuum. At one end there are cases of structural or procedural impediments 
by the state that prevent the accused from receiving the benefits of the right to 
counsel. The most obvious example is, of course, the failure of the state to 
provide any counsel at all. The next cases are multiple representation and 
possible conflict of interest. The problem of late appointment moves us farther 
along the continuum. At the other end of the continuum are cases, including the 
United States of America v. Willie DeCoster, in which the issue is counsel’s 
performance when he is “untrammelled and unimpaired” by the state action. 
The ABA standards, Justice Leventhal continued, were not designed as a 
checklist of defense counsel’s duties for courts. In application of whatever 
standard there must be room for judgment and for consideration of circums-
tances of the case. In addition to that Justice Leventhal emphasized that the 
claimed deficiency must fall measurably below accepted standards: to be 
“below average” is not enough, because this is the case almost half of the time. 
In connection with the element of prejudice the court did not require that the 
accused has to show an actual prejudice. In court’s opinion the accused must 
demonstrate a likelihood of effect on the outcome.692  
Now it was Judge Bazelon’s time to disagree as he was the one who wrote 
the first opinion in the United States of America v. Willie DeCoster. In his 
dissent to majority opinion he emphasized that the ABA Standards summarize 
the consensus of the practicing Bar on the crucial elements of defense advocacy 
in the adversary system. Even though these standards were not intended to serve 
as criteria for judicial evaluation of effectiveness, they are certainly relevant 
guideposts for courts. Naturally, given the complexity of each case and the 
constant call for professional discretion, it is not possible to form a complete 
checklist with rules for counsel’s performance. Nevertheless, preserving 
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flexibility does not mean that it is not allowed to establish minimum 
components of effective assistance, and here the ABA Standards are helpful 
guidelines. Relying on standard does not mean that a slightest departure from a 
checklist of counsel’s duties establishes ineffectiveness and requires reversal. 
Since counsel’s decisions must be adapted to the certain circumstances of the 
certain case, the proper performance of counsel’s obligations necessarily 
assumes considerable discretion. The Sixth Amendment demands that counsel’s 
conduct be conscientious, reasonable, and informed, not that it would be 
flawless.693  
Therefore Judge Bazelon’s opinion does not support a categorical approach 
in its absolute meaning, but he seems to think that the checklist is necessary 
(feature of categorical approach) although it does not have to be an absolute 
truth for courts (feature of judgmental approach), meaning that in the special 
circumstances counsel’s performance could be declared ineffective although he 
fulfilled all duties described in the checklist and in some special circumstances 
the court could declare counsel’s performance effective, although he did breach 
some duty described in the checklist. But what in my opinion makes Judge 
Bazelon’s approach more categorical than judgmental is the fact that he thinks 
that the court should always rely its reasoning on the checklist. That way if the 
court wants to conclude that although counsel did not fulfill his duty described 
in the list, it has to give a very good cause for its opinion, which makes the 
court’s reasoning easy to follow and courts’ decisions less arbitrary, which is 
one of the main goals of categorical approach. 
In addition to what Judge Bazelon wrote about the checklist-based approach, 
he found the element of prejudice unacceptable and claimed that “the majority’s 
position confuses the defendant's burden of showing that counsel's violation was 
“substantial” with the government's burden of proving that the violation was not 
“prejudicial”. The former entails a forward-looking inquiry into whether de-
fense counsel acted in the manner of a diligent and competent attorney; it asks 
whether, at the time the events occurred, defense counsel's violations of the 
duties owed to his client were justifiable. In contrast, the inquiry into “pre-
judice” requires an after-the-fact determination of whether a violation that was 
admittedly “substantial,” nevertheless did not produce adverse consequences for 
the defendant.” The Judge continued: “Moreover, “prejudice” to the defendant 
may take many forms. The likelihood of acquittal at trial is not the only touch-
stone against which the consequence of counsel's failures is to be measured. The 
duties of an attorney extend to many areas not necessarily affecting the outcome 
of trial.”694 Consequently, in Judge Bazelon’s opinion the element of prejudice 
in the meaning that the accused has to prove it, is improper when the court is 
solving ineffective assistance claims. 
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As it can be seen United States courts, legal practitioners and theorists were 
active in the field of ineffective defense long before the United States Supreme 
Court decided to give its opinion about the matter. There are two issues argued 
most in the United States when it comes to the standard of effectiveness of 
defense counsel. First, whether the approach should be categorical, i.e. focused 
on fixed guidelines, or judgmental, i.e. based on the case-by-case analysis and 
whether the element of prejudice should be part of the test or not and who has to 
prove existence or absence of it. Therefore the question has been whether the 
standard should consist of one or two prongs and what the content of those 
prongs should be. 
 
 
3. Standards of Effectiveness  
of Counsel That Are Used in the United States 
Finally the day came when the United States Supreme Court decided to express 
its opinion about the proper standard of effectiveness of defense counsel, a day 
that courts, legal practitioners and theorists had waited for a long time. As with 
every judgment made by the highest court, some of them were disappointed and 
some of them rejoiced. 
In Strickland v. Washington the accused claimed that counsel failed to pre-
sent mitigating evidence during the capital trial and that the failure of counsel 
constituted an ineffective defense. Now it was time for the Supreme Court to 
assess counsel’s performance and it did. 
With Strickland the Court set forth a two-prong standard, requiring the 
accused to show first, that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second, 
that the deficient performance prejudiced the accused so as to deprive the 
accused of a fair trial. According to the Court’s judgment, in order to claim that 
counsel’s performance was deficient, the accused has to show that counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Court 
explained: “More specific guidelines are not appropriate. The Sixth Amendment 
refers simply to “counsel”, not specifying particular requirements of effective 
assistance.”695 Norms of practice as reflected in ABA Standards are guides to 
determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides and nothing more.696 
The Court also added that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be 
highly deferential (“It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess 
counsel’s assistance after conviction or an adverse sentence, and it is all too 
easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, 
to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.”697), 
and every effort has to be made to eliminate the effects of hindsight. Therefore 
the courts have to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
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conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. In 
addition to that, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and 
the accused must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy”.698 Therefore the 
proper standard to evaluate counsel’s behavior is an objective standard of 
reasonableness and while assessing counsel’s performance, courts have to 
interpret every suspicion about whether counsel rendered ineffective defense or 
not to the favor of counsel.  
With regard to the requirement to show prejudice, in Court’s opinion the 
proper standard requires the accused to show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different: “A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”699 The Court continued: 
“The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a 
defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be 
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the 
Constitution.”700 A court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the 
totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.701 The Court also emphasized 
that the standard does not establish mechanical rules: the ultimate focus of 
inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is 
being challenged. A court does not even need to first determine whether 
counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by 
the accused as a result of the alleged deficiencies.702 The Court emphasized: 
“The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If 
it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 
sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be 
followed. Courts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims do not 
become so burdensome to the defense counsel that the entire criminal justice 
system suffers as a result.”703  
Of course, the Court’s judgment in Strickland v. Washington has been 
criticized a lot.704 It has been argued that the Strickland judgment reflects the 
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Court’s characteristic refusal to look beyond sub judice and consider the 
systemic consequences of decision,705 which is in my opinion absolutely true. 
Deciding that there was nothing wrong with the Strickland lawyer’s perfor-
mance was one thing, but to set a standard which is extremely burdensome to all 
accused persons who claim ineffectiveness of their counsel and which will be 
followed by all courts in the United States, is something else. It has been 
claimed in the United States that “…the Strickland Court interpreted the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s right to effective assistance of counsel 
in such an ultimately meaningless manner as to require little more than a warm 
body with a law degree standing next to the defendant,” which means that it set 
a very high bar for accused persons who seek to get their convictions reversed 
based on ineffective representation from counsel.706 Therefore the Strickland 
judgment has even been referred to as “the breathing standard”, so long as 
counsel draws breath and sits next to his client without doing anything 
aggressively stupid, the representation is not considered to be ineffective.707  
In addition to that some authors think that the Strickland Court voiced the 
opinion in a manner which ensures that the courts will still apply the underlying 
elements of the “farce and mockery” test,708 because it emphasizes the “ends” 
                                                     
705 Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard 
Criminal Law, 242, p. 278. 
706 Klein, Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Symposium: 
Gideon – A Generation Later, 1433, p. 1446; George C. III Thomas, When Lawyers Fail 
Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems 
Symposium – Beyond Biology: Wrongful Convictions in the Post-DNA World, 2008 Utah L. 
Rev. 25 (2008), p. 34.  
“If a defendant is without counsel, many other constitutional rights become meaningless 
because the defendant and those rights have no champion in the courtroom. In order for the 
right to counsel to have meaning, the person representing the defendant must do more than 
just breathe.” Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 425, p. 474. 
707 Gregory J. O'Meara, You can't Get there from here: Ineffective Assistance Claims in 
Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA Symposium: Criminal Appeals: Right to Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 545 (2009), p. 570; Zelnick, In Gideon's Shadow: The 
Loss of Defendant Autonomy and the Growing Scope of Attorney Discretion, 363, p. 373; 
Garcia, Right to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right, the, 35, p. 84. 
The Strickland test has been “…only half-facetiously described by advocates as being in 
reality a three-part test consisting of: 
(1) a lawyer with a bar card; 
(2) a breathing lawyer; and 
(3) after substantial litigation and over strong dissent in a federal court of appeals in the 
sleeping lawyer cases in Texas, a lawyer who is conscious during trial.” Stephen F. Hanlon, 
State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent Defense Systems Symposium: Broke and Broken: 
Can we Fix Out State Indigent Defense System: Boots on the Ground: The Ethical and 
Professional Battles of Public Defenders, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 751 (2010), pp. 768–769. 
708 Genego, Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards and 
Competent Representation, the, 181, pp. 181 and 196; Fogelman, Justice Asleep is Justice 
Denied: Why Dozing Defense Attorneys Demean the Sixth Amendment and should be 
Deemed Per Se Prejudicial, 67, p. 84; Bright, Neither Equal nor just: The Rationing and 
193 
and not the “means”.709 It is most certainly true and does not match with the 
nature of the right to effective assistance of counsel. As I have already dis-
cussed, in an adversary system, the basic goal is to reach a verdict through 
contest between adversaries. Therefore, the verdict, i.e. the outcome, can only 
be called just if the procedural rules have been followed. Thus, it is absolutely 
inappropriate and against principles of the adversary proceedings to claim that 
even if one of the contestants was “missing” in the meaning that it did not 
exercise his duties, the outcome could still be called “fair”. 
So why does Strickland have no teeth at all? The answer is simple: as it 
leaves the first prong very vague and uses the element of prejudice as the 
second prong, it enables courts in the United States to consciously avoid 
overturning many convictions710 and it actually gives the courts the impression 
that this was the United States Supreme Court’s intent when it wrote Strickland. 
From the Court’s opinion appears the sad fact: Court’s absolute reluctance to 
deal with ineffectiveness claims and a strong wish to disregard those claims as 
conveniently and quickly as it is possible. If the Supreme Court gives such 
guidelines, it is almost certain that other courts will follow its lead and start to 
regard these claims with a strong indifference. And it is obvious that it has 
happened in the United States: the problem with quality of defense, especially 
with defense for an indigent is something that has been discussed and referred 
to over and over again in the law reviews, but nothing seems to get better as the 
Supreme Court has already expressed its so far unyielding opinion. In addition 
to that the Court’s rules do nothing to improve the quality of criminal defense 
overall.711  
When it comes to the first prong of the test the Court showed a great 
reluctance towards the categorical approach. As the Court noted: “No particular 
set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the 
variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate 
decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any such set of 
rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of 
counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions.”712 The Court also expressed its opinion that the existence of detailed 
guidelines for representation could distract counsel: “There are countless ways 
to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense 
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attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.”713 Moreover, 
the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is not 
to improve the quality of legal representation but to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial.714 In addition to that, as it was already mentioned, 
the Court stated that to satisfy the first prong of the test, an accused must 
overcome the court’s strong presumption in favor of counsel effectiveness and 
its deference to counsel’s tactical judgment. Therefore, in order to prevail, the 
accused must overcome the strong presumption that his lawyer’s conduct was 
within the wide and unspecified range of reasonable professional assistance and 
was not based on tactical considerations.715 The Court’s decision granting trial 
counsel’s performance such great deference indicates that the Court was overly 
concerned about judicial economy and counsels’ reputations and not so 
concerned about the effectiveness of defense lawyers generally.716 The Court 
also showed a concern over the principle of finality, stating that “[t]he 
availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of 
detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of 
ineffectiveness challenges.”717 Thus, the Court used almost every argument that 
had been used by “judgmentalist” before it. Yet the Court did not specify how 
to give the meaning to the “reasonable”, which in turn left the door open to 
uncertainty and arbitrariness, which is the most common objection supporters of 
the categorical approach make to the judgmental approach.718  
It seems that the Court left the notion “reasonable” unspecified because it 
was afraid that courts in the United States would really start to evaluate 
counsel’s performance and consequently overturn judgments. In his dissent to 
majority’s opinion in Strickland v. Washington Justice Marshall criticizes: “To 
tell lawyers and the lower courts that counsel for a criminal defendant must 
behave “reasonably” and must act like “a reasonably competent attorney,” … is 
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to tell them almost nothing. In essence, the majority has instructed judges called 
upon to assess claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to advert to their own 
intuitions regarding what constitutes “professional” representation, and has 
discouraged them from trying to develop more detailed standards governing the 
performance of defense counsel.”719 Justice Marshall continues and asks: “Is a 
“reasonably competent attorney” a reasonably competent adequately paid 
retained lawyer or a reasonably competent appointed attorney? It is also a fact 
that the quality of representation available to ordinary defendants in different 
parts of the country varies significantly. Should the standard of performance 
mandated by the Sixth Amendment vary by locale?”720  
Second, once an accused has established that his counsel was ineffective, he 
must satisfy the second prong of the test by showing prejudice, i.e. that but for 
his counsel’s ineffectiveness his trial would have resulted in an acquittal (as it 
has already discussed in 2001 the United States Supreme Court found it 
acceptable that the accused proves that without counsel’s ineffectiveness he 
would have received more lenient punishment).721 The Strickland test prejudice 
prong is considered to be an anomaly in constitutional jurisprudence. If a court 
finds that a lawyer fails the first prong, it basically finds that a constitutional 
violation has occurred. Yet the accused bears the burden of proof in convincing 
the higher court that this violation prejudiced him.722 Although in the Strickland 
judgment the Supreme Court seems to show equal concern for ensuring a just 
adversarial process and just results, subsequent applications of Strickland reflect 
an undeniable bias for the latter goal. The judicial practice of the United States 
courts shows that once the higher court becomes convinced of an accused’s 
factual guilt, prejudice is impossible to prove under Strickland and relief is 
denied, even if the adversarial process did not actually function.723  
The opponents to the second prong of the Strickland test have used the same 
arguments against the prejudice element that are used generally. In their opinion 
the Supreme Court failed to notice that the prejudice inquiry is inappropriate in 
the context of defining an accused’s Sixth Amendment rights.724 If effective 
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defense counsel is really essential to a fair trial, then the showing of ineffective 
assistance is proof of an unfair trial725 and the accused does not have to show 
prejudice. Even if a prejudice requirement is justifiable, placing the burden of 
proving prejudice on the accused effectively shifts the burden of proving a 
harmless error from the state to the accused.726 The Court’s prejudice prong 
assumes that there are some instances in which an accused’s substandard 
counsel will deliver a fair result and the Court seems to think that this is the 
norm not exception by setting an unreasonably high bar for proving errors that 
would satisfy the deficiency prong of the effectiveness test.727  
Thus, in the Strickland case the Supreme Court used the notion, 
“reasonable”, which meaning was left open and added the prejudice element in 
the meaning that it is the accused’s responsibility to prove that his counsel’s 
mistakes affected the outcome of the case, which is a really heavy burden for 
the accused.728 Therefore it has been even argued that the Strickland test does 
not have any practical importance to solving ineffectiveness claims. Actually, it 
is not quite true, the Strickland test has an effect: it enables not to solve 
ineffectiveness claims in favor of accused persons. It is true that explaining that 
sufficiency of the performance should be measured against an “objective 
standard of reasonableness” in light of prevailing professional norms offers as 
little help if one really wants to look into counsel’s behavior. But if one wants 
to disregard the claim quickly, this standard is more that useful. It is true also 
that saying that prejudice turns on whether there is a “reasonable probability” 
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that the result would have been different absent counsel’s errors is a very vague 
guideline, but it actually serves the same purpose.729 In sum, one can agree with 
the critics of Strickland that the United States Supreme Court’s approach to 
ineffectiveness claims in Strickland is fundamentally wanting and itself in-
effective,730 failing to assure even a minimal level of effectiveness.731 In 
addition to that Strickland employs a double presumption that counsel is always 
effective: first the Court stressed that it is necessary to presume that the lawyer 
gave adequate assistance; second, the Court instructed lower courts to ignore 
even failed assistance unless the accused can show that adequate counsel would 
have produced a different result.732  
But it would be unfair to claim that the Strickland judgment fundamentally 
wrong: there are some advantages of Strickland worth to mention here too. 
First, Strickland directed courts to assess outcome determination from “the 
totality of the evidence before the judge”, which means the hindsight has no 
role in determining the impact of counsel’s errors upon the outcome.733 This 
truly is justified in the light of principle of finality and respect to duties of 
counsel. Second, since the Strickland judgments the United States Supreme 
Court made it clear, that the issue of whether counsel performed effectively or 
not is decided by counsel’s performance in the particular case. Consequently, 
even the most experienced counsels can be found ineffective in a certain case, 
and counsels who just passed the Bar may not: the answer to the ineffectiveness 
inquiry depends on how counsel acts in a particular case and not on who he 
is.734 By focusing on counsel’s performance in a certain case, the accused’s 
right to effective assistance of counsel is most certainly guaranteed, if the court 
uses at the same time an adequate standard. 
                                                     
729 April Trimble, Defense Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance at the Sentencing Phase 
of a Capital Trial by Failing to Find Mitigating Evidence Contained in the Defendant's 
Prior Conviction Record: Rompilla v. Beard Recent Decisions, 44 Duq. L. Rev. 363 (2005–
2006), p. 380. 
730 Sanjay K. Chhablani, Chronically Stricken: A Continuing Legacy of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 1984: How One Year Reshaped Criminal Procedure, 28 St. Louis U. 
Pub. L. Rev. 351 (2008–2009), p. 392; Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A 
Comparison of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom Note, 317, p. 320. 
731 Weaver, Perils of being Poor: Indigent Defense and Effective Assistance Criminal 
Procedure Discussion Forum, 435, p. 441; Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up Gideon's 
Trumpet Symposium: The Legal Profession: Looking Backward, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1461 
(2002–2003), p. 1464. 
732 George C. III Thomas, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 543 
(2004), p. 590. 
733 Foster, Lockhart v. Fretwell: Using Hindsight to Evaluate Prejudice in Claims of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Notes, 1369, pp. 1392–1393. 
734 Kathy Swedlow, When can Defense Counsel's Decision Not to Present Mitigating 
Evidence be Challenged as Ineffective Assistance Death Penalty, 2002–2003 Preview U. S. 
Sup. Ct. Cas. 328 (2002–2003), p. 332. 
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But to use Strickland as an example is still very difficult, because it does not 
give clear guidelines to the effective counsel’s performance: the assessment of 
ineffectiveness claims is based on facts of a certain case and no particular 
standard is applied. That is why cases in which counsel does nothing or next to 
nothing are easy to assess: counsel has to investigate his client’s case and 
support his clients with advice, and if it is determined that counsel failed to do 
so, then his performance will be deemed ineffective.735 However, the usual 
cases, cases where counsel does a little bit more than nothing or next to nothing, 
are much more difficult to evaluate.  
As it has already been discussed, the second prong of the Strickland test 
requires the accused to demonstrate prejudice, which in other words means 
weighing of counsel’s malfeasance against prosecutorial proof.736 There are 
three situations in the United States where courts will presume prejudice and 
reverse a conviction without measuring how the counsel’s performance affected 
the outcome. First, prejudice is presumed when counsel and the accused are 
divided by a completely antagonistic relationship, which means that there is 
irreconcilable conflict between counsel and the accused.737 It has to be 
mentioned that this approach has not been approved by the case law of the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, prejudice is presumed in some cases of 
conflicts of interests, which I have already discussed above.738 Third, prejudice 
is presumed when an accused can claim that representation was so inadequate 
as to constitute a complete deprivation of counsel.739 The latter applies to the 
cases where there has either been: l) a complete deprivation of counsel at a 
                                                     
735 Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (applying Strickland to a claim of 
ineffectiveness based on counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal); Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362 (2000) (applying Strickland to a claim of ineffectiveness based on counsel’s failure 
to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence during capital sentence 
proceeding); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (applying Strickland to 
counsel’s failure to file a suppression motion); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) 
(applying Strickland to a claim that trial counsel failed to adequately present mitigating 
evidence). 
“In general, United States courts will uphold counsel’s behavior in the courtroom if counsel 
is conscious, participates (however badly) in the trial, and is not laboring under a conflict of 
interest.” Ekins, Defence Counsel Incompetence and Post-Conviction Relief: An Analysis of 
how Adversarial Systems of Justice Assess Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 529, 
p. 544. 
736 Bernhard, Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 37, 
p. 38. 
737 United States of America v. Carl Dexter Moore. Nos. 92–10026, 97-15412, 159 F.3d 
1154. United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. April 13, 1998, Argued and 
Submitted; September 23, 1998, Filed.  
738 Holloway v. Arkansas. See subsection 3.2 of this dissertation. 
739 United States v. Cronic. See also Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective 
Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational 
Absence, 827, p. 842. 
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critical stage in the life of a criminal case;740 or 2) where counsel has been asked 
to provide representation in an unusually difficult situation;741 or 3) where 
counsel fails “to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing”,742 which has been interpreted very narrowly by the Supreme Court, as I 
will discuss further below.  
The conflict of interests, completely antagonistic relationship and a situation 
where counsel has been asked to provide representation in an unusually difficult 
situation invoke a “no lawyer could” rationale stating that regardless of 
counsel’s actual performance at trial, no lawyer could have provided effective 
representation because of an outside influence beyond the lawyer’s control. 
There is no need to scrutinize the counsel’s actual conduct once these 
circumstances are established.743 When it comes to the meaning of “critical 
stage of the trial”, it is obvious that not all stages of the trial are critical for the 
United States Supreme Court. If the Court had intended the entire trial to 
constitute a critical stage, it would have pointed that out, not explicitly mention 
“critical stage”. Rather, by listing specific trial moments that constitute “critical 
stages”, the Court signaled that not all trial absences will trigger a presumption 
of prejudice.744  
The most confusing position of the United States Supreme Court is the 
nature of situations where counsel fails “to subject the prosecution’s case to 
meaningful adversarial testing”. Although at first it seemed that United States v. 
Cronic made bringing an ineffective assistance claim easier for those appellants 
who are alleging such conduct, in the later case of Bell v. Cone,745 the United 
States Supreme Court refused to make the exception where counsel fails “to 
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” meaningful by 
interpreting it narrowly.746 The Court held in Bell v. Cone that under Cronic, 
                                                     
740 “Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that 
counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is 
denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 659. See also 
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), 488 U.S. 280. 
741 “Circumstances of that magnitude may be present on some occasions when, although 
counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a 
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of 
prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.” United States v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 659-660. 
742 “…[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process 
itself presumptively unreliable.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 659. See also Bernhard, 
Exonerations Change Judicial Views on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 37, p. 38. 
743 Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of Cronic's 
Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 827, p. 853. 
744 Ibid., p. 861. 
745 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). 
746 Hornung, Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration of the Right to 
Appointment of Legal Counsel for Indigent Defendants, the Symposium: Advocating for 
Change: The Status & Future of America's Child Welfare 30 Years After CAPTA: Note, 495, 
p. 513. 
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counsel’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case must be complete. If the accused 
argues not that his counsel failed to oppose the prosecution throughout the 
sentencing proceeding, but that he failed to do so at specific points, his claim 
has to be evaluated according to Strickland’s performance and prejudice 
components.747 The practice of the United States Supreme Court indicates that 
as long as a defense counsel does something more than sits quietly in the 
courtroom, prejudice cannot be presumed. Therefore, as long as the accused is 
not denied counsel totally and as long as counsel participates in the trial, the 
only way the accused is afforded a presumption of prejudice under Cronic is if 
the circumstances are such that even competent counsel would not be able to 
effectively assist the accused.748 Consequently, the exception “fail to subject the 
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing” has lost its meaning – 
according to the Court it means that counsel was completely silent at every 
stage of the trial, but this situation resembles a Cronic scenario of a complete 
deprivation of counsel.749 Consequently, as in case of conflict of interest the 
prejudice is usually presumed, with Cronic the Supreme Court suggests that 
counsel’s duty of loyalty is more fundamental than the duty of competence.750  
Therefore, when it comes to the element of prejudice, the current test for 
ineffective assistance in the United States is the following: in rare instances, 
ineffective assistance can be presumed from the facts surrounding the case. In 
the majority of cases, the accused has to prove that specific errors were 
unreasonable and prejudicial.751 
Soon after the United States Supreme Court established the test for assessing 
the effectiveness of defense counsel during criminal proceedings with Strick-
land, it considered whether the ineffective assistance doctrine was applicable to 
plea bargains.752 The Court concluded that the test announced in Strickland 
could apply to a plea bargain that an accused had accepted as a result of 
ineffective assistance. While the prong related to the deficiency of counsel 
                                                     
747 Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 693–698. 
748 William, Criminal Law – the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel – the Supreme Court 
Minimizes the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel by Maximizing the Deference 
Awarded to Barely Competent Defense Attorneys – Florida v. Nixon the Ben J. Altheimer 
Symposium: Courtroom with a View: Perspectives on Judicial Independence in Honor of 
Judge Richard Sheppard Arnold: Note, 149, p. 170. 
749 Rebecca Klaren & Irene Merker Rosenberg, Splitting Hairs in Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Cases: An Essay on how Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine Undermines the 
Prohibition Against Executing the Mentally Retarded, 31 Am. J. Crim. L. 339 (2003–2004), 
p. 345. 
750 Berger, Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead End, the, 9, 
p. 90. 
751 Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising the Standard for Effective Assistance 
of Counsel Note, 147, p. 157. The United States Supreme Court’s latest cases in which the 
Court asks an accused to establish both deficient performance and prejudice are for instance: 
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. ____ – 07-1315 (2009); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 
____ – 09-587 (2011); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U. S. ____ – 09-1088 (2011). 
752 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
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remains the same in assessing ineffective assistance related to a guilty plea, the 
prejudice prong was altered to require a showing of reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s error, the accused would have insisted on proceeding to 
trial.753  
The latest United States Supreme Court’s cases in which the Court tried to 
specify the first prong of the ineffectiveness test (at least many authors think the 
Court tried it) are from 2000, 2003, 2004, 2009 and 2011. Cases of Williams,754 
Wiggins,755 and Rompilla756 were quite detailed analysis of trial counsel’s pre-
paration and investigation,757 as well as Knowles v. Mirzayance758 and Harring-
ton v. Richter759. Although the first three were death penalty cases, it was 
suggested that the issues in these cases are not limited to cases involving the 
death penalty.760 Stephen F. Smith explained the issue: “The need for attorneys 
to make strategy decisions, in noncapital and capital cases alike, implies a 
corresponding need for courts to scrutinize those decisions to ensure that they 
comported with professional standards of competence. Failing such scrutiny, 
serious attorney error will potentially undermine the reliability and accuracy of 
the criminal proceedings.”761 And it turned out he was half right as the United 
States Supreme Court scrutinized counsels’ performance very attentively in 
Knowles v. Mirzayance and Harrington v. Richter, although neither of these 
cases was a death penalty case, but still remained highly deferential762 to 
decisions of counsels, which at least gives the impression that the Court 
                                                     
753 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 59. See also Anthony E. Rufo, Opportunity Lost – the 
Ineffective Assistance Doctrine's Applicability to Foregone Plea Bargains Note, 42 Suffolk 
U. L. Rev. 709 (2008-2009), p. 718. The Supreme Court has reassured its opinion lately for 
example in Premo v. Moore, 562 U. S. ____ (2011).  
754 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
755 Wiggins v. Smith, Warden, et al. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
756 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2004). 
757 Robert R. Rigg, T-Rex without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the, 35 Pepp. L. Rev. 77 (2007–2008), p. 94; O'Meara, 
You can't Get there from here: Ineffective Assistance Claims in Federal Circuit Courts After 
AEDPA Symposium: Criminal Appeals: Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 545,  
p. 575.  
758 Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U. S. ____ – 07-1315 (2009). 
759 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. ____ – 09-587 (2011). 
760 It was already discussed before those cases: Timothy W. Floyd, How Bad must a Defense 
Lawyer be for a Federal Court to Reverse in a Capital Case Habeas Corpus, 1999-2000 
Preview U. S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 47 (1999-2000), p. 51; and afterwards: Stephen F. Smith, Taking 
Strickland Claim Seriously, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 515 (2009), p. 537 and 539. 
761 Ibid., p. 539. See also ibid., p. 537. Professional standards do not simply speak to capital 
cases; they also provide important guidance as to how defense counsels should represent 
clients in other criminal cases. Ibid., p. 540. See also Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at 
Sentencing, 1069, p. 1113. 
762 It is interesting to note that as in Williams, Wiggins and Taylor the Court does not 
mention “highly deferential” as regards to the counsel’s performance, but in Knowles v. 
Mirzayance and Harrington v. Richter the Court does that. 
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believes that the courts have much more freedom to assess counsel’s behavior 
in death penalty cases than in the other cases.763  
As the Strickland took a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, then looking at the 
language of Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla, the Supreme Court seemed to 
abandon this presumption in favor of a more detailed analysis of the claimed 
breach of duty,764 which provided some reason for optimism in the United 
States.765 This optimism was grounded in the fact that these three cases stand for 
the proposition that the ABA Standards should be used as norms for 
determining what is objectively reasonable representation.766 As the Court 
stated in Wiggins referring to Williams: “In highlighting counsel’s duty to 
investigate, and in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as 
guides, we applied the same “clearly established” precedent of Strickland we 
apply today.”767 Some authors even rejoiced that after nearly twenty years, 
Strickland v. Washington has finally been given teeth.768  
After Williams it was also claimed that it is obvious that the Supreme Court 
wants to distinguish between counsels’ blunders masquerading as “strategy” 
from tactical decisions that are exercises in sound professional judgment and 
thus really deserving of judicial deference.769 All of these cases present the 
                                                     
763 See Kara Duffle, Harrington V. Richter: AEDPA Deference and the Right to Effective 
Counsel, 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol'y 54 (2011), pp. 68 and 69 where Kara Duffle is 
discussing the reasons why the Supreme Court will not likely find Richter’s counsel’s 
performance ineffective, mentioning that one of the reasons might be that it is not a capital 
case.  
764 The same can be concluded from Knowles v. Mirzayance and Harrington v. Richter, 
although in both of these cases counsels were found effective by the Supreme Court. 
765 Rigg, T-Rex without Teeth: Evolving Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, the, 77, p. 98. 
766 John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, It's Like Deja Vu all Over again: Williams v. 
Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines 
Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 127 (2006–2007), p. 
129. “Although the Strickland majority had been concerned that a guidelines approach might 
become a straightjacket leading to excessive, futile work on behalf of attorneys and courts, 
the reality was that in the hands of most state courts and many federal courts of appeal, the 
Strickland performance prong was license to do nothing. In essence, the Supreme Court 
realized that Strickland was part of the problem, not a solution to poor representation in 
capital cases. Capital defendants were frequently being represented by ineffective counsel, 
and the high threshold of the Strickland standard tied the hands of appellate courts from 
doing much about the problem.” Ibid., p. 153. 
767 Wiggins v. Smith, Warden, 539 U.S. 522. But Justice Scalia wrote in his dissent that in 
Strickland the Court specifically stated that the very ABA standards upon which Williams 
later relied “…are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Ibid., 
539 U.S. 543. Justice Kennedy expressed the same opinion in his dissent in Rompilla v. 
Beard, saying that the majority, by “…parsing the guidelines as if they were binding 
statutory text, ignores this admonition.” 
768 Constitutional Law the Supreme Court, 2002 Term – Leading Cases, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 
226 (2003–2004), p. 278. 
769 Smith, Taking Strickland Claim Seriously, 515, p. 538. 
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scenario in which counsel performs some investigation but makes what appears 
to be a poor choice based on that investigation.770 The notion set forth since 
Williams was that the Supreme Court will not evaluate whether the decisions 
counsel made were, in fact, bad, but will look at the process leading up to 
counsel’s decision, is similar to the business judgment doctrine: directors and 
officers (and counsels) are not liable for poor strategic decisions, but only for 
failing to reasonably investigate prior to making these strategic decisions.771 
Consequently, in these cases the United States Supreme Court finally accepted 
examining a trial counsel’s investigation and preparation before determining 
whether that lawyer’s strategic choices were effective or not.772 Further, in these 
cases the Court deemed counsels ineffective even though counsels’ conduct was 
neither nonexistent nor egregiously deficient, which represents an important 
shift in ineffective assistance jurisprudence. Some even hoped that courts in the 
United States will take these decisions as an example and decide to take a 
stronger stance against poor lawyering.773  
It still must be mentioned that not all were happy with Williams, Wiggins, 
and Rompilla, stating that although with these judgments the United States 
Supreme Court did try to reduce the damage it has done with Strickland, it 
actually failed for two reasons. First, although referring to ABA standards, the 
Supreme Court still requires courts to use Strickland’s performance prong and 
apply “an objective standard of reasonableness” and therefore the Court sticks 
to the vague standard for courts to use in case of ineffectiveness cases.774 In my 
opinion this is actually understandable because the courts cannot use the whole 
of ABA Standards to evaluate counsels’ performance in case the accused claims 
counsel’s ineffectiveness in appeal. It has to be taken into account that the ABA 
Standards are attorneys’ ethical guidelines that are composed to be a basis for 
disciplinary actions and not for annulling courts judgments. If courts use them 
for the latter purpose, it makes violations of the bar professional standards both 
ethical violations and constitutionally ineffective counsel,775 which means in 
                                                     
770 See about Wiggins Swedlow, When can Defense Counsel's Decision Not to Present 
Mitigating Evidence be Challenged as Ineffective Assistance Death Penalty, 328, p. 332. 
771 Elizabeth Connelly, Striking Similarities between the Business Judgment Doctrine and 
the Strickland Test, the Current Developments 2004–2005, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 669 
(2004–2005), p.675–676. 
772 Mickenberg, Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is it Possible to Keep Innocent 
People Off Death Row Honorable James J. Gilvary Symposium on Law, Religion, and Social 
Justice: Evolving Standards of Decency in 2003 – is the Death Penalty on Life Support, 319, 
p. 326. 
773 Cawley, Raising the Bar: How Rompilla v. Beard Represents the Court's Increasing 
Efforts to Impose Stricter Standards for Defense Lawyering in Capital Cases Note, 1139, pp. 
1179–1180. 
774 Kelly Green, There's Less in this than Meets the Eye: Why Wiggins Doesn't Fix 
Strickland and what the Court should do Instead Note, 29 Vt. L. Rev. 647 (2004–2005),  
p. 673. 
775 David M. Siegel, The Role of Trial Counsel in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: 
Three Questions to Keep in Mind, 33 Champion 14 (2009), p. 15. 
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turn that these standards would have a strong effect on the principle of finality. 
Therefore, courts can use these standards as a guide, but they have to take into 
account that only the most basic duties from these standards form a basis for 
annulment of court judgments. Second, the Supreme Court did not change the 
prejudice prong:776 the Court’s increased use of the ABA Standards is only 
relevant to the performance component of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Strickland’s prejudice prong, which requires the accused to prove that 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, 
was not modified with Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla.777  
Although there was a general rejoicing after Williams, Wiggins, and Rom-
pilla, and many authors seemed to think the time for moving towards the 
categorical approach has come, in Bobby v. Van Hook778 the Court seems to 
take one step away from what it had said about the ABA standards in Williams, 
Wiggins and Rompilla. “Strickland stressed, however, that “American Bar 
Association standards and the like” are “only guides” to what reasonableness 
means, not its definition. ... We have since regarded them as such. ... What we 
have said of state requirements is a fortiori true of standards set by private 
organizations: “[W]hile States are free to impose whatever specific rules they 
see fit to ensure that criminal defendants are well represented, we have held that 
the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement: that counsel make 
objectively reasonable choices.””779 Justice Alito added in his concurrence that 
the American Bar Association is a venerable organization with a history of 
service to the bar, but it still is a private group with limited membership. The 
views of the association’s members do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
American bar as a whole. It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the 
nature of the work that a defense attorney must do in order to meet the 
obligations imposed by the Constitution, and there is no reason why the ABA 
Guidelines should be given a privileged position in making that deter-
mination.780 Therefore, although it had been almost sure for a while that 
counsels’ conduct could be assessed in accordance to the ABA Standards or at 
least those standards could be taken into account to form courts’ own standard, 
right now it seems that the United States Supreme Court is back to its vague 
“objective standard of reasonableness”.781  
                                                     
776 Green, There's Less in this than Meets the Eye: Why Wiggins Doesn't Fix Strickland and 
what the Court should do Instead Note, 647, p. 673. 
777 See also Blume & Neumann, It's Like Deja Vu all Over again: Williams v. Taylor, 
Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 127, p. 164. 
778 In Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U. S. ____ (2009). In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. ____ 
(2010) the Court emphasized once more that the ABA Standards are only the guides. 
779 Bobby v. Van Hook. 
780 Bobby v. Van Hook, Justice Alito, concurring.  
781 Bobby v. Van Hook. “The Sixth Amendment entitles criminal defendants to the 
“ ‘effective assistance of counsel’ ”—that is, representation that does not fall “below an 
objective standard of reasonableness” in light of “prevailing professional norms.” Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 686 (1984) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 
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So what we can learn from the judicial practice and theoretical discussions in 
the United States? First that there is a strong opposition between “categori-
calists” and “judgmentalist”, so strong even that representatives of the 
approaches seem to not notice that their opponent’s arguments may also make 
some sense. It is true that each case is different and therefore there is no point in 
working out rigid guidelines and to oblige counsels to follow them no matter 
what. At the same time, limitation of the right to efficient defense to the 
assertion that counsel has to provide reasonably competent assistance will end 
up with discontent, confusion and arbitrariness, even a fall in the quality of 
defense. Therefore in my opinion any imposed standard has to be detailed, but 
at the same time leave room for the courts to decide whether counsel was 
ineffective or not based on specific facts of the case. In order to form such a 
standard, it has to be figured out, what are the universal duties of counsel in all 
criminal cases, which should be listed in the guidelines. Other duties, duties that 
arise from a specific case, would be up to court to assess and to declare 
obligatory or optional to follow.  
Before I am going to give further justification for imposing a specific standard 
for effectiveness of counsel, there is one other thing I have to mention. Although 
plea bargaining is not an adversarial procedure in its classical sense, I agree with 
the United States Supreme Court that it is possible to assess counsel’s perfor-
mance in plea bargaining also. As counsel is the one who has a principal role as 
an advisor to the accused during the plea bargaining, his duties in the course of 
plea bargaining should be related to this role. Therefore in this thesis I will 
propose a standard for conduct of counsel in plea bargaining as well. 
 
 
4. Why to Impose a Specific Standard and  
How to Work Out a Proper Standard? 
As it can be seen from the judicial practice of the United States Supreme Court, 
the Supreme Court seems to be supporting rather a “judgmental” approach than 
“categorical”. Lawyers’ and courts’ fear against setting a standard for defense 
counsel’s performance is understandable. Lawyers are afraid of losing their 
independence and courts fear that by analyzing counsel’s performance in the 
light of a certain standard, the balance of the adversary process is impaired, 
because counsel who follows the standard loses his freedom to make tactical 
                                                                                                                                  
771, n. 14 (1970)). That standard is necessarily a general one. “No particular set of detailed 
rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances 
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent 
a criminal defendant.” 466 U. S., at 688–689. Restatements of professional standards, we 
have recognized, can be useful as “guides” to what reasonableness entails, but only to the 
extent they describe the professional norms prevailing when the representation took place. 
Id., at 688. 
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decisions and form his strategy.782 In addition to that courts fear that every 
deviation from the standard would result in an annulment of judgment of the 
lower court, which would significantly impair the principle of finality, not to 
mention the fact that if other accused persons see the success of ineffectiveness 
claims, this would end up with flood of appeals to the higher courts.  
Yet the fear of standards is premature. Lawyers are professionals and their 
performance should be judged by the standards as courts use standards to judge 
other professionals as well. It is somehow puzzling why lawyers, who demand 
so much of other professionals, ask so little of themselves.783 As a minimum, all 
lawyers should do three things: consult with the accused, investigate both the 
law and the facts, and make all the motions necessary.784 This would already 
form a strong basis for working out a proper standard, which in fact could be 
used for counsels in plea bargaining also as counsel has the same duties in the 
course of plea bargaining too.  
Determining, especially after the trial, whether defense counsel acted 
competently and professionally is and will always be difficult and highly fact-
specific, therefore a huge challenge for courts. This challenge could be made a 
little bit less difficult if specific guidelines for the performance of counsels are 
imposed in order to evaluate defense counsel’s behavior in the light of 
professional standards of practice.785 Erin Rieger notes: “Without rules setting 
forth the boundaries for acceptable and unacceptable behavior, the system 
would run afoul of its purpose, leaving thousands of defendants at the mercy of 
counsel’s personal standards for professional conduct.”786 Still, as I have 
already discussed I agree with those who claim, some room should be left to 
consider specific facts of the case and therefore those standards should be used 
in a case by case analysis.787 Hence, even when one meets the reluctance by 
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787 See also Bazelon, Defective Assistance of Counsel, the, 1, pp. 32–33. 
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courts and lawyers, a detailed standard would be very useful for a specific case 
and for the overall quality of defense, because it enables courts to act equably. 
In my opinion the goals of the standard outweigh the reluctance expressed by a 
profession, although one has to take into account the need to preserve 
independence of counsel and to honor the principle of finality, the basic 
objections “judgmentalists” express against the categorical approach. In relation 
to principle of finality, it has to be taken into account that not all of counsel’s 
mistakes form a basis for annulment of the judgment made by the lower court. 
Therefore in order to set an adequate standard one has to describe only duties of 
counsel absolutely essential to effective assistance in the criminal proceedings. 
The standard for trial courts could be a little bit stricter for counsels and enable 
courts to react towards less serious breach of duties, because the trial courts do 
not annul any judgments, the most it could do is to replace counsel, which does 
not affect the principle of finality.  
When it comes to tactical decisions, which are the main expression of 
independence of counsels in criminal proceedings, the standard must be set in 
the way that it would protect reasonable tactical decisions and therefore 
independence of counsel. This means that the court does not ask whether 
counsel’s decisions were correct, but rather whether they were objectively 
reasonable under all the circumstances.788 It must also be taken into account that 
not all counsel’s errors are “tactical”: there are a number of errors that suggest 
totally inadequate preparation or a complete lack of awareness of the applicable 
rules.789 The court should not allow counsels to hide behind strategy if these 
kinds of errors have occurred.  
Obviously, counsels have the right to work out the strategy for a criminal 
case and act in accordance with that. Therefore it is understandable that courts 
are reluctant to evaluate counsel’s actions when the accused refers to counsel’s 
failure in evolving a strategy. Most of the facts upon which counsel formulates 
his strategy are revealed during counsel’s investigation and, because of rules of 
confidentiality, will never be exposed to judicial scrutiny, unless the accused 
waives the confidentiality. Therefore it is understandable that courts are willing 
to give substantial deference to counsel’s decisions as strategic choices;790 “If 
counsel did not have room to determine strategy and tactics, a client would have 
fewer options in order to present a defense.”791  
Yet what is matter of strategy and tactics, and what is not, is by no means 
clear. The vagueness of the rule makes it a convenient tool for the courts to 
                                                     
788 Gabriel, Stickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 
Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of due Process, the Comment, [1290],  
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avoid analysis and refuse to consider counsel’s actions.792 There are three 
problems with courts paying too much respect to counsel’s tactical decisions 
worth to mention here. First, isolated analysis of individual errors ignores the 
importance of having an overall, competent strategy for representation. The 
second problem is that labeling a decision as one of the available tactical 
choices can mask the fact that no choice was made at all, because counsel even 
did not know that there was the option to make a choice. The third problem with 
too much respect for tactical choices is that it ignores the decision underlying 
the tactical choice:793 the decision is either bad or good, either informed or not 
and if one denies court’s competence evaluating the former one, there is no 
question that courts should be allowed to assess how well was counsel prepared 
when he made the decision. That is why it would be better to apply the rationale 
behind the rule, i.e. that where counsel makes an informed choice between 
alternatives, his discretion should not be questioned unless it was clearly 
erroneous. In order to obtain the decision to be found clearly erroneous, an 
accused has to prove that counsel failed to make a decision that was objectively 
reasonable in light of all of the circumstances of the case.794 So the crucial 
inquiry, especially for judges in higher courts is whether the record indicates 
that counsel was aware of the problem, considered the alternatives, and made a 
reasonable decision.795 In order to make assessment of counsel’s tactical choice 
easier to courts one can require counsels to document their reasons for choosing 
a given tactic. Martin C. Calhoun explains: “Such a requirement would 
eliminate the common practice of courts “racking their brains” to find a rational 
explanation for counsel’s apparent error by creating a hypothetical “tactical 
choice” that may never have even crossed counsel’s mind.”796  
Even if one agrees that it is possible and necessary to impose a standard of 
conduct of counsels in criminal proceedings, while composing this standard one 
has to be extremely careful. The standard too detailed will harm the indepen-
dence of the defense counsel and does not take into consideration the fact that 
different criminal cases need a different approach.797 The classic objection to 
                                                     
792 Brody & Albert, Ineffective Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conviction: 
Principles for Appellate Review, 1, p. 20. 
793 See more about these three problems Levinson, Don't Let Sleeping Lawyers Lie: Raising 
the Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel Note, 147, pp. 165–168. 
794 Gabriel, Stickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 
Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of due Process, the Comment, [1290],  
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796 Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating 
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797 One possible position is that standards of counsel’s performance in pretrial and in trial 
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a lawyer to perform specific pretrial actions will not interfere with counsel’s strategic 
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categorical rules is that they “upset the institutional arrangement of the 
adversary system by interfering with the defense function”798 and this may 
really happen if counsel, in order to meet the standard has to make tactical 
decisions in accordance with the standard. Thus, how to make strategic choices 
could be written in the standard (e.g., in order to make a choice counsel has to 
know the facts of the case), but not what kind of choices counsel should make.  
As the standard should not be too detailed, it should not be too vague either. 
A standard with no ultimate point of reference is likely to produce different 
results with each application and with each judge, which means that a standard 
too vague results in no standard at all. Such a standard does not provide judges 
with clear guidelines according to which they can monitor defense counsel’s 
performance. Therefore, the shortcomings of this standard are a lack of pre-
dictability and objectivity, which is an advantage of the more detailed checklist-
based standard.799 In addition to that, such a standard will not give defense 
counsels guidance with sufficient particularity to lead them to adjust their 
behavior and actions in the way the more categorical rules would do.800 
Consequently, there is no point in wasting time to work out a standard, which is 
no help for courts, counsels and accused persons in certain cases and therefore 
does not improve the quality of the assistance of counsel generally. 
In Estonia a starting point for an adequate standard may be found in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure and rules of conduct for advocates, in the United 
States it could be found in the ABA Standards. The basis for these standards 
already written is the belief that certain fundamental and specific tasks and 
duties must be performed in all criminal cases by counsel.801 Although stating 
that the ABA standards are just guidelines, by repeatedly relying on these 
                                                                                                                                  
discretion. Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A 
New Look After United States v. Decoster, 752, p. 766. This is a statement I do not fully 
agree with. Conscientious counsel starts to build his strategy during the pre-trial proceedings 
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to advise his client to confess or not, whether to enter plea bargaining negotiations or not, 
which witnesses to call to court etc. Lawyers need independence to make those decisions 
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings too.  
798 Ibid., pp. 766–767. 
799 Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Notes and Comments, 413, p. 448. The Strickland 
test, which denied ABA standards as possible checklist, although referred to these standards 
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of arbitrariness. Henderson, Truly Ineffective Assistance: A Comparison of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel in the United States of America and the United Kingdom Note, 317,  
p. 331.  
800 Identifying and Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel: A New 
Look After United States v. Decoster, 752, p. 765; Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: 
Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
Notes and Comments, 413, p. 434. 
801 Blume & Neumann, It's Like Deja Vu all Over again: Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. 
Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the Guidelines Approach to the Effective 
Assistance of Counsel, 127, p. 135. 
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standards, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that general norms 
of professional criminal representation must be applied in evaluating counsel’s 
performance.802 At the same time it is notable that the ABA itself is very modest 
while describing the purpose of the standards: “These standards are intended to 
be used as a guide to professional conduct and performance. They are not 
intended to be used as criteria for the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct 
of defense counsel to determine the validity of a conviction. They may or may 
not be relevant in such judicial evaluation, depending upon all the circum-
stances.”803  
Although the Constitution of the Estonian Republic and the European 
Convention on Human Rights do not stipulate code of conduct and do not refer 
to such, as the United States Constitution does not require counsels to act in 
accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association, 
standards of conduct of counsel in criminal proceedings are an important source 
for courts for evaluating whether counsel acts in a professional manner or not. 
Consequently, the relationship between professional standards and cons-
titutional rights is a circular one – the evaluation of counsel’s performance in 
light of the professional rules is necessary when a constitutional right may be 
violated. Likewise, when a constitutional right is violated, it is necessary to 
evaluate counsel’s performance in light of professional standards.804  
Professional standards provide the courts with guidance when evaluating the 
performance of counsel and obligate counsel to exercise reasonable professional 
judgment at all times, and to fulfill the duties that are essential to effective 
assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings: to zealously represent the client, 
to keep the client well-informed about the case, and to consult with the client 
regarding fundamental decisions, both preceding and during the course of 
trial.805 These and some other duties of counsel are the essence of the assistance 
of counsel, which means that if they are not fulfilled, the accused is left 
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defenseless, at least in specific point. Thus, the ABA Standards and other 
similar standards in the field reflect the underlying premise of the right to 
counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel, which both stand for the 
proposition that an accused enjoys the assistance of counsel for his defense 
provided by an informed, diligent defense counsel, who makes his decisions 
zealously and deliberatively.806 As I have already discussed, it does not mean 
that courts should conclude ineffectiveness of counsel no matter what duty from 
these standards counsel has been breached. It still has to be remembered that 
these standards have been worked out for disciplinary actions, which means that 
courts should have their own standard, although while working this standard 
out, they could use Bar standards as guideposts. 
Another question is whether the standard of conduct should be the same for 
retained and appointed counsel. On the basis of case law of the United States 
Supreme Court and the ECtHR it can be concluded that both the United States 
Supreme Court and the ECtHR have rejected the distinction between retained 
and appointed counsel when it comes to the claim of ineffective assistance.807 
The United States Supreme Court has stressed it word-for-word in Strickland v. 
Washington and the ECtHR has expressed the same with numerous decisions. 
For instance, if we analyze the two most important decisions of the ECtHR 
about ineffectiveness of defense counsel: while Mr. Artico had, from the outset, 
legal-aid counsel, Mr. Goddi had retained counsel of his own choosing.808 To be 
honest there is no reason to argue both courts’ conclusion that counsel’s duties 
and responsibilities to the accused are the same whether counsel is retained by 
the client or appointed. Therefore there is no reason to deal with an appointed 
counsel ineffectiveness claim differently from a retained counsel ineffectiveness 
claim. Some authors suggest that more is likely to be demanded of appointed 
counsel: because the client’s choice usually played little part in his selection, 
counsel is confronted with the more difficult task of establishing and 
maintaining the trustful attorney-client relationship.809 In my opinion, this is 
something that cannot be reflected in the guidelines, but has to be taken into 
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account by the court if the accused claims that there has been a total breakdown 
in the attorney-client relationship and seeks the removal of his appointed 
counsel.  
In addition to that in the case of ineffectiveness claims, it does not matter 
how long imprisonment was applied to an accused or whether the court imposed 
him imprisonment at all or instead of that, for instance imposed pecuniary 
punishment. Constitutional rights, as the right to effective assistance of counsel 
is, apply to all persons charged with crime and do not disappear when a person 
is charged with a less serious one. Therefore, the fact that an accused has 
received a short sentence or did not receive imprisonment at all does not 
extinguish his constitutional rights to argue counsel’s ineffectiveness.810  
As I have analyzed the case law of the United States, especially the case law 
of the Supreme Court, the case law of the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of 
Estonia, I am going to suggest a standard that is more similar to the “cate-
gorical” approach than “judgmental” approach, although it could be that it is a 
mixture of both. A specified standard which guides counsels through every 
stage of the criminal proceedings would be helpful for counsels, because they 
would know what is expected of them and to courts, because courts would be 
able to monitor more effectively the quality of representation the accused is 
receiving during the court proceedings and higher courts would have a guide to 
evaluate ineffectiveness claims. A standard would assist and guide counsel in 
the preparation of the defense in a criminal trial as well as would describe what 
is expected of him during the trial.811 In addition to that the standard would 
enable accused persons to understand what is involved in the defense of a case 
and therefore would inform accused persons of what to demand from 
counsels.812  
I also suggest that the standard for higher courts to evaluate the performance 
of counsel would be mainly two-step. First, the accused would have to prove 
that counsel failed to satisfy one of the components on the checklist, which is 
composed by the duties I consider most important. The prosecutor has an 
opportunity here to prove, that counsel either satisfied the component at issue or 
that any failure on defense counsel’s part was so minimal that he did 
substantially satisfy the component. Second, the prosecutor can prove that the 
allegedly ineffective act or omission was justified. Here it can be claimed that 
defense counsel made a reasonable tactical decision under the particular 
circumstances of the accused’s case and that this decision justified his failure to 
satisfy one or more of the basic components.813 Nevertheless, I will also list 
duties that in my opinion are so essential to effective defense that if missing 
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could never be justified, which makes up a part of the standard one-step. 
Therefore, the “categorical” approach I suggest here supported by proposals 
made by Martin C. Calhoun and William J. Genego in the United States does 
not deny counsel’s discretion to make strategic decisions and moreover, it does 
not hide the fact that every criminal case is different.814 To ensure that the 
checklist is a floor and not a ceiling for what constitutes reasonable repre-
sentation, an accused must have the opportunity to prove that defense counsel 
was ineffective under the particular circumstances of his case even if counsel 
satisfied all components of the checklist,815 which in turn enables the prosecutor 
to claim that either counsel fulfilled this duty, he made an informed judgment 
not to fulfill his duty or thirdly, that this duty was not essential to the effective 
assistance of counsel in a particular case. In order to prove that this duty was 
not essential in a certain case, the prosecutor has to prove that it did not have an 
effect on the defense position, which means that it either did not affect the 
outcome of the case or did not affect the exercise of the accused’s rights.816 
Therefore, although I generally reject the element of prejudice as an element 
which goes strongly against the nature and principles of adversary trial, I still 
believe that here this element is required in order to protect the principle of 
finality and society’s interest in conserving resources, because without applying 
the element of prejudice the list of counsel’s mistakes that lead to annulment of 
judgments made by lower courts would be endless. Still, in order not to violate 
the presumption of innocence, I propose that it should be the prosecutor, who 
proves that counsel’s failure(s) did not affect the outcome of the case or 
exercise of the accused’s rights. The latter I add to the element of prejudice in 
my proposed standard, because I share the standpoint of authors in the United 
States that the purpose of the right to counsel is not only to guarantee that the 
outcome of the case would be accurate, but also to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial meaning that his rights are protected in the criminal 
proceedings. Therefore in my opinion the element of prejudice could not be 
considered to be something that must certainly have an effect on the outcome of 
the case.  
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VI. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR EFFECTIVENESS 
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL FOR ESTONIAN COURTS 
Here I will propose two standards. One is a standard of effectiveness of defense 
counsel for trial (county) and circuit courts and for the Supreme Court of 
Estonia that gives a guidance for courts in case the court decides whether to 
remove counsel or not. The other is a standard for effectiveness of defense 
counsel for higher courts (circuit courts and the Supreme Court of Estonia) in 
case the court decides whether to annul the judgment of lower court or not. As 
for the higher courts an important principle, the principle of finality, which must 
be taken into account, raises, the standard for ineffectiveness of defense counsel 
should be different, which means that courts should be allowed to remove 
counsels more easily than annul judgments of lower courts.  
When it comes to the standard for trial courts, as I have discussed above, I 
suggest that courts should have competence to remove both appointed and 
retained counsel. In relation to appointed counsels this competence comes for 
Estonian courts from § 20 (31) of the SLAA. In relation to retained counsels 
such ground for removal may exist since the 1st of September 2011 if § 267 (41) 
of the CCP, which allows the court to withdraw incompetent counsel, and is 
interpreted in a way that it allows the court to disqualify counsel permanently. 
This indeed results in a situation where such a ground for removal is not 
provided for in the § 55 of the CCP, where all other grounds for removal of 
counsel are provided, so it should be concluded that if the legislator has meant it 
to be ground for removal, it should be added to § 55 of the CCP. Even if § 267 
(41) of the CCP means only temporary withdrawal, my proposed standard is 
nevertheless based on the idea that court’s obligation to guarantee the right to 
effective assistance of counsel outweighs the accused’s right to be assisted by 
certain counsel he has chosen, if counsel’s failure to fulfill his duties is 
manifest. Then the court should be allowed to remove counsel and ask the 
accused to choose a new one or appoint new counsel for the accused.  
The standard I propose here for the courts to use for removal of counsel 
consists of two parts. The first one is the one where counsel’s most important 
mistakes are listed. The most important duties are the ones that in case they are 
breached, always result in violation of the accused’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel. In order to end the violation and guarantee the right, counsel’s 
behavior should be either corrected or if the mistake is repeated or egregious, 
counsel should be removed. But because the reality is always complicated, the 
list of counsel’s mistakes is endless, which means that only a list of the most 
important duties is possible to compose. Nevertheless it could be that the court 
finds it unavoidable to remove counsel in a situation where any other breach of 
duties occur. Therefore courts should be allowed to declare any other violation 
of counsel’s duties manifest when specific facts of the case so require, which 
means that the standard is not an exhaustive list and in case the court decides to 
remove counsel because of a mistake the standard does not include, it should 
give its reason for declaring the duty breached manifest. 
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For the courts of higher instances I will also a propose standard that consists 
of two parts. If duties that are described in the first part were not followed in the 
court proceedings of court of lower instance, it should give rise to annulment of 
the court judgment. After the accused has proved that counsel failed to satisfy 
one of the components on the checklist, the prosecutor should have an 
opportunity to prove, that counsel either satisfied the component at issue or he 
did substantially satisfy the component. Second, the prosecutor can prove that 
the allegedly ineffective act or omission was justified, maybe because of 
reasonable tactical choices or because of any other reason. Nevertheless, as 
some duties are essential to the function of defense, in case they are breached, 
the prosecutor should not be allowed to prove that the breach of duty was 
justified. The second part of the standard may include any other duty that the 
accused claims to be essential. Here the prosecutor can show the duty was not 
essential (it either did not affect the outcome of the case or did not affect 
exercise of the accused’s rights) or similar to the first part of the standard that 
counsel made an informed judgment not to fulfill this duty. As I have already 
discussed, hearing the criminal matter in the absence of counsel is a material 
violation of criminal procedural law, which is a ground for annulment of a court 
judgment according to § 339 (1) 3) of the CCP. Any other ineffectiveness of 
defense counsel should in my opinion form a ground for annulment of court 
judgment according to § 339 (1) 12) of the CCP, a provision that came into 
force on the 1st of September 2011. As the annulment of judgment is a serious 
infringement of principles of finality and preservation of resources, one has to 
take into account that the list of mistakes that result in annulment of judgment 
should be thoroughly thought through and it should be composed only of the 
most important duties. If the higher court finds the duty that is not described in 
the standard to be essential, it should thoroughly justify its conclusion and it 
should take into account that its decision to declare the duty essential strongly 
affects those two principles. 
It must be emphasized that if court has ascertained that counsel was 
ineffective, it does not mean that ineffectiveness of counsel was counsel’s fault 
and some sanctions should follow for him automatically. As I have already 
discussed, reasons of ineffectiveness of defense counsel are manifold and 
ineffectiveness may be caused by state’s activity also. Therefore these standards 
are not a basis for counsel’s responsibility, but enable the accused to have new 
counsel or a new trial (in some cases just a new judgment). 
 
 
1. Standard of Effectiveness of Defense Counsel that 
Forms a Basis for Removal of Counsel 
In addition to counsel’s behavior in the court proceedings in the court of first 
instance this standard also reflects counsel’s proper behavior in the court 
proceedings of the courts of higher instances. Nevertheless, as it can be seen 
from the heading of this subsection, this standard is a basis for removal of 
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counsel, and other possible means the court could use to affect counsel’s 
performance, not a basis for annulment of the court judgments. 
 
1. Counsel’s general competence 
1.1. Counsel should have thorough knowledge of criminal law and the law 
of criminal procedure generally. The court is allowed to remove 
counsel if he has shown himself to be incompetent in either or both 
areas. 
1.2. Counsel should be polite towards the court and other parties to a 
proceeding. If counsel does not behave himself in spite of court’s 
remarks, court is allowed to remove him.  
1.3. Counsel has to be sober and not under the influence of drugs. The 
court may remove counsel immediately if it notices counsel’s inade-
quacy either because counsel is drunk or under the influence of drugs. 
In case counsel is physically ill and it prevents him from fulfilling his 
duties as counsel even if he is provided with a support person, the court 
is allowed to remove him. In case counsel is mentally ill and it 
prevents him from fulfilling his duties as counsel, the court is allowed 
to remove him. 
1.4. Retained counsel has to be either an advocate or if he is a non-
advocate, he has to have permission from the body conducting the 
proceedings. If an advocate is excluded from the Bar or disbarred he 
has to inform the court and he may continue to perform as retained 
counsel if he receives court’s permission to do so. If he does not 
inform the court without delay about his exclusion or disbarment, the 
court shall remove him, as well as if he is suspended. If an advocate is 
appointed counsel and he is excluded from the Bar, disbarred or 
suspended, he is replaced pursuant to § 20 (3) of the SLAA. 
1.5. If it has been ascertained that counsel has broken the law in the course 
of providing legal assistance to the accused and as a consequence of it 
the accused’s position in the criminal proceedings is prejudiced, the 
court is allowed to remove counsel. 
 
2. Conflict of interest 
2.1. If counsel has not removed himself, court should remove him:  
2.1.1. If counsel is or has been subject to the criminal proceedings on 
another basis in the same criminal matter. 
2.1.2. If counsel previously defended or represented another person 
whose interests are in conflict or may be in conflict with the 
interests of the person to be defended. 
2.1.3. If counsel’s own interests are in conflict or may be in conflict 
with the accused’s interests. This basis for removal should be 
added to § 54 of the CCP. 
2.1.4. If a conflict of interest exists or there is a possible conflict of 
interest between the accused’s interests and interests of the third 
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party related to counsel. This basis for removal should be added 
to § 54 of the CCP. 
2.1.5. If counsel is defending more than one accused and there is a 
conflict of interest or may be a conflict of interest between 
persons being defended.  
2.2. A suspicion of existence of such conflict is interpreted to the benefit 
of existence of such conflict.  
2.3. In the case of multiple representation described in p. 2.1.5 of this 
standard counsel may defend the accused if there is a possible conflict 
of interest only if it is advantageous to the accused persons 
represented and all of them give their informed consent in writing. 
 
3. Participation in the court proceedings and relevant pre-trial duties 
3.1. Counsel has to be present in the court sessions all the time unless it is 
provided otherwise in § 45 (4) of the CCP. According to § 270 (2) of 
the CCP if counsel fails to appear in a court session, the court hearing 
shall be adjourned. If counsel fails to appear repeatedly, court is 
allowed to consider removing him.  
3.2. Counsel should be always awake during the court sessions. If the court 
notices counsel sleeping repeatedly, it is allowed to remove counsel. 
3.3. While present, counsel should participate in the proceedings. If 
counsel fails to reason his silence, court is allowed to remove counsel. 
3.4. Counsel has to be prepared: he has to have knowledge of the facts of 
the case and also of relevant law. According to § 273 (4) if counsel is 
not familiar with the criminal matter, which should be interpreted in 
the way that counsel should know relevant facts and relevant law, the 
court may adjourn the court session for up to ten days. If counsel 
appears to the court session unprepared repeatedly, the court is 
allowed to remove counsel. 
3.5. Counsel should prepare the statement of defense on time. If he fails to 
do that, court is allowed to remove him. 
3.6. Counsel should submit all requests on time. If counsel has not 
requested collection of evidence or hearing a witness in the statement 
of defense although he was aware of the need to present that evidence 
or hear the witness at that time, the court should not dismiss the 
request for collection of additional evidence during the court 
proceedings, if the accused shows the extreme relevance of that 
evidence or witness (in the meaning that there is a probability that it 
could mitigate the accused’s situation). 
 
4. Relationship between counsel and the accused 
4.1. The relationship between the accused and counsel should be based on 
trust. If there is a serious breakdown in the attorney-client 
relationship, the court is allowed to remove counsel. Possible 
indicators for breakdown of the attorney-client relationship are: 
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counsel has revealed confidential information, although it is not 
allowed by law; serious differences between counsel and the accused 
about possible strategy, counsel has made decisions that are in the sole 
competence of the accused etc. 
4.2. Counsel should always consult with the accused. If the court learns 
that counsel has not consulted the accused, the court obliges counsel 
to do that. If counsel fails to consult the accused repeatedly, court is 
allowed to remove counsel.  
4.3. If counsel expresses an opinion to the court that the accused is guilty 
and the accused has not admitted his guilt, the court should remove 
counsel. 
 
5. Counsel’s duties in the settlement proceedings 
5.1. Before an accused agrees with a settlement, counsel should advise him 
fully of his rights and consequences of settlement. Counsel should 
also give reasoned advice to the accused whether in his opinion the 
accused should agree with the settlement or not. Counsel’s advice 
should be based on investigation of relevant facts and law. If court 
ascertains that counsel has not fulfilled these duties, it should not 
convict the accused in accordance with the settlement and it should 
remove counsel. 
5.2. If counsel coerces the accused to agree with the settlement or deceives 
him to get such agreement and the court is notified of such counsel’s 
activity, it should not convict the accused in accordance with the 
settlement and it should remove counsel. 
 
6. Other duties of counsel 
The court may declare any other breach of counsel’s duties manifest and 
therefore basis for removal of counsel under special circumstances of the case. 
While doing so the court should give thorough justification for its decision. 
 
7. Counsel’s performance in the appellate and cassation proceedings 
7.1. While participating in the court proceedings of the court of higher 
instance, counsel has the same duties as described above as long as 
these duties are in accordance with the nature of court proceedings of 
higher court instance. 
7.2. Counsel has to file a notification of appeal or appeal of cassation and 
appeal or appeal of cassation itself to the circuit court or the Supreme 
Court of Estonia on time. If counsel fails to do that without good 
reason, the court should remove him and give the accused a new term 
to choose counsel or ask the Bar to appoint counsel, who has within 
the term granted by court a chance to file a notification of appeal 
(appeal of cassation) or appeal (appeal of cassation) itself. 
7.3. The appeal composed by counsel has to be in accordance with 
requirements provided for in § 321 of the CCP or appeal of cassation 
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with the requirements provided for in § 347 of the CCP. If the court 
refuses to hear an appeal or the appeal of cassation, because counsel 
has not eliminated the deficiencies on time, court should remove him 
and give the accused a new term to choose counsel or ask the Bar to 
appoint counsel, who has within the term granted by court a chance to 
file new appeal or appeal of cassation. 
7.4. Before drafting the appeal or appeal of cassation counsel has to 
consult with the accused. Counsel can leave aside issues that are 
frivolous and also issues that are unimportant in counsel’s point of 
view. When the accused claims that an important issue was left aside, 
he should be given a new chance to file an appeal or appeal of 
cassation if he is able to show that the neglected issue had sufficient 
merit, in light of the other available issues. 
7.5. If the circuit court refuses to hear the appeal because counsel as 
appellant has not appeared to the court session, counsel should be 
removed and the accused should have a new chance for the court 
session. 
The principle expressed in the previous standard should be added to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. This basically means that if the appeal or appeal of 
cassation is refused to be heard by court and the reason for refusal is counsel’s 
failure to fulfill his duties, counsel should be removed and the accused should 
be have a new chance to file the appeal or the appeal of cassation. 
 
 
2. Standard of Effectiveness of Defense Counsel that 
Forms a Basis for Annulment of Court Judgment 
 of Lower Court 
8. Basis for annulment of court judgment per se: absence of assistance by 
counsel 
8.1.   Counsel was not present in the court proceedings, except for situations 
provided for in § 45 (4) of the CCP, no matter how short that time 
was. Absence of counsel in case the accused has more than one 
counsel should form a basis for annulment of court judgment under 
special circumstances of the case. 
8.2.   Counsel slept during the trial either: 
8.2.1. During the substantial stage of trial, which may be, e.g., when 
the prosecutor questioned the witness. 
8.2.2. Through a relatively large portion of the overall trial pro-
ceedings.  
8.2.3. During a large amount of time. 
8.3.   Counsel was drunk or under the influence of drugs during the court 
session. Counsel was physically or mentally impaired and it could be 
concluded that it refrained him from fulfilling his duties as counsel. 
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8.4.   Counsel participated in the court proceedings although conflicts of 
interest existed. A suspicion of existence of such conflict is interpreted 
to the benefit of non-existence of such conflict.  
8.5.   Counsel participated in the court proceedings as an advocate, although 
he was excluded from the Bar or disbarred and he did not ask the 
permission from the court to continue as counsel in the criminal pro-
ceedings. Counsel participated in the court proceedings as an advocate 
although he was suspended. 
8.6.   Counsel participated in the proceedings without general knowledge of 
criminal law or law of criminal procedure.  
8.7.    Counsel participated in the court proceedings, although there was a 
total breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.  
 
9. Basis for annulment of court judgment per se: manifest mistakes of counsel 
that may not be justified with the strategy or tactics 
9.1. Counsel participated in the proceedings without knowledge of the 
facts of the case or knowledge of relevant law. 
9.2. Counsel participated in the court proceedings without formerly 
consulting with the accused or the consultation was superficial. 
9.3. Counsel has expressed an opinion to the court that the accused is 
guilty and the accused has not admitted his guilt and the trial court has 
not removed counsel. 
9.4. It is ascertained that counsel was silent during the entire trial or an 
entire section of a trial (e.g., failed to make opening statement). 
9.5. Counsel failed to file a request for the collection of extremely relevant 
evidence (in the meaning that there is a probability that it could 
mitigate the accused’s situation) that was known to him or should 
have been known to him on time. 
9.6. The accused agreed with the settlement as a result of counsel’s advice 
that was based on inadequate investigation of relevant facts or law or 
counsel coerced or deceived the accused to agree with the settlement, or 
it has been ascertained that counsel did not advise the accused at all. 
9.7. On the basis on how counsel acted in the proceedings it could be 
ascertained that counsel did not have a strategy or he had inadequate 
strategy. 
9.8. Counsel has failed to ask for an acquittal if there are circumstances 
that were known to counsel or should have been known to him that 
show that there are no grounds for the criminal proceedings, i.e. if 
necessary elements of an offence do not exist or it is possible to 
preclude unlawfulness of the act. 
9.9. Counsel has failed to bring out an existing and known or should be 
known to the defense circumstance that precludes guilt. 
 
10. Basis for annulment, if the prosecutor does not prove that non-fulfillment of 
the duty was based on counsel’s reasonable decision 
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10.1. Although present, counsel refused to act during the specific point of 
the trial (e.g. during questioning one witness). 
10.2. Counsel has failed to make an adequate opening statement. 
10.3. Counsel has cross-examined witness inadequately. 
10.4. Counsel has failed to make adequate closing arguments.  
10.5. Counsel has failed to give an adequate opinion about the punishment 
required by the prosecutor. This opinion should be based on facts of 
the case and relevant law and both refer to mitigating circumstances 
and object aggravating circumstances. 
10.6. Counsel has failed to object to unlawful evidence or to make other 
material objections or requests. 
 
11. Not listed mistakes as bases for annulment, if the prosecutor does not prove 
that non-fulfillment of the duty was based on counsel’s reasonable decision 
or that the non-fulfillment did not prejudice the defense position 
The court may declare any other breach of counsel’s duties manifest and 
therefore basis for annulment of the court judgment under special circumstances 
of the case. While doing so the court should give thorough justification for its 
decision. 
 
12. Basis for annulment of court judgment per se: court’s groundless inter-
ference into the attorney-client relationship. 
12.1. It is ascertained that the trial court did not weigh the accused 
interests and public interests while it refused to ask the Bar to 
appoint an advocate preferred by the accused and with whom the 
accused has an agreement according to § 20 (1) of the SLAA. 
12.2. It is ascertained that the trial court did not give permission for a non-
advocate person who met the educational requirements provided for 
in § 41 (4) of the CCP to perform as counsel without a good reason 
or it withdrew its consent without a good reason.  
12.3. It is ascertained that the trial court did not appoint additional counsel 
to the accused, although the accused requested it and there was a 
necessity for additional counsel. 






Right to the assistance of counsel is a right that every accused has in the 
criminal proceedings in any democratic society. It is usually stipulated in the 
constitution, like it is in the Constitution of the Republic of Estonia and in the 
Constitution of the United States of America. It is also guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and highly 
recognized by the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union. In 
addition to that it is often provided for in codes of criminal procedure, like it is 
in the Estonian Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Whenever the content of the right to the assistance of counsel comes under 
discussion, things turn out to be a little bit more complicated. It is unequivocal 
that to every accused the right to the assistance of counsel should be guaranteed, 
but what it really means, is a subject that has been discussed over and over 
again. One thing is certain: the right to the assistance of counsel definitely 
means the right to have counsel present in the criminal proceedings. For 
instance, it can be seen very clearly from the Estonian Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure: according to § 339 (1) 3) of the CCP, conducting a court proceeding 
without the participation of counsel is a material violation of criminal pro-
cedural law. Pursuant to § 341 (1) of the CCP such violations result in annul-
ment of the judgment of the court of lower instance by the court of higher 
instance and reversion of the criminal matter to the court of lower instance for a 
new hearing. But usually it is agreed that mere presence is not enough and this 
is where the standard of counsel’s performance comes under discussion. It is 
said that as counsel should be an equal contestant to the prosecutor, especially 
in the adversary system, that is based on the principle of two competing parties 
and a neutral judge who finally makes a decision based on the parties’ argu-
ments, counsel should do at least a bit more than to be present in the pro-
ceedings, which means that in addition to the duty to be present counsel also has 
to be effective. Counsel as a legal professional is the one who should help the 
accused to understand and exercise other defense rights the accused has in the 
criminal proceedings and should present his side of the story to the court. 
Otherwise the accused who usually does not have a legal education is basically 
alone against the powerful state, which in turn results in the situation where the 
accused does not know how to exercise his rights and often even what rights he 
has. His side of the story is left unrepresented and he has lost the opportunity to 
defend himself against the charges. Therefore usually it is recognized, and I also 
agree with the position that accused persons do not only have the right to the 
assistance, but the right to effective assistance of counsel, which is an 
inseparable element of the right to the assistance of counsel.  
But to recognize the accused person’s right to effective assistance means to 
raise even more questions. What does it really mean? Whether it is a court’s 
business to guarantee it? How should courts guarantee it? What happens if it is 
ascertained that it was not guaranteed to the accused during the proceedings? 
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These are the basic questions I tried to find answers in chapters two to six of 
this thesis. 
The formal legal definition of effective assistance could be quite simple: 
effective assistance is the assistance the court has found effective as ineffective 
assistance is the assistance that the court has declared ineffective (If court’s 
competence to assess counsel’s performance in the criminal proceedings is not 
recognized, the one that assesses counsel’s performance and gives a meaning to 
the notion “effective assistance” could be, for instance the Bar or also a civil 
court). But it does not actually clarify anything as courts usually do not have 
common understanding about what effective defense is. Here positions about 
how to define effective defense diverge dramatically: the two most common 
approaches are “categoricalism” and “judgmentalism”. The first one supports 
developing a standard that courts could base their decision on about whether 
counsel has been effective during the proceedings or not. The supporters of the 
latter think that the best way to answer such a question is to use a case-by-case 
approach, which means that there is no standard and the court decides whether 
the assistance of counsel was effective or not based on specific facts of the case. 
There is also a middle way: that means that a standard of the most basic duties 
is composed and additionally a court can make its decision based on specific 
circumstances of the case if necessary. In this thesis I have proposed the middle 
way for two reasons. First, in my opinion, when no standard is imposed, there is 
a danger that judicial practice develops hectically and is arbitrary: two similar 
cases should result in similar conclusions. And it is easier to achieve it if there 
is a standard that could be used as a guide to make decisions. Second, if the 
standard would be conclusive, it would not take into account that every criminal 
proceeding is different and it might be that in addition to universally basic 
duties there are some duties that the court finds necessary to declare in-
dispensable in certain criminal proceedings. 
One thing is absolutely sure – effective assistance of counsel does not 
involve the outcome of the proceedings in the meaning that whenever the 
accused was not acquitted, it could be claimed that counsel was not effective. 
Rather, the effective defense means that counsel is diligent, makes everything 
possible and in accordance with law in order to achieve acquittal or the most 
lenient punishment and always supports the accused with his advice. In addition 
to that counsel exercises the accused’s rights in the proceedings. If counsel has 
done that, he has been an equal contestant to the prosecutor, adequate supporter 
to the accused and diligent party to a proceeding, i.e. a full representative of the 
defense side.  
In chapter three of my thesis I discussed the duties that are in my opinion 
most essential and therefore should be fulfilled by every counsel in all criminal 
proceedings. To be more exact I named there different types of ineffective 
defense no matter if it is a result of state’s interference, conflict of interests or 
counsel’s activity or inactivity and then discussed the duties that are behind 
every type of ineffectiveness. In my opinion counsel participating in the 
criminal proceedings should be active, awake and sober, in good health that 
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allows him to participate in the proceedings as counsel, without conflict of 
interest, with good knowledge of criminal law and law of criminal procedure 
generally, with good knowledge of the facts of the certain case and law 
applicable in that case. Of course, counsel also has to meet formal requirements 
provided for in § 42 (1) of the CCP, which means that counsel has to be either 
an advocate or in case a non-advocate person wants to be contractual counsel 
this person has to have legal education provided for in § 41 (4) of the CCP and 
achieve permission from the body conducting the proceedings. In addition to 
that while participating in the criminal proceedings counsel should observe 
deadlines, consult with the accused and try to develop a trustful attorney-client 
relationship with the accused. These and some other duties I have listed in 
standards I propose for the Estonian courts of first and higher instances in 
chapter six of the thesis. 
While counsels are independent in their activities, which is a principle highly 
valued and repeatedly stressed for example by the European Court of Human 
Rights and the United States Supreme Court, a certain level of control over their 
performance must nevertheless be possible, to ensure that the right of the 
accused to effective assistance of counsel does not become an empty right. The 
basis of the arguments I present in my thesis is a belief that next to competition, 
judicial supervision is one of the most important mechanisms for reducing 
ineffective assistance of counsel, because it enables the courts to react pre-
ventively or if it is not possible at least in the same criminal proceedings where 
the ineffective assistance has occurred. Therefore the question about how courts 
should guarantee effective assistance of counsel could be answered by three 
words: by direct interference. The court directs the proceedings and gains a 
direct overview of counsel’s performance, and therefore can react swiftly in 
cases of ineffective assistance. Even if the ineffectiveness claim is solved by the 
higher court, this court can still annul the judgment of the lower court and give 
an order to try the case once more, but this time with presence of an effective 
counsel. Other measures that could be used in case of ineffectiveness of 
counsel: civil actions and supervision by bars are measures that can be used 
after the criminal proceedings, which means that they always turn out to be a 
little bit too late. Civil court’s finding that counsel was ineffective and has to 
pay damages does not change the fact that the accused was not guaranteed 
effective assistance of counsel during the criminal proceedings and neither does 
the disciplinary penalty that is imposed by the competent body of the Bar. That 
is why in this dissertation I propose the judicial supervision as an effective 
method to improve effectiveness of counsel. In addition to the fact that it 
enables to react already during the criminal proceedings and especially if 
performed by the judge in front of whom the ineffectiveness occurs, it allows 
immediate correction of counsel’s performance as it also sends a powerful 
message to other persons that perform as counsels in the criminal proceedings: 
the court is there in the criminal proceedings and observes closely, detecting 
mistakes of counsel and reacting immediately. In addition to that I believe that 
the fact that counsel’s performance is declared ineffective by the court that has 
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actually heard the case, is a great humiliation for counsel and it motivates him 
to improve his performance in the future as he realizes that he cannot continue 
to neglect his duties, because it will be noticed by the court in the criminal 
proceedings sooner or later.  
As I have already emphasized, the standard for the courts to evaluate 
counsel’s performance I have proposed here is two-fold, consisting of both 
listed guidelines and ad hoc assessment. In addition there are actually two 
different standards I propose in this dissertation: a standard for courts that are 
hearing the case and that have to decide whether to act during the proceedings, 
from making a remark up to removal of counsel, and a standard for higher 
courts that have to assess whether counsel has been ineffective during the 
proceedings of lower court, which in turn leads to annulment of the judgment of 
the court of lower instance. During the first case the court has several options in 
front of it and removal of counsel should be the last one, as it interferes into the 
relationship between the accused and his counsel most severely. Whether the 
court is allowed to remove counsel at all or not, which often means that it does 
it without the consent of the accused, is another question, but here the court’s 
competence to do that should be acknowledged if it is acknowledged that it is 
the obligation of courts to guarantee effective assistance of counsel to the 
accused. Otherwise the obligation would be empty in the meaning that although 
it is recognized, courts do not have the means to fulfill their obligation, which in 
turn leaves the right to effective assistance hollow. Therefore I suggest in my 
thesis that courts should have the right to remove ineffective counsel, no matter 
whether it is with or without the accused’s consent. But the one thing that has to 
be mentioned here is that removal does not have an effect on principle of 
finality, the most it does is that it affects the attorney-client relationship, which 
ceases to exist after the court has removed counsel. 
Another issue is with annulment of the judgment. Mostly this means that the 
accused is entitled to new proceedings in a lower court, unless there is a ground 
for higher court to make a new judgment itself, for instance acquit the accused. 
But the new proceedings mean that extra resources are spent, and it strongly 
influences society’s faith in adjudication. It is understandable that the members 
of society hope that the case is solved correctly at the first instance and the fact 
that the case is returned to a lower court for a new hearing undermines their 
belief in the justice system. Therefore the question arises, whether the mere 
finding that counsel has breached his duties is enough for annulment of the 
judgment or it should be ascertained that the breach of duties affected the 
outcome of the case, because if it affected the outcome, we can most certainly 
be ascertained that ineffective assistance had an effect on the situation of the 
accused. This is a question that is argued over and over again, especially in the 
United States: the question of element of prejudice. Some authors claim in the 
United States that the element of prejudice is necessary for the accused to prove 
as otherwise ineffective defense claims would be a huge burden for the justice 
system: counsels make many mistakes and if every mistake would result in 
annulment of judgment, there would be way too many annulments. The others 
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express their opinion that the accused’s burden to prove prejudice is against the 
principle of presumption of innocence and therefore, although the element of 
prejudice itself is absolutely appropriate in the light of principle of finality, the 
absence of prejudice should be proved by the prosecutor, which means that the 
accused only has to prove that his counsel did not fulfill his duties, after which 
the prosecutor has an opportunity to prove that it did not affect the outcome. 
And there is a third approach also: some authors are in a position that the 
element of prejudice is not appropriate in the context of the accused’s right to 
effective assistance of counsel. If the result of the assessment is that counsel did 
not fulfill his duties, it could be concluded that the accused’s right to effective 
defense counsel was violated and therefore the right to fair trial was not 
guaranteed to the accused. Consequently, the reliability of outcome is always in 
question in case of ineffectiveness of counsel; even if other rights than the right 
to effective assistance of counsel were not breached in the course of the 
proceedings and effective assistance would have provided the same result. The 
last approach basically emphasizes that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel is an independent element of fair trial. As every accused is entitled to 
fair trial and the fact that the accused was guaranteed effective assistance of 
counsel is an indicator of fair trial, a trial can never be fair if the assistance of 
counsel was ineffective. This in turn means that whenever ineffective assistance 
has occurred, the accused should have an opportunity for a new trial. 
The United States Supreme Court has taken the first position and asks 
accused persons to show element of prejudice. Only in rare cases element of 
prejudice is presumed, which means that the prosecutor should still have an 
opportunity to claim the contrary. One can imagine that the supporters of the 
harmless error rule (i.e. the principle that it should be prosecutor that always 
claims lack of prejudice) and abolishment of the element of prejudice are not 
happy with the position of the United States Supreme Court, which can be very 
clearly seen from the number of articles they have written to express their dis-
content.  
The European Court of Human Rights does not ask the applicant to prove 
element of prejudice, but at the same time it must be taken into account that the 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights does not have an effect to the 
validity of the underlying court judgment, because it is up to the state to decide 
whether to annul the judgment, which was made in the proceeding that the 
European Court of Human Rights has declared to have conducted in the way 
that violated Article 6 of the Constitution. In Estonia the Code of Criminal 
Procedure does not mention element of prejudice and also the Estonian 
Supreme Court has not required the accused to prove that. According to § 339 
(1) 12 of the CCP, which came into force on the 1st of September 2011, 
violation of criminal procedural law is material if in the course of the court 
hearing the principle of a fair and just court procedure is violated. Here the 
question whether the right to effective assistance of counsel is an independent 
element of fair trial becomes extremely relevant. If it is, § 339 (1) 12 of the 
CCP should be interpreted in the way that ineffective assistance of counsel itself 
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is a material violation of criminal procedural law. If it is not, then the effect that 
counsel’s breach of duties had on the outcome of the case is important. 
In this thesis I propose that there exist duties of counsel that are so essential 
to the defense that in case they are breached, the element of prejudice, no matter 
if the burden of existence of it is on the accused or the burden of non-existence 
of it is on the prosecutor should be left aside and the annulment of judgment 
should result if the court has ascertained that counsel breached these duties. The 
participation of active and diligent counsel, equal contestant to the prosecutor is 
essential to the adversary system, which presupposes a match between pro-
secution and the defense. Only if this competition has occurred, the pro-
ceedings, which resulted in the judgment are fair and the result itself is fair. If 
the proceeding has not been fair because one contestant has been either missing 
or “missing” from the proceedings, the result cannot be fair either. Therefore in 
my opinion the adversary system values the proceeding itself as much or even 
more than the result. In order not to burden the justice system too much, only 
breach of the most essential duties of counsel should result in annulment of the 
court judgment. Therefore, a standard for removal of counsel should be 
different than a standard for annulment of judgment, an approach I have taken 
in my thesis as I propose two different standards. But in order to guarantee that 
the courts would still have opportunity to take into account special circums-
tances of the case, I also suggest that the list should be left open as it should be 
left open for the standard for removal of counsel and if the court sees any other 
duty not listed in the standard essential in certain case, it has an opportunity to 
declare it indispensable in this specific case if it gives a thorough reason for its 
decision. Here the precondition of prejudice as a requirement that protects 
principle of finality comes in and the prosecutor should have an opportunity to 
prove that the breach of this certain duty did not affect the defense position, i.e. 
it did not have an effect on the outcome of the case or exercise of the accused’s 
rights. In addition to that the prosecutor should be allowed to prove that it was 
counsel’s reasonable decision not to fulfill the duty. Also the prosecutor should 
be allowed to prove that it was counsel’s reasonable decision not to fulfill the 
duty, if the accused claims that counsel breached a listed duty, although I also 
name some duties in my proposed standard, which should always be fulfilled 
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Abinõud ebaefektiivse kaitse vastu.   
Kohtulik järelevalve kaitsja tegevuse üle Eesti kriminaalmenetluses  
Käesolevas töös otsin vastust küsimusele, kuidas mõjutada kaitse kvaliteeti 
Eesti kriminaalmenetluses ning pakun välja kohtuliku kontrolli kui efektiivse 
võimaluse kriminaalmenetluse kestel kõigi menetluses osalevate kaitsjate töö 
kvaliteeti kontrollida ja puudustele reageerida. Selleks et kohtunikud reagee-
riksid sarnastes situatsioonides sarnaselt ja ei kuritarvitaks oma pädevust kaits-
jate töö kvaliteedi hindamisel, tõstatan töös küsimuse, kas on võimalik välja 
töötada standard, mida Eesti kohtud saaksid kasutada kaitsja töö efektiivsuse 
hindamisel jooksvalt kohtumenetluse käigus ja ka siis, kui süüdistatav on 
kriminaalmenetluse kestel esitanud kaebuse ebaefektiivse kaitse peale kõrge-
male kohtule.  
Selleks et põhjendada kohtute pädevust kaitse kvaliteedi üle kontrolli teosta-
misel, otsin kõigepealt vastust küsimustele, mida tähendab õigus kaitsele (selle-
le küsimusele vastan töö esimeses peatükis); mida tähendab õigus efektiivsele 
kaitsele (sellele küsimusele vastan töö teises peatükis) ja kas see on olemus-
likult seotud õigusega kaitsele (ka sellele küsimusele vastan töö teises peatükis). 
Üksnes sellisel juhul, kui tunnustada süüdistatava õigust efektiivsele kaitsele, 
saab hakata otsima põhjendusi sellele, miks kriminaalmenetlust juhtiv kohus on 
õigustatud kaitse efektiivsust kontrollima ja ebaefektiivsusele reageerima. Töö 
kolmas peatükk käsitlebki ebaefektiivset kaitset ja on kolmeks jagatud selle 
alusel, millised on ebaefektiivse kaitse põhjused. Igas alapeatükis toon välja 
kohustused, mis kaitsjal (erandjuhtudel ka riigil) täitmata jäävad ning arutlen 
iga kohustuse juures, kas see kohustus peaks kuuluma minu poolt kuuendas 
peatükis pakutavasse standardisse, mida võiksid kaitsja käitumisele hinnangu 
andmisel kasutada Eesti kohtud. Töö neljandas peatükis vastan ühele olulise-
male küsimusele, st sellele, miks peaks kohtud olema need, kes kontrollivad 
kaitsja tegevust, ja kas kaitsja sõltumatuse põhimõtet arvestades peaks kohtulik 
kontroll kaitsja tegevuse üle üleüldse lubatud olema. Viiendas peatükis ana-
lüüsin USA kogemust kaitse kvaliteedi üle kohtuliku kontrolli teostamisel ja 
efektiivse kaitse standardi väljatöötamisel, ja ühtlasi põhjendan seda, miks 
selles valdkonnas peaks uurima just arenguid USA-s. Lühidalt öeldes on olu-
kord järgmine: USA Ülemkohus on efektiivse kaitse standardi väljatöötamisega 
(eelkõige kohtuotsuste tühistamise kaalumise jaoks) tegelenud juba alates 1932. 
aastast ja seetõttu on just USA-st võimalik leida hulgaliselt häid ja halbu koge-
musi. Lisaks on USA-s kriminaalmenetlus võistlev ning Eestiski on kriminaal-
menetlus võistlevate elementidega, mis tähendab seda, et kaitsja funktsioonid 
on võrdlemisi sarnased (eelkõige just üldmenetluses, millele ma käesolevas töös 
peamiselt keskendungi). Loomulikult ei saa teisest riigist kunagi mitte midagi 
üks ühele ilma kriitilise analüüsi ja võimaliku modifitseerimiseta üle võtta, 
mistõttu Eesti standardi koostamiseks uurin nii USA-s kehtivat standardit, 
standardite ajalugu, kriitikat kehtiva standardi kohta kui ka ettepanekuid 
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standardi muutmiseks. Samuti tuleb arvestada, et Eesti asub Euroopas, mistõttu 
mööda ei saa selles õigusruumis kehtivatest õigusaktidest (pean siin eelkõige 
silmas Euroopa Liidu õigusakte ja Euroopa Nõukogu õigusakte) ja loomulikult 
Eesti enda õigusaktidest. Lisaks eelnevale on viiendal peatükil veel üks oluline 
funktsioon – selgitada, miks ma üldse pakun välja standardi, st miks ei võiks 
ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebusi lahendada ka edaspidi juhtumipõhiselt, mida siiani 
Eestis on tehtud. Ning viimases, kuuendas peatükis pakun välja standardid, 
mille järgi saaksid Eesti kohtud kriminaalmenetluses kaitsja töö kvaliteeti 
hinnata.  
Käesolev eestikeelne kokkuvõte on midagi enamat kui lihtsalt kokkuvõte, 
proovides põhjalikult seletada töös toodud järelduste tagamaid. Seetõttu kasutan 
ka siin mitmetes kohtades viiteid, kuigi kokkuvõttes seda tavaliselt ei tehta. 
Samuti tuleb rõhutada, et kohati ma ei järgi kokkuvõttes töö struktuuri – seda 
põhjusel, et töös toodud seisukohtade lühidalt, kuid samas piisavalt põhjalikult 
seletamine tingis minu arvates parema arusaadavuse eesmärgil vajaduse mõned 
teemad ettepoole tõsta ja mõned tahapoole viia. Nii käsitlen kokkuvõttes esmalt 
esimese ja teise peatüki sisu, siis neljanda ja viienda peatüki sisu, ja viimaks 
toon lugejani kolmanda ja kuuenda peatüki sisu koos, mis annab mulle ilma 
kordamata võimaluse selgitada, miks ma ühe või teise kaitsja kohustuse enda 
poolt pakutud standardisse lisan. Standardi olemusele, st sellele, mitmest 
astmest koosneva standardi ma üldse välja pakun, annan aga põhjenduse juba 
viiendas peatükis, mistõttu kuues peatükk sisaldab töös nii kolmandas kui ka 
viiendas peatükis toodud järeldusi. Et aga kokkuvõtte sissejuhatus ei muutuks 
liialt keeruliseks, püüangi järgnevalt selgitada, milliseid teid pidi jõudsin 
kohtuliku kontrolli õigustamiseni ja efektiivse kaitse standardini, mille pakun 
välja Eesti kohtutele kaitsja töö kvaliteedi hindamiseks kriminaalmenetluses. 
Õigus kaitsjale on süüdistatava üks olulisemaid õigusi kriminaalmenetluses. 
Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste kaitse konventsiooni817 (edaspidi EIÕK) 
artikli 6 lõike 3 punkti c kohaselt on igal kuriteos süüdistataval õigus kaitsta end 
ise või enda poolt valitud kaitsja abil või saada tasuta õigusabi juhul, kui 
õigusemõistmise huvid seda nõuavad ja süüdistataval pole piisavalt vahendeid 
õigusabi eest tasumiseks. Euroopa Inimõiguste Kohtu (edaspidi EIK) praktika 
selles valdkonnas on niivõrd laialdane, et siinkohal oleks ehk asjakohasem 
mainida erandjuhtu, mil EIK ei ole nõudnud konventsiooni artikli 6 lõike 3 
punkti c täitmist: nimelt otsuses Engel and Others vs Netherlands818 leidis 
Kohus, et selles sättes toodud õigust piirati, kuna isikutel ei olnud võimalik 
endale kaitsjat valida, kuid lisas, et rikkumist ei saa järeldada, sest kaasus oli 
niivõrd lihtne, et isikud olid ennast võimelised ise kaitsma.819 Reeglina nõuab 
                                                     
817 Euroopa Inimõiguste ja Põhivabaduste Kaitse Konventsioon. – RT II 1996, 11/12, 34. 
Jõustunud Eesti suhtes 16. aprillil 1996. 
818 Engel and Others v. Netherlands. Application no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 
5370/72. 8 June 1976, § 91. 
819 Kaasuses Engel and Others vs Netherlands oli arutlusobjektiks distsiplinaarasi, milles 
EIK kohaldas küll põhimõtteid, mis tema arvates kehtivad kriminaalmenetlusele, kuid leidis 
siiski, et asja lihtsuse tõttu ei olnud kaitsja osavõtt menetlusest kohustuslik. On võimalik 
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Kohus aga alati, et süüdistatava õigus kaitsjale oleks siseriiklikus menetluses 
tagatud. 
Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse820 § 21 lg 1 sätestab: „Igaühele, kellelt on 
võetud vabadus, teatatakse viivitamatult talle arusaadavas keeles ja viisil 
vabaduse võtmise põhjus ja tema õigused ning antakse võimalus teatada 
vabaduse võtmisest oma lähedastele. Kuriteos kahtlustatavale antakse 
viivitamatult ka võimalus valida endale kaitsja ja kohtuda temaga.” Kõne all 
oleva paragrahvi kaitseala eristab kahte isikute gruppi: igaüht, kellelt on võetud 
vabadus, kaasa arvatud kuriteos kahtlustatavad, ja kuriteos kahtlustatavad. 
Seega on kuriteos kahtlustataval võrreldes igaühega lisaõigus viivitamata valida 
endale kaitsja ja kohtuda temaga.821 Paragrahv 21 esimese lõike teine lause on 
ainus, mis käsitleb põhiseaduses kaitseõigust.822 Riigikohtu põhiseaduslikkuse 
järelevalve kolleegium on rõhutanud, et põhiseaduse § 21 on reservatsioonita 
põhiõigus, mida võib piirata üksnes mõne muu põhiõiguse või põhiseadusest 
tuleneva väärtuse kaitseks.823 Kuigi põhiseadus nimetab üksnes kahtlustatavat, 
on ainuvõimalik § 21 lg 1 tõlgendus selline, et õigus kaitsjale on ka süüdis-
tataval. Süüdistatava õigus kaitsja abile on sätestatud kriminaalmenetluse 
seadustiku824 (edaspidi KrMS) § 34 lg 1 p-s 3 ja § 35 lg-s 2 (kahtlustatava õigus 
kaitsja abile on sätestatud KrMS § 34 lg 1 p-s 3), millele vastab KrMS § 8 p-s 3 
sätestatud uurimisasutuse, prokuratuuri ja kohtu kohustus tagada kahtlustatavale 
ja süüdistatavale kaitsja abi KrMS § 45 lg-s 2 sätestatud juhtudel825 või kui ta 
seda taotleb. Riigikohtu kriminaalkolleegium on märkinud, et KrMS § 8 p-des 2 
ja 3 rõhutatakse kriminaalmenetluse käigu eest vastutavate subjektide – 
uurimisasutuse, prokuratuuri ja kohtu kohustust tagada kaitseõigus. Sellega 
seoses tuleb järeldada, et kaitseõiguse tagamise põhimõte tähendab eeskätt 
kriminaalmenetluse käigu eest vastutavate ametiisikute ja nende kaudu riigi 
vastavat kohustust, mistõttu nõustuda ei saa seisukohaga, et kaitseõiguse 
tagatuse küsimus on vaid kaitsealuse ja tema kaitsja vahekorra küsimus.826 
                                                                                                                                  
arutleda, et selles otsuses toodud järeldused kehtivadki üksnes distsiplinaarasjadele, kuna 
kriminaalasju ei saa kunagi pidada nii lihtsaks, et seal ei oleks kaitsja osavõtt kohustuslik, 
kui süüdistatav seda nõuab. 
820 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. – RT 1992, 26, 349; RT I, 27.04.2011, 2. 
821 Eesti Vabariigi Põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne. Teine, täiendatud väljaanne, 
2008, § 21 kommentaar 3. 
822 Ibid., § 21 kommentaar 6. 
823 Riigikohtu põhiseaduslikkuse järelevalve kolleegiumi 18. juuni 2010. a otsus kohtuasjas 
nr 3-4-1-5-10, p. 38. 
824 Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik. – RT I 2003, 27, 166; RT I, 14.03.2011, 35. 
825 Kõne all oleva sätte kohaselt on kaitsja osavõtt kogu kriminaalmenetlusest kohustuslik, 
kui isik on pannud kuriteo toime alaealisena; isik ei ole oma psüühilise või füüsilise puude 
tõttu suuteline ise end kaitsma või kui kaitsmine on selle tõttu raskendatud; isikut 
kahtlustatakse või süüdistatakse kuriteos, mille eest võib mõista eluaegse vangistuse; isiku 
huvid on vastuolus teise isiku huvidega, kellel on kaitsja; isik on viibinud vahi all vähemalt 
kuus kuud; kriminaalasja menetletakse kiirmenetluses. 
826 Riigikohtu kriminaalkolleegiumi 2. augusti 2010. a otsus kohtuasjas nr 3-1-1-61-10, p 
10.1. 
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USA-s on õigus kaitsjale sätestatud konstitutsiooni827 kuuendas paranduses, 
kuid USA Ülemkohus tunnustas esimest korda süüdistatavate õigust kaitsjale 
(seda küll ainult nende süüdistatavate puhul, keda võis karistada surma-
nuhtlusega) alles 1932. aastal.828 Võttis veel kolmkümmend aastat ja 1963. 
aastal leidis Ülemkohus lõpuks, et igal süüdistataval, olenemata tema vastu 
esitatud süüdistusest ja konkreetsest kriminaalasjast, on konstitutsiooni kuuenda 
paranduse järgi õigus kaitsjale.829 
Süüdistatava õigust kaitsjale tunnustab ka Euroopa Liit. Euroopa Liidu 
Põhiõiguste Harta,830 mis tulenevalt artikkel 51 esimesest lõikest kehtib küll 
liikmesriikidele üksnes liidu õiguse kohaldamise korral, sisaldab kuuendat 
peatükki pealkirjaga „Õigusemõistmine“. Selles peatükis oleva artikli 47 teise 
lõike teise lause kohaselt peab igaühel olema võimalus saada nõu ja kaitset ning 
olla esindatud. Artikli 48 teine lõige sätestab, et iga süüdistatava õigus kaitsele 
on tagatud. Kuigi Euroopa Liit ei ole veel jõudnud õigust kaitsele puudutava 
direktiivi väljatöötamiseni, mis tulenevalt Nõukogu poolt 30. novembril 2009 
välja antud teekaardist831 on meede C kahtlustatavate või süüdistatavate 
menetlusõiguste tugevdamiseks kriminaalmenetluses, on Euroopa Liidu institut-
sioonid korduvalt rõhutanud, et isiku õigus kaitsjale on äärmiselt oluline, kuna 
aitab kaasa sellele, et ka tema teised õigused on kriminaalmenetluses tagatud.832  
Eelnevast nähtub, et süüdistatavate õigus kaitsjale on õigus, mis tuleneb nii 
põhiseadustest, rahvusvahelistest ja Euroopa Liidu õigusaktidest kui ka 
menetlusseadustikest. Üks peamisi põhjusi, miks süüdistatavatele peab õigus 
kaitsjale olema tagatud on see, mida on rõhutatud Euroopa Liidu tasemel – 
kaitsja osavõtt menetlusest aitab kaasa sellele, et süüdistatava teised õigused on 
tagatud. On ju reeglina süüdistatav tavaline inimene, kellel ei ole õiguslikku 
haridust, mistõttu ta ei ole teadlik õigustest, mis tal kriminaalmenetluses on, ja 
isegi kui ta on neist teadlik, ei pruugi ta olla võimeline neid kasutama. Kuid 
õigusel kaitsjale on ka teine väga oluline eesmärk – tagada võistlevas 
menetluses olukord, kus võistlevad pooled on oma oskustelt vähemalt enam-
vähem võrdsed. Ei ole vist kellelgi kahtlust, et kui süüdistatav osaleks 
menetluses ilma kaitsjata, ei saaks tasakaalust reeglina juttugi olla, arvestades 
                                                     
827 The Constitution of the United States of America. Online. Available: 
http://supreme.justia.com/constitution/, 29 April 2011. 
828 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).  
829 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
830 OJ C 83, 30.3.2010, p. 389–403. 
831 Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009 on a Roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings OJ C 295, 
4.12.2009, pp. 1–3. 
832 Nt Green Paper from the Commission – Procedural Safeguards for Suspects and 
Defendants in Criminal Proceedings throughout the European Union (19 February 2003, 
COM(2003) 75 final). Identifying the basic rights, 2.5., p. 14. Teekaardi meetme C 
lühikirjeldus: kahtlustatava või süüdistatava isiku õigus saada kriminaalmenetluse käigus 
õigusnõustamist menetluse nii varajases järgus kui vajalik on õiglase menetluse 
kindlustamise põhialus; õigus saada õigusabi peaks tagama õigusnõustamise tegeliku 
kättesaadavuse. 
250 
asjaolu, et süüdistatava vastas on professionaalne jurist – prokurör – kelle selja 
taga on omakorda riik oma praktiliselt ammendamatute ressurssidega. Seega on 
kaitsja ülesanne olla menetluses (ja eelkõige kohtumenetluses, sest just seal 
võisteldakse) süüdistatava kõrval, anda talle nõu, esitada asjakohaseid tõendeid, 
mis aitaksid kinnitada süüdistatava versiooni toimunust ja lükata ümber 
prokuröri väiteid. Ühesõnaga, kui rääkida süüdistavast poolest ja kaitsepoolest, 
siis viimase puhul lasub raskuspunkt just kaitsjal. Siit aga tõusetubki esimene 
küsimus, millele püüdsin oma töös vastata: mida õigus kaitsjale tegelikult 
tähendab, st milline on selle sisu? 
Et õigus kaitsjale hõlmab kindlasti kaitsja osavõttu menetlusest, on igati 
loogiline: kaitsja puudumise korral ei saaks kuidagi rääkida sellest, et 
süüdistatavale on õigus kaitsjale tagatud. Seda saab järeldada ka kriminaal-
menetluse seadustikus sätestatust – tulenevalt KrMS § 339 lg 1 p-st 3 on 
kriminaalmenetlusõiguse oluline rikkumine, kui kaitsja ei ole kohtumenetluses 
osalenud, kuigi kaitsja osavõtt oli kohustuslik.833 Kriminaalmenetluse sea-
dustiku § 341 lg 1 kohaselt toob see rikkumine kaasa maakohtu otsuse 
tühistamise ringkonnakohtu poolt ja kriminaalasja tagasisaatmise maakohtule 
uueks arutamiseks teises kohtukoosseisus. Lähtudes KrMS § 361 lg-st 2 peaks 
samamoodi toimima ka Riigikohus. Aga – üksnes kohalolekust ei piisa,834 
ütlevad ameeriklased, mistõttu on USA kohtupraktika kantud ideest, et 
süüdistatavatele peab olema tagatud efektiivne kaitse, ja võistleva menetluse 
valguses on neil igati õigus. Aktiivne isiku kaitseõiguste elluviimine, tema 
nõustamine, kohtule tema versiooni esitamine toimunust jne, need on kaitsja 
ülesanded, mida ei saa täita siis, kui kaitsja magab, ei tunne asja, on menetluses 
oma huvide eest väljas vms. Tulenevalt KrMS § 47 lg-st 2 on kaitsja kohustatud 
kasutama kõiki kaitsmisvahendeid ja -viise, mis ei ole seadusega keelatud, et 
selgitada kaitsealust õigustavad, mittesüüstavad ja karistust kergendavad 
asjaolud, ning andma talle muud kriminaalasjas vajalikku õigusabi. Sellist 
kohustust ei saa täita kaitsja, kes on ainult kohal. Seega hüpoteesid, mis ma oma 
töös olen püstitanud: et kohtute poolt teostatud järelevalve on võimalik ja 
vajalik meede efektiivse kaitse tagamiseks nii konkreetses asjas kui ka 
õigussüsteemis tervikuna ja et on võimalik kehtestada standard, mida kohtud 
saaksid kasutada, hindamaks, kas kaitsja on oma tööd teinud efektiivselt või 
mitte, on kantud veendumusest, et õigus kaitsjale tähendab midagi enamat kui 
                                                     
833 Alates 1. septembrist 2011 ei ole kaitsja osavõtt kohtumenetlusest enam kohustuslik, kui 
süüdistatav ei soovi kaitsjat, ta on kohtu hinnangul võimeline enda huve ise esindama ning 
soovib loobuda kaitsja osalemisest: 
1) teise astme kuriteo kohtulikul arutamisel kokkuleppemenetluses; 
2) kohtuotsuse kuulutamisel lihtmenetluses; 
3) lühimenetluses kohtusse saadetud kriminaalasja menetluses, kui süüdistatav vastab 
käesoleva seadusega lepingulisele kaitsjale kehtestatud nõuetele ning esitab kohtule kirjaliku 
põhistatud taotluse lubada kaitsta end ise (KrMS § 45 lg 4 p-d 1–3). 
834 Vt nt William W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel – the Trial Judge's Role, 
93 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1979–1980), p. 637; Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), 386 
U. S. 744; Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U. S. 475 (1978), 435 U. S. 491. 
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kaitsja kohalolek. Selguse mõttes olen oma töös kasutanud kahte mõistet: õigus 
kaitsjale, mis tähendab kaitsja kohalolekut ja õigust efektiivsele kaitsjale, mis 
tähendab seda, et kaitsja peab tegema midagi rohkemat kui olema kohal. 
Vaatamata sellele olen seisukohal, et mis õigusaktides sätestatud õigust kaitsjale 
puudutab, siis see hõlmab ka õigust efektiivsele kaitsele. Vastasel juhul tekiks 
olukord, kus saaks väita, et õiguslikult on tagatud üksnes kaitsja kohalolek, mis 
aga ei ole aga arvestades kaitsja funktsioone võistlevas menetluses mõistlik ja 
süüdistatava huvisid arvestav. 
Ka EIK-l on mitmetes lahendites tulnud tegeleda kaitse efektiivsuse küsi-
musega, mille käigus on EIK kaalunud seda, kas süüdistatavale garanteeritud 
õigus kaitsjale oli konkreetses asjas praktiline ja efektiivne või teoreetiline ja 
illusoorne,835 kusjuures EIK ei hinda kaitse efektiivsust juhtudel, kus isikul on 
olnud määratud kaitsja, erinevalt võrreldes juhtudega, kus isikul on olnud 
lepinguline kaitsja.836 Kohtu seisukoht on, et kui kaitsja ei ole ükskõik millistel 
põhjustel võimeline oma ülesandeid täitma, on siseriiklikul kohtul kohustus 
tegutseda – vahetada kaitsja välja või kohustada teda oma ülesandeid täitma.837 
Igal juhul ei tohi siseriiklik kohus sellises situatsioonis jääda passiivseks.838 
Kaasusest Kamasinski vs Austria nähtub siiski selgesti see, et EIK hoidub 
võimaluse korral kaitsja töö sisulise külje käsitlemisest. Nimelt väitis süü-
distatav, et rikutud oli tema õigust kaitsja abile, tuues selle kinnituseks välja 
mitmed väited, sh tema hinnangul kaitsja ebarahuldava esinemise kohtuistungil. 
Viitega lahendile Artico vs Italy leidis EIK, et riiki ei saa pidada vastutavaks iga 
puudujäägi eest kaitsja töös. Ühtlasi leidis EIK, et riik peaks sekkuma üksnes 
siis, kui puudujääk kaitsja töös on silmanähtav või mingil muul viisil kohtule 
esitatud.839 Üldiselt jääb EIK lahenditest mulje, et kohus on siiani pidanud 
kaitsja töö efektiivsuse küsimusse puutuvalt EIÕK artikli 6 lõike 3 punkti c 
rikkumiseks üksnes selliseid olukordi, kus kaitsja ei ole üldse mingit ülesannet 
täitnud või kaitseülesannete täitmine tema poolt oli oluliselt takistatud.840 
Muudel juhtudel peab kohus aga kaitsjate töö sõltumatusele viidates paremaks 
                                                     
835 Artico v. Italy. Application no. 6694/74. 13 May 1980; Goddi v. Italy. Application no. 
8966/80. 9 April 1984; Kamasinski v. Austria. Application no. 9783/82. 19 December 1989; 
Daud v. Portugal. Application no. 22600/93. 21 April 1998, Czekalla v. Portugal. Appli-
cation no. 38830/97. 10 October 2002. 
836 Vaadakem või kahte põhjapanevamat EIK lahendit ebaefektiivse kaitse valdkonnas – 
Artico vs Italy ja Goddi vs Italy. Kui hr Articol oli määratud kaitsja, siis hr Goddil oli 
lepinguline kaitsja. Mõlemal juhul vaagis EIK kaitse ebaefektiivsust samade põhimõtete 
järgi. 
837 Artico v. Italy, § 33. 
838 Sannino v. Italy. Application no. 30961/03. 27 April 2006, § 51.  
839 Kamasinski v. Austria, § 65. 
840 Kaasuses Artico vs Italy keeldus kaitsja süüdistatavale õigusabi osutamisest. Kaasuses 
Goddi vs Italy ei ilmunud kaitsja kohtuistungile. Kaasuses Daud vs Portugal ei osutanud 
esimene määratud kaitsja isikule üldse õigusabi, teine aga ei valmistanud kohtuistungiks 
ette. Kõigil juhtudel leidis EIK, et tegemist on EIÕK artikkel 6 lõige 3 punkti c rikkumisega, 
aga kõigil juhtudel oli samas tegemist olukorraga, kus kaitsja oli teatud ülesande üldse 
tegemata jätnud. 
252 
kaitse efektiivsust mitte hindama hakata.841 Igal juhul ei ole EIK tuvastanud 
EIÕK artikkel 6 lõike 3 punkti c rikkumist üksnes süüdistatava väite tõttu, et 
kaitsja on küll üldises plaanis oma ülesanded täitnud, kuid ei ole mõnda oma 
ülesannet täitnud kvaliteetselt. Märkusena olgu öeldud, et viide kaitsja 
sõltumatusele ei ole kindlasti asjakohatu ja ka siseriiklikud kohtud peaksid seda 
põhimõtet kindlasti arvesse võtma. Kuigi Eesti kriminaalmenetluse seadustik ei 
sätesta kaitsja sõltumatust, on ometi ilmne, et kaitsja tegutseb kriminaal-
menetluses oma kaitsealuse huvides ja ei ole vastaspoole ega kohtu dikteerida, 
kuidas kaitsja oma ülesandeid täidab. Kuivõrd enamik kriminaalmenetluses 
osalevaid kaitsjaid on Eestis advokaadid,842 on põhjust kaitsja sõltumatuse 
definitsiooni otsida advokatuuriseadusest (edaspidi AdvS).843 Advokatuuri-
seaduse § 43 lõike 1 kohaselt on advokaat õigusteenust osutades sõltumatu ning 
juhindub seadustest, advokatuuri organite õigusaktidest ja otsustest, advokaadi 
kutse-eetika nõuetest ning headest kommetest ja südametunnistusest. Kuna 
Eesti kriminaalmenetlus baseerub kahe võrdse poole vahelisel võistlusel, mille 
alusel langetab erapooletu kohus otsuse, võib järeldada, et selleks, et menetlus 
oleks aus ja õiglane, nagu seda nõuab KrMS § 339 lg 1 p 12, kehtib advoka-
tuuriseaduses tooduga sarnane sõltumatuse põhimõte kõigi kriminaalmenetluses 
osalevate kaitsjate (ja loomulikult ka prokuröride) kohta. 
EIK ettevaatlik lähenemine kaitsja efektiivsuse sisulisele hindamisele on 
mõistetav – kaitsjad on tõepoolest sõltumatud oma ametialases tegevuses ja 
kohtumenetluse poolena on neil õigus langetada otsuseid, ilma et teised 
kohtumenetluse pooled või kohus sellesse sekkuks. Pealegi, EIK poole ei saa 
süüdistatav pöörduda otse oma kaitsja vastu, vaid ta peab viitama riigi 
tegematajätmisele. Selleks aga, et jaatada riigi vastutust ebaefektiivse kaitse 
korral, tuleb esmalt tunnustada riigi kohustust tegutseda, mis võistleva kohtu-
menetluse kontekstis tähendab seda, et kohus, kes kannab neutraalse otsustaja 
rolli, saab endale pädevuse sekkuda sõltumatu poole tegevusse. On selge, et 
selline kohtu käitumine läheb mõningasse konflikti võistleva menetluse 
põhimõtetega. Teiselt poolt tähendaks riigi vastutuse eitamine seda, et eba-
efektiivne kaitse tema suhtes läbi viidud menetluses jääb heastamata.844 Sestap 
tuleb tõdeda, et kuigi tuleb tunnustada kaitsjate sõltumatuse põhimõtet, on 
kokkuvõttes just riik see, kes esitab isikule süüdistuse, viib tema suhtes läbi 
kohtumenetluse ja viimaks mõistab talle karistuse, milleks võib olla ka 
vabadusekaotus, mis tähendab seda, et riik on see, kellel lasub kohustus tagada 
                                                     
841 EIK tõi kaitsjate elukutse sõltumatuse esimest korda välja kaasuses Goddi vs Italy ning 
on alates selles otsusest rõhutanud kaitsjate sõltumatuse põhimõtet korduvalt. 
842 Tulenevalt KrMS § 42 lg 1 p-st 1 võib lepinguliseks kaitsjaks olla advokaat ja teised 
KrMS § 41 lg-s 4 sätestatud haridusnõuetele vastavad isikud menetleja loal. Määratud 
kaitsjaks võib KrMS § 42 lg 1 p 2 kohaselt olla üksnes advokaat. Kuigi käesoleva ajani ei 
ole avaldatud statistikat selle kohta, kui palju kriminaalmenetlusi toimub advokaadist kaitsja 
osavõtul ja kui palju nö muu kaitsja osavõtul, julgen oma kogemuse põhjal siiski väita, et 
enamalt jaolt on kriminaalmenetluses kaitsjaks advokaadid.  
843 Advokatuuriseadus. – RT I 2001, 36, 201; RT I, 14.03.2011, 24. 
844 Ed Cape et al., Effective Criminal Defence in Europe (2010), p. 59. 
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selle menetluse kvaliteet, mida ta süüdistatava suhtes läbi viib. Seetõttu olen 
seisukohal, et asjaolu, et EIK ei pruugi ebaefektiivset kaitset tunnistada 
konventsiooni rikkumiseks, ei vähenda riigi kohustust efektiivne kaitse süüdis-
tatavatele tagada. Sellest tõdemusest olen lähtunud ka käesoleva töö 
kirjutamisel. 
Seega, olgu kaitsjad oma töös nii sõltumatud kui tahes, peab teatud kontroll 
nende tegevuse üle siiski võimalik olema seetõttu, et süüdistatava õigus kaits-
jale ei taanduks kaitsja kohaloleku kriteeriumiks. Kohtulik kontroll on 
konkurentsi kõrval üks olulisemaid ebaefektiivse kaitse vähendamise mehha-
nisme. Kohus juhib menetlust ja omab vahetut ülevaadet kaitsja tegevusest ja 
seetõttu ka kiiret võimalust ebaefektiivsele kaitsele reageerida. Seejuures võib 
kohtu kontrolli kaitsja tegevuse üle jagada jooksvaks kontrolliks ja järel-
kontrolliks. Jooksva kontrolli all pean silmas kohtu võimalust esitada eba-
efektiivset tööd tegevale kaitsjale asjakohaseid tähelepanekuid ja järelepärimisi 
kuni selleni välja, et kohtul on võimalik ebaefektiivne kaitsja menetlusest 
taandada. Järelkontrolli teostab kohus süüdistatava taotlusel eelkõige apellat-
siooni- või kassatsioonimenetluses ja selle tulemus võib olla alama astme kohtu 
otsuse tühistamine ebaefektiivse kaitse tõttu ning süüdistatavale uue menetluse 
võimaldamine (erandjuhtudel ka kohe uue otsuse, nt õigeksmõistva otsuse 
tegemine). Käesolevast tööst olen välja jätnud kaitsjate tsiviilvastutuse ja 
advokaatide distsiplinaarvastutuse kui kriminaalmenetlusvälise järelkontrolli, ja 
seda järgmistel põhjustel. 
Tsiviilvastutuse suurimaks puuduseks peetakse seda, et see ei muuda 
kriminaalmenetluse tulemust. Tõepoolest, rahaline kompensatsioon ei muuda 
seda, et süüdistatava suhtes läbi viidud menetlus oli ebaõiglane, ja mis veelgi 
hullem – et tema suhtes tehtud süüdimõistev kohtuotsus võib olla ebaõige.845 
Lisaks tuleb arvestada, et võimalus, et süüdistatav kunagi hiljem pöördub (kui 
üldse pöördub) tsiviilkohtu poole, on kriminaalmenetluse toimumise ajal 
niivõrd ähmane, et see ei pruugi mõjutada kaitsja(te) käitumist.  
Ka distsiplinaarvastutusel on reeglina sama puudus, mis tsiviilvastutuselgi, 
olgugi et kui süüdistatav pöördub advokatuuri pädeva organi poole, võib 
juhtuda, et ebaefektiivsele kaitsele reageeritakse kriminaalmenetluse jooksul – 
näiteks heidetakse advokaat karistuseks advokatuurist välja, mis tähendab, et 
süüdistatav saab endale uue kaitsja, või juhul kui advokaadi suhtes kohaldatakse 
mõnd teist karistust, võib juhtuda, et see mõjutab teda edaspidi menetluses 
efektiivselt tegutsema. Igal juhul tuleb arvestada, et advokatuurile kui teatud 
isikuid ühendaval institutsioonile on igati loomupärane oma liikmeid  
kaitsta, mis võib viia selleni, et ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebusele ei reageerita  
                                                     
845 Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel – the Trial Judge's Role, 633, p. 649; Eve 
Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 679 (2006–2007), p. 700; Jay William Burnett & 
Catherine Greene Burnett, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting a Felony Trial Judge: To Remove 
Or Not to Remove Deficient Counsel, 41 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1315 (1999–2000), p. 1353; Asher 
D. Grunis, Incompetence of Defence Counsel in Criminal Cases Articles and Addresses, 16 
Crim. L. Q. 288 (1973–1974), p. 289. 
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adekvaatselt.846 Ka on oluline, et lepinguliseks kaitsjaks võib Eestis olla mitte-
advokaadist kaitsja, mis tähendab seda, et sellest inimesest läheb distsiplinaar-
vastutus täiesti mööda. Ja viimaks, kui panna ennast ebaefektiivse kaitsjaga 
süüdistatava olukorda, siis distsiplinaarkaristus on veelgi vähem tulemust andev 
kui tsiviilvastutus: kui tsiviilmenetluse tulemuseks võib olla rahaline kompen-
satsioon, siis distsiplinaarvastutus tähendab üksnes seda, et advokatuuri pädev 
organ järeldab, et advokaat ei täitnud oma kohustust ja seetõttu tuleb tema 
suhtes kohaldada karistust. 
Kui rääkida täpsemalt kohtulikust kontrollist, mida käsitlen põhjalikult 
käesoleva töö neljandas peatükis, siis tuleb tõdeda, et kaitse ebaefektiivsuse 
kaebuse esitamise võimalus pärast kohtuotsuse tegemist kõrgemale kohtule ei 
pruugi süüdistatava kaitseõigust tagada, kuna võib osutuda süüdistatava jaoks 
liiga suureks koormaks.847 Juba ainuüksi etteantud tõendamisstandard võib 
määrata ära selle, et on peaaegu võimatu kaitseõiguse rikkumise kaebuse 
esitamisel edu saavutada. Teiseks ei pruugi kriminaalasja materjalid anda 
kaebust lahendavale kohtule piisavalt informatsiooni kaitsja tegevuse kohta 
kohtumenetluse käigus.848 Kolmandaks tekib küsimus, kes selle kaebuse 
esitama peaks. Ringkonnakohtule saab Eestis kaebuse esitada süüdistatav ise, 
kuid Riigikohtule võib süüdistatav kaebuse esitada KrMS § 344 lõike 3 punktist 
2 lähtudes üksnes advokaadist kaitsja vahendusel. See tekitab aga omakorda 
probleeme, kuivõrd võib oletada, et arvestades, et kaitsjad eelistavad ka 
edaspidi vähemalt mingil määral tööalaselt normaalseid suhteid säilitada, ei ole 
nad teab kui varmad üksteise peale kaebama. Ja isegi kui süüdistatav valib 
ringkonnakohtusse kaebust esitades võimaluse esitada kaebus ise, vältimaks 
kahe kaitsja vahel tekkida võivaid vastuolusid, siis ei ole üldse kindel, kas ta 
juriidilise hariduseta inimesena suudab asjakohased aspektid kõrgema kohtu 
jaoks välja tuua. Lisaks tuleb arvestada, et isegi kui kaitsja on menetluse jooksul 
teinud vigu, on alama astme kohtu otsuse tühistamine ja kriminaalasja uueks 
arutamiseks saatmine alati põhjalikku kaalumist vajav otsustus, kuivõrd uus 
protsess tähendab uusi kulutusi, riivab õiguskindluse põhimõtet ning garan-
teeritud ei ole, et tõendite kvaliteet on säilinud (nt tunnistajad võivad olla nähtu 
unustanud).849 Kui tegemist on kaitsja veaga, mis oleks pidanud olema teada ka 
                                                     
846 Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel Claims, 679, p. 700. 
847 Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court: Trial Court Responsibility 
for Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N. Y. U. Rev. L. & 
Soc. Change 425 (2004–2005), p. 451. 
848 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance: The Awakening of 
Cronic's Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 827 
(2003), p. 841; Richard Klein, Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact 
on Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, the, 29 B. C. L. Rev. 531 (1987–
1988), p. 566; Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: 
Some Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 Brandeis L. J. 793 (2003–
2004), p. 803. 
849 Bruce A. Green, Judicial Rationalizations for Rationing Justice: How Sixth Amendment 
Doctrine Undermines Reform Colloquium: What does it Mean to Practice Law in the 
255 
menetlust juhtinud kohtule, võib öelda, et reageerimine alles kõrgema kohtu 
tasandil on vastutustundetu ressursside raiskamine, kuna asja menetlev kohus 
oleks saanud ise kaitsja käitumist korrigeerida. Mõistetavalt on otstarbekam, kui 
kohus saab kaitsja ebaefektiivsele tööle reageerida koheselt menetluse käigus.  
Põhimõtteliselt on kohtul, kes näeb pealt ebaefektiivset kaitset enda juhitud 
menetluses, kolm võimalust – ta kas jääb neutraalseks ja tegevusetuks, nagu 
ühele võistlevas menetluses menetlust juhtivale kohtule peaks idee järgi justkui 
kohane olema, võtab üle kaitsja ülesanded, mis tähendab seda, et kohtunik ja 
kaitsja on menetluses üks ja seesama isik, või suunab kaitsja kui kohtu-
menetluse poole käitumist, ise samal ajal tema positsiooni üle võtmata. Esimene 
ja teine võimalus on võistleva menetluse põhimõtteid arvestades vastu-
võetamatu – igal juhul kaob võistlevale menetlusele klassikaliselt omane 
kolmnurk – süüdistus, kaitse ja otsustaja: esimesel juhul kaitsja ja teisel juhul 
kohtunik. Seega jääb üle üksnes kolmas võimalus, mis otseselt tunnustab kohtu 
kui menetluse juhi rolli kriminaalmenetluses. Edasi tekib loomulikult küsimus, 
kuidas kohus kaitsja käitumist suunama peaks, et ei tekiks olukorda, kus kohus 
sekkub kaitsja sõltumatusesse liialt või võtab kaitsja rolli üle.  
Ühelt poolt ei keela miski kohtul teha kaitsjale menetluse käigus teatud ette-
kirjutusi – kohustada teda kriminaalasja materjalidega tutvuma, süüdistatavaga 
nõu pidama jne. Kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku § 273 lg-s 4 on kaitsja kohustus 
ennast kriminaalasjaga kurssi viia eraldi väljagi toodud. Nimelt võib kohus 
kohtuistungi kuni kümneks päevaks edasi lükata ning panna istungi 
edasilükkamisest tingitud kriminaalmenetluse kulud kaitsja kanda, kui kaitsja ei 
tunne kriminaalasja. Veelgi olulisem kohustus on loomulikult kohtuistungil 
osalemise kohustus, mis tuleneb KrMS § 270 lg-st 2. Alates 1. septembrist 2011 
lisandus kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku KrMS § 267 lg 41, mis lubab kohtul 
kõrvaldada kaitsja menetlusest, kui isik ei ole võimeline kohtus nõuetekohaselt 
esinema või on kohtumenetluses näidanud end ebaausana, asjatundmatuna või 
vastutustundetuna, samuti kui ta on pahatahtlikult takistanud asja õiget ja kiiret 
menetlemist või jätnud korduvalt täitmata kohtu korralduse. Mida see säte 
täpselt tähendab, on selgusetu, kuna eelnõu seletuskirjas ei ole märgitud midagi 
muud, kui et sätte eesmärk on tagada võistlevas menetluses kohtusse saadetud 
kriminaalasjade tõhus ja kiire arutamine.850 Paigutatud on see lõige paragrahvi 
267, mille peakiri on „Kohtuistungi korda rikkuva isiku suhtes võetavad 
meetmed”. Arvestades seda, et KrMS § 267 lg 42 näeb ette, et kohus teeb viivi-
tamata kohtumenetluse poolele ettepaneku valida endale uus kaitsja, paistab 
olemuslikult tegemist olevat lepingulise kaitsja taandamist lubava sättega, kuigi 
KrMS § 55, kus on sätestatud kõik kaitsja taandamise, sh ebakompetentse 
määratud kaitsja taandamise alused, seda alust lisatud ei ole. Kuigi ma ei ole 
iseenesest vastu, et kohtule on antud pädevus ebakompetentne lepinguline 
                                                                                                                                  
Interests of Justice in the Twenty-First Century, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1729 (2001–2002), p. 
1730. 
850 Kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste seaduste muutmise 
seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri. 599 SE, XI Riigikogu koosseis. 
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kaitsja taandada, taunin niivõrd olulise pädevuse andmist kohtule ilma, et 
eelnevalt oleks ühiskonnas toimunud põhjalik arutelu. Ei maksa unustada, et 
ebaefektiivse kaitsja taandamisega saab kohus sisuliselt võimaluse eemaldada 
menetlusest ka selline kaitsja, kes ei ole kohtule mingil põhjusel meelepärane 
(nt kaitseb süüdistatava õigusi liiga aktiivselt ja on kohtunikule n-ö ebamugav). 
Seetõttu peaks kohtule vastava pädevuse andmisele eelnema põhjalik arutelu, 
millised on ebaefektiivse kaitse tunnused, milline kohtu kohustus enda otsustust 
põhjendada, milline on kaebevõimalus, st kõik, mis puudutab kohtute poolset 
kuritarvituste vältimist. Seda arutelu ei toimunud enne ebakompetentse määra-
tud kaitsja taandamise aluse sissetoomist kriminaalmenetluse seadustikku ega 
toimunud ka nüüd. Ja ei maksa unustada, et on neidki, kes leiavad, et süüdis-
tatava poolt valitud kaitsja taandamine on niivõrd radikaalne sekkumine 
süüdistatava õigusesse valida endale kaitsja, et see ei tohiks üldse lubatud olla. 
Ka selle lähenemise pooldajatele peaks enne vastava kohtu pädevuse menetlus-
reeglitesse sisseviimist andma võimaluse oma argumente esitada. 
Aga nagu ma juba mainisin, arutelude korraldamine enne kohtule pädevuse 
andmist süüdistatava ja kaitsja vahelisse suhtesse sekkumiseks paistab Eesti 
seadusandjale üldse põhimõtteliselt vastumeelne olevat. Nimelt tuleneb 1. jaa-
nuaril 2010 jõustunud riigi õigusabi seaduse851 (edaspidi RÕS) § 20 lg 31 
esimesest lausest (taandamisaluse enda annab KrMS § 55 lg 1), et kohus 
kõrvaldab riigi õigusabi saaja taotlusel või omal algatusel määrusega advokaadi 
riigi õigusabi osutamisest, kui advokaat on end näidanud asjatundmatuna või 
hooletuna. 1. jaanuarist 2009 kuni 1. jaanuarini 2010 kehtinud redaktsioon 
nõudis kaitsealuse nõusolekut kaitsja taandamiseks, kuid nüüd süüdistatava 
nõusolekut enam ei nõuta. Kuigi võib arvata, et sellise muudatusega püüti 
reguleerida situatsioone, kus süüdistatav ei pruugi ise aru saada kaitsja töö 
ebaefektiivsusest või ta saab, kuid teatud põhjustel siiski kaitsja taandamist ei 
nõua, ei ole eelnõu seletuskirjas tehtud muudatust siiski kommenteeritud.852 Ka 
seda, mida hooletus ja asjatundmatus tähendavad, ei ole siiani veel kusagil lahti 
seletatud. 
Kõik eelnev tähendab kohtu võimalust sekkuda alles siis, kui ebaefektiivne 
kaitse on juba aset leidnud. Ameerika Ühendriikides on leitud, et tagantjärgi 
reageerimine pole just kõige otstarbekam, ning seal on tehtud ettepanek anda 
kohtule võimalus ka ennetavaks kontrolliks. Esiteks peavad USA kolleegid 
tähtsaks kohtunikupoolset selgitustööd: kohtunik peaks juba enne kohtu-
menetluse algust rääkima kaitsja ja süüdistatavaga, selgitamaks neile, milline on 
kaitsja funktsioon kriminaalmenetluses.853 Kohtunik William W. Schwarzer on 
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853 Peter W. Tague, Attempt to Improve Criminal Defense Representation, the, 15 Am. Crim. 
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USA-s soovitanud kohtuistungieelset intervjuud.854 See toimub tema nägemuse 
kohaselt selliselt, et enne kohtumenetluse algust kutsub kohus kaitsja enda 
juurde ning palub tal selgitada, millised on tema poolt süüdistatava kohtus 
kaitsmiseks tehtud ettevalmistused. Enne seda küsib kohus süüdistatavalt, 
sealjuures eelistatavalt nelja silma all, sest kaitsja kohaloleku puhul ei pruugi 
süüdistatav oma tõelist arvamust avaldada, kas ta on rahul kaitsja senise ja 
planeeritava tööga. Sellist lähenemist saab kasutada nii lepingulise kui ka 
määratud kaitsja puhul. Kui ollakse mures selle üle, et kohtunik saab teada 
infot, mida ta asja otsustajana ei peaks teadma, on võimalus, et intervjuu 
korraldab teine kohtunik või hoopis kohtuteenistuja.855 Intervjuu eelis on, et see 
annab võimaluse saada nii teavet kui ka fikseeritud materjale selle kohta, mida 
kaitsja tegi ning miks ta teatud samme ei ole ette võtnud.856 Intervjuud on 
soovitatud ka kokkuleppemenetluse korral,857 kuna kokkuleppemenetluse 
olemusest lähtuvalt peaks kaitsja olema enne selle menetlusliigi süüdistatavale 
soovitamist ja enne ise sellega nõustumist veendunud, et just kokkuleppe-
menetlus tagab süüdistatava jaoks soodsaima tulemi. Seda saab kaitsja aga teada 
üksnes siis, kui ta on ennast kriminaalasja faktide ja kohaldatava õigusega 
piisavalt kurssi viinud, mida saabki kohtunik intervjuu käigus kontrollida.  
Teine võimalus, mis ei ole niivõrd aega ja muid ressursse nõudev, on nn 
kontrollnimekirja süsteem. Kaitsjal tuleb täita kohtu poolt antud küsimustik 
selle kohta, mida ta on teinud ja mida mitte ning mida tal on veel plaanis teha. 
Süüdistataval on sellisel juhul võimalus kaitsja poolt täidetud küsimustik üle 
vaadata ning kui ta millegagi nõus ei ole, pöördub ta kohtuniku poole, millele 
järgneb juba vestlus süüdistatava ja kaitsjaga. Kui tal aga kaitsja poolt kirjeldatu 
osas vastuväiteid ei ole, ei edastata küsimustikku kohtunikule. Täidetud küsi-
mustiku abil on võimalik lahendada ka hilisemad, pärast isiku süüdimõistmist 
esitatud ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebused.858  
Käesolevas töös väljendan toetust just viimasele lähenemisele, kuna see ei 
ole niivõrd ressurssinõudev kui intervjuu ning kohtunik ei sekku sellisel juhul 
niivõrd intensiivselt süüdistatava ja kaitsja suhtesse, kui ta teeb intervjuu 
käigus. Lisaks sellele on Eesti selles suunas juba liikunud – alates 1. septembrist 
2011 on kaitsjal pärast süüdistusakti koopia saamist kohustus hiljemalt kolm 
tööpäeva enne eelistungit kohtule esitada kaitseakt ning prokuratuurile selle 
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koopia (KrMS § 227 lg 1). Kaitseaktis märgitakse, millised on kaitse seisu-
kohad süüdistuse ning süüdistusaktis nimetatud kahju kohta, sealhulgas millised 
süüdistusaktis esitatud väited ja seisukohad vaidlustatakse ja millised võetakse 
omaks; tõendid, mida kaitsja soovib kohtule esitada, viidates, millist asjaolu 
millise tõendiga tõendada soovitakse; nende isikute nimekiri, kelle kutsumist 
kohtuistungile kaitsja taotleb ning kaitsja muud taotlused (KrMS § 227 lg 3 p-d 
1–4). Seega annab kaitseakt mingil määral ülevaate sellest, mida kaitsja on juba 
menetluses ära teinud ja mida ta plaanib veel teha. Vastavalt eelnõu seletus-
kirjale aitab kaitseakti koostamise kohustus paremini tagada poolte võrdsuse 
kohtumenetluses ning võimaldab ühtlasi viia kohtuliku menetluse läbi senisest 
ettevalmistatumalt ja seega kiiremini. 
Kui kaitsja ei ole kohtumenetluses oma tööülesandeid kompetentselt täitnud 
ja süüdistatav ise või kohus ei ole sellele mingil põhjusel alama astme kohtus 
toimunud menetluse vältel reageerinud, oli Eestis süüdistataval võimalik vaid-
lustada alama astme kohtu otsus apellatsiooni- ja kassatsioonikorras enne  
1. septembrit 2011 KrMS § 339 lõike 2 alusel, nüüd eelduslikult KrMS § 339 lg 
1 p 12 alusel. Tulenevalt viimasena nimetatud sättest on kriminaalmenetlus-
õiguse oluline rikkumine, kui kohtulikul arutamisel on rikutud ausa ja õiglase 
kohtumenetluse põhimõtet. Eelnõu seletuskirjast nähtub, et ausa ja õiglase 
kohtumenetluse põhimõtte rikkumine peaks olema kriminaalmenetlusõiguse 
olulise rikkumisena seaduses eraldi välja toodud, kuna tegemist on kriminaal-
menetluse keskse põhimõttega, mis on sätestatud ka EIÕK artikkel 6 esimeses 
lõikes. Kuni 1. septembrini 2011 käsitas Riigikohus ausa ja õiglase menetluse 
põhimõtte rikkumist olulise menetlusõiguse rikkumisena KrMS § 339 lg 2 
tähenduses.859 Käesoleval ajal sätestab KrMS § 341 lg 3, et tuvastades KrMS  
§ 339 lg 1 p-s 12 nimetatud kriminaalmenetlusõiguse olulise rikkumise, mida ei 
ole võimalik apellatsioonimenetluses kõrvaldada, tühistab ringkonnakohus 
kohtuotsuse ja saadab kriminaalasja maakohtule uueks arutamiseks samas või 
teises kohtukoosseisus. Lähtudes KrMS § 361 lg-st 2 peaks samamoodi toimima 
ka Riigikohus. Kui ebaefektiivne kaitse on kõrgema kohtu arvates toonud kaasa 
isiku ebaõige süüdimõistmise või liiga raske karistuse, peaks lähtuvalt menet-
luse efektiivsuse põhimõttest kõrgem kohus ise õigeksmõistva kohtuotsuse ära 
tegema või mõistma süüdistatavale kergema karistuse, sest sellisel juhul on 
ebaefektiivse kaitsega tekitatud kahju süüdistatavale võimalik heastada ilma, et 
alamas astmes tuleks menetlust korrata.  
Arvestades asjaolu, et kohtuotsuse tühistamine ning uue menetluse võimal-
damine toob endaga kaasa täiendavad kulutused ja riivab tugevalt õiguskindluse 
põhimõtet, tekib õigustatult küsimus, millisel juhul tuleks alama astme kohtu 
otsus tühistada ebaefektiivse kaitse korral ehk Eesti seadustiku mõisteid 
kasutades – millisel juhul on tegemist kriminaalmenetlusõiguse olulise rikku-
misega (st ausa ja õiglase kohtumenetluse põhimõtte rikkumisega)? Kas iga 
kaitsjapoolne ülesannete täitmata jätmine peaks kaasa tooma kohtuotsuse 
tühistamise? Sellele küsimusele on mitmeid erinevaid vastuseid. 
                                                     
859 Riigikohtu kriminaalkolleegiumi 8. aprilli 2011. a otsus kriminaalasjas nr 3-1-1-19-11. 
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Näiteks USA-s said ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebused hoo sisse USA Ülemkohtu 
otsusega Gideon vs Wainwright, mis pani kohtud tõsiselt kaaluma seda, millal 
tuleks alama astme kohtu otsus tühistada. Siin tuleb eristada kahte aspekti. 
Esiteks saab rääkida kaitsja poolt tehtavatest vigadest, mis toovad kohtu-
menetluse käigus kaasa kohtu reageeringu, alustades märkustest ja lõpetades 
taandamisega, st vead, mille puhul me saame iseenesest rääkida ebaefektiivsest 
kaitsest. Teiseks saab rääkida standardist, mida kohtud kasutavad, otsustamaks, 
kas tühistada alama astme kohtu otsus, kui selgub, et kaitsja tegi sealses 
menetluses olulisi vigu. Lähtudes asjaolust, et kõrgema astme kohtu jaoks on 
kaalukausil nii süüdistatava kui ka õigussüsteemi huvid, tuleb ette, et isegi kui 
kõrgem kohus tuvastab, et kaitsja ei täitnud alama astme kohtus oma kohustusi 
nõuetekohaselt, st oli ebaefektiivne, ei pruugi sellest kõrgema kohtu jaoks 
piisata selleks, et õigustada kohtuotsuse tühistamist. Põhimõtteliselt tähendab 
see, et kõrgema kohtu jaoks on ebaefektiivse kaitse tõendamiseks vaja lisaks 
kaitsjapoolsete vigade äranäitamisele ka midagi muud, nt seda, et kaitsja vead 
mõjutasid menetluse tulemust. Selline standard on kaheastmeline. On standard 
üheastmeline, siis teatud kaitsjapoolsed vead (aga kindlasti mitte kõik, sest 
süüdistatav ei saa oodata perfektset kaitset860) tähendavad ebaefektiivset kaitset 
ja toovad automaatselt kaasa alama astme kohtu otsuse tühistamise. Kõige 
lihtsam on nimetatud kahe lähenemise erinevust selgitada USA Ülemkohtu 
praktika alusel. 
Otsuses Strickland vs Washington861 leidis Ülemkohus, et otsuse tühistamise 
toob kaasa see, kui kaitsja tegi oma tööd kvaliteediga, mis langes alla 
objektiivse mõistlikkuse taseme ja see mõjutas menetluse tulemust. Kohus 
rõhutas, et kaitsja ebaefektiivsuse kaebused tuleb lahendada juhtumipõhiselt 
ning et kindlasti tuleb välja selgitada ebapädeva töö kahjulik mõju. Kui kohus 
saab jätta kaebuse rahuldamata kahjuliku mõju puudumise tõttu, siis kaitsja 
tööle ei tulegi sisulist hinnangut anda. See Ülemkohtu otsus pani aluse 
kaheastmelise standardi kasutamisele selleks, et kindlaks teha, kas kaitsja 
tegevuse ebaadekvaatsus toob endaga kaasa alama astme kohtu otsuse 
tühistamise. Oluline on seejuures lisada, et USA kohtu praktika kohaselt peab 
mõlemad elemendid tõendama süüdistatav.  
EIK, muide, erinevalt USA Ülemkohtust, ei nõua, et süüdimõistetu tõendaks 
ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebuse korral kahjustava elemendi olemasolu. EIK 
arvamuse kohaselt ei tähenda asjaolu, et süüdistatav ei kandnud mingit kahju 
seda, et tema õigust kaitsjale poleks rikutud.862 Veelgi enam, kohus on 
märkinud, et Konventsiooni rikkumine tuleb kõne alla ka ilma selleta, et sellega 
                                                     
860 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), 475 U.S. 681. 
861 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
862 EIK ütles seda väga selgelt otsuses Artico vs Italy. Pisut arusaamatuks jääb lahendi Artico 
vs Italy kontekstis lahend Alimena vs Italy. (Application no. 11910/85. 19 February 1991). 
Siin kordas kohus küll Artico vs Italy lahendis toodud seisukohta, mille kohaselt ei ole 
süüdistataval vaja tõendada kahjustava elemendi olemasolu, kuid märkis siiski, et 
süüdistatav oli ilma jäetud õigusabist, mis oleks võinud aidata kaasa ta püüdlustele 
saavutada õigeksmõistev kohtuotsus. 
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oleks kaasnenud isiku jaoks kahjulik tagajärg. Kahjustav element on oluline 
üksnes EIÕK artikli 50 kontekstis.863 Seega lähtub EIK erinevalt USA 
Ülemkohtust pigem üheastmelisest testist ning leiab, et kaitseõiguse rikkumine 
on võimalik ka sellisel juhul, kui kahjustav element puudub. Aga seejuures 
tuleb lisada, et EIK ei pea arvestama õiguskindluse põhimõttega, kuna erinevalt 
siseriiklikest kõrgema astme kohtutest ei otsusta EIK selle üle, kas alama astme 
kohtu otsus jääb jõusse või mitte: EIK üksnes järeldab Konventsiooni rikkumist, 
millele järgnevalt otsustab riik ise, kuidas EIK järeldusele reageerida. 
Kahjustav element on see, mille tõendamise kohustus teeb Strickland vs 
Washingtoni kriitikutele suurt tuska. On neid, kes arvavad, et see element on 
põhimõtteliselt vastuvõetamatu ja on neid, kes leiavad, et õiguskindluse ja 
õigussüsteemi säästmise argumenti arvestades on see element igati vajalik, kuid 
lähtudes süütuse presumptsioonist peaks pigem prokurör tõendama selle 
elemendi puudumist kui süüdistatav selle olemasolu. Ülemkohus on ise teinud 
ebaefektiivse kaitse valdkonnas sellise möönduse, et kahjustava elemendi 
olemasolu eeldatakse juhul, kui kaitsja menetlusest puudus või tema tegut-
semine oli takistatud864 või kui kaitsjal oli huvide konflikt, millele menetlus-
osaline tähelepanu juhtis, kuid millele kohus ei reageerinud.865 Need, kes 
eitavad põhimõtteliselt kahjustava elemendi kasutamise sobilikkust ebaefek-
tiivse kaitse kaebuste lahendamiseks, leiavad, et õigus efektiivsele kaitsele on 
üks õiglase menetluse näitaja. See tähendab omakorda, et kui süüdistatavale 
pole menetluses tagatud efektiivset kaitset, pole tema suhtes läbi viidud 
menetlus olnud õiglane ja õiglane ei saa olla ka selle menetluse tulem isegi siis, 
kui saab väita, et uue menetluse läbiviimisel oleks tulemus tõenäoliselt see-
sama.866 Rõhutatakse sedagi, et just võistlevas menetluses on kaitsja kui proku-
rörile võrdväärse vastase osavõtt äärmiselt oluline, mistõttu võib järeldada, et 
menetluse käik ja selle korrektsus on peaaegu et olulisemgi kui selle tulemus.867 
Käesolevas töös toetan seisukohta, et raskemate rikkumiste korral ei tohiks 
kahjustava elemendi tõendamise nõue üldse kõne alla tulla, isegi kui selle 
olemasolu tõendamist ei nõuta süüdistatavalt, vaid selle puudumise tõendamist 
                                                     
863 EIÕK artikkel 50 sätestab: „Kui kohus leiab, et mõni Kõrge Lepinguosalise õigus- või 
muu võimu langetatud otsus või rakendatud abinõu on täielikult või osaliselt vastuolus 
konventsioonist tulenevate kohustustega ning kui osundatud lepinguosalise siseriiklik õigus 
lubab otsuse või abinõu läbi kahjustatule ainult osalist hüvitust selle otsuse või abinõu 
tagajärgede eest, võib kohus vajadusel oma otsusega määrata kahjustatud poolele õiglase 
hüvituse.“ 
864 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). 
865 Holloway v. Arkansas. 
866 Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for 
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Notes and Comments, 77 Geo. L. J. 413 
(1988–1989), p. 440; Cape et al., Effective Criminal Defence in Europe, p. 4. 
867 Richard Ekins, Defence Counsel Incompetence and Post-Conviction Relief: An Analysis 
of how Adversarial Systems of Justice Assess Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 9 
Auckland U. L. Rev. 529 (2000–2003), p. 554; Richard L. Gabriel, Stickland Standard for 
Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise 
of due Process, the Comment, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. [1290] (1985–1986), p. 1266. 
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prokurörilt. Kui kaitsja on jätnud täitmata olulise kohustuse, ei ole kahjustav 
elemendi tõendamise nõue ebaefektiivse kaitse kaebuste lahendamiseks 
võistleva menetluse kontekstis sobiv. Kuna menetlust, kus tegutses kaitsja, kes 
rikkus oma olulist kohustust, ei saa pidada võistlevaks, siis ei ole otsus, millega 
menetlus kulmineerub, õiglase menetluse tulem. Seega ei ole kohane eraldi 
vaadata, millist mõju avaldas ebaefektiivne kaitse kohtuotsusele, mis välistab 
kahjustava elemendi kasutamise, ükskõik siis, kas sel viisil, et elemendi 
tõendamise kohustus on süüdistataval või selle puudumise tõendamise kohustus 
prokuröril. Käesoleva töö kuuendas peatükis toon rea kohustusi, mis minu 
arvates on niivõrd olulised, et nende rikkumine kaitsja poolt peaks automaatselt 
kaasa tooma alama astme kohtu otsuse tühistamise. Siiski on selge, et mitte iga 
kaitsja poolt tehtud viga ei saa kaasa tuua kohtuotsuse tühistamist ja uue 
menetluse võimaldamist süüdistatavale. Vastasel juhul oleksid ebaefektiivse 
kaitse kaebused õigussüsteemile liiga suureks koormaks, ja me justkui 
lähtuksime eeldusest, et inimene saab olla veatu, mis ei ole kuidagi kooskõlas 
tegelikkusega. Seetõttu pakun ma käesolevas töös lahenduse, mis seisneb selles, 
et ma toon välja minu hinnangul kõige olulisemad kohustused, mis lasuvad 
kaitsjal alati, olenemata sellest, millise kriminaalasjaga tegu on. Kui mõnda 
neist kohustustest on rikutud, saab järeldada, et kaitse on olnud ebaefektiivne, 
mis toob endaga kõrgema astme kohtu menetluses kaasa madalama astme 
otsuse tühistamise. Lisaks sellele on aga süüdistataval võimalik tõendada, et 
kaitsja jättis täitmata mõne teise, nimekirjas mitte toodud kohustuse. Sellisel 
juhul tõusetub teravalt vajadus kaitsta ressursside kokkuhoiu ja õiguskindluse 
põhimõtet, mistõttu otsus tuleks kohtul tühistada üksnes kahjustava elemendi 
olemasolu korral. Selleks et selline lähenemine ei oleks vastuolus süütuse 
presumptsiooniga, teen ettepaneku, et prokurör on see, kellel on kohustus 
tõendada kahjustava elemendi puudumist. 
Nimekiri kaitsja olulisematest kohustustest on teema, mis on samuti USA-s 
palju arutelu tekitanud. Alustada tuleb sellest, et Ülemkohus sellist nimekirja 
Stricklandi lahendiga ei koostanud, mis tekitas umbes sama palju pahameelt kui 
kahjustava elemendi kasutamine. Kaitsetöö, mis „langeb alla objektiivse 
mõistlikkuse taseme“, on tõepoolest juhtnöör, millest ei ole kohtutele eba-
efektiivse kaitse kaebuste lahendamisel teab kui suurt abi. Üldse jaguneb 
arvamus sellest, millise standardi alusel kaitsjate efektiivsust hinnata, USA-s 
kaheks. On nn kaasusepõhise otsustuse tegemise pooldajad ja etteantud 
nimekirja pooldajad. Vastasseis nende kahe lähenemise vahel kulmineerus 
ammu enne seda, kui Ülemkohus Stricklandi kaasuses oma arvamuse välja 
ütles.868 Aasta oli siis 1976 ja ühe USA föderaalse apellatsioonikohtu ette jõudis 
juba kolmandat korda sama kaasus, milles vaidlus käis selle üle, kas 
süüdistatava kaitsja oli esimese astme kohtu menetluses ebaefektiivne või mitte. 
Esimesel korral võttis apellatsioonikohus konkreetse standardipõhise lähe-
                                                     
868 United States of America v. Willie DeCoster, Jr. No. 72-1283, 624 F.2d 196; 199 U.S. 
App. D.C. 359; 1976 U.S., October 19, 1976. 
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nemise, leides, et kaitsja efektiivsust saab hinnata ABA standardite869 alusel. 
1976. aastal tegi aga apellatsioonikohus en banc lahendi, milles leidis, et 
konkreetsete käitumisjuhendite kaitsjatele ettekirjutamine ei ole võimalik, 
kuivõrd iga menetlus on erinev. Lisaks rõhutas kohus seda, et ABA standardid 
on ühe eraorganisatsiooni välja töötatud käitumisjuhendid, mida ei ole kohtul 
kohane kaitsjate tegevuse hindamise aluseks võtta. Sarnasele seisukohale asus 
hiljem ka Stricklandi kohus, rõhutades seda, et kui üldse, siis ABA standardid 
saavad olla nn juhised, millest kohus võib, aga ei pea lähtuma. Kuigi lahendites 
Williams vs Taylor,870 Wiggins vs Smith,871 ja Rompilla vs Beard872 pea kaks-
kümmend aastat hiljem näis Ülemkohus astuvat sammu lähemale järeldusele, et 
ABA standardid ongi kaitsja töö kvaliteedi hindamise aluseks võetavad 
standardid, mis tekitas palju pahameelt USA Ülemkohtu konservatiivsemates 
kohtunikes, siis kauaks Stricklandi lahendi esimese elemendi kriitikutele siiski 
rõõmustada ei olnud antud – Bobby vs Van Hook873 oli lahend, kus Ülemkohus 
pöördus ABA standardite staatuse küsimuses tagasi Stricklandi seisukohtade 
juurde. Seega on Ülemkohtu praegune seisukoht, et ABA standardid annavad 
üksnes juhtnöörid selle kohta, mida mõistlikkus kaitsetöö puhul tähendab, mitte 
ei ole mõistlikkuse definitsioon.  
Ülemkohtu seisukohast võib aru saada. Advokatuur ei ole tõepoolest pädev 
organisatsioon otsustamaks, millal tuleks üks kohtuotsus tühistada ja millal 
mitte. Aga just sellise pädevuse omandaks advokatuur siis, kui kohtud 
hakkaksid kaitsja käitumise hindamisel lähtuma ainuüksi advokatuuri poolt oma 
liikmetele kehtestatud käitumisreeglitest. Sealjuures tuleb tähele panna, et kõik 
kaitsjad ei pruugi olla advokaadid (ja just Eestis see nii ongi – advokaatide 
kõrval leidub ka mitteadvokaatidest kaitsjaid) ja ebaefektiivse kaitse küsimuse 
otsustamine advokatuuri poolt kehtestatud käitumisreeglite järgi looks 
kummalise olukorra, kus mitteadvokaadid peaksid järgima käitumisreegleid, 
mis neile tegelikult ei kohaldu, kuna nad ei ole advokatuuri liikmed. Pealegi, 
advokaatide käitumisreeglite rikkumine toob advokaadile halvimal juhul kaasa 
distsiplinaarvastutuse, mitte ei tähenda kohtuotsuse tühistamist, mistõttu neid 
käitumisreegleid välja töötades ei ole keegi arvestanud vastuoluliste väärtus-
tega, mida tuleb arvesse võtta tasandil uus menetlus vs õiguskindlus, mis annab 
omakorda aluse järeldada, et nii mõnedki käitumisreeglid, mille advokatuur on 
kehtestanud, on sellised, mis kohtuotsuse tühistamist kaasa tooma ei peaks. 
Aga millega kaasusepõhise lähenemise pooldajad ei arvesta, on asjaolu, et 
kui kohtutel puudub kaitsja tegevuse efektiivsuse hindamiseks vastav juhtnöör, 
siis tulemused võivad kohtuti olla väga erinevad. See aga toob omakorda kaasa 
                                                     
869 Ameerika Advokaatide Ühenduse standardid. Üks olulisemaid standardeid on ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice. Prosecution Function and Defense Function. Third Edition 
(1993). 
870 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
871 Wiggins v. Smith, Warden, et al. 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 
872 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2004). 
873 Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U. S. ____ (2009). Ka lahendis Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S. 
____ (2010) rõhutas ülemkohus, et ABA standardid on ainult juhtnöörid. 
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olukorra, kus sarnaste kaasuste lahendused ei pruugi olla sarnased, olukorra, 
mida peaks lähtudes võrdse kohtlemise põhimõttest püüdma vältida. Kas seda 
just täiesti ära hoida saab, on iseküsimus, kuid meelevaldseid lahendusi aitab 
kindlasti vähendada see, kui kohtud enam-vähem teavad, mida ühelt kaitsjalt 
menetluses nõudma peaks. Selline standard peaks olema kohtute ühine 
kokkulepe, mitte aga neile advokatuuri poolt ette kirjutatud nimekiri kaitsjate 
kohustustest kriminaalmenetluses. Seetõttu olengi käesolevas töös püstitanud 
hüpoteesi, et on olemas teatud kaitsjate kohustused, mis on universaalsed ja 
millest võib koostada standardi, mille alusel kohtud saavad kaitsjate töö 
efektiivsust hinnata. Mõningad kohustused peaksid seejuures olema sellised, 
mille täitmata jätmine on ebaefektiivne kaitse per se ja toob endaga kaasa kas 
taandamise või teatud eriti oluliste kohustuste täitmata jätmine ka kohtuotsuse 
hilisema tühistamise kõrgema kohtu poolt. Osad olulisematest kohustustest on 
aga minu arvates sellised, mille täitmata jätmist saab kaitsja põhjendada 
taktikaliste kaalutlustega, mis omakorda välistab kaitse ebaefektiivsuse ja 
kaitsja taandamise või otsuse tühistamise. Igal juhul tuleb aga arvestada asja-
oluga, et iga kaasus on erinev,874 mistõttu üks standard ei saa kunagi olla katus, 
vaid üksnes vundament.875 Seega ei saa nimekiri kaitsja kohustustest, mille 
täitmata jätmine toob kaasa kaitsja taandamise või hiljem alama astme kohtu 
otsuse tühistamise, olla suletud. Ka siin tuleb arvestada, et nii mõnigi kord on 
nimekirjavälise kohustuse täitmata jätmine kaitsja kaalutletud otsus, mistõttu 
menetlust juhtival kohtul on igati mõistlik lasta kaitsjal oma kaalutlust 
selgitada876 ja kui küsimus ebaefektiivsusest tõusetub apellatsioonitasandil, on 
prokurör see, kellel peaks olema võimalus tõendada, et kohustuse täitmata 
jätmine oli kaitsja mõistlik taktikaline otsustus. Seetõttu teen ettepaneku, et kui 
kaitsja on rikkunud kohustust, mida ei ole minu poolt toodud nimekirjas 
nimetatud, võib kohus kaitsja taandada pärast seda, kui kohus on järeldanud, et 
tegemist on kohustusega, mis on selles kriminaalasjas oluline ja kaitsja on 
andnud selgituse kohustuse mittetäitmise kohta, mida kohus ei ole pidanud 
rahuldavaks. Igal juhul lasub kohtul siinkohal ülesanne esitada üksikasjalikud 
põhjendused, kuna kohus viitab kaitsja kohustusele, mida ei ole nimekirjas. Kui 
süüdistatav väidab kaebuses alama astme kohtu otsuse peale, et kaitsja rikkus 
mõnda nimekirjavälist kohustust, on prokuröril võimalik tõendada seda, et 
kohustuse täitmatajätmine oli kaitsja mõistlik taktikaline otsustus. Lisaks sellele 
lisandub siin ka kahjustav element, mille eesmärk on tagada õiguskindluse 
põhimõtte austamine. Seega saab prokurör siin lisaks eelnevale ka tõendada, et 
kaitsjapoolne kohustuste rikkumine ei olnud süüdistatavale kahjulik, st et see ei 
                                                     
874 William J. Genego, Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Standards 
and Competent Representation, the, 22 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181 (1984-1985), p. 206. 
875 Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims Notes and Comments, 413, p. 442. 
876 Ibid., p. 441. 
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mõjutanud menetluse tulemust või ei kahjustanud süüdistatava õigusi 
menetluses.877 
Töös tehtud analüüs näitas, et ei ole võimalik piirduda ühe standardiga, kuna 
kaitsja taandamine ja alama astme kohtu otsuse tühistamine on erineva 
ulatusega abinõud. Kui kaitsja taandamisega lõpetatakse advokaadi ja tema 
kaitsealuse vaheline suhe, siis kohtuotsuse tühistamine mõjutab oluliselt 
ressursside kokkuhoiu ja õiguskindluse põhimõtet. Seega jõudsin analüüsiga 
käesolevas töös kahe erineva nimekirjani kaitsja kohustustest – üks sisaldab 
selliseid kohustusi, mille rikkumine toob või võib kaasa tuua kaitsja taandamise 
ja teine selliseid, mille rikkumine toob kaasa või võib kaasa tuua (st juhul kui 
prokurör ei tõenda, et tegemist oli kaitsja taktikalise otsustusega) madalama 
astme kohtu otsuse tühistamise kõrgema astme kohtu poolt. Mõlemad nime-
kirjad on lahtised, nagu märkisin eelmises lõigus. Praktiline vajadus sellisele 
eristamisele on igati olemas, arvestades asjaolu, et üksnes otsuse tühistamine 
riivab õiguskindluse põhimõtet ja vaieldamatult toob see kaasa palju suurema 
ressursikulu kui menetluse kestel ühe kaitsja asendamine teisega. Loomulikult 
ei tohi kaitsja taandamine osutuda mugavaks tööriistaks kohtuniku käes 
ebameeldiva kaitsja taandamisel, mistõttu teen käesolevas töös ettepaneku, et 
kui kohus on ilma põhjuseta kaitsja taandanud viimase ebaefektiivsusele 
viidates, tuleks süüdistatavale anda võimalus uueks menetluseks koos endale 
meelepärase, varasemalt ebaefektiivsele kaitsele viidates taandatud kaitsjaga 
osalemiseks. Sellise võimaliku sanktsiooni olemasolu korral saaksid kohtunikud 
suurema tõenäosusega aru oma otsustuse tõsidusest ja põhjendamiskohustuse 
täitmise vajalikkusest, ning väheneks võimalus, et kohtunik oma positsiooni 
kuritarvitab. 
Kui rääkida lühidalt põhjustest, miks kaitsjad oma kohustusi nõuetekohaselt 
ei täida, siis neid on mitmeid. Esiteks võib kaitsja olla lihtsalt halb jurist, teiseks 
võib kaitsja olla konkreetsel juhul võimetu tegutsema (nt haiguse, alkoholi 
tarvitamise või hõivatuse tõttu), kolmandaks võib kaitsjal olla liiga vähe aega 
või muud ressurssi, et asja ette valmistada, ja neljandaks võib seadus või kohus 
luua olukorra, milles kaitsja on võimetu tegutsema (nt liiga lühikesed menetlus-
tähtajad).878 Viiendana võiks välja tuua kaitsja motiveerituse, kuhu alla võib 
paigutada mitmeid märksõnu alates konkreetse asja atraktiivsusest kaitsja jaoks, 
lõpetades õiglase tasu saamisega.879 Käesolevas töös toon välja järelduse, et 
ebaefektiivne kaitse peab saama olla kaitsja taandamise või kohtuotsuse tühis-
tamise aluseks, olenemata sellest, milline on selle põhjus, kuid kuna eba-
efektiivse kaitse põhjuseid on mitmeid, ei saa kohtu järeldusest, et kaitse on 
                                                     
877 Käesolevas töös leian, et kahjustav element ei peaks hõlmama endast mitte üksnes 
kohtuotsuse, vaid ka süüdistatava menetlusliku positsiooni mõjutamise aspekti. Seda 
seetõttu, et võistlevas menetluses on olulisel kohal mitte üksnes tulemus vaid ka protsess. 
878 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can 
Prosecutors do Justice, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 45 (1991), p. 66. 
879 Anneli Soo, An Individual’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel Versus the 
Independence of Counsel: What can the Estonian Courts do in Case of Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel in Criminal Proceedings? 7 Juridica International 252 (2010), p. 252. 
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kriminaalmenetluses olnud ebaefektiivne, tuletada automaatselt kaitsja vastutust 




1. Efektiivse kaitse standard kaitsja  
taandamise küsimuse otsustamiseks 
1. Kaitsja üldine ebakompetentsus on kaitsja taandamise aluseks, kui 
1.1. Kaitsja ei tunne karistusõigust või kriminaalmenetlusõigust. On selge, 
et üksnes isik, kellel on teadmised nendes kahes valdkonnas, saab 
süüdistatavat adekvaatselt kaitsta. Seetõttu peab kohus taandama 
kaitsja, kui selgub, et kaitsja ükskõik kumba või mõlemat valdkonda ei 
tunne. 
1.2. Kaitsja eirab korduvalt kohtu märkusi suhtuda kohtusse või teistesse 
kohtumenetluse pooltesse lugupidamisega. Selline alus tuleneb KrMS § 
267 lg-st 41. Kaitsja võimetus kohelda kohut või teisi kohtumenetluse 
pooli lugupidamisega ja täita kohtu korraldusi näitab kaitsja 
allumatust menetluse põhimõtetele ja reeglitele, ning viitab sellele, et 
kaitsja ei ole menetluses võimeline täitma oma ülesandeid kvaliteetselt.  
1.3. Kaitsja on alkoholijoobes või on narkootilise või psühhotroopse aine 
mõju all. Kaitsja füüsiline puue takistab tal isegi koos tugiisikuga 
kaitseülesandeid täitmast või kaitsjal on vaimne haigus, mis takistab tal 
kaitseülesandeid täitmast. Kui isik on alkoholi- või narkojoobes, on 
kaitseülesannete täitmine tema poolt häiritud. Füüsiline ja vaimne 
puue ei pruugi kaitsjal takistada ülesannetega toimetulemist (nt 
füüsilise haiguse korral võiks kaitsja kasutada tugiisiku abi), mistõttu 
kaitsja taandamine tuleb kõne alla üksnes siis, kui kaitsja ei suuda oma 
kohustusi seetõttu täita.  
1.4. Advokatuuri liikmestaatuse kaotanud kaitsja osaleb ilma menetleja 
loata menetluses. Vastavalt KrMS § 42 lg 1 p-le 1 peab mitte-
advokaadist haridusnõuetele vastav isik saama kaitsjana menetlusest 
osavõtuks loa menetlejalt. Kui isik on Advokatuurist välja arvatud või 
välja heidetud, siis ta peab menetluses jätkamiseks küsima loa 
menetlejalt, kuna ta ei ole enam advokaat. Kui ta luba ei küsi, on see 
märk sellest, et ta tegutseb menetluses ebaausalt, st oma staatust 
varjates, mistõttu juhul, kui ta ei ole viivitamatult luba küsinud ja 
menetleja saab tema Advokatuurist väljaheitmisest või väljaarvamisest 
teada, siis peaks kohus ta taandama. Kohus peaks taandama ka isiku, 
kelle kutsetegevus advokaadina on peatatud (AdvS § 19 (3) kohaselt ei 
tohi selline isik õigusteenust osutada). Sarnased põhimõtted on 
sätestatud ka RÕS § 20 lg-s 3, mille kohaselt riigi õigusabi osutava 
advokaadi advokatuurist väljaarvamise või väljaheitmise või tema 
kutsetegevuse peatamise või advokaadi pikaajalise töövõimetuse või 
surma korral, samuti muul seaduses sätestatud juhul määrab advoka-
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tuur senise riigi õigusabi osutaja, riigi õigusabi saaja, kohtu, proku-
ratuuri või uurimisasutuse taotluse alusel või omal algatusel uue riigi 
õigusabi osutaja.  
1.5. Kui on kindlaks tehtud, et advokaat on läinud õigusabi osutades 
seadusega vastuollu ja see rikkus tema ja süüdistatava vahelise 
usaldussuhte või see kahjustas süüdistatava positsiooni menetluses. Ka 
see alus tuleneb KrMS § 267 lg-st 41. 
2. Huvide konflikt on kaitsja taandamise aluseks, kui 
2.1. Kaitsja on olnud või on samas kriminaalasjas kriminaalmenetluse muu 
subjekt (KrMS § 54 p 1). 
2.2. Kaitsja on varem samas või sellega seonduvas kriminaalasjas kaitsnud 
või esindanud teist isikut, kelle huvid on või võivad olla kaitsealuse 
huvidega vastuolus (KrMS § 54 p 2). Kuigi KrMS § 54 p 2 nõuab 
tegelikku huvide konflikti, teen süüdistatavate õiguste parema tagamise 
eesmärgil ettepaneku, et taandamise alus on ka see, kui kaitsja on 
varem samas või sellega seonduvas kriminaalasjas kaitsnud või 
esindanud teist isikut, kelle huvid võivad kaitsealuse huvidega 
vastuolus olla.  
2.3. Kui kaitsja enda huvid on või võivad olla vastuolus süüdistatava 
huvidega. See põhimõte tuleneb eetikakoodeksi880 § 8 lg-st 1 ja tuleks 
lisada KrMS § 54. 
2.4. Kui kaitsjaga seotud teise isiku huvid on vastuolus või võivad olla 
vastuolus süüdistatava huvidega. Ka see põhimõte tuleneb eetika-
koodeksi § 8 lg-st 1 ja tuleks lisada KrMS § 54. 
2.5. Kui kaitsja kaitseb mitut süüdistatavat korraga ja nende süüdistatavate 
huvide vahel on või võib olla konflikt. See põhimõte on sätestatud 
KrMS § 42 lg-s 3, kuid mitte eraldi taandamisalusena. 
Ühtlasi pakun käesolevas töös välja süüdistatava õiguste paremaks tagamiseks 
põhimõtte, et kahtlus huvide konflikti olemasolus tuleb tõlgendada selle 
olemasolu kasuks. Juhul kui kaitsjal on ühes kriminaalasjas mitu kaitsealust, on 
Ameerika Advokaatide Ühendus välja töötanud põhimõtte, et võimaliku huvide 
konflikti korral võib kaitsja kaassüüdistatavaid siiski kaitsta, kui see on kõigile 
tema kaitsealustele kasulik ja nad kõik annavad kirjalikult oma informeeritud 
nõusoleku. See ettepanek on mõistlik just seetõttu, et tihti võib mitme süüdis-
tatava kaitsmise korral kõne alla tulla võimalik, kuid mitte kindel huvide 
konflikt, mistõttu sellisel juhul võiks süüdistatavatel olla võimalus sõna sekka 
öelda, eriti seetõttu, et kaitsmine ühe kaitsja poolt tähendab süüdistatavatele 
väiksemat õigusabikulu. 
3. Kohus taandab kaitsja, kui  
                                                     
880 Eesti Advokatuuri eetikakoodeks. Vastu võetud Eesti Advokatuuri 8. aprilli 1999. a 
üldkogu otsusega nr 5. Muudetud Eesti Advokatuuri 5. Mai 2005. a üldkogu otsusega nr 4, 
Eesti Advokatuuri 13. märtsi 2007. a üldkogu otsusega nr 4, Eesti Advokatuuri 21. veebruari 
2008. a üldkogu otsusega nr 4. 
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3.1. Kaitsja ei koosta kaitseakti õigeaegselt. Kaitseakti koostamine on 
tihedalt seotud kohtumenetluse ettevalmistamisega ning kaitsjale 
koostamiseks kohustuslik alates 1. septembrist 2011. Tulenevalt KrMS 
§ 227 lg-st 1 esitab kaitsja pärast süüdistusakti saamist hiljemalt kolm 
tööpäeva enne eelistungit kohtule kaitseakti ning prokuratuurile selle 
koopia. Kriminaalasja erilise keerukuse või mahukuse korral võib 
kohus kaitsja põhistatud taotlusel nimetatud tähtaega pikendada. 
Kriminaalmenetluse seadustiku § 227 lg 5 sätestab, et kui kaitsja ei 
esita kaitseakti ettenähtud tähtajaks, teeb kohus süüdistatavale 
ettepaneku valida endale uus kaitsja kohtu määratud ajaks või 
pöördub Eesti Advokatuuri poole uue kaitsja määramiseks. Ei ole 
põhjust, miks kaitseakti ette valmistamata jätmisel peaks lepingulisi ja 
määratud kaitsjaid erinevalt kohtlema, mistõttu teen ettepaneku, et kui 
süüdistatav ei soovi endale uut kaitsjat valida, võib kohus kohustuse 
täitmisest keelduva kaitsja siiski omal algatusel taandada. 
Eraldi toon siin välja tõendi kogumise taotluse. Lähtudes KrMS § 227 lg 3 p-
dest 2 ja 3 peab kaitsja nii tõendid, mille ta esitada soovib kui ka tunnistajad, 
kelle ülekuulamist ta taotleb, loetlema kaitseaktis. Juhul kui kaitsja seda ei tee, 
kuigi ta oli teadlik tõendi esitamise või tunnistaja ülekuulamise vajadusest, on 
tal võimalik esitada kohtuistungil täiendava tõendi kogumise taotlus, mis tal on 
võimalik loomulikult esitada ka siis, kui ta tõendi esitamise või tunnistaja 
ülekuulamise vajadusest kaitseakti koostamisel ei teadnud või kui ta ei teadnud 
isegi tõendi või tunnistaja olemasolust. Seejuures tuleb tähele panna, et KrMS § 
2861 lg 2 p 2 kohaselt võib kohus keelduda tõendi vastuvõtmisest ja selle 
tagastada või keelduda tõendi kogumisest, kui tõendit ei olnud loetletud kaitse-
aktis ning kaitsja ei ole nimetanud olulisi põhjuseid, miks ta ei saanud taotlust 
varem esitada. Seetõttu juhul kui kaitsja on teadlik tõendi kogumise vajadusest, 
kuid seda kaitseaktis ei kajasta, riskib ta sellega, et kohus tõendit vastu ei võta. 
Vaatamata sellele teen ettepaneku, et juhul kui kaitsja ei ole tõendit, mille 
tähtsusest ta teadlik oli, kaitseaktis märkinud, peaks kohus selle siiski vastu 
võtma, kui süüdistatav näitab, et tõend on kriminaalasja lahendamise seisu-
kohalt eriti oluline, mis tähendab seda, et on võimalus, et see tõend kergendab 
süüdistatava olukorda. Selline lahendus aitaks paremini tagada süüdistatava 
kaitseõigused ka ebaefektiivse kaitse korral ja vähendaks võimalust, et kõrgem 
kohus leiab hilisemalt, et on vajadus läbi viia uus menetluses, kuna kaitsja on 
menetluses olnud ebaefektiivne. See tagab ka, et süüdistatav ei ole tõendite 
esitamise osas üksnes kaitsja meelevallas, sest kaitseakti koostamise pädevus ja 
kohustus on üksnes kaitsjal ning süüdistataval puuduvad hoovad kaitsja 
otsustust selles osas mõjutada. 
3.2. Süüdistatava ja kaitsja vaheline usaldussuhe on olulisel määral rikutud. 
Selleks et kaitsja saaks oma kohustusi täita, peab tema ja süüdistatava 
vahel olema usalduslik suhe. Kui kohtuni jõuab süüdistatava kaudu 
teave, et tema ja kaitsja vaheline usaldussuhe on mingil põhjusel 
purunenud (siin saab rääkida üksnes määratud kaitsjast, sest 
lepingulise kaitsja puhul vahetaks süüdistatav kaitsja lihtsalt välja), 
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peaks kohus asuma asja uurima ning vajadusel kaitsja taandama. 
Võimalikud usaldussuhte purunemise indikaatorid võiksid olla: kaitsja 
on avaldanud konfidentsiaalset infot, kuigi see ei ole seadusega 
lubatud; tõsised erimeelsused kaitsja ja süüdistatava vahel võimaliku 
kaitsestrateegia osas; kaitsja on süüdistatava eest teinud otsuse, mis on 
süüdistatava pädevuses jne. 
3.3. Selgub, et kaitsja ei ole süüdistatavaga nõu pidanud, kuigi kohus on 
selleks juba korra korralduse andnud. Kriminaalasjas on süüdis-
tatavaks isik, keda kaitsja kaitseb, mitte kaitsja ise. Seega peab kaitsja 
süüdistatavaga nõu pidama, tema seisukohti kuulama, talle nõu andma 
jne. Kui kaitsja seda ei tee ja peab paremaks asja lahendada nii, nagu 
ta seda ise näeb, peab kohus kohustama kaitsjat süüdistatavaga 
ühendust võtma. Kui kaitsja kohtu korralduse korduvalt täitmata jätab, 
on kohtu pädevuses KrMS § 267 lg-st 41lähtudes kaitsja taandada. 
Eelnev ei tähenda muidugi, et kaitsja ei võiks strateegia ja taktikaliste 
otsustuste osas langetada otsuseid, mis ei ole kooskõlas süüdistatava 
juhtnööridega, kuid see ei võta kaitsjalt kohustust süüdistatavaga 
kohtuda ja nõu pidada. 
3.4. Kaitsja avaldab vastupidiselt süüdistatava seisukohale arvamust, et 
süüdistatav on süüdistuses süüdi. Üldlevinud on arusaam, et kaitsja ei 
ole süüdistatava marionett, vaid iseseisev menetlusosaline ja kohtu-
menetluse pool, mis annab talle võimaluse toimida teistmoodi, kui seda 
peab vajalikuks süüdistatav. On aga olukord, milles peetakse abso-
luutselt lubamatuks seda, et kaitsja asub süüdistatavaga võrreldes 
teisele seisukohale, ja see on olukord, kus süüdistatav ennast talle 
esitatud süüdistuses süüdi ei tunnista. Kuna kaitsja ei ole ise sünd-
muste juures viibinud, siis tema ei saa kunagi tõsikindlalt väita, kas 
süüdistatav on talle esitatud süüdistuses süüdi või mitte, ja seda isegi 
siis, kui kõik tõendid näivad süüdistatava süüd kinnitavat. Seetõttu 
peab kaitsja juhul, kui süüdistatav oma süüd ei tunnista, asuma 
süüdistatavaga samale positsioonile ja kujundama kaitsestrateegia 
sellest lähtudes. See põhimõte tuleneb ka Advokatuuri eetikakoodek-
sist, mille § 19 lg 3 sätestab, et kui kaitsealune eitab temale süüks 
arvatud teo toimepanemist, on advokaat seotud kaitsealuse posit-
siooniga.  
4. Kohus taandab kaitsja, kui kaitsja kohtumenetluses, 
4.1.  Jätab korduvalt kohtuistungile tulemata. Lähtuvalt KrMS § 45 lg-st 4 
on kaitsja osavõtt kohtumenetlusest reeglina kohustuslik. Kui kaitsja 
jääb kohtuistungile ilmumata, lükatakse kohtulik arutamine edasi 
(KrMS § 270 lg 2). Kuna kaitsjal on võimalik enne kohtuistungit enda 
mitteilmumisest kohut teavitada ja nimetada vajadusel asenduskaitsja 
KrMS §-st 44 lähtudes, siis minu ettepanek on, et kui kaitsja jätab 
korduvalt kohtuistungile tulemata, mis tähendab, et ta ei ole õige-
aegselt tegutsenud selle nimel, et istung edasi lükataks või vastupidi, et 
see toimuks, võib kohus kaitsja taandada. Taandamine ei ole siiski 
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kohtu kohustus, vaid võimalus, mis tähendab, et kohus võib kaitsja 
jätta ka taandamata, kui selgub, et kaitsjal oli mitteilmumiseks ja 
abinõude kasutusele võtmata jätmiseks mõjuv põhjus. 
4.2.  Jääb vaatamata kohtu märkustele korduvalt istungi käigus magama. 
Võimalus kõrvaldada menetlusest kaitsja, kes on korduvalt jätnud 
kohtu korraldusele reageerimata, tuleneb KrMS § 267 lg-st 41. On 
selge, et kui kaitsja jääb menetluse käigus magama, siis süüdistatav 
jääb selleks ajaks sisuliselt kaitseta, mistõttu peab kohus süüdistatava 
kaitseõiguste tagamiseks reageerima ja kaitsjat korrale kutsuma või 
siis vajadusel ta taandama. 
4.3.  Ei osale kohtumenetluses, kuigi on kohal. Tegemist on harva, kuid 
näiteks USA kohtute praktikas ette tulnud olukorraga, mida ka näiteks 
Saksamaa Ülemkohus on pidanud lahendama.881 Põhimõtteliselt 
tähendab see seda, et kaitsja on kohal, kuid ei tee midagi, mis tähen-
dab, et süüdistatav on sisuliselt kaitseta. Võib olla, et kaitsja jääb 
menetluses kuni teatud etapini passiivseks taktikalistel kaalutlustel (nt 
keeldub ühte tunnistajat küsitlemast). Seetõttu peaks kohus igal juhul 
kuulama ära kaitsja selgituse oma vaikimise põhjustest, enne kui 
otsustab kaitsja taandada. 
4.4.  Ilmub kohtuistungile korduvalt selliselt, et ta ei tunne kriminaalasja 
faktilisi asjaolusid või kohaldatavat õigust. On selge, et kaitsja saab 
süüdistatavale õigusabi osutada vaid siis, kui ta tunneb kriminaalasja 
faktilisi asjaolusid. Üksnes sellisel juhul teab kaitsja, kuidas konk-
reetsele tunnistajale läheneda, milliseid tunnistajaid kutsuda, milliseid 
prokuröri versioone vaidlustada, milliste tõendite uurimist taotleda 
jne. Enamik neist otsustest peab olema tehtud kaitseakti koostamiseks, 
kuid ka kohtuistungil peab kaitsja faktilistes asjaoludes orienteeruma, 
sest vastasel juhul osutuks mitmed istungi etapid – avakõne, tunnis-
tajate küsitlemine jne – süüdistatava positsiooni seisukohalt kasutuks. 
Samal põhjusel peaks kaitsja lisaks üldistele teadmistele kriminaal-
menetlus- ja karistusõigusest teadma ka konkreetses asjas kohalda-
tavat õigust. Tulenevalt KrMS § 273 lg-st 4 võib kohus kohtuistungi 
kuni kümneks päevaks edasi lükata ning panna istungi edasi-
lükkamisest tingitud kriminaalmenetluse kulud kaitsja kanda, kui 
kaitsja ei tunne kriminaalasja. Leian, et kõne all olevat sätet tuleks 
tõlgendada selliselt, et see hõlmaks nii kriminaalasja faktilised 
asjaolud kui ka kohaldatava õiguse. Kui kaitsja ilmub ettevalmista-
matult kohale korduvalt, näitab see tema ükskõikset ja lugupidamatut 
suhtumist õigusemõistmisesse, mistõttu kohtul peab olema lubatud 
selline kaitsja menetlusest kõrvaldada. 
                                                     
881 BGH 1 StR 341/07 15.07.2007. 
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5. Kokkuleppemenetluses jätab kohus kokkuleppe kinnitamata ja taandab 
kaitsja,882 kui 
5.1.  Selgub, et kaitsja on soovitanud süüdistataval sõlmida kokkulepe ja 
andnud ise nõusoleku kokkuleppemenetluseks, ilma et ta oleks teadlik 
kriminaalasja faktilistest asjaoludest ja kohaldatavast õigusest või kui 
selgub, et kaitsja ei ole süüdistatavale enne, kui süüdistatav kokku-
leppemenetlusega nõustus, nõu andnud. Teadupärast ei ole kokku-
leppemenetluse kohaldamise eelduseks see, et süüdistatav ennast süüdi 
tunnistab, mistõttu kokkuleppe saab sõlmida ka süüdistatav, kes 
väidab, et tema talle esitatud süüdistuses süüdi ei ole. Kaitsja võib 
sellisel juhul põhimõtteliselt kokkuleppemenetlusega nõus olla, kuid 
selleks, et anda süüdistatavale adekvaatne hinnang selle kohta, et 
kokkuleppe sõlmimine on parim lahendus, peab ta kursis olema nii 
faktiliste asjaolude kui ka kohaldatava õigusega. Kui ta seda ei ole, 
siis sisuliselt on süüdistatav jäänud menetluses kaitsja abi ja toetuseta. 
Igal juhul on kaitsja kohustus menetluses süüdistatavat nõustada, mitte 
jääda neutraalseks kõrvalseisjaks. 
5.2.  Selgub, et kaitsja sundis süüdistatavat kokkuleppemenetlusega nõus-
tuma või saavutas süüdistatava nõusoleku pettusega. Kaitsjal võivad 
olla omad huvid, mille tõttu ta soovib, et süüdistatav nõustuks kokku-
leppemenetlusega: näiteks võib kaitsja soovida vabaneda ebameeldi-
vast asjast, saavutada lõpplahend kriminaalasjas ilma, et peaks selle 
nimel töötama jne. Kuna kaitsja kui professionaalse juristi nõuandel 
on tihti väga suur mõju süüdistatava otsusele selle kohta, kas kokku-
leppemenetlusega nõustuda või mitte, siis kohus peaks kontrollima, et 
kaitsja ei ole oma positsiooni kuritarvitanud.  
Kuna tegelik elu on niivõrd rikas, et kõike ei ole võimalik standarditesse panna, 
teen oma töös ettepaneku, et kohus võib kuulutada ka mõne eespool nimetamata 
kaitsja kohustuste rikkumise oluliseks ja seega ka taandamise aluseks, kui 
konkreetse kaasuse asjaolud seda nõuavad. Et kohus ei hakkaks oma diskret-
siooniõigust kuritarvitama, on ta seejuures seotud põhjendamiskohustusega. 
Ka kõrgema astme kohtu menetluses võib ette tulla olukordi, kus kaitsja ei 
täida oma kohustusi, mistõttu kohus on sunnitud kas kaitsja taandama või muul 
viisil süüdistatava õiguste tagamiseks reageerima. Põhimõtteliselt on kaitsjal 
kõrgema astme kohtu menetluses samad kohustused, mis esimese astme kohtu 
menetluses, kuigi arvestada tuleb ka kõrgema astme kohtu menetluse eripära. 
Seetõttu teen käesolevas töös ettepaneku, et ka kõrgema astme kohtud saavad 
eespool toodud standardit teatud piirini kasutada, kuid lisaks sellele nimetan 
mõned aspektid, millega just kõrgema astme kohtud peaksid arvestama. 
6. Kaitsja taandamise alused kõrgema astme kohtutes on minu ettepaneku 
kohaselt järgmised. 
                                                     
882 Siin ei ole küsimus ainult kaitsja taandamises, vaid eelkõige peaks kohus tagama, et 
kinnitamata jääks kokkulepe, millega süüdistatav on nõustunud ebaefektiivse kaitse 
tulemusena. 
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6.1.  Kaitsja peab apellatsiooni esitamise teate ja apellatsiooni või siis 
kassatsiooni esitamise teate ja kassatsiooni esitama õigeaegselt. Kui ta 
seda ei tee ilma mõjuva põhjuseta, peaks kohus kaitsja taandama ja 
andma süüdistatavale tähtaja uue kaitsja valimiseks või taotlema 
Advokatuurilt uue kaitsja nimetamist, kellel on kohtu poolt antud 
tähtaja jooksul võimalik esitada apellatsiooniteade/apellatsioon või 
kassatsiooniteade/ kassatsioon. Ettepaneku põhjus on väga lihtne. Kui 
süüdistatav on kaitsja kätte usaldanud ülesande tagada kaebuse 
esitamise õigus kõrgema astme kohtule (Riigikohtusse ei saa süüdis-
tatav üldse ise kassatsiooniga pöörduda), siis edasi puudub süüdis-
tataval võimalus kaitsjat õigeaegselt tegutsema sundida. Loomulikult 
võib süüdistatav kaitsjalt küsida, kas viimane on juba nõutud doku-
mendid esitanud, kuid see ei tähenda veel, et kaitsja oma kohustusi 
täidab. Kui kaitsja jätab vajalikud dokumendid mõjuva põhjuseta 
esitamata, mis tähendab seda, et esitamise tähtaja ennistamiseks alust 
ei ole, kaotab süüdistatav sisuliselt edasikaebeõiguse. See on aga 
ebaõiglane, arvestades, et süüdistatav ei saa kaitsja tegutsemist mõju-
tada. Seetõttu olen seisukohal, et süüdistatav ei tohiks kaotada 
võimalust edasi kaevata kaitsja ebaefektiivsuse tõttu. 
6.2.  Kaitsja poolt koostatud apellatsioon peab vastama KrMS § 321 
nõuetele ja kassatsioon KrMS § 347 nõuetele. Kui kohus jätab § 323 lg 
2 p 3 või § 326 lg 1 alusel apellatsiooni või KrMS § 350 lg 2 p 3 alusel 
kassatsiooni läbi vaatamata, kuna kaitsja ei ole puudusi etteantud 
tähtajaks kõrvaldanud, peaks kohus kaitsja taandama ja andma 
süüdistatavale tähtaja uue kaitsja valimiseks või taotlema Advo-
katuurilt uue kaitsja nimetamist, kellel on kohtu poolt antud tähtaja 
jooksul võimalik esitada nõuetekohane apellatsioon või kassatsioon. 
Jällegi on küsimus selles, et süüdistataval puudub võimalus kaitsja 
tegevust mõjutada ja kaitsja ebaadekvaatse tegevuse korral kaotab 
süüdistatav edasikaebevõimaluse. Sellise tagajärje ärahoidmiseks 
tuleks kaitsja, kes ei suuda koostada nõuetekohast kaebust, menetlusest 
kõrvaldada. 
6.3.  Kui ringkonnakohus jätab apellatsiooni läbi vaatamata, kuna kaitsja ei 
ole apellandina mõjuva põhjuseta istungile ilmunud, peaks kohus 
kaitsja taandama ja andma süüdistatavale võimaluse uueks kohtu-
istungiks ringkonnakohutus. Tulenevalt KrMS § 334 lg-st 4 võib kohus 
jätta apellatsiooni määrusega läbi vaatamata või arutada kriminaal-
asja apellandi osavõtuta, kui apellant kohtuistungile ei ilmu ega ole 
teatanud ilmumata jätmise mõjuvast põhjusest või ei ole seda põhis-
tanud. Seega võib süüdistatav kaitsja ebaefektiivsuse tõttu kaotada 
võimaluse, et tema asja arutatakse apellatsioonikohtus uuesti. Leian, et 
edasikaebeõiguse kaotamine sel viisil ei ole põhjendatud ja teen 
ettepaneku, et kaitsja ilmumata jätmine ei tähendaks süüdistatavale 
asja arutamise võimaluse kaotust. 
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Seega olen käesolevas töös teinud ettepaneku, et süüdistatava kaebeõiguse 
paremaks tagamiseks peaks apellatsiooni- ja kassatsioonimenetluses kehtima 
põhimõte, et kui süüdistatav kaotab edasikaebeõiguse kaitsja ebaefektiivsuse 
tõttu, peaks kohus kaitsja taandama ja andma süüdistatavale uue võimaluse 
edasi kaebamiseks. Olen seisukohal, et see põhimõte tuleks lisada ka kriminaal-
menetluse seadustikku. 
Iseenesestmõistetavalt peab kaitsja enne apellatsiooni või kassatsiooni 
koostamist süüdistatavaga nõu pidama, sest lõplik sõna selles, kas apellatsioon 
või kassatsioon üldse koostada, on süüdistataval. Kohe tekib küsimus, kas 
süüdistatav peaks saama määrata apellatsiooni või kassatsiooni sisu. USA-s 
ollakse seisukohal, et kaitsja ei pea sisse võtma süüdistatava poolt pakutud 
argumente, mis on ebaasjakohased või tähtsusetud.883 Põhimõtteliselt tähendaks 
see ka seda, et kaitsja ei peaks üldse apellatsiooni koostama, kui ta leiab, et kõik 
süüdistatava poolt pakutud teemad on tähtsusetud ja asjakohatud ning tal endal 
ei ole ka midagi paremat välja pakkuda. Lähtudes KrMS § 45 lg-tes 5–8 
sätestatust sõltub Eestis siiski väga palju süüdistatavast ja tema tahtest ning selle 
taustal on väga raske teha ettepanekut, et kaitsja ei peaks üldse kaebust 
koostama, kui ta leiab, et tõepoolest ei ole ühtegi probleemi, mida tõstatada, 
kuigi ka see on iseenesest võimalus, mida ressursside efektiivsemaks kasuta-
miseks võiks kaaluda. Samas ei ole mingit põhjust, miks kaitsja peaks 
kaebusesse lisama kõik süüdistatava poolt pakutu, eriti kui see on täiesti 
ebaoluline. Igal juhul peaks süüdistataval olema võimalus kaitsja otsustus 
vaidlustada ja näidata, et kõrvale jäetud argumendil oleks olnud piisavalt 
edulootust, arvestades kõiki teisi võimalikke argumente.  
 
 
2. Efektiivse kaitse standard madalama astme kohtu 
otsuse tühistamise küsimuse otsustamiseks 
 
1. Pakun käesolevas töös välja, et oluliseks menetlusõiguse rikkumiseks ja 
kohtuotsuse tühistamise aluseks per se on kõigepealt kaitsja puudumine või 
„puudumine“884 menetlusest, mis võib seisneda järgnevas: 
1.1.  Kaitsja ei olnud kohtumenetluses kohal, välja arvatud KrMS § 45 lg-s 
4 sätestatud erandjuhtudel. Seejuures ei oma tähtsust, kui pikk oli aeg, 
mille jooksul kaitsjat menetluses ei olnud. Tulenevalt Riigikohtu 
praktikast on ühe kaitsja puudumine menetlusest juhul, kui isikul on 
rohkem kaitsjaid kui üks, menetlusõiguse rikkumine erandlikel asja-
oludel.885 
 
                                                     
883 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), 488 U.S. 69–85. 
884 St, kaitsja on kohal, kuid erinevatel põhjustel ei osale ta menetluses sisuliselt süüdistatava 
kaitsjana. 
885 Riigikohtu kriminaalkolleegiumi 20. juuni 2003. a otsus kriminaalasjas nr 3-1-1-86-03,  
p 10. 
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1.2.  Kaitsja magas kohtuistungil, kas 
1.2.1. Olulisel hetkel, nt siis kui prokurör küsitles tunnistajat. 
1.2.2. Suhteliselt suure hulga kohtuistungi ajast, nt 10 minutit 1-
tunnisest istungist. 
1.2.3. Pika aja jooksul, nt mitmeid kordi 30-päevase kriminaalasja 
jooksul.886 
1.3.  Kaitsja oli menetluses alkoholi- või narkojoobes või psühhotroopsete 
ainete mõju all. Kaitsjal esines füüsiline või vaimne puue, mis takistas 
tal kaitsekohustusi täitmast. Siin on süüdistatav jäänud sisuliselt 
kaitsja abita, mistõttu talle tuleks anda võimalus uueks menetluseks 
efektiivse kaitsja osavõtul. 
1.4.  Kaitsja osales menetluses, kuigi eksisteeris huvide konflikt. Kuna 
otsuse tühistamine riivab olulisel määral õiguskindluse põhimõtet, teen 
ettepaneku, et kui ei olda päris kindel huvide konflikti olemasolus, 
tuleks see tõlgendada konflikti puudumisena. 
1.5.  Kaitsja osales menetluses advokaadina, kuigi ta oli Advokatuurist välja 
arvatud või välja heidetud ja menetlejalt osalemiseks luba ei küsinud. 
Kaitsja osales menetluses, kuigi tema kutsetegevus oli peatatud. 
Sellisel juhul puudub menetlusest osavõttev kaitsja juba formaalselt, 
mistõttu süüdistatavale tuleb anda võimalus uueks menetluseks.  
1.6.  Kaitsja osales menetluses ilma üldise teadmiseta kriminaalmenetlus- ja 
karistusõigusest. 
1.7.  Kaitsja osales menetluses, kuigi tema ja süüdistatava usaldussuhe oli 
oluliselt rikutud. 
2. Kohustuste rikkumised, mille puhul ei saa küll rääkida kaitsja puudumisest 
või „puudumistest“, kuid mis peaksin siiski kaasa tooma alama astme kohtu 
otsuse tühistamise per se on järgmised. 
2.1.  Kaitsja osales menetluses, ilma et ta oleks teadnud kriminaalasja 
faktilisi asjaolusid või kohaldatavat õigust. 
2.2.  Kaitsja osales menetluses ilma eelnevalt süüdistatavaga konsul-
teerimata või tegi seda pinnapealselt. 
2.3.  Kaitsja väljendas kohtule veendumust, et süüdistatav on süüdi, kuigi 
süüdistatav ise oma süüd ei tunnistanud, ja kohus ei taandanud kaitsjat. 
2.4.  On kindlaks tehtud, et kaitsja oli terve kohtumenetluse jooksul või ühe 
etapi jooksul (nt keeldus pidamast avakõnet) passiivne, st ta ei teinud 
mitte midagi. Kui kaitsja võib taktikaliselt põhjendada seda, miks ta 
ühte tunnistajat keeldub küsitlemast, siis kindlasti ei saa ta põhjendada 
passiivsust terve menetluse jooksul või siis ühe menetluse etapi jooksul 
                                                     
886 Need ettepanekud on tehtud USA kirjanduse pinnal (Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, 
and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 425 (1996), p. 469) ja nende sisuks on, et 
kui kaitsja magab olulise hetke maha, ta magab menetlusest suure hulga maha või ta magab 
menetluses hulga aega, juhtub, et prokuröril ei ole vastast ja süüdistatav jääb kaitseta. 
Sellises olukorras tuleb anda süüdistatavale võimalus menetluseks, kus kaitsja on siiski 
prokurörile enam-vähem võrdväärne vastane. 
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(siin pean silmas suuremat üksust kui ühe tunnistaja küsitlemist, nt 
avakõne, kõigi tunnistajate küsitlemine või lõpukõne vms). 
2.5.  Kaitsja ei esitanud kaitse jaoks eriliselt olulist tähtsust omava tõendi 
kogumise taotlust õigeaegselt, kuigi kaitsja oli selle tõendi olemasolust 
teadlik või pidi teadlik olema. Eriliselt olulise tähtsusega tõendina 
pean siin silmas tõendit, mis võib kergendada süüdistatava olukorda.  
2.6.  Süüdistatav nõustus kokkuleppemenetlusega, ning ta andis nõusoleku 
kas ilma kaitsjapoolsete soovitusteta või tema nõusolek põhines kaitsja 
soovitusele, mis oli antud ilma faktilisi asjaolusid ja kohaldatavat 
õigust tundma õppimata või mis põhines kaitsja sunnil või kaitsja-
poolsel tegelike asjaolude moonutamisel. 
2.7.  Arvestades seda, kuidas kaitsja menetluses tegutseb, võib järeldada, et 
tal puudub strateegia täiesti või see ei ole kohane. See on näitaja, mida 
kõrgemal kohtul võib olla väga raske hinnata, kuid on selge, et nii 
mõnigi kord, isegi kui kaitsjad endale faktilised asjaolud ja õigusliku 
külje selgeks teevad, suhtuvad nad süüdistatava kaitsmisesse kerge-
käeliselt ja ei kujunda strateegiat, mille järgi menetluses tegutseda. 
See aga mõjutab oluliselt süüdistatava olukorda, kuna kaitsja esine-
mine kohtus peaks põhinema arusaamal, millist lahendust kaitsja 
taotleb ja milliseid argumente, tõendeid ja vastuväiteid ta selleks 
esitab. 
2.8.  Kaitsja ei ole suutnud välja tuua teo koosseisupärasust, õigusvastasust 
või süülisust välistavaid asjaolusid, kuigi need olid kaitsjale teada või 
oleksid pidanud teada olema. Selge on, et siin ei ole enam küsimus asja 
tagasisaatmises, vaid kõrgema astme kohus peaks ressursside kokku-
hoidmiseks võimalusel tegema ise õigeksmõistva otsuse. 
3. Edasi tulevad kohustused, mille täitmata jätmist saab kaitsja põhimõtteliselt 
taktikalise otsusega põhjendada. Apellatsiooni- ja kassatsioonimenetluse 
kontekstis tähendab see, et prokuröril, kes otsuse tühistamisele vastu vaid-
leb, on võimalus tõendada, et kohustuse täitmine põhines kaitsja mõistlikul 
taktikalisel otsustusel. 
3.1.  Kuigi kaitsja oli kohal, keeldus ta kindlal hetkel menetluses tegutse-
mast, nt ta ei küsitlenud ühte tunnistajat. 
3.2.  Kaitsja ei esitanud tavapärase põhjalikkusega avakõnet. See, mis on 
esmapilgul ebaadekvaatne, võib kaitsja seletuste järgselt tunduda 
täiesti adekvaatne. 
3.3.  Kaitsja küsitles tunnistajat ebaadekvaatselt. 
3.4.  Kaitsja ei esinenud kohtuvaidluses adekvaatselt. 
3.5.  Kaitsja ei andnud adekvaatset arvamust prokuröri poolt taotletava 
karistuse kohta. Arvamus peaks põhinema kaasuse faktilistel asja-
oludel, seadusel ning kergendavatel ja raskendavatel asjaoludel. 
3.6.  Kaitsja ei esitanud vastuväidet lubamatule tõendile või jättis esitamata 
mõne muu olulise vastuväite või taotluse. Siin peaks kohtul olema väga 
lai otsustusõigus koos sellega kaasneva põhjendamiskohustusega.  
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Lisaks eelnevale peaks kõrgemal kohtul olema jällegi elu mitmekesisust 
arvestades võimalus kuulutada oluliseks kriminaalmenetlusõiguse rikkumiseks 
ja seega kohtuotsuse tühistamise aluseks mõni teine kaitsja viga, lähtudes 
konkreetse kaasuse asjaoludest. Ka siin peaks prokuröril võimalik olema 
tõendada, et kohustuse mittetäitmine oli kaitsja mõistlik taktikaline otsustus ja 
lisaks sellele on prokuröril võimalik tõendada, et kohustuse täitmine ei mõju-
tanud menetluse tulemust ja süüdistatava positsiooni menetluses. 
4. Viimase kohtuotsuse tühistamise alusena toon oma töös välja kohtu 
põhjendamatu sekkumise süüdistatava ja kaitsja vahelistesse suhetesse, mis 
võib seisneda järgmises: 
4.1. On kindlaks tehtud, et kohus ei kaalunud süüdistatava ja avalikkuse 
huvisid, kui ta keeldus menetlusse lubamast advokaati, keda süüdis-
tatav oma senisele määratud kaitsjale eelistas. Tulenevalt RÕS § 20 lg-
st 1 võib riigi õigusabi osutava advokaadi ja riigi õigusabi saaja 
kokkuleppel asuda isikule samas asjas õigusteenust osutama teine 
advokaat, kes on nõus temale riigi õigusabi osutamise kohustuse 
üleandmisega. Uus riigi õigusabi osutaja määratakse kohtu, proku-
ratuuri või uurimisasutuse taotluse alusel RÕS §-s 18 sätestatud kor-
ras. Vastavalt EIK kohtu praktikale võib süüdistatavapoolset määratud 
kaitsja valikut piirata just õigusemõistmise huvidest lähtuvalt.887 
4.2. On kindlaks tehtud, et kohus ei andnud menetlusse sisenemiseks 
põhjuseta luba mitte-advokaadile, kes vastas KrMS § 41 lg-s 1 
sätestatud nõuetele või kohus võttis selle loa põhjuseta tagasi. 
4.3. On kindlaks tehtud, et kohus ei nõustunud lisakaitsja määramisega, 
kuigi süüdistatav seda taotles ja oli vajadus kaitsja määramiseks. Eesti 
kriminaalmenetluses on määratud kaitsjate arv piiratud – nimelt võib 
KrMS § 42 lõike 2 järgi isikul olla kuni kolm lepingulist kaitsjat. 
Mõistlik ja kooskõlas võrdse kohtlemise põhimõttega on sama arvulist 
piirangut rakendada ka määratud kaitse puhul. Kuigi ei kriminaal-
menetluse seadustikust ega riigi õigusabi seadusest ei tulene üldse, et 
isikule võiks määrata rohkem kui ühe kaitsja, võib ette tulla niivõrd 
keerukaid kriminaalasju, kus ühe kaitsja määramisega ei ole süüdis-
tatava õigus kaitsjale tagatud. Sellisel juhul peaks mitme kaitsja 
määramine olema võimalik, ja kui kohus on mitme kaitsja määramist 
sellisel juhul takistanud, tuleks süüdistatavale tagada võimalus uuele 
menetlusele.  
4.4. On kindlaks tehtud, et kohus taandas kaitsja ilma põhjuseta.  
                                                     
887 Lagerblom v. Sweden. Application no. 26891/95. 14 January 2003. 
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